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THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT'S DEVELOPING
DEFAMATION GUIDELINES: COLORADO ENTERS
THE QUAGMIRE
MICHAEL W. ANDERSON* AND JEFFREY S. PAGLIUCA**
INTRODUCTION
In 1964 the United States Supreme Court abolished the common law
principle that "whatever a man publishes he publishes at his peril"' and
imposed constitutional limitations, based upon the first amendment guaran-
tees of freedom of speech and of the press,2 on state libel laws. The Court's
attempt to establish a workable set of guidelines in the defamation area can-
not be classified as a model of clarity, and this lack of adequate guidance
prompted Colorado Supreme Court Justice Erickson to note that "the quag-
mire of confusion that has been created by the intervention of the Supreme
Court of the United States into the law of libel and slander on a constitu-
tional plane is regrettable."'3 The difficulty of reconciling the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press with the individual's inter-
est in protecting his reputation has not been confined to the Supreme Court,
however, and almost every state court that has tried to balance the two com-
peting interests has expressed some difficulty.
4
Since 1975, the Colorado Supreme Court has attempted to develop its
own guidelines to be used in defamation cases involving media defendants.
Colorado has attempted to define "actual malice"5 and has grappled with
the classifications of "public official," "public figure," 6 and "matters of pub-
lic interest."'7 In addition, Colorado has promulgated jury instructions to be
applied to defamation issues in civil cases.8 Unfortunately, the regrettable
"quagmire of confusion" that Justice Erickson complained of in Walker v.
Colorado Springs Sun, Inc. 9 has not been confined to the United States
Supreme Court. A review of Colorado case law indicates inconsistencies in
* Partner, White & Steele, P.C., Denver, Colorado; B.A., Colorado College, 1970; J.D.,
University of Colorado, 1973.
** B.A., Duke University, 1979; J.D., University of Denver, 1982.
1. King v. Woodfall, 20 Howell's State Trials 895, 902 (1770).
2. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3. Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 104, 538 P.2d 450, 460 (Erickson,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
4. See, e.g., La Rue, Living with Gertz: A fractical Look at Constitutional Libel Standards, 67
W. VA. L. REV. 287 (1981).
5. DiLeo v. Kolnow, 613 P.2d 318 (Colo. 1980); Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc.,
188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cert. denid, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975); Manuel v. Ft. Collins Newspapers,
Inc., 42 Colo. App. 324, 599 P.2d 931 (1979), rev'don other grounds, 631 P.2d 114 (Colo. 1981).
6. DiLeo v. Koltnow, 613 P.2d 318 (Colo. 1980).
7. Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1025 (1975).
8. COL). JuRY INSTR. CIv. 2d, 22:1 to 22:26 (1980).
9. 188 Clo. 86, 538 P.2d 450 (1975).
DENVER LAWJOURNAL
the area when media defendants are involved. These inconsistencies were
most recently highlighted in Kuhn v. Tribune Republican Publishing Co. ,1 a case
in which the Colorado Supreme Court misinterpreted "actual malice" and
disregarded the defamation standards recently adopted in the Colorado Jury
Instructions.
This article will briefly review the defamation standards applied to me-
dia defendants since New York Tines Co. v. Sullivan I " and their application in
Colorado when media defendants are involved. It will be argued that as a
result of Kuhn and the inconsistencies among the decisions of the Colorado
Court of Appeals, the Colorado Supreme Court, and the Colorado Jury In-
structions, it is almost impossible for a publisher or practitioner to accurately
predict the constitutional standard that will be required in media-related
defamation cases. It will be suggested that any decisions similar to Kuhn
could be reversed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court and that as
a result of Kuhn other areas of the Colorado defamation law are now
questionable.
I. ABROGATION OF COMMON LAW STRICT LIABILITY AND THE
EMERGENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE
Beginning with the landmark case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the
United States Supreme Court began to impose constitutional limitations on
state libel laws. In New York Times, the Court abrogated the common law
libel standard of strict liability and held that false statements or unjustified
comments published by the media regarding public officials were constitu-
tionally protected unless the material was published with "actual malice;"'
2
that is, with actual knowledge of the falsity or with a reckless disregard for
the truth or falsity of the material.1
3
In 1967, the New York Tines standard was expanded to include "public
figures," as well as "public officials."'1 4 The Court reasoned that because
public figures commanded a substantial amount of independent public in-
terest, similar to that commanded by public officials, they were required to
show that their defamers had acted with known falsity or reckless disregard
of the truth. 15 Three years later, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. ,16 the Court
determined that the constitutional privilege should also be applied to situa-
tions in which the media was reporting matters of public or general interest,
even if a private individual was involved.'
7
During this period the United States Supreme Court also attempted to
define "actual malice." In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court
stated that actual malice could be proven by a showing of actual knowledge
10. 637 P.2d 315 (Colo. 1981).
11. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
12. Id at 279-80.
13. Id
14. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
15. Id at 155.
16. 403 U.S. 29 (1970). Rosenbloom was disapproved in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974).
17. ld at 52.
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of the falsity, or with a reckless disregard for the truth.' 8 The definition of
actual knowledge was fairly clear. Reckless disregard, however, was subject
to a number of interpretations and made a case-by-case review of lower
court decisions necessary.
Decisions following New York Times noted that there was a great distinc-
tion between "New York Times malice" and common law malice. The
Supreme Court noted that New York Times actual malice was "a term of art,
created to provide a convenient shorthand expression for the standard of
liability that must be established before a state may constitutionally permit
public officials to recover for libel in actions brought against publishers."' 9
In dealing with "reckless disregard" the Supreme Court first stated that reck-
less disregard could be found where the publisher possessed a "high degree of
awareness of. .. probable falsity."'20 The Court attempted to define reck-
less disregard further and, in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Bulls,2 t noted that reck-
less disregard was "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme
departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily ad-
hered to by responsible publishers." 22 In St. Amant v. Thompson,23 the Court
held that in order to find reckless disregard, "[t]here must be sufficient evi-
dence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious
doubts as to the truth of his publication. '24 The Court then gave examples
of reckless disregard: A story based on an unverified anonymous phone call,
or a situation in which the reporter had obvious reasons to doubt the verac-
ity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports. 25 Finally, in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. ,26 the Court reemphasized the definitions set forth in Curtis Pub-
lishing Co. and St. Amant and added that reckless disregard requires more
than mere proof of failure to investigate.
27
As one writer has noted, Gertz ended the Supreme Court's dominant
role in the establishment of the doctrine of constitutional privilege. 28 After
Gertz, however, certain generalizations can be made. It is recognized that a
media publisher is immune from liability for libel based upon pure comment
or opinion. 29 Further, public officials and public figures must prove actual
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth or probable falsity for lia-
18. 376 U.S. at 280.
19. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 251-52 (1974).
20. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
21. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
22. Id at 155.
23. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
24. Id at 731.
25. Id at 732.
26. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
27. Id at 332.
28. "In Rosenbloom, the pendulum reached its outer limit in its swing away from the com-
mon law libel standard of strict liability." NiNrH ANNUAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW INSTITUTE
24 (1981). "In Gertz v. Robert Welch, . . . the Supreme Court, 'sensing that the balance be-
tween free speech and private reputation had tipped too far in the direction of free speech'
retreated to a limited extent from the enveloping protection of Rosenbloom, and extended an
invitation (not a command) to the states to fashion a similar limited retreat, if so advised." Id
(quoting Chapadeau v. Utica Observer Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 199, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61
(1975)).
29. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 339-40.
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bility to be imposed on the media.3 0 If a media publisher makes false state-
ments of fact regarding a private individual and such statements are
published with fault and pose a substantial danger to reputation, the pub-
lisher may be held liable for defamation. 3 ' In cases involving purely private
plaintiffs, the states may define the appropriate standard of liability so long
as the media is not held strictly liable for defamatory statements.32 Finally,
in an action against the media, both presumed and punitive damages can be
recovered only upon a showing of actual malice.
3 3
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE IN COLORADO
In Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc. ,34 the Colorado Supreme Court, in
its first post-Gertz defamation opinion, addressed the issue of what standard
applies to a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory material that injured a
private individual and that related to a matter of public concern. The court
specifically adopted the rule of the plurality in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 35
and held that in matters involving public concern, a media publisher would
be liable to the person defamed if he knew the statement was false or if the
,statement was made with reckless disregard for the truth.3 6 Significantly,
the court adopted the rule of Rosenbloom, but did not adopt the definition of
"reckless disregard" enunciated in St. Amant and reaffirmed in Rosenbloom.37
The Walker court, in interpreting St. Amant, stated that to find reckless disre-
gard under St. Amant there had to be sufficient evidence to permit the con-
clusion that the defendant had, in fact, entertained serious doubts as to the
truth of the publication. 38 This subjective standard was rejected as a corol-
lary or amendment to the Rosenbloom definition.39 The Walker court did
state that the St. Amant test of subjective serious doubt, taken in conjunction
with the definition of reckless disregard, had merit, because it provided more
concrete guidelines to a jury, but that by consensus the court felt that it
would not approve the St. Amant definition "at this time" because the term
"reckless disregard" had already been applied in the tort field in Colorado. 4°
It is important to note, however, that the Walker case dealt with the
definition of "actual malice" in the context of a private individual suing a
media defendant. Under Gertz, the Colorado Supreme Court was free to
adopt any standard it wished so long as strict liability was not imposed. The
court rejected the simple negligence test proposed by Justice Harlan in Rosen-
bloom 4 ' and adopted by many states,42 because a "simple negligence rule
30. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. at 731.
31. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 347-48.
32. Id at 347.
33. Id at 349.
34. 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cefl. dented, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
35. 402 U.S. 29 (1971).
36. 188 Colo. at 98-99, 538 P.2d at 457.
37. Id at 98, 538 P.2d at 457.
38. Id
39. Id
40. Id at 99, 538 P.2d at 457.
41. 403 U.S. at 62. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
42. See, e.g., Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. dented,
452 U.S. 962 (1981); Mills v. Kingsport Time News, 475 F. Supp. 1005 (W.D. Va. 1979);
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would cast such a chilling effect upon the news media that it would print
insufficient facts in order to protect against libel actions; and this ... insuffi-
ciency would be more harmful to the public interest than the possibility of
lack of adequate compensation to a defamation-injured private individ-
ual."'43 The standard of proof adopted by the court in Walker can be classi-
fied as one of gross negligence. Although the court rejected St. Amant, as it
was free to do in this context under Gertz, it also interpreted St. Amant.4
This interpretation was to form the basis for the standard to be applied to
public persons in later cases and in the Colorado Jury Instructions.
In Manuel o. Ft. Colh'ns Newspapers, Inc. ,45 the question of what standard
should apply when a media publisher is sued by a public official or a public
figure was addressed for the first time in Colorado by the court of appeals.
In dealing with the issue of whether Ft. Collins Newspapers, Inc. published
defamatory remarks, the court of appeals applied St. Amant and held that
because the newspaper did not entertain serious doubts as to the truth of the
publication there could be no showing of actual malice.4 6 In addition, the
court noted that a failure to investigate or mere negligence on the part of a
reporter or publisher was insufficient to show reckless disregard.4 7 Thus,
Judge Van Cise ruled that summary judgment should have been entered for
the defendants. 48  The Colorado Supreme Court, however, reversed the
lower court's decision on other grounds, holding that in public official defa-
mation actions, the denial of a summary judgment motion may not be con-
sidered on an appeal from a final judgment entered after a trial on the
merits.49 The Colorado Supreme Court did not, however, discuss the lower
court's application of the St. Amant definition of reckless conduct.
One year after the court of appeals' decision in Manuel, the Colorado
Supreme Court had an opportunity to consider the standard to be applied
when a public official or public figure institutes a defamation action against
a media defendant. In DiLeo v. Koltnow 50 the court noted that "a public
Mathis v. Philadelphia Newspapers, 455 F. Supp. 406 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Peagler v. Phoenix
Newspapers, 144 Ariz. 304, 560 P.2d 1216 (1977); Bodrill v. Arkansas Democrat, 265 Ark. 628,
590 S.W.2d 840 (1979), cert. denie-d, 444 U.S. 1076 (1980); Widener v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Corp., 75
Cal. App. 3d 415, 142 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1977), cert. dented, 436 U.S. 918 (1978); Phillips v. Evening
Star Newspaper Co., 424 A.2d 78 (D.C. 1980); Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56
Hawaii 522, 543 P.2d 1356 (1975); Truman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975);
Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975); E.W. Scripps Co. v.
Cholomondelay, 569 S.W.2d 700 (Ky. 1978); Jacron Sales v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d
688 (1976); Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, 367 Mass. 849, 330 N.E.2d 161 (1975); Thomas
H. Malony & Sons v. E.W. Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App. 2d 105, 334 N.E.2d 494 (1974), ceri. denied,
423 U.S. 883 (1975); Martin v. Griffin Television, 549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976); Memphis Publish-
ing Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1978); Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, 541 S.W.2d 809
(Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977); Seegmiller v. KSL, 626 P.2d 968 (Utah 1981);
Taskett v. KING Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976).
43. 188 Colo. at 99, 538 P.2d at 458.
44. Id at 98-99, 538 P.2d at 457.
45. 42 Colo. App. 324, 599 P.2d 931 (1979), rev'd on other groundr, 631 P.2d 1114 (Colo.
1981).
46. Id at 327, 599 P.2d at 933.
47. Id
48. Id at 329, 599 P.2d at 935.
49. 631 P.2d 1114 (Colo. 1981).
50. 613 P.2d 318 (Colo. 1980).
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official can only recover damages for a defamatory statement concerning his
official conduct by presenting clear and convincing proof that the statement
was made with actual malice."'5 1 According to Chief Justice Hodges, New
York Times actual malice meant "that the defamatory statement was known
to be false or was made with reckless disregard of whether it was true or
false."'5 2 In defining reckless disregard the court gave the accepted defini-
tion: "Reckless disregard has subsequently been explained as requiring suffi-
cient evidence that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the
truth of the published statement. '5 3 The court appears to have approved
the St. Amant definition of reckless disregard in its finding that "the defend-
ants did not publish the article. . . with actual malice as above-defined.
'54
The subjective test has been applied many times by lower courts since
the St. Amant decision. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated unequivo-
cally that "[w]hile verification of the facts remains an important reporting
standard, a reporter, without a high degree of awareness of their probable
falsity, may rely on statements made by a single source even though they
reflect only one side of the story without fear of libel prosecution. . .. "55
Although the courts frown on a failure to verify factual assertions, liabil-
ity is not generally imposed unless there is evidence of calculated falsehood.
In Ga//man v. Carnes,56 the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that a substan-
dard investigation, in which the reporter failed to contact all of the parties
involved, "does not in itself establish bad faith."'57 The United States
Supreme Court has itself noted that "mere proof of failure to investigate,
without more, cannot establish reckless disregard for the truth."5 8
The issue, then, is not whether prudence requires a reporter to verify his
assumptions before distributing a story. Rather, it is whether the reporter
"in fact seriously doubted the accuracy of his assumption."'5 9 Thus, as the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals noted, "the constitutional definition of mal-
ice is more concerned with showing the publisher's subjective reckless disre-
gard for accuracy."
' 6
The United States Supreme Court recently emphasized the absolute ne-
cessity of the reporter's subjective state of mind in Herbert v. Lando.6 1 In Her-
bert, the issue was whether, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 62 a
plaintiff could, through the use of depositions, discover the author's state of
mind at the time of publication. The Supreme Court held that because
proof of actual malice would be impossible if the editorial process were not
subject to discovery, the media could not claim editorial privilege in a defa-
51. Id at 321.
52. Id
53. Id at 321, n.4.
54. Id at 321.
55. New York Times Co. v. Conner, 365 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 1966).
56. 254 Ark. 987, 497 S.W.2d 47 (1973).
57. Id at 994, 497 S.W.2d at 51 (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. at 733).
58. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 332.
59. Waskow v. Associated Press, 462 F.2d 1173, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
60. Orr v. Argos-Press, 586 F.2d 1108, 1116 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denid, 440 U.S. 960 (1979).
61. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
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mation action. 63 The Court noted that "in every or almost every case, the
plaintiff must focus on the editorial process and prove a false publication
attended by some degree of culpability on the part of the publisher. '64 This
degree of culpability would be found, according to the Court, in circum-
stances of knowing falsity or in which the "defendant in fact entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. ' 65 Quoting Gertz and Si.
Amant, the Court added that "such subjective awareness of probable falsity
. ..may be found if 'there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the
informant or the accuracy of his reports.' "66
Inquiry into the subjective state of mind of a media defendant, then, is
an essential element of any media defamation case. And, as a result of the
Colorado decisions of Walker, Manuel, and DiLeo, an assumption could be
made that Colorado has accepted the above definition of reckless disregard.
This assumption is strengthened by the second edition of the Colorado Jury
Instructions.
Colorado Jury Instruction 22:3 defines reckless disregard where the
plaintiff is a public official or public person. The instruction states:
A statement is published with reckless disregard when, at the
time of publication, the person publishing it has knowledge of facts
that indicate to him that the statement is probably false and he has
serious doubts as to its truth, but nevertheless publishes it.
The failure to exercise reasonable care before publication to
discover the truth or falsity of information does not alone consti-
tute a reckless disregard of whether the statement was false or
not.
6 7
The commentary to the Jury Instructions traces the history of the first
amendment privilege from New York Tines to Walker and their rejection of
the simple negligence standard. 68 The commentary deals directly with the
role of St. Amant and adopts the St. Amant definition of reckless disregard.
69
The requirement that the publisher have subjective knowledge of falsity or
serious doubts as to the truth is limited to cases in which the plaintiff is a
public figure.
70
Where the plaintiff is a private person, Instruction 22:4 applies:
A statement is published with reckless disregard when, at the
time of publication, the person publishing it has knowledge of facts
that indicate to him that the statement is probably false but never-
theless publishes it with indifference to the consequences.
The failure to exercise reasonable care before publication to
discover the truth or falsity of information does not alone consti-
tute reckless disregard of whether the statement is false or not. 71
63. 441 U.S. at 170.
64. Id. at 176.
65. Id. at 156.
66. Id at 156-57.
67. COLO. JURY INSTR. Civ. 2d 22:3 (1980).
68. Id, Commentary at 144-45.
69. Id
70. Id, Commentary at 144.
71. Id at 22:4.
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The Jury Instructions, then, make a distinction between reckless disre-
gard in defamation cases involving public figures and those involving private
individuals. The instructions specifically adopt the St. Amant standard where
public officials are involved. The failure to exercise reasonable care in publi-
cation or the failure to discover the truth or falsity of the information does
not lead to liability in this context. Rather, clear and convincing evidence
must be presented that the defendant had serious doubts as to the truth of
the statement and also knew that the statement was probably false. Where a
private person sues a media defendant, however, there is a requirement of
knowledge of facts that the statement was probably false, but no require-
ment as to serious doubt on behalf of the defendant.
Until October 2, 1981, Colorado defamation law in this area could be
summarized as follows: In matters of public or general concern a private
individual alleging defamatory remarks by the media must show knowing
falsity or gross negligence on the part of the media in the publication of the
defamatory material. In situations in which a public figure or public official
sues the media for defamatory remarks, proof of actual malice is more diffi-
cult, because reckless disregard in cases involving public individuals requires
that the defendant have had serious doubts as to the truth of the published
statements. However, with the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in Kuhn
v. Tribune-Republican Publishhng Co. ,72 the above generalizations are no longer
valid.
III. KUHN v TRIBUNE-REPUBLICAN PUBLISHING Co.: COLORADO ENTERS
THE QUAGMIRE
On January 8, 1976, the Greeley Tribune published an article concern-
ing the Greeley Recreation Department's ski program. The article reported
that two ski areas sent complimentary season lift passes to the Recreation
Department and implied that the two areas were included in the city's ski
program because they provided ski passes for the personal use of the Director
of the Recreation Department, the City Manager, and the Director of the ski
program.
73
The reporter of the article, John Seelmeyer, spent approximately two
hours investigating the story and thirty minutes writing it. The investigation
consisted of telephone calls to various officials involved with the ski program,
the City Manager, two ski shops, Colorado Ski Country-U.S.A., the two ski
areas in question, and the owner of the Shark Tooth Ski Area. 74 It does not
appear that Seelmeyer knew that any of the information was false. 75 Thus,
the key issue at trial was whether the Tribune published with reckless disre-
gard. A jury found that the newspaper had in fact published with reckless
disregard of the truth or falsity of the story and awarded a verdict against
the newspaper.
72. 637 P.2d 315 (Colo. 1981).
73. Id at 316.
74. Id at 317-18.
75. Kuhn v. Tribune-Republican Publishing Co., 637 P.2d 395, 396 (Colo. App.), revd, 637
P.2d 315 (Colo. 1981).
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After reviewing the record, however, the court of appeals noted that
"the article was substantially accurate, and, aside from some estimated dol-
lar figures which proved to be somewhat high but still sizeable, there were no
factual errors of any consequence." 7 6 Further, the court held that "[tihere
was no showing of knowledge of falsity or serious doubts as to the truth. At
most, plaintiffs' case was that the reporter did not ask enough questions or go
far enough in his investigation. That does not, however, constitute the 'reck-
less disregard' that the First Amendment requires."' 77 The court concluded
that the plaintiffs failed to meet their constitutional burden and that sum-
mary judgment or a directed verdict should have been entered in favor of
the newspaper.
78
The decision by the court of appeals was reversed by the Colorado
Supreme Court. 79 Justice Dubofsky, writing for the majority, held that Seel-
meyer's failure to attempt to verify or refute the information previously ob-
tained evidenced a reckless disregard for the truth.8 0 Justice Dubofsky
equated a failure to verify statements with fabrication and noted that when
one acts as Seelmeyer had, he "knowingly risks the likelihood that the state-
ments and inferences are false and thereby forfeits First Amendment protec-
tions."8" Thus, the majority concluded that the article was not entitled to
constitutional protection, and reinstated the jury verdict.
8 2
As the dissent makes clear, however, the majority, by failing to deal
with the subjective knowledge requirement of St. Amant, incorrectly defined
reckless disregard. 83 Relying on St. Amant and Herbert, the dissent correctly
focused on "the defendant's conduct and state of mind at the time of publi-
cation."8 4 Justice Rovira noted that although the publication contained
some inaccurate and misleading statements, "the publication of false facts is
not actionable against a defendant who had no knowledge of the falsity or
probable falsity of the underlying facts at the time of publication. '8 5 Be-
cause the dissent found no showing of a conscious awareness of probable
falsity as required by St. Amant, the dissent would have affirmed the judg-
ment of the court of appeals.
8 6
IV. EFFECTS OF THE KUHN DECISION
The Kuhn decision has significantly muddied the doctrine of constitu-
tional privilege in Colorado and could create a number of problems for both
publishers and practitioners. By its failure to apply the St. Amant subjective
knowledge test, the Colorado Supreme Court has created a different defini-
tion of reckless disregard than that mandated by decisions of the United
76. 637 P.2d at 396.
77. Id
78. Id
79. 637 P.2d 315.
80. Id at 319.
81. Id
82. Id
83. Id at 324 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
84. Id at 323.
85. Id
86. Id at 324.
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States Supreme Court. Any similarly decided cases are therefore appealable
and reversible at the United States Supreme Court level. Because the Colo-
rado Court of Appeals and the Colorado Jury Instructions have correctly
interpreted reckless disregard,8 7 it is possible that Colorado district courts
and the court of appeals will continue to apply the St. Amant standard and
will continue to be incorrectly reversed by the Colorado Supreme Court. If
the lower courts attempt to follow Kuhn, however, it is submitted that be-
cause of the Colorado Jury Instructions and prior case law, both of which
apply the St. Amant subjective standard, nothing but confusion will result.
Finally, the Kuhn decision casts doubts on whether the gross negligence stan-
dard which was held to apply to private plaintiffs in Walker v. Colorado Springs
Sun, Inc. is still viable.
A. Possible Appeal and Reversal of Similar Decisions
In dealing with public figures or public officials, the states are still con-
trolled by the constitutional privilege that demands knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard. The very specific issue, when dealing with a potential
challenge to the Kuhn-Colorado defamation standard, is whether reckless dis-
regard demands proof of the media's knowledge of falsity or serious doubts
as to the truth of the publication. The court of appeals and the Colorado
Jury Instructions adopt the Gertz and St. Amant standard and, as the embodi-
ment of Colorado and United States constitutional law, appear to be correct.
The Colorado Supreme Court in Kuhn, believed that the jury clearly
could have been convinced that the defendant evidenced a reckless disregard
for the truth or falsity of the publication.8 The court specifically held that
the publication failed to meet the standard set down by New York Times and
its progeny:
Here, ajury could reasonably find that the publication failed even
to meet this generous standard. [The reporter] admitted that he
had no bases for most of his erroneous statements, and that he
faiied to take the time to corroborate allegations made in the arti-
cle, even though no particular urgency existed as to the time of
publication. Actual malice may be inferred by a finder of fact if an
investigation is grossly inadequate.
89
It is interesting to note that the constitutional standard was set out and
that immediately thereafter the reference by the Colorado Supreme Court
was in regard to the failure to corroborate allegations. The issue of the sub-
jective knowledge of the reporter, however, was not dealt with. The court
also dealt with the reporter's failure to pursue obvious available sources and
concluded that this type of evidence can establish reckless disregard for the
truth 9 0
The requirement of St. Amant, that the reporter or publisher entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of the statements, is not considered in the Kuhn
87. See supra text accompanying notes 34-71.
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decision. The focus upon reporting inadequacies or the mere negligence of
the reporter or publisher is "constitutionally insufficient to show the reckless-
ness that is required ... ."91 The dissent recognized that there was no
showing that the reporter had knowledge of the falsity or serious doubts
about the article's truth before publication, and specifically noted that reck-
less disregard is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent person
would have published, or would have investigated before publishing, but
that reckless disregard must reflect a conscious awareness of probable fal-
sity.92 In addition, the dissent correctly pointed out that the test of actual
malice is whether the defendant knew or had reason to suspect that his pub-
lication was false. 93 Any inquiry, then, must focus on the defendant's con-
duct and state of mind at the time of publication.
This constitutional standard is not adopted by the majority opinion
and, as such, Kuhn would raise a specific and narrow appealable issue to the
United States Supreme Court. The majority opinion in Kuhn focuses on
reporting procedures and not on the actual knowledge of the reporter or
publisher. A review of the Colorado Supreme Court's summary of facts con-
sidered to be germane to the constitutional issue arguably leads to the con-
clusion that the reporter acted with subjective knowledge of falsity.
Reference is made by the majority to the fact that the story itself was worded
to imply that recreational officials had personally accepted the passes when,
at the same time, the reporter knew that the passes were given to the Recrea-
tion Department. 9 4 This testimony goes to the heart of the defamation as-
serted in Kuhn, but without the supreme court's specific review of the
reporter's knowledge of falsity, it is difficult to know if in fact the St. Amant
standard could have been applied to find liability against the Kuhn defend-
ants. At the very least, the Colorado Supreme Court chose either not to
recognize the St. Amant requirement or not to deal with the requirement as it
relates to Kuhn. Because a finding of subjective knowledge of probable fal-
sity is required where a public person sues a media defendant, the court's
failure to deal with the issue is appealable and reversible at the United
States Supreme Court level.
B. Interpretation of Reckless Disregard in the Colorado Court of Appeals and the
Colorado Supreme Court
It is obvious that a significant difference of opinion regarding the defini-
tion of reckless disregard exists between the Colorado Court of Appeals and
the Colorado Supreme Court. This difference of opinion is highlighted in
Kuhn, where the two courts, reviewing the same record, came to conclusions
which were entirely opposite. Although it is not unusual for appellate courts
to disagree, in this situation a problem arises because the court of appeals
appears to be correct in its interpretation of reckless disregard.
91. COLO. JURY INSTR. Civ. 2d 22:3 (1980) (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun,
Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975)).
92. 637 P.2d at 322-23 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
93. I d at 323.
94. Id at 318.
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Because a case-by-case determination must be made in this area of defa-
mation law, it is entirely possible that each reckless disregard case decided by
the Colorado Court of Appeals, correctly applying United States Supreme
Court standards, will be overruled by the Colorado Supreme Court. If, like
Kuhn, the case is not appealed to the United States Supreme Court for a
clarification of the term "reckless disregard," the cycle could continue, re-
sulting in a waste of time, money, and a further misapplication of the law.
The Colorado Jury Instructions, recently adopted by the Colorado
Supreme Court, support the position of the court of appeals. Thus, the Kuhn
decision will also create problems in the application of these jury instructions
at the trial court level.
C. Continued Viabthy of Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc.
As a result of the Kuhn decision, Colorado's future treatment of private
plaintiffs in media defamation cases must also be questioned. In Walker v.
Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., the court rejected a simple negligence test and in-
stead adopted the rule of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia without the subjective
qualification of St. Amant. 95 This standard is one of gross negligence. The
Colorado Jury Instructions point out that in this situation, reckless disregard
is knowledge that the statement is probably false, but has been published
with indifference to the consequences. There is no requirement that the de-
fendant have serious doubts as to the truth.96 This standard is in reality no
different than the one applied by the Colorado Supreme Court in Kuhn. In
Kuhn, the court inferred reckless disregard from inadequate investigation
without dealing with the reporter's subjective statement of mind. In so do-
ing, it applied the test supposedly reserved for private persons.
Aside from constitutional questions, Kuhn raises the issue of what stan-
dard will be applied in cases involving private individuals. The rationale
behind the different standards is clear. Private individuals are not in the
public eye and do not willingly expose themselves to public scrutiny. Be-
cause private individuals do not command the attention of the media, they
have little chance to correct false statements. Finally, the courts recognize
the role played by the media as a public "watchdog" where government
officials are concerned. As a result, the courts have afforded the media
greater protection against suits by public persons and have made it easier for
a private individual to recover for libel. 9 7 The decision has been basically
one of public policy. The courts have concluded that because of their posi-
tion in our society, public persons are afforded less protection from media
defamation. 98
As a result of Kuhn, however, it can be argued that in Colorado there is
no difference between suits brought by private individuals and those
brought by public persons. One could speculate that the Walker gross negli-
95. 188 Colo. at 98, 538 P.2d at 457.
96. COLO. JURY INSTR. Civ. 2d 22:4; see also St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727; supra
text accompanying notes 31-44.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 12-17, 30-32.
98. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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gence standard is no longer valid and that a simple negligence test such as
that proposed by Justice Erickson but rejected by the majority in Walker will
be applied in the future.
CONCLUSION
In Kuhn v. Tribune Republican Publishing Co., the Colorado Supreme Court
seriously confused the law of defamation in Colorado. From the standpoint
of a practitioner, publisher, or trial judge it is unclear what standards will
apply to a media defendant in defamation cases.
In Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., the Colorado Supreme Court's first
media defamation decision after the establishment of constitutional privi-
lege, Justice Groves expressed concern over a decision that would "cast such
a chilling effect upon the news media that it would print insufficient facts in
order to protect itself against libel actions. . .. "99 The court in Walker re-
jected a simple negligence standard and observed that "the vagueness of the
negligence standard itself, would create a strong impetus toward self censor-
ship, which the First Amendment cannot tolerate." 10 0 It is hoped that the
"regrettable quagmire of confusion" created by the court by its decision in
Kuhn has not significantly impaired first amendment rights in Colorado.
99. 188 Colo. at 100, 538 P.2d at 458 (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S.
29, 50).
100. Id (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 50).
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Top leasing,' whereby a lessee acquires a lease on a mineral estate cur-
rently under a valid, existing lease, is not a new phenomenon in the oil and
gas industry. The legal issues surrounding top leasing have been the subject
of reported cases for more than fifty years.
It has been during the last decade, however, that the practice of top
leasing for oil and gas has increased dramatically. During the late 1970's,
highly competitive leasing areas such as the Williston Basin in North Dakota
and Montana became fertile ground for this proliferation of top leasing.
The major factors that combined to spur the growth of top leasing in those
areas include the shortage of drilling rigs, an increasing number of brokers
and independent oil and gas exploration companies hungry for leasehold
positions and, perhaps, increasingly sophisticated mineral owners. Ethical
and moral concerns regarding the practice of top leasing, which led one
court in 1960 to state that "[t]op leasing has the same invidious characteris-
tics as claim jumping,"'2 have seemingly ebbed in the face of strident compe-
tition for leasehold positions.
Although courts in many jurisdictions have upheld the validity of a
properly drafted top lease, concerns regarding the legal ramifications of the
art and practice of top leasing for oil and gas persist. The aim of this article
is to outline those concerns in an understandable manner and offer a few
suggestions as to how an oil and gas company engaged in top leasing might
be able to avoid litigation.
I. DEFINITION OF A Top LEASE
A top lease is an oil and gas lease covering a mineral estate that is cur-
rently under a valid, existing oil and gas lease. The top lease has been de-
scribed as a "partial alienation of a possibility of reverter"3 and as a "present
grant of a future interest."14 In oil and gas terms, the prior lease is frequently
referred to as the "bottom lease." In most cases, the bottom lease will still be
within its primary term when the top lease is executed. However, when a
* Copyright 0 1982 by J. Hovey Kemp.
** Attorney at law, Davis, Graham & Stubbs, Denver, Colorado. B.A., 1976, Harvard
University; J.D., 1980, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. For other legal periodical articles on this subject, see Brown, E.ect of Top Leases: Ob-
struction of Tile and Related Considerations, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 213 (1978); Ernest, Top Leasing-
Legality v. Morally, 26 ROcKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 957 (1980).
2. Frankfort Oil Co. v. Snakard, 279 F.2d 436, 445 n.23 (10th Cir. 1960).
3. Brown, supra note 1, at 239.
4. Barnett v. Getty Oil Co., 266 So. 2d 581, 585 (Miss. 1972).
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mineral estate is burdened by an oil and gas lease in its secondary term (for
example, where the lessee has established production from the leased lands,
or from lands with which the leased lands have been pooled or unitized,
prior to expiration of the primary term), a second lease that is executed
before the prior lease expires can be properly classified as a "top lease" as
well.
In general, there are two basic types of top leases. First, a two-party top
leasing situation can be described as follows: B (lessee) owns an oil and gas
lease covering the mineral estate of A (lessor). The lease is dated January 1,
1972, with a primary term of ten years and so long thereafter as oil or gas is
produced. Some months before the primary term of his lease expires, B
secures another lease from A, dated September 1, 1981, but with a primary
term of ten years commencing January 1, 1982 (the day after B's prior lease
expires). 5 B might top lease his own bottom lease for a variety of reasons.
Drilling rigs may be scarce in the last year of the bottom lease's primary
term, threatening B's ability to extend the lease into a secondary term. More
likely, B may be concerned that he will lose his leasehold position if he
doesn't get to A before his competitors arrive, armed with offers of an in-
creased bonus and a greater landowner's royalty.
The second basic type of top lease involves a three-party situation,
which can be pictured as follows: The owner of the mineral estate, A (les-
sor), leases to B (lessee), by an oil and gas lease dated January 1, 1972, with a
primary term of ten years and so long thereafer as oil or gas is produced.
Some months before the primary term of B's lease expires, C, a third party,
secures another lease from A covering the same lands, dated September 1,
1981, but with a primary term of ten years from January 1, 1982 (the day
after the primary term of the prior lease expires). 6 C may have been able to
secure his top lease with an offer of an increased royalty, promises of immi-
nent drilling operations, and payment of a portion of the bonus considera-
tion at signing, the remainder to be paid if the top lease actually takes effect
upon expiration of the bottom lease.
7
II. APPROACHES TO Top LEASE LITIGATION
Top leases come under the scrutiny of courts most frequently in disputes
between the bottom lessee and the top lessee over the exclusive possession of
5. The two-party top lease diagrammed above should be distinguished from the situation
where B's top lease is not subject to B's bottom lease (that is, where B's top lease is dated and
"effective" September 1, 1981, and makes no mention of his prior lease). If B is wise, he will
avoid any overlap of the two leases, thereby avoiding questions of which lease terms apply if
there is production during the overlap period. For a thorough discussion of the applicability of
the doctrine of "novation," as applied to the two-party top lease situation, see Brown, supra note
1, at 231-37.
6. The three-party lease pictured above should be distinguished from the situation where
C's top lease is not subject to the rights of B under the bottom lease (that is, where C's top lease
is dated and effective September 1, 1981, and makes no mention of B's prior lease). As discussed
in the text, C will avoid creating any such overlap of the two leases while B's lease is still in
effect, thereby steering clear of some of the legal pitfalls described herein.
7. One method by which a bottom lessee could have an option to prevent his lease from
being top leased by a third party would be for him to include in his bottom lease a preferential
right to purchase a top lease on the same terms as any top lease offer that the lessor receives.
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the leasehold estate. Resolution of these disputes generally turns on the issue
of whether the bottom lease has expired or whether it has been extended.
The litigation is usually in the form of a quiet title action by either the top
lessee or the bottom lessee. Sometimes, however, a lessor who has executed a
top lease will sue on his own or will join in an action with the top lessee to
cancel the bottom lease. Ultimately, however, the central question to be
determined by the court is the same: Whose lease is valid?
When the litigation is instigated by the top lessee, he will generally
claim that his top lease is the only valid lease covering the subject mineral
estate and will ask the court to quiet his title or, perhaps, he may request
that the court find the bottom lessee in trespass. In general, when the bot-
tom lessee brings such an action he will typically assert that his bottom lease
is still valid, and will request 1) that the court quiet his title to the exclusion
of the top lessee or 2) that the court find the top lessee in trespass. If the facts
warrant, the bottom lessee may also sue his lessor, claiming that the lessor
has obstructed or otherwise interfered with his rights under his bottom lease
by executing the top lease.
State courts in Kentucky,8 Louisiana,9 Mississippi, 1° Montana," Ne-
braska, 12 North Dakota, 13 Oklahoma, 14 and Texas,' 5 and several federal
courts have considered such claims.' 6 It should be noted that most cases
involving top leases do not turn on the validity or invalidity of top leasing.
Because courts generally have accepted the proposition that a properly
drafted top lease creates a valid interest in favor of the top lessee, the bulk of
the discussion below examines those cases that are concerned with the more
problematic legal aspects of top leasing for oil and gas.
A. Recognition of the Top Lease
In 1923, in Rorex v. Karcher' 7 the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a
8. See, e.g., Joyce v. Zachary, 434 S.W.2d 659 (Ky. 1968); Wheeler & LeMaster Oil & Gas
Co. v. Henley, 398 S.W.2d 475 (Ky. 1965); Lebow v. Cameron, 394 S.W.2d 773 (Ky. 1965);
Swiss Oil Corp. v. Hupp, 253 Ky. 552, 69 S.W.2d 1037 (1934); Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Gillam,
212 Ky. 293, 279 S.W. 626 (1926).
9. See, e.g., Prentice v. Amax Petroleum Corp., 220 So. 2d 783 (La. Ct. App. 1969).
10. See, e.g., Barnett v. Getty Oil Co., 266 So. 2d 581 (Miss. 1972); Lone Star Producing
Co. v. Walker, 257 So. 2d 496 (Miss. 1971).
11. See, e.g., Christian v. A.A. Oil Corp., 161 Mont. 420, 506 P.2d 1369 (1973).
12. See, e.g., Willan v. Farrar, 176 Neb. 1, 124 N.W.2d 699 (1963).
13. See, e.g., Norman Jessen & Assocs. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 305 N.W.2d 648 (N.D. 1981).
14. See, e.g., Henry v. Clay, 274 P.2d 545 (Okla. 1954); Jennings v. Elliott, 186 Okla. 285,
97 P.2d 67 (1939); Gypsy Oil Co. v. Marsh, 121 Okla. 135, 248 P. 329 (1926); Rorex v. Karcher,
101 Okla. 195, 224 P. 696 (1923).
15. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 594 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); At-
lantic Richfield Co. v. Hilton, 437 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); Milburn v. Yates, 430
S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Matthews v. Sun Oil Co., 425 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. 1968); Shell
Oil Co. v. Goodroe, 197 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946). For a discussion of Texas decisions
involving top leases, see Brown, supra note 1, at 228-31.
16. See, e.g., St. Clair v. Exeter Expl'n Co., 671 F.2d 1091 (8th Cir. 1982); Superior Oil Co.
v. Devon Corp., 604 F.2d 1063 (8th Cir. 1979); Cox v. Gulf Oil Corp., 301 F.2d 122 (loth Cir.
1962); Muth v. Aetna Oil Co., 188 F.2d 844 (7th Cir. 1951); Stoltz, Wagner & Brown v.
Duncan, 417 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Robinson v. Continental Oil Co., 255 F. Supp.
61 (D. Kan. 1966).
17. 101 Okla. 195, 224 P. 696 (1923).
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top lease is valid. Plaintiff, the top lessee, acquired a top lease from the
mineral owners while a valid oil and gas lease already covered the lessors'
lands. Roughly a month before the prior lease was to expire, the lessors
executed an extension agreement with defendants, the prior lessees, to ex-
tend the prior lease. The prior lessees then commenced drilling some three
months after the primary term of their lease expired. Plaintiffs sued when
the defendants refused to stop drilling. During the trial, the defendants
called into question the validity of the top lease. In reviewing the trial
court's decision for defendants, the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated:
[I]t is the contention of the defendants that the lease to the plain-
tiff, having been executed while there was a valid lease on the
property, was void. No authority is cited to sustain this proposi-
tion, and we have been unable to find any which tends to support
the same. The lessors were the owners of the fee-simple title to the
property, and the same was not restricted in any manner whatever.
Such being the condition of the title, there was no reason why the
owners of the fee could not carve out as many estates as they saw
fit. There was no reason why the [lessors] could not execute a sec-
ond oil and gas lease during the existence of the first lease. Of
course, the holders of the second lease would take same subject to
the rights of the holders of the first lease . . . . We are therefore of
the opinion that the lease to the plaintiff was valid, and that judg-
ment should have been rendered for the plaintiff. 18
The Oklahoma Supreme Court again confronted a case involving a top
lease inJennings v. Ellott,19 and upheld the right of a landowner to execute
an oil and gas lease covering land subject to an unexpired prior lease. The
plaintiff landowners inJennings sought to cancel defendants' prior lease and
to enjoin defendants from entering and trespassing on the leasehold prem-
ises. As defendants, the bottom lessees sought to restrain or enjoin plaintiffs
from alienating or disposing of the oil and gas rights conveyed under their
prior lease (that is, from executing a top lease), while their prior lease was
still in force.2 0 Concerning the top lease, the court stated:
In Gypsy Oil Co. v. Marsh,2 the right of a land owner to execute an
oil and gas lease covering land that is already subject to an
unexpired prior lease was before the court and upheld. However,
the second lessee does not acquire the right to explore, develop for,
and produce oil from the premises as against the prior lessee until
the prior lease had terminated. If plaintiffs should execute such a
18. Id. at 196, 224 P.2d at 697-98.
19. 186 Okla. 285, 97 P.2d 67 (1939).
20. Id. at 287, 97 P.2d at 70.
21. 121 Okla. 135, 248 P. 329 (1926). The Supreme Court of Oklahoma considered a top
lease in the context of a lawsuit on the question of whether the bottom lease had expired at the
end of its primary term. The plaintiff in Gypsy Oil, the top lessee, brought an action to cancel
the prior lease, for possession of the leased premises and to enjoin the defendant, the prior lessee,
from asserting any right, title, or interest in the premises. Despite the above-cited statement in
the later decision inJmngs about the holding of the Gypsy Oil court, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court in that latter case did not specifically discuss the issue of the legality of the top lease or its
existence as a defense, and affirmed the trial court's decision to cancel the bottom lease because
the prior lessee had failed to discover oil or gas in paying quantities before the primary term of
the bottom lease had expired. The legality of the top lease seems to be presumed.
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lease it would in no way interfere with defendants in whatever
rights they may eventually be adjudged to have under the lease
they claim to be still in force.
22
Other jurisdictions have similarly upheld the practice of top leasing for
oil and gas. For example, in the case of Bamelt v. Geto Oil Co., 2 3 the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court considered a bottom lessee's contention that the partic-
ular top lease involved was not a valid and subsisting oil, gas and mineral
lease. The court rejected that contention as follows:
Whether you consider the lease a present grant of a future interest
or otherwise, the fact that the primary term was not to commence
until a date in the future does not alter the fact that the said lease
was valid, subsisting and in effect according to its terms from the
moment of its execution .... 24
B. Reject'on of the Top Lease
The Oklahoma case of Simons v. McDan'el2 5 has been noted as one of the
few cases in which the bare existence of a top lease was held to constitute an
obstruction of the bottom lessee's title.26 However, the decision can be dis-
tinguished on its facts and has been correctly classified as an "anomaly" in
this area.
27
In Sinons, the lessor granted plaintiffs, the bottom lessees, a lease with a
term of five years; the lease provided that "if no well be commenced" on or
before the end of the primary term, the lease was to terminate, subject to the
lessees' right to make delay rental payments. Four months before the pri-
mary term expired, the lessor's successors granted defendants top leases cov-
ering the same lands. The top leases became effective two weeks after the
prior lease's primary term expired. The bottom lessees commenced a well,
however, just before the term expired. And, prior to the expiration date, the
bottom lessees brought a quiet title action to eliminate the top leases as a
cloud on their title. They also sought a court order that would permit them
to cease drilling operations under the bottom lease pending resolution of the
dispute.
The court held that the right to commence a well within the primary
term carried with it the right, after the term expired, to complete the well
begun within the term when the lessee acted in good faith. 28 Regarding the
top leases, the court stated:
The acts of the [lessors], in executing and delivering 'top leases,'
was an election to declare the first lease at an end [citations omit-
ted] ....
22. 186 Okla. at 288, 97 P.2d at 70-71. The court went on to state: "Particularly is this
true in the instant case for any person who might purchase a second lease after this action had
been commenced, would be a purchaser pendente lite, and would of necessity take subject to
any judgment or decree that might thereafter be rendered or entered in defendants' favor." Id.
23. 266 So. 2d 581 (Miss. 1972).
24. Id. at 585.
25. 154 Okla. 168, 7 P.2d 419 (1932).
26. See Brown, supra note 1, at 218; Ernest, supra note 1, at 958-59.
27. Brown, supra note 1, at 220.
28. 154 Okla. at 170, 7 P.2d at 420-21.
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These acts obstructed the exercise of the rights of the original
lessees under the terms of their lease. Their title was clouded. Had
they produced oil or gas as a result of commenced development,
ownership thereof would have been in litigation and the value of
production impounded, so that a real obstacle was imposed by les-
sors upon the right of lessee plaintiffs.
29
The court in Simons found that the bottom lessees were acting in good faith
and permitted them to suspend operations pending resolution of the pro-
ceedings to remove obstructions imposed by the lessors.
30
The court's decision in Si'mons that the top leases constituted "clouds on
title" is difficult to understand in the context of other decisions in this area,
including prior Oklahoma cases.3 1 The fact that the practice of top leasing
has been condoned by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in decisions before and
after Simons makes the latter decision puzzling in light of the fact that the
top leases involved in S&nons were prospective (that is, they were to take
effect two weeks after the end of the bottom lease's primary term).
A 1966 case, Robinson v. Conti'nental Oil Co. ,32 is consistent with Simons in
holding that a top lease not "subject to" a bottom lease is a cloud on the
bottom lessee's title.3 3 The Robinson case involved a suit by a lessor to cancel
an oil and gas lease on the ground that it expired by its own terms or by the
lessee's breach of the implied covenant to develop. In holding for the oil and
gas lessee, the court found that the lessee had established a commercial gas
well within the primary term, that the lessee was entitled to reasonable time
in which to locate a market for the well, and that the lessee had not obli-
gated to tender shut-in payments while lessee's title was under attack by
lessor.
34
While considering the lessee's obligation to tender shut-in payments, the
court in Robinson discussed the fact that the lessor had executed top leases
covering the same lands as the lease in question. The court stated:
Further, we conclude that while Continental made a timely
tender of shut-in payments, it was under no obligation to make
such tender because defendant's title was at the time under attack
by plaintiff as lessor. The execution of top leases by plaintiff...
was in our opinion a challenge of Continental's title (citations
omitted).
3 5
29. Id., 7 P.2d at 420.
30. Id. at 170-71, 7 P.2d at 421.
31. For an articulate discussion as to the rather puzzling holding of Si)nons, see Brown,
supra note 1, at 218-19.
32. 255 F. Supp. 61 (D. Kan. 1966).
33. See also Berry v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 188 F.2d 820, 822 n.4 (5th Cir. 1951).
This latter decision cites the Texas case of Shell Oil Co. v. Goodroe, 197 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1946), for the proposition that a lessor's execution of a top lease constitutes a declaration of
forfeiture, thus forbidding drilling operations by the bottom lessee. A close reading of the Shell
Oil decision reveals that it is weak authority for the proposition cited by the Fifth Circuit. In
SAll Oil, the lessor not only executed top leases, but repudiated the bottom leases and de-
manded their release by the bottom lessee prior to expiration of their primary term. See Brown,
supra note 1, at 229-30.
34. 255 F. Supp. at 63-64.
35. Id. at 63.
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As judicial precedent, the quoted statement of the court in Robinson is ques-
tionable. As pointed out by one commentator, the court's reliance on cited
authority appears to be misplaced. 36 Furthermore, the holding of the Robin-
son court was based on alternative grounds, namely that the lessor "at-
tacked" the bottom lessee's title through litigation to cancel the bottom lease
before the first shut-in royalty was due.
37
The decisions, even though they seem to be against the weight of au-
thority in this area, should not be taken lightly. To be safe, a top lease
should state expressly that it is taken subject to the rights of prior lessees
under the terms of any valid and subsisting bottom lease in existence at the
time the top lease is executed.
III. PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF Top LEASING
A. The Two-Party Top Lease
As stated above, a two-party top lease situation is one in which, for one
reason or another, the bottom lessee secures another lease from the lessor
before the primary term of his prior lease expires, with the top lease to take
effect at the expiration of the earlier lease. In many instances, such a situa-
tion would not cause great concern to an oil and gas lawyer or landman.
However, there are certain circumstances in which the bottom lessee's ac-
tions may result in litigation. Two such circumstances involve the issues of
whether the top lessee may avoid overriding royalty and gas purchase con-
tract obligations created under or burdening his bottom lease.
1. Extinguishing Overriding Royalty Obligations
One of the questions that may arise in the two-party top lease situation
is whether overriding royalty obligations, created during the term of the bot-
tom lease, survive the execution of a top lease. Cases indicate that the an-
swer depends on the facts surrounding the creation of the overriding royalty.
Where the lessee obtains his bottom lease by assignment, and the assignor's
sole consideration for making the assignment is the reservation of the over-
ride, the overriding royalty will likely burden the lessee's top lease. Con-
versely, where other additional consideration is involved in the assignment of
the bottom lease, the lessee may be found to take his top lease free from the
previously created overriding royalty burden.
Brannan v. Sohio Petroleum Co. 38 involved a suit to establish and enforce
an assignor's right to an overriding royalty interest in an oil and gas lease-
hold. Plaintiffs had assigned to defendant two oil and gas leases covering
lands in Oklahoma. The leases were for a primary term of five years, termi-
nating October 25, 1954. Each assignment reserved to the assignors an over-
riding royalty of one-sixteenth of seven-eighths of all oil and gas produced on
the premises. Shortly before the primary lease terms expired, defendant ob-
tained a top lease covering both tracts from the mineral owners. The top
36. Brown, supra note 1, at 220 n.56.
37. 255 F. Supp. at 63. See Brown, supra note 1, at 220.
38. 260 F.2d 621 (10th Cir. 1958).
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lease provided that it was subject to existing leases and should not go into
effect until the existing leases terminated. Defendant did nothing to develop
the premises during the life of the original leases. Then, after the original
leases expired and the top lease became effective, defendant developed the
premises and obtained production. Plaintiffs claimed an overriding royalty
interest in the oil and gas produced, but defendant successfully resisted the
claim.
3 9
The plaintiffs in Brannan contended that a fiduciary relationship existed
between them and defendant, and that after defendant's top lease became
effective, they were entitled to a constructive trust upon the leasehold estate
for the undivided portion of production reserved in the earlier lease assign-
ments. The court stated:
In ordinary circumstances, the mere reserving of an overriding roy-
alty interest in the assignment of an oil and gas lease-alone and
without more--does not create a confidential or fiduciary relation-
ship between the assignor and the assignee which denies to the as-
signee the right to obtain from the owner of the land a top lease to
take effect after the expiration of the assigned lease free of the bur-
den of the overriding royalty, either in the form of a constructive
trust or otherwise.
4 °
The court distinguished the Brannan decision from that in Rees v. Bn's-
coe,41 where the Oklahoma Supreme Court had held that a fiduciary rela-
tionship existed between an assignee and an assignor. The Rees court had
determined that where the assignor had received no consideration for the
leases except the overriding royalty interest and the assignee's express agree-
ment that a well would be drilled, the assignee took renewal leases impressed
with a trust in favor of the assignors and respecting their overriding royalty
interest reserved in the original lease assignments. The court in Rees had
said it was unreasonable to assume that the assignor would assign the leases
for no present consideration unless he felt he could depend upon the assignee
to undertake development of the leases.
In contrast, the assignors in Brannan not only reserved the overriding
royalty, but also were paid a cash bonus of fifty dollars per acre for the land
covered by the assigned leases, and nothing was said about drilling a well on
that land. The Brannan court held that the assignment created no fiduciary
relationship impinging upon the assignee's right to obtain a top lease that
would become effective on termination of the assigned leases, "free of any
burden either in the form of a constructive trust or otherwise concerning the
share in the production reserved in the assignment."1
42
A recent decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, St. Clair v.
Exeter Exploration Co., 4 3 involved the question of whether plaintiff, pursuant
to a turnkey agreement by which plaintiff had sold a number of properties
(including a farmout of the bottom lease) to defendant, was entitled to re-
39. Id. at 621-23.
40. Id. at 622.
41. 315 P.2d 758 (Okla. 1957).
42. 260 F.2d at 623.
43. 671 F.2d 1091 (8th Cir. 1982).
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ceive an assignment of an overriding royalty under a top lease acquired by
defendant. In brief, the primary term of one of the leases subject to the
turnkey agreement expired; the defendant, however, secured a top lease on
those lands prior to the expiration date. Defendant refused plaintiff's re-
quest that defendant assign plaintiff an override under the top lease pursu-
ant to the turnkey agreement. In a decision that turns largely on the
language of the particular contracts involved, the Eighth Circuit affirmed
the lower court decision which required the defendant to assign the
override.
44
2. Extinguishing Gas Purchase Contract Obligations
A recent federal decision, Amarex, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatoy Commis-
si'n,45 concerned a two-party top lease situation involving a gas purchase
contract. Amarex had acquired by assignment the bottom lease, which com-
menced in 1967, with a primary term ending in 1972, covering a quarter-
section of land. That lease was included in a 1970 contract for the sale of
natural gas to the Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company (Arkla) for a primary
period of twenty years. By virtue of a Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion (FERC) order regarding small producers, Amarex was granted a certifi-
cate of convenience and necessity of unlimited duration covering all Amarex
sales and services in interstate commerce.
Amarex's service under the 1970 gas purchase contract began with ini-
tial deliveries to Arkla in 1971 of gas from acreage included in the contract,
but not from the quarter-section covered by the 1967 bottom lease.
Amarex's leasehold interest in the lands covered by the 1967 lease expired in
September, 1976. Some five months earlier, however, the lessors executed a
top lease with Amarex covering the same quarter-section of land, with a
primary term of five years beginning on the date the 1967 lease expired.
Before executing the 1972 top lease, Amarex requested a title opinion,
which advised that any gas produced from the premises would be subject to
the 1970 gas purchase contract. Despite that advice, Amarex refused to
comply with Arkla's request that gas attributable to Amarex's interest in the
subject quarter-section be delivered to Arkla when production began under
the 1972 top lease.
Both parties commenced proceedings before FERC. Arkla first filed a
complaint asking FERC to direct Amarex to deliver the natural gas attribu-
table to Amarex's oil and gas leasehold in the lands covered by the 1972 top
lease. Amarex, in turn, filed a petition for a declaratory order that Arkla
was not entitled to the gas from Amarex's 1972 leasehold.
46
FERC held that the public service obligation, imposed by Amarex's
small producer certificate of public convenience and necessity and the terms
of the 1970 gas purchase contract between Amarex and Arkla, applied to
Amarex's leasehold interest under the 1972 top lease, and directed Amarex
44. Id. at 1097.
45. 603 F.2d 127 (10th Cir.), cert. dented, 444 U.S. 1102 (1979).
46. Id. at 128-29.
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to deliver to Arkla any gas produced from or attributable to Amarex's inter-
est in the subject quarter-section for interstate transportation and sale.4 7
Amarex appealed FERC's order.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the order, following the
Supreme Court's holding in California v. Southland Royaly Co.48 In Southland,
the Supreme Court examined FERC's interpretation of the relevant portion
of the Natural Gas Act,49 which provides that, once gas has begun to flow in
interstate commerce from a field subject to a certificate of unlimited dura-
tion, a service obligation is imposed, and the expiration of a lease on the field
does not affect the obligation to continue the flow of gas; the service obliga-
tion cannot be terminated unless FERC authorizes abandonment of
service. 50
Relying on Southland, the Tenth Circuit found that Amarex was in an
even less favorable position than was Southland Royalty Company. South-
land Royalty Company was a stranger to the gas purchase contract and the
certificate involved in the Southland case. 5 1 Such was not the case in Amarex,
where the top lessee was a party to the contract and had been delivering gas
pursuant to its certificate of unlimited duration.
The teaching of the Amarex decision, when read in light of Southland, is
that a top lessee will not be able to "top" his own bottom lease to avoid the
obligations of a gas purchase contract burdening the bottom lease where
interstate deliveries have been made pursuant to a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity of unlimited duration.
It is crucial that the Amarex and South/and decisions, read jointly, not
only control in a two-party top lease situation, but also in a three-party top
lease situation. Therefore, where a third party top leases an existing lease
that is subject to a gas purchase contract, and the bottom lease is included in
a field from which gas is being delivered in interstate commerce pursuant to
the contract and to a certificate of public convenience and necessity of un-
limited duration, the top lessee may not avoid the obligations of the gas
purchase contract.
B. The Three-Party Top Lease
In a three-party top lease situation, most disputes arise between the top
lessee and the bottom lessee over whose lease is valid. Therefore, questions of
whether the bottom lessee has extended his lease into its secondary term by
47. Id. at 129 (citing Commission Opinion No. 798). FERC denied Amarex's application
for rehearing in Opinion 798-A, but permitted Amarex to deliver gas to Arkla under a protec-
tive order, pending the outcome of judicial review.
48. 436 U.S. 519 (1978). Judge McWilliams' Tenth Circuit opinion was written after the
opinion of the Supreme Court in United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. McCombs, 442 U.S. 529 (1978).
Although Judge McWilliams stated in his opinion that the court believed the McCombs decision
fully supported the result reached in the Amarex case, Judge Barrett's concurring opinion raises
some doubt. Judge Barrett's concern is not relevant here, however, as it deals with whether
Southland should be broadened beyond McCombs to include dedications of all "fields" subject to
the certificate.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1976).
50. 436 U.S. at 525.
51. 603 F.2d at 131.
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production, pooling, payment of shut-in royalties or otherwise, dominate.
Central to three-party top lease situations is the risk involved in top leasing
should the bottom lease be extended. By entering into a top lease, a lessee
gambles that he may lose the portion of the bonus he pays the mineral owner
upon execution of the top lease if the bottom lease does not expire at the end
of its primary term.
In most cases, the top lessee should be able to avoid litigation by verify-
ing conclusively, prior to taking possession of the leased premises, that the
bottom lease has in fact expired by its terms. Such a factual determination is
not always easy, however, and disputes may ensue even though the top lessee
has satisfied himself that the bottom lease expired prior to his entry. The
result is often an action in trespass.
1. Trespass
Several courts have found a top lessee in trespass where the top lessee
has entered onto the leased premises and started drilling operations after the
end of the bottom lease's primary term. 52 In general, these cases involve
situations where, for one reason or another, the top lessee believes that the
prior lease has expired but in fact the bottom lease has been extended into its
secondary term, either by pooling, by commencement of drilling operations,
by production prior to expiration, or otherwise. However, where the bottom
lessee does not relinquish his leasehold when his lease has expired, the top
lessee might recover damages for the bottom lessee's trespass as well.
53
The first case to consider trespass by a top lessee, Swiss Oil Corp. v.
Hupp,54 involved an action for damages by a bottom lessee against a top
lessee whose lease had been adjudicated invalid and who had been found in
trespass in an earlier decision.
The issue in Swiss Oil-and central to any case concerned with assessing
damages where a top lessee has trespassed-was whether the top lessee was a
"willful" or "innocent" trespasser. As stated by the court in Swiss Oil, that
distinction generally is made using the following test:
The conditions and behavior are usually such that the court can
determine whether the trespass was perpetrated in a spirit of
wrongdoing, with a knowledge that it was wrong, or whether it was
done under a bona fide mistake, as where the circumstances were
calculated to induce or justify the reasonably prudent man, acting
with a proper sense of the rights of others, to go in and to continue
along the way.55
Included among the factors the Swiss Oil court considered as evidencing the
good faith of the top lessee were: 1) at least reasonable doubt existed as to
the bottom lessee's exclusive or dominant right; and 2) the top lessee acted
52. See, e.g., Joyce v. Zachary, 434 S.W.2d 659 (Ky. 1968); Lebow v. Cameron, 394 S.W.2d
773 (Ky. 1965); Swiss Oil Corp. v. Hupp, 253 Ky. 552, 69 S.W.2d 1037 (1934); Lone Star
Producing Co. v. Walker, 257 So. 2d 496 (Miss. 1971). See also Superior Oil Co. v. Devon Corp.,
604 F.2d 1063, 1072-73 (8th Cir. 1979).
53. See, e.g., Lone Star Producing Co. v. Walker, 257 So. 2d 496 (Miss. 1971).
54. 253 Ky. 552, 69 S.W.2d 1037 (1934).
55. Id. at 560, 69 S.W.2d at 1041.
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upon the advice of counsel, to whom all the facts had been fairly submitted.
Using these factors and considering the specific facts presented, the court
affirmed the trial court's finding that the top lessee was an innocent
trespasser.
The court then turned to the question of damages. The bottom lessee
sought to recover the "gross" receipts of the oil produced by the top lessee,
based on the contention that the top lessee was a willful trespasser. As
stated, however, the court found that the top lessee was an innocent tres-
passer. The court considered the weight of authority regarding the measure
of damages for a good faith trespass or appropriation, and found it to be the
value of the oil at the mouth of the well, less the amount reasonably ex-
pended in producing it.
56
The top lessee urged the court to employ the exception to the general
rule, recognized in Kentucky, that establishes the damage or compensation
as the customary royalty paid in the community. 57 The court distinguished
that rule, stating that it was only a fair measure of damages as between a
mineral owner and a trespasser who has removed the mineral. As between
two oil and gas lessees, the court noted that in the usual contractual relation
a lessee is entitled to seven-eighths of the oil produced and not, as in the case
of the landowner, one-eighth of the oil produced.58 The top lessee also urged
the court to allow it to return the same quantity of oil it took from the lease.
The court termed this a "novel proposition" and rejected it, noting that the
decrease in the value of oil since the top lessee had removed it from the
premises was a matter of common knowledge.
59
The court in Swiss Oil followed the weight of authority and concluded
that the bottom lessee was entitled to the top lessee's net profits, that is, to
the value of the oil at the mouth of the well as established by the sale price,
less reasonable costs and expenses of production.60 The court considered
several contested deductions by the top lessee. It rejected the top lessee's
attempt to deduct the value of improvements, income taxes and legal fees.
6 1
The court also refused to disturb the trial court's discretionary ruling that
the bottom lessee was not entitled to recover interest.
62
Subsequent cases in Kentucky further illuminate the question of mea-
suring damages owed by the top lessee who is an innocent trespasser. For
example, in the case ofJoyce v. Zachary,63 Kentucky's highest court again held
that the top lessee was liable to the bottom lessee for his net profits. InJoyce,
the top lessee was entitled to take the following deductions: 1) waterflooding
56. Id. at 564, 69 S.W.2d at 1043 (citing Barnes v. Winona Oil Co., 83 Okla. 253, 200 P.
985 (1921); L. MILLS & J. WILLINGHAM, LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 22 (1926); 1 S. WILLIS,
THORNTON ON OIL AND GAS § 59 (5th ed. 1932)).
57. The court seemed to indicate that the Kentucky law in this regard stemmed from coal
cases. See, .g., Kentucky Harlan Coal Co. v. Harlan Gas Coal Co., 245 Ky. 234, 53 S.W.2d 538
(1932); New Domain Oil & Gas Co. v. McKinney, 188 Ky. 183, 221 S.W. 245 (1920).
58. Swiss Oil Corp. v. Hupp, 253 Ky. 552, 565, 69 S.W.2d 1037, 1044 (1934).
59. Id. at 567, 69 S.W.2d at 1044-45.
60. Id. at 567, 69 S.W.2d at 1044.
61. Id. at 567-69, 69 S.W.2d at 1045.
62. Id. at 569, 69 S.W.2d at 1046.
63. 434 S.W.2d 659 (Ky. 1968).
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expenses; 2) ad valorem taxes; 3) overpayment of landowner's royalties;
4) operating expenses after suit was filed; and 5) expenses for drilling a dry
hole.64 The court rejected the top lessee's attempt to deduct "supervisory'!
expenses of one of its non-participating partners.
65
Superior Oil Co. v. Devon Corp. 66 is a recent federal decision consistent
with the Kentucky cases discussed above. The Superior Oil facts were as fol-
lows: in 1949, the mineral owners executed an oil and gas lease to Superior
Oil Company covering 3,440 acres of land in Banner County, Nebraska.
The lease had a primary term of ten years and "as long thereafter as oil, gas,
* ..or any of the products covered by this lease is or can be produced." Oil
was discovered and produced within the primary term, and in 1961, that
part of the Superior leasehold on which oil was being produced was unitized
into the Willson Ranch Field "J" Sand Unit.
6 7
After 1961, neither Superior nor its subsequent assignees conducted fur-
ther drilling on the tracts covered by the Superior lease. In February 1976,
the successors in interest to the original lessors executed oil and gas top leases
to Chris L. Christensen, Jr., on certain tracts that were subject to the prior
Superior lease, and an oil well was successfully completed in February
1977. 68
In June 1977, Superior and its assignees filed an action naming as de-
fendants the lessors, and the lessee and assignees under the 1976 top leases.
Plaintiffs alleged in part that the lessors breached their contract with plain-
tiffs by executing the top leases, thereby creating a cloud on title, and that
the top lessee and his assignees were guilty of trespass and conversion. Plain-
tiffs sought injunctive relief, an accounting, and a decree quieting title to the
leasehold. In turn, the lessors sought cancellation of the Superior lease for
plaintiffs' breach of the implied covenant of further development, which cov-
enant, apparently, had not previously been recognized under Nebraska
law.
69
The district court concluded that it had to find the lessors liable for the
execution of the top leases unless the bottom lessee, Superior, and its assign-
ees had violated the implied covenant to further develop prior to February
of 1976.70 The court then found that Superior had failed to meet the stan-
dards required of a prudent operator and that prior to February 1976 it had
breached the implied covenant to further develop. 7 1 The court dismissed
64. Id. at 661-63.
65. Id. at 662.
66. 604 F.2d 1063 (8th Cir. 1979).
67. Id. at 1066.
68. Id.
69. Id. See Note, Oiland G as, 13 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1429-35 (1980).
70. Superior Oil Co. v. Devon Corp., 458 F. Supp. 1063, 1071 (D. Neb. 1978), revld, 604
F.2d 1063 (8th Cir. 1979). The decision of the lower court held that, as between Superior and
the lessors, the express terms of the 1949 lease had not been breached and that neither the
failure to file an affidavit of production (required by Nebraska law) nor the subsequent unitiza-
tion agreement altered the lessor-lessee contractual relationship between those parties.
71. 458 F. Supp. at 1075. The court held that an adjudication of breach of the implied
covenant to further develop was not barred by the failure of the lessors to demand further
drilling, and ordered that portion of the Superior lease outside the Willson Ranch Field "J"
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plaintiffs' claim against the top lessee and his assignees. 72
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the Superior
lease should not have been cancelled because the lessee had not been served
with notice or demand before the lessor executed the top leases. 73 The court
held that the lack of notice and an opportunity for redemption protected the
lease against allegations of a breach of implied covenant to further develop;
consequently, the district court erred in dismissing the action. However, the
court of appeals' decision did not rest upon a finding of insufficient notice to
the plaintiffs; the court also considered the question of notice to the
defendants:
The fact that the Superior lease was valid and prior to the [top]
lease does not ipsofacto make the [top lessee and his assignees] tres-
passers and converters . . . Although the Superior lease, as be-
tween Superior and its lessors, was held by production after
expiration of the primary term in 1959, no affidavit of production
was filed under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 57-208. . . .Section 57-208 is a
notice statute to the public. . . . The 1949 lease did not provide
notice to subsequent purchasers of its existence after the expiration
of the primary term. A purchaser after August 1, 1959, who relied
upon the public records and who did not otherwise have actual or
constructive notice of the Superior lease would therefore be a sub-
sequent good faith purchaser for value, and his leasehold interest
would be prior to that of the lessees under the Superior lease.
74
The Eighth Circuit concluded that if the top lessee and his assignees did
not have actual or constructive notice of oil production under the Superior
lease, they would be bona fide purchasers for value and the bottom lessee's
only recourse would be against the lessors. 75 The court continued, "[i]f,
however, the [top lessee or his assignees] had actual or constructive notice of
plaintiffs' interests, they would be trespassers and converters and would be i'able to
plaint# for damages and such other relief as may be appropriate."76
In a significant footnote, 77 the court stated that the top lessee may have
made a good faith but mistaken determination that the Superior lease was
not held by production. The appellate court pointed to the lower court's
finding that the top lessee had conducted a title search, obtained an attor-
ney's title opinion and concluded that Superior's lease was not held by pro-
duction. The court noted that if the lower court upon reconsideration found
the top lessee had actual or constructive notice of production from the Supe-
Sand Unit cancelled unconditionally as of a time preceding the execution of the top leases. Id.
at 1078-80.
72. Id. at 1080.
73. The Eighth Circuit grounded its reversal on the principle that an oil and gas lease is a
recognized and protected property interest, that a cancellation of an oil and gas lease effects a
forfeiture of that interest and that the law abhors a forfeiture. Accordingly, the court concluded
that an oil and gas lease will not be cancelled for breach of an implied covenant without the
lessor having first given the lessee notice of the breach and demanding that the terms of the
implied covenant be complied with within a reasonable time. 604 F.2d at 1069.
74. Id. at 1072 (citing Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Adair, 273 F.2d 673, 677 (10th Cir. 1959);
Grand Island Hotel Corp. v. Second Island Dev. Co., 191 Neb. 98, 214 N.W.2d 253 (1974)).
75. 604 F.2d at 1072.
76. Id. at 1072-73 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 1073 n.13.
[Vol. 59:4
TOP LEASING FOR OIL AND GAS
rior leasehold, "under the circumstances of the case equity may require that
they recover their drilling and production CoStS." 78 The court, therefore, im-
plicitly recognized the willful-innocent distinction in damages for trespass in
a case where the top lessee was found liable for irespass against the bottom
lessee's leasehold.
In sum, the Superior Oil decision is instructive for top lessees who execute
a top lease on a bottom lease that is within its secondary term. If the lands
are within a jurisdiction, such as Colorado 79 or Nebraska,80 that requires an
affidavit of production to be placed of record as constructive notice that a
lease has been extended by production into its secondary term, and no such
affidavit is of record under the bottom lease, the top lessee who does not
otherwise have actual or constructive notice of the continued effectiveness of
the bottom lease may be elevated to the status of a bona fide purchaser. As
such, his lease may be insulated from liability. The bottom lessee's only legal
recourse in such an event would lie against the lessor.
A decision by the Mississippi Supreme Court, Lone Star Producing Co. v.
Walker,81 presents the reverse side of the top lessee-as-trespasser case. In Lone
Star, the top lessee recovered damages from a bottom lessee who was adjudg-
ed to have an invalid lease after production ceased for an unreasonable time
during the bottom lease's secondary term. The bottom lessee in Lone Star
had extended his lease past its primary term by production. The top lease
was entered into during the sixty-day window period allowed for beginning
drilling or reworking operations after production ceased. In fact, production
under the bottom lease ceased for more than sixty days before reworking
operations began.
The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's holding that
the delay invalidated the bottom lease and that the top lessee's lease was
therefore valid.82 The top lessee was able to clear the cloud on his title cre-
ated by the bottom lessee's continued possession under the terminated prior
lease. Further, the court held that the top lessee was entitled to damages in
the amount of the value of production from the date of the bottom lessee's
completion of reworking operations, less the bottom lessee's reasonable costs
of production.
8 3
2. Protecting Against Last-Minute Bottom Lease Extensions
One of the most difficult issues in the three-party top lease situation
arises in the following factual situation: A, the mineral owner, leases the oil
and gas leasehold estate to B, the bottom lessee. Before the primary term of
78. Id.
79. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-42-106 (1973).
80. NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-208 (1978).
81. 257 So. 2d 496 (Miss. 1971). It might be noted that the top leases involved in Lone Star
were executed two years after the expiration of the primary term of the bottom lease; however,
the "top lease" classification was correct because at the time of their execution the bottom lease
was still alive by virtue of the clause in the bottom lease granting the lessee 60 days to engage in
drilling or reworking operations after cessation of production.
82. Id. at 500-01.
83. Id. at 501.
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that lease expires, A enters into a top lease with C, and then executes an
extension agreement with B, extending the bottom lease. Do A's actions in
extending the bottom lease render C's top lease ineffective?
The Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in Rorex v. Karcher,84 discussed
above, is authority for the proposition that the bottom lessee's rights under
such an extension agreement would be subject to the superior rights of the
top lessee. For this to be the case, however, the court in Rorex made the
following point:
It is insisted by the defendants, that one of the rights of the lessees
under the first lease was to procure an extension of time during the
lifetime of the first lease. There was no provision in the lease con-
tract granting an extension or right of extension to the lessees, and
any extension procured by the lessees was subject to the rights of
intervening third persons. Prior to the time the extension was pro-
cured, the rights of the plaintiff intervened by reason of his lease,
and any extension granted after the execution of the lease to the
plaintiff was taken subject to the rights of the plaintiff under his
lease.
8 5
At least in Oklahoma, therefore, it appears that so long as the bottom lease
does not expressly grant an extension or create a right of extension in the
lessee, any extension procurred by the bottom lessee would be subject to the
rights of an intervening third-party top lessee.
The Nebraska Supreme Court addressed a related situation in Wllan v.
Farrar8 6 and found that, having entered into a top lease, the lessor owes a
duty to the top lessee not to render the provisions of the top lease ineffective.
In Willan, Willan's oil and gas leases, which provided for termination unless
delay rentals were paid by a specified date, burdened the lessor's mineral
estate. Before delay rentals became due under Willan's bottom leases, the
lessor executed top leases that apparently were to be effective only if the
bottom leases terminated for failure to pay the rentals. Although there was
some dispute as to whether the lessor extended the time for rental payment
and whether he actually accepted the payment, the bottom lessee tendered
delay rental payment after the due date. The bottom lessee then brought an
action to quiet its title in the leasehold.
The question before the court was whether the bottom lessee paid his
delay rentals before the due date. The court concluded, "[tihe evidence is
plain he did not and the top leases thereupon fell into place according to
their terms."
'8 7
In a well-reasoned opinion, the Willan court cited favorably to Rorex v.
Karcher, discussed above, and held:
The top leases were expressly given to be in force on the termina-
tion of the prior ones because of nonpayment of the rentals. The
[lessors] evidently desired that their premises remain under lease if
Willan's delay rentals were not paid. Though [the bottom lessee]
84. 101 Okla. 195, 224 P. 696 (1924). See supra text accompanying note 17.
85. Id. at 196, 224 P.2d at 697-98.
86. 176 Neb. I, 124 N.W.2d 699 (1963).
87. Id. at 7, 124 N.W.2d at 704.
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had an option by which he could continue the leases by paying the
rentals when they became due, he was under no obligation to do so.
[The lessorsj having given the top leases to [the top lessee] owed a duty not
to render their provisions inective. The purpose of[the top] leases should
not be permitted to be defeated by the actions of the lessors at will.88
The Rorex and the Willan cases indicate that the top lessee may be able
to prevent the lessor or bottom lessee from defeating the top lessee's rights as
an intervening purchaser. One important caveat should be remembered,
however: the top lessee's rights are always subject to the bottom lessee's
rights under the terms of the latter's lease. Therefore, if the bottom lease
expressly grants the right to an extension or the right to pool, and the lands
are pooled or an extension agreement is entered into after the top lease is
executed but before the bottom lease expires, the top lease would not take
effect.
Riders might be employed by a top lessee who wants to avoid the situa-
tion litigated in Rorex.89
IV. SUMMARY OF LEGAL THEORIES THAT MAY
INVALIDATE A Top LEASE
A bottom lessee who has been "topped" may assert a number of differ-
ent theories of liability against the lessor and/or the top lessee. Although
many but not all of these theories have been touched upon, several deserve
special summary treatment. The theories that might invalidate a top lease
include: 1) violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities; 2) cloud on title;
3) obstruction of the prior lessee's interest; 4) tortious interference with the
prior lessee's contractual rights; and 5) trespass by the top lessee.
A. Violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities
Although this theory of liability will arise only in the rarest of circum-
stances, an improperly drafted top lease may be invalid if it does not meet
the test imposed by the Rule Against Perpetuities. The Rule Against Perpe-
tuities stems from the common law of England, and was developed as a legal
mechanism to prevent the creation of remote future interests in real property
that might never vest. Despite its archaic roots, the Rule is still recognized
in many jurisdictions. The Rule, as commonly phrased, states that "no in-
terest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than 21 years after some
88. Id. at 6, 124 N.W.2d at 704 (emphasis added).
89. The following are examples of riders that might be used to protect the top lessee from
prior lease extensions:
Example /: Lessor agrees to execute no agreements, the effect of which would be
to extend the primary term of the said prior lease.
Example 2: Lessor represents and warrants that lessor has not entered into any
renewal or agreement to renew said prior lease or amended said prior lease so as to
extend the primary term as set forth or recorded therein. Further, lessor covenants
and agrees not to extend, amend or modify said existing lease.
The riders probably would be effective only where the bottom lease is silent on the right to
extension, however, because the top lessee's rights should always be subject to the rights of the




life in being at the time of creation of the interest."9 0
Simply stated, if a lessor purports to grant a top lease that is to vest at
the time the existing lease terminates, the top lease might be held to be void
under the Rule because there is no assurance that the bottom lease will ter-
minate or that the top lessee's leasehold interest will vest within the
perpetuity period.9 1
The likelihood of such an improperly drafted top lease running afoul of
the Rule Against Perpetuities is confirmed by case law.9 2 In a recent case,
Stoltz, Wagner & Brown v. Duncan,93 the top lessees sought to quiet title in
their leasehold estates. Defendants were the assignees under the prior leases.
Plaintiffs contended that defendants' leases had expired at the end of their
primary term. The defendants in their counterclaim asserted that plaintiffs'
top leases violated the Rule Against Perpetuities and were void.
The top leases in issue in Stoltz provided:
[Flor a term of one (1) year from and after the 8th day of August,
1975, or from and after the expiration of the existing . . . lease,
whichever is the later, hereafter called 'primary term' and as long
thereafter as oil, gas . . . may be produced.9 4
The court held that under Oklahoma law, a party cannot maintain an ac-
tion to quiet title unless he has a title or an interest in the land. As stated,
the top leases provided that their effective date was August 8, 1975, or "at
the expiration of the existing oil and gas lease, whichever is the later." The
court found that the top leases appeared to violate the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities.9 5 However, the court maintained that the plaintiffs' top leases could
be reformed under the "cy pres" provision of the Oklahoma statutes,
9 6
which would act to delete the provision for bringing the top lease into effect
at the expiration of the existing lease. The court held that, once reformed, it
would be possible for the plaintiffs' top leases to vest on August 8, 1975, or
within the one-year primary term provided for in the top leases, if the owner
of the existing leases failed to extend the primary term of his leases.
The court held that the plaintiffs had valid top leases as reformed and
could maintain an action to quiet title. However, the court held for the
defendants. It found that they had commenced drilling work on August 6,
1975, which was within the primary term of their leases, and that they had
continued in good faith and with due diligence so as to comply with the
extension terms of their leases. Therefore, the bottom lessees continued their
leases beyond their primary terms and, as stated by the court, the top lessees
"lost their gamble and must lose their quest to quiet their title to the leases
90. J. GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETUrrIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942).
9 1. 1 E. KUNTZ, LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 17.2 (13th ed. 1962 & Supp. 198 1); see alro Ernest,
spra note 1, at 961-62.
92. See, e.g., Greenshields v. Superior Oil Co., 204 Okla. 681, 233 P.2d 959 (1961).
93. 417 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
94. Id. at 556.
95. Id.
96. OKLA. STAT. 60, §§ 75-77 (1971). The cy pres doctrine acts as a liberal rule of con-
struction to allow the fulfillment of an underlying intent to be carried out where the instrument
would not permit the intended grant. Thus, the Oklahoma statutes allow an instrument to be
reformed to meet the intent of the parties where the Rule is violated.
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they topped."9'
B. Cloud on Title
If there is a valid non-producing oil and gas lease outstanding, and the
primary term is about to expire, the lessor cannot grant a "naked" top lease
(one which does not recognize the existence and priority of any outstanding
lease and appears to be effective as of the date of execution). Such a grant
arguably would cloud the title of the lessee's outstanding lease. Simons and
Robinson illustrate this point.9 8
C. Obstruction
Under the equitable doctrine of obstruction, the lessor of an oil and gas
lease is not permitted to assert that the lease has terminated or otherwise
come to an end for the lessee's failure to produce oil or gas or otherwise to
comply with the terms of the lease if the lessor has obstructed the operations
of the lessee, and such obstruction accounts for the failure of the lessee to
comply with the terms of the lease.99
Again, absent language subordinating the top lease to an existing lease,
the lessor cannot grant a presently effective "naked" top lease while the prior
lease remains in effect; such a grant may serve to obstruct operations under
the existing lease and thereby to perpetuate the bottom lease during the pe-
riod of obstruction.l°° The granting of a top lease, when combined with
other acts by the lessor in which he attempts to repudiate the bottom lease,
would obstruct the rights of the bottom lessee. However, so long as the top
lease recognizes the existence of the bottom lease and so long as the top lessee
and the lessor do not otherwise assert that the top lessee's rights are superior
to the bottom lessee's rights while his bottom lease is still in effect, there
should be no finding of obstruction from the mere existence of a top lease.
D. Interference with Contractual Rights
Where a top lessee has notice of an existing lease and the top lessee
begins exploration and drilling activities before it is certain that the prior
lease has terminated, the prior lessee could bring suit against the top lessee
for interference with his contractual rights. To avoid such a claim the top
lease should specifically recognize outstanding leases or option agreements
and should verify the termination of the prior lease before commencing op-
erations under the top lease.
97. 417 F. Supp. at 556.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 25-37.
99. 2 E. KuNrz, LAw OF OIL AND GAs § 26.14 (13th ed. 1964 & Supp. 1981).
100. Id; Simons v. McDaniel, 154 Okla. 168, 7 P.2d 419 (1932); Shell Oil Co. v. Goodroe,
197 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) (lessor's execution of top leases in conjunction with les-
sor's notice repudiating bottom lease and demand by lessor that bottom lessee execute a release
while bottom lease was still in effect relieved bottom lessee of operating gas well pending resolu-




Where exploration or drilling operations are conducted under a top
lease that is invalid because of the continued validity of a prior lease, a court
may find the top lessee in trespass where the top lessee had actual or con-
structive notice of the prior interest. 10 ' The cases discussed above stand for
the principle that, where the top lessee is found in trespass, he would be
liable to the prior lessee for damages and such other relief as may be appro-
priate. ' 02 The critical question for trespass damages is whether the top lessee
is a willful trespasser, or a good faith trespasser. A willful trespasser who
extracts minerals must make complete restitution without credit for expenses
incurred. When, however, the trespasser inadvertently, or under a bona fide
belief or claim of right, invades the bottom lessee's property and extracts
minerals, he is allowed credit for proper expenditures in obtaining or pro-
ducing the minerals, but is not allowed a profit.103
Where the bottom lease grants to the lessee the exclusive right to ex-
plore, the top lessee has no right to conduct geophysical exploration on the
lands covered by the bottom lease before that lease expires, absent authoriza-
tion from the bottom lessee. Any such exploration activity could subject the
top lessee to liability for seismic trespass. 104
IV. CHECKLIST FOR THE ToP LESSEE
In considering the top lessee's potential liability under various theories
that might invalidate a top lease, the following checklist is recommended for
the potential top lessee:'
0 5
A. The top lease should be dated the day it is executed.
B. The habendum clause should contain a term of years to begin
one day after the bottom lease expires. For example, if the
bottom lease expires on at midnight on March 31, 1982, insert
". .. this lease shall remain in effect for a term of X years
from April 1, 1982" (to allow for the situation where the bot-
tom lessee releases his lease prior to the expiration of the pri-
mary term, the top lessee might use a clause which states that
the primary term of the top lease is for a term of X years from
the date that the bottom lease is terminated or released, if such
termination or release occurs prior to the expiration of the pri-
mary term of the bottom lease, or April 1, 1982, whichever is
101. Superior Oil Co. v. Devon Corp., 604 F.2d 1063, 1072-73 (8th Cir. 1979).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 52-81.
103. Swiss Oil v. Hupp, 253 Ky. 552, 69 S.W.2d 1037 (1934). The footnote in Superior Oil,
604 F.2d at 1073 n.13, is consistent with this view.
104. Although no "seismic trespass" cases could be found which involved the geophysical
trespass of a top lessee, it is extremely doubtful that the fact that the top lessee had a valid
future interest in the oil and gas leasehold would be of concern to a court where the bottom
lease provides for the exclusive right of exploration. For cases in the area of seismic trespass, see
generally Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1957) (applying Texas law);
Franklin v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co., 218 La. 987, 51 So. 2d 600 (1951) (applying Louisiana law);
see also, Ohio Oil Co. v. Sharp, 135 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1943); Kennedy v. General Geophysical
Co., 213 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); (these last two decisions indicate that liability may
be imposed for deliberate and unauthorized off-site exploration, presumably for trespass).
105. See also Ernest, supra note 1, at 978-79.
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the later date). 106
C. The delay rental obligation under the top lease should com-
mence with a date one year from the day after the date upon
which the existing lease's primary term expires.
D. One or more riders should be attached to the top lease, subor-
dinating the top lease to the prior lessee's rights 10 7 and pro-
tecting the top lease from actions by the lessor that would
extend the prior lease's primary term.' 0 8
E. A portion of the bonus due for the top lease should be paid to
the mineral owner when the top lease is executed (the percent-
age of the total to be paid will vary according to the facts in-
volved, that is, depending on the area, the period remaining in
the primary term of the prior lease, etc.); the balance due
should be payable when and if the lease becomes effective. In
addition, if a rider is used to subordinate the top lease to the
prior outstanding lease, the top lessee should be in a position
to pay the remainder of the bonus for unreleased lands covered
by the top lease to the mineral owner within thirty days of
receiving notice that the bottom lease has expired. ° 9
F. A clause which allows for postponement of the second pay-
ment in case of a dispute or litigation as to whether the bottom
lease has expired should be included.
G. Record the top lease as soon as possible after execution.
H. If the bottom lease grants the lessee the exclusive right to ex-
plore, do not enter upon the leased premises to conduct geo-
physical or other exploration activities before the prior lease
106. Where, for example, the primary term of a top lease is to run three years from its
"effective date," rather than three years from the day after expiration of the bottom lease, a
court could find that the top lease expires three years from the date of its execution, rather than
three years from the date upon which the top lease received any actual rights to the mineral
leasehold. A Texas court so found in Oblegoner v. Oblegoner, 526 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Civ. App.
1975).
107. The following rider might be used to subordinate a top lease:
The lessee's rights hereunder are subordinate to that certain oil and gas lease
dated , 19 -, recorded in Book -, at - and lessee shall have no
right of entry or possession for the purpose of exercising lessee's rights hereunder to the
extent such exercise may be adverse to the right of the prior lessee, during the term of
such prior lease. After termination of such existing lease, lessor shall give lessee notice
and demand stating that said existing lease has expired. Thirty (30) days after receipt
of such demand by the lessee this lease shall become null and void, unless on or before
the end of said thirty (30) day period, lessee pays to lessor the amount equal to S -
- per net mineral acre owned by lessor in the lands described above as to which lessee
has not theretofore (or within said 30-day period) recorded a release of this lease. Pay-
ment shall be made direct to lessor at the address shown in this lease, or at the option
of lessee, to the depository bank to which the annual delay rentals are to be paid, as
provided for in Paragraph - herein. The commencement of drilling or mining opera-
tions by the lessee herein, upon any part of the lands described herein, or upon acreage
with which this property has been pooled, shall not relieve said lessee, his successors or
assigns, of the obligation to pay the amount set forth above.
The rider contemplates that the top lessee will pay a portion of the bonus due upon execution of
the top lease. It subordinates the top lease to the rights of the bottom lessee under the terms of
the latter's lease. It provides for written notice and demand by the lessor upon termination of
the bottom lease. The rider then gives the top lessee a thirty-day option period to lease those
lands described in the lease that the top lessee has not previously (or during the option period)
released, by paying the remaining portion of the bonus due on a net mineral acre basis.
108. See mpra note 89.
109. Thus, if the bottom lessee drilled a dry hole on a portion of his lease, the top lessee
could, in effect, carve out the nonproductive acreage.
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terminates, without a further agreement from the bottom
lessee.
I. Make a good faith effort to determine whether the prior lease
has terminated or whether the primary term has been extended
by production or otherwise before entering onto the leased
premises to explore or drill under the top lease. Such effort
should include the following steps:
1. Title search, including, prior to drilling, an attor-
ney's title opinion; and,
2. A release from the prior lessee or, at least before
drilling, conclusive evidence that the prior lease
has expired, which will usually require proof of
nondevelopment as to all of the lands in the prior
lease and any lands with which any of such lands
have been pooled or unitized.
CONCLUSION
Legal authorities illuminate several features of top leases that are of sig-
nificant import to an oil and gas company engaged in the practice of top
leasing. The top lease must expressly recognize the existence of the prior
lease and be subject to it. Prior to entrance onto or possession of the leased
premises, the top lessee must be absolutely certain that the prior lease has
not been extended past its primary term by production, pooling, or other-
wise. Even if the primary term of the prior lease should have terminated
some years before the execution of the top lease, a top lessee may be a tres-
passer if he has actual or constructive notice that the prior lease is being held
by production.
In this regard, it is of paramount importance that the top lessee make a
good faith effort to determine whether the prior lease has in fact terminated,
whether the leased lands have been pooled with other lands, or whether the
prior lease is being held by production or otherwise. The top lessee should
conduct an independent title search and obtain an attorney's title opinion
before drilling. The top lessee should also conduct a surface examination.
The top lessee should obtain releases or, alternatively, assurances from the
lessor that the lessor has given notice and demand to the lessees or assignees
of any prior unreleased oil and gas leases. These would constitute the steps
that the top lessee must take to ensure the safety of his investment and to
shield him from liability to a bottom lessee.
In sum, an examination of the judicial decisions involving top leases
reveals that litigation can arise in a number of different circumstances.
From the legal perspective, there is much to be learned from the authority in
this area. As the practice of top leasing for oil and gas continues to prolifer-
ate, the top lessee who knows the law will stand a much better chance of
avoiding litigation.
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INTRODUCTION
The relationship between utilities and renewable energy' is important
because utilities will determine to a large extent the development of renewa-
ble energy in the United States. To understand this key role that utilities
will play, it is necessary to explain how utilities are regulated. The purpose
of this article is to provide both an overview of the ways in which renewable
energy applications affect utilities, and an analysis of relevant legal princi-
ples that shape this relationship.
The article is divided into three major sections. The first section in-
troduces the general nature of utility involvement in renewable energy use.
It discusses thet various types of utilities most likely to take an interest in
renewable energy, the kinds of applications that are the subject of this inter-
est, and the conditions that generally will trigger this utility interest. The
second section focuses on the legal relationship between utilities and decen-
tralized renewable energy applications-technologies which operate at the
site of the customer and reduce the need for the utility to provide power to
the customer. Because such decentralized technologies are presently market-
able, their use will have important legal and economic consequences for util-
ities. The final section outlines the important legal issues that arise from
1. "Renewable" energy forms are, as the term implies, capable of supplying energy by
resources that are largely inexhaustible. Such resources, and their applications, are:
Resource Application
(1) the sun (solar) hot water (active systems)
space heating and cooling (active)
passive systems (heating and cooling)
industrial process heat
solar thermal power (electricity)
photovoltaics (electricity)
(2) the wind wind energy conversion systems (electricity)
(3) biomass gas
alcohol fuels
residue waste heat (electricity)
(4) rivers low head hydroelectric power (electricity)
(5) the ocean ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC) (electricity)
waves and tidal power (electricity)
Several studies predict that these renewable energy forms could supply up to 20% of the
country's energy needs. Set H. KENDALL & S. NADis, ENERGY STRATEGIEs: TOWARD A SOLAR
FUTURE (1980); R. STOBAUGH & D. YERGIN, ENERGY FUTURE (1980); HousE COMM. ON EN-
ERGY AND COMMERCE, SOLAR ENERGY RESEARCH INSTIrTUE, REPORT ON BUILDING A SUS-
TAINABLE FUTURE, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1981).
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utilities' adoption of centralized renewable energy applications-technolo-
gies that allow utilities to provide power from renewable fuels directly to
customers. Due to their high cost and technical complexity, centralized re-
newable energy applications are not as market-ready as decentralized appli-
cations. Therefore, the discussion of legal issues is relatively brief.
I. OVERVIEW: THE NATURE OF UTILITY INVOLVEMENT. IN RENEWABLE
ENERGY APPLICATIONS
A. Types of Ut'lities and Their Dijfering Relationships to Renewable Energy
Utilities can be divided into several categories. The most obvious way
to classify utilities is by their end product. Utilities usually supply gas, elec-
tricity or both. Another way of classifying them is by their function. Some
electric utilities generate electricty; others purchase it wholesale from utilities
that generate electricity, and distribute or transmit it to their customers; still
others perform all of these functions. Gas utilities do not "generate" gas, but
merely purchase it from pipeline companies and distribute it to their
customers.
Utilities may also be classified by their ownership and regulation. Most
are privately owned and are regulated by state public utility commissions
(PUCs). Some are owned by the federal government and are generally oper-
ated by agencies of the Department of Energy or Interior under federal law.
Still others are owned by other public bodies, generally municipalities, and
regulated by municipal charter and state law. Finally, many are owned and
operated by rural nonprofit cooperatives that both generate and distribute
power to rural customers.
The final way of categorizing utilities is by the fuel used to produce
power. Gas utilities obviously use and sell natural and synthetic gas. Elec-
tric utilities, however, have a number of alternative sources of fuel. For
many years the cheapest fuels were gas and oil and, where available, conven-
tional and pumped storage hydroelectric power. With rising oil and gas
costs, and a reduction of new hydroelectric capacity, electric utilities turned
to coal and uranium as fuels.2 Many electric utilities now rely on a combi-
nation of fuels for differing needs. Nuclear plants are generally used to meet
the utilities' baseload requirements; coal-fired plants are used for intermedi-
ate needs; and power plants that rely on oil, gas, gas turbines, and diesels are
often used to meet the utilities' peaking requirements.
1. Electric Utilities and Renewable Energy
The electric power industry is comprised of a variety of utility systems,
2. The Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act (FUA), 42 U.S.C. § 8301 (Supp. III
1979), creates various restrictions upon the use of oil or gas by electric utilities and industrial
facilities. Strict rules limit the use of oil or gas in plants constructed after the passage of FUA.
In addition, existing powerplants must limit their use of natural gas to the quantity used during
the 1974-76 base period and, after January 1, 1990, must cease using gas entirely. These ex-
isting powerplants are free, under FUA, to switch from gas to oil. Thus, FUA, conceived in
1977 and enacted in 1978, has the immediate effect of encouraging electric utilities to reduce oil
and gas use, and increase coal consumption.
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some owned by private companies (investor-owned), some by the federal
government, municipalities, states, or public utility districts, and some by
electric cooperatives. In all there are nearly 4000 individual enterprises. As
in other industries, much of the total volume of utility business is handled by
a small fraction of the enterprises.
3
There are approximately 400 investor-owned electric power utilities, less
than ten percent of the systems in the entire industry. In terms of any index
of size, however, such as kilowatts of generating capacity or number of cus-
tomers, the investor-owned systems constitute the dominant segment of the
industry. Sizes of investor-owned systems range from the largest in the na-
tion with annual sales in excess of ninety million megawatt hours, to some of
the very smallest. The 200 largest systems own and operate more than sev-
enty-five percent of the generating capacity and serve about eighty percent
of the customers of the total electric power industry.
4
Because of sheer size alone, investor-owned electric utilities will play the
dominant role in utility interaction with renewable energy technologies.
The major responsibility for the regulation of investor-owned utility activi-
ties has traditionally rested with PUCs. The scope of the authority of state
utility commissions to regulate these systems varies considerably among the
states. Nevertheless, most state commissions have rather broad powers, in-
cluding the regulation of rates and adequacy of service, as well as authority
for certification of major property additions and utility involvement in own-
ership, sale, leasing, or financing of various marketing activities. These regu-
latory powers (and the state commissions that exercise them) will be critical
in determining the ultimate role investor-owned electric utilities will play in
the future of renewable energy development.
5
The other type of electric utility that may be active in the renewable
3. The data which follows regarding the structure and size of the electric utility industry
is drawn largely from the U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., Inventory of
Power Plants in the United States-Dec., 1979 (1980); and U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENERGY
INFORMATION ADMIN., National Power Surveys of the Federal Power Commission, conducted
in 1964, 1970, and 1974.
4. These large investor-owned systems are for the most part vertically integrated. The
majority are independently owned and operated, although many are subsidiaries of firms regis-
tered as holding companies under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C.
§ 79 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Some are subsidiaries of companies which for various reasons are
exempt from the provisions of that Act. These subsidiaries are grouped into holding companies
controlled by a few firms, which also operate electric utilities, and some are owned by nonoper-
ating holding companies. The subsidiaries of the nonoperating holding companies provide
roughly one-quarter of the generating capacity of the investor-owned segment.
Nearly all of the major investor-owned utilities operate integrated generation, transmission,
and distribution systems, and many are also engaged in distributing gas. In general, the electric
portion of these combination utilities has greater revenues and plant investment than the gas
portion. This is primarily due to the large investment in electrical production and transmission
facilities, compared to the smaller investment in distribution facilities for gas.
5. From the standpoint of renewable energy use, the crucial regulatory function is rate
approval. Typically, regulatory agencies first decide how much a utility will be allowed to earn,
and then approve rate schedules designed to produce that profit. The rate of return is a func-
tion of the rate base, those investments on which the utility may make a profit. Operating
expenses, including fuel costs, taxes, and other noncapital costs, are then added to determine the
total revenue needs. A decision to market or lease solar collectors would have to be approved by
the utility commission before these expenses could be added to the rate base. It should be noted
that the utility profits only if it makes an investment in capital. Therefore, a utility might
1982]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
energy field is that which is federally-owned. A few large federal agencies
market power in the forty-eight contiguous states: the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority (TVA), Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), Southwestern
Power Administration (SWPA), Southeastern Power Administration
(SEPA), Western Area Power Administration (WAPA), and Bureau of Rec-
lamation. They are important contributors to the electric power supply of
this country and are second only to the investor-owned systems in terms of
generating capacity. Federally-owned utilities- also supply much electric
power to other electric systems (for example, municipally-owned and rural
cooperatives). 6 Moreover, with the exception of the TVA, all the major fed-
eral utilities are operated by Department of Energy agencies. 7 This centrali-
zation of authority, combined with the extensive reach of federally-produced
electric power, suggests the far-reaching consequences of a decision to have
federally-owned utilities become actively involved in renewable energy.
8 In-
deed, it is likely that efforts to implement renewable energy programs on
federal utility systems will trigger more initiatives by privately-owned
utilities.
9
finance the purchase of solar collectors by homeowners, but the utility would lose the benefits of
depreciation and of the increase in its rate base.
6. The federal government's role in the electric utility field reflects a broad range of objec-
tives. The TVA was authorized in 1933 to develop hydroelectric power resources in the Tennes-
see River Basin in conjunction with navigation and flood control. Following essentially full
utilization of the hydroelectric potential of the basin, the TVA developed a comprehensive
power production system by adding fossil-fuel and nuclear generating plants. It is now the
nation's largest power system, having approximately twice the generating capacity of the next
largest, and is the only federal agency with full responsibility to supply all the electric power
requirements of a large geographical area. The TVA sells over half of its production at whole-
sale to municipal and cooperative systems, with most of the balance going to industrial custom-
ers and federal agencies.
Large federal power agencies other than the TVA market hydroelectric power and gener-
ally supplement the supplies of other systems. The Department of Energy is the marketing
agent for power produced by all federal projects other than the TVA. Except for sales to a
number of large industrial customers, nearly all of the power is sold at wholesale to other elec-
tric systems.
7. This is not to say that federally-owned utilities are subject only to Department of En-
ergy regulations. On the contrary, they are also controlled extensively by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC), which has responsibility for regulating wholesale rates of in-
terstate sales of gas and electricity, for setting and housing hydroelectric plants, and for sales
between utilities and small power producers and cogenerators. Set 16 U.S.C. §§ 797(c), 817,
824-837h (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C.
§ 2601 (Supp. IV 1980). The Securities and Exchange Commission regulates certain phases of
the subsidiaries of federally-owned utilities engaged in the electric utility business, including
accounting, security issuances, and inter-company transactions. Also, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission has authority to regulate construction of all nuclear reactors owned and operated
by federally-owned utilities.
8. See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, SOLAR ENERGY RESEARCH
INSTITUTE, REPORT ON BUILDING A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print
1981) [hereinafter cited as BUILDING A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE]; Bonneville Power Administration
Proposes Small Wind Machine 'lot Project, 1 SOLAR L. REP. 559 (1979); TV Moves Further Along
Solar Path, 1 SOLAR L. REP. 714 (1979).
9. Two other types of electric utilities-non-federal, public electric systems and rural elec-
tric cooperatives-also have some potential for renewable energy development. Nonfederal
public electric systems generate approximately one-tenth of total industry production. These
systems, which include towns, cities, a small number of counties, special utility districts, and
various kinds of state authorities, purchase approximately 35% of their requirements from the
federal systems and an additional 11% from the investor-owned systems.
Municipal utilities are by far the most common form of the public, nonfederal power en-
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2. Gas Utilities and Renewable Energy
Natural gas, originally a nuisance by-product of oil, is today a critical
component of our nation's energy supply. Gas now supplies roughly 19.8
quadrillion Btu's (quads) of energy to the United States market, or forty
percent of the energy consumed in residential and commercial buildings,
fifteen percent of that consumed by electric utilities, and thirty-eight percent
of that consumed in the industrial sector. '0 There is enormous regional vari-
ation in the pattern of gas use. In the Southwest, gas is the primary fuel for
electric utility generation. In the Midwest, it dominates the residential heat-
ing and industrial energy markets. Gas plays a relatively minor, but gradu-
ally increasing, role in the Northeast.
Utilities supplying natural gas have a potential interest in renewable
energy for two reasons. First, one renewable energy fuel, biomass, serves as a
relatively reliable source of gas supply. Because existing natural gas sources
are not adequate to satisfy the enormous demand for service that would exist
if oil users were free to switch to gas, utilities may be interested in the devel-
opment of new and renewable supplies of gas. I I Second, decentralized, non-
generating renewable energy applications, such as solar hot water and space
conditioning systems, may assist in reducing the demand for natural gas.
Since utilities may, despite the potential of biomass and other expensive
sources (e.g., coal gasification), be faced with declining gas supplies, they
may be willing to investigate ways of reducing demand through decentral-
ized solar use.
Despite this potential, several federal and state policies inhibit gas util-
ity interest in the development of natural gas supplies through renewable
sources or in the reduction of demand for natural gas through decentralized
solar applications. The production and consumption of natural gas has been
declining slowly since the early 1970's. This production trend, however, is
likely to reverse itself due to the price incentives provided by the Natural
Gas Policy Act of 1978,12 which requires gradual deregulation of prices
through the 1980's. As prices rise, production companies should have more
short-term incentive to locate and develop existing sources of conventional
tity. They vary in size from very small systems, serving only a few hundred customers, to the
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, which serves over a million customers. In a
relatively few instances (e.g., Cleveland, Ohio), a municipal and an investor-owned system serve
within the same municipality. Some municipal utilities are taking an active interest in renewa-
ble energy technologies. See California Cities Considenng Municipal Solar Utilities, I SOLAR L. REP.
529 (1979); L.A. Ciy Utilid> Makes So/ar Loans, 1 SOLAR L. REP. 908 (1980); Voters Approve Munici
pal Utlyt So/ar Loans, 1 SOLAR L. REP. 914 (1980).
The Rural Electrification Administration, established as a lending agency in 1936, has
financed the construction of about a thousand rural electric service cooperatives in 46 states,
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. These utilities range in size from less than 100 members to
as many as 35,000. Although they have a membership representing 10% of all electric power
customers in the country, their total sales of energy are only about four and one-half percent of
the national total, and their generating capacity is about one percent. Even if these utilities
become involved in renewable energy promotion, their impact will be fairly small.
10. &e BUILDING A SUSTAINABLE FUTRE, supra note 8, at 907.
11. It has been estimated that between 0.2 and 4.0 quads of gas could be produced from
biomass annually at prices ranging between $5.90 and 88.40/MBtu. BUILDING A SUSTAINABLE
FuTuRE, supra note 8, at 908.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 3301 (Supp. IV 1980).
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natural gas, and less incentive to develop new and relatively more expensive
sources of biomass.
On the demand side, solar systems will be able to compete with natural
gas only if the cost of solar systems is below projected gas prices. Despite
phased deregulation of natural gas, and despite tax incentives for solar space
heating and hot water, solar system costs appear to be well above the fore-
casted costs of natural gas. One study commissioned by the American Gas
Association yielded the following pessimistic findings:
Solar heating systems in the residential gas market will have mini-
mal impact on gas utilities through 1990. Conventional gas space
heating and hot water systems remain more economical than com-
parable solar systems through the year 1990, based on current esti-
mates of gas prices derived from the American Gas Association.
Projected U.S. annual energy savings from solar-gas space heating
and/or hot water systems in the residential gas market indicate
that with no utility involvement solar energy savings in 1990 are
less than 0.5 percent. Even with utilities providing lease arrange-
ments, solar savings represent only 2 percent of the residential gas
demand for 1990.
t 3
Interest in renewable energy development is minimized further by fed-
eral and state policies that allow gas utilities to charge customers rates that
reflect only the average cost of the gas. Average cost pricing rolls in expen-
sive, new, deregulated sources of gas with less expensive regulated gas, and
results in an average price that is still below the cost of the new sources. One
result is that customers are not confronted with, and do not have to pay, the
actual cost of providing the gas. Consequently, alternatives to natural gas,
such as renewable energy forms, are not able to compete. Only when gas
prices are set according to their marginal cost-the price that reflects, to the
maximum extent practicable, the actual cost of supplying the gas-will re-
newable energy appear to be a more attractive investment option to gas util-
ities and their customers.
Because the prospects for gas utility involvement in renewable energy
appear uncertain, most of the following analysis concentrates on electric util-
ities. Electric utilities may be interested in renewable energy development
because, unlike gas utilities, they are generally required to provide electricity
to any customer in their service area. This requirement ensures that electric
utilities will find renewable energy useful either as a supplemental source of
fuel for generating capacity or as a means of regulating and reducing de-
mand on existing capacity. Also, because electricity is more widely used
than gas, it is a more likely source of back-up power for decentralized renew-
able energy applications, thereby precipitating electric utility interest in the
effect such back-up requirements will have on the utility system.14 Finally,
13. D. BOYD, J. CASKEY, G. PRICE, & P. SPEWAK, SOLAR IMPACTS ON GAS UTILITIES, XI-
xii (1976).
14. One countervailing trend argues ihfawr of future gas utility interest in renewable en-
ergy. In recent years, supplies of gas have not kept pace with projected demand. The opportu-
nities available for increasing fuel supplies, primarily imported liquefied natural gas and
gasified coal, involve high costs and technical and environmental uncertainty. Thus, for some
uses, current solar heating technology may be on the brink of economic viability. Because re-
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as noted above, of all the different types of electric utilities, the size and
market penetration of the investor-owned, PUC-regulated sector makes it
the most likely candidate to take the lead in renewable energy development.
Unless otherwise noted, this type of electric utility is the focus of the remain-
der of this article.
B. Prospects for Utility Interest n Renewable Energy
Although it appears that investor-owned electric utilities will be most
likely to become involved in renewable energy, their involvement is by no
means assured. Renewable energy must be cost competitive with conven-
tional investment options before any type of utility will participate in its
applications. For example, utilities will not be much interested in decentral-
ized renewable energy applications to reduce demand on their load if such
applications are unable to compete economically with traditional demand
reduction techniques, such as conservation and load management. Before
utilities seriously consider using renewable energy fuels and their related
generating technologies, such investment options must appear economical
when compared with conventional approaches.
Although it may be economical for some utilities to invest in or take
advantage of renewable energy technologies, institutional and regulatory
barriers may intervene. For example, even if an active solar space heating
unit can reduce the demand on an overloaded electric utility more cheaply
than either new capacity or traditional home conservation measures, the
utility may still be uninterested in the solar system if the solar unit functions
best only during off-peak hours and therefore does not reduce the utility's
peak load requirements. Even if the solar unit is both cheaper than con-
servation and able to shave the utility's peak, PUC regulations may forbid
the utility from commercializing or even encouraging customer use of the
solar system.15 Similarly, if a utility with insufficient capacity decides that
an investment in a large, electricity-producing wind machine is less expen-
sive than conventional nuclear or coal-fired power plants, it may neverthe-
less reject the option if the reliability of either the wind resource or the
equipment itself is uncertain. Even given that the wind machine is both
cheaper than conventional capacity and reliable, the utility may lose interest
if it decides that it will be too difficult to comply with local siting
regulations. 16
Economic, institutional, and legal issues will thus shape the nature and
extent of utility involvement in renewable energy. What follows is an analy-
sis of these issues, divided according to whether the potential utility involve-
ment is in decentralized or centralized renewable energy applications. This
newable energy may be used as a substitute for natural gas, certain gas utilities have begun to
show considerable interest in exploiting the market. In some states, gas companies have re-
quested permission to market solar energy devices as part of a combined gas/solar energy
package.
15. See, e.g., Laitos & Feuerstein, May Regulated Utih'esMAonopolie t/e ?, 56 DEN. L. J. 31,
43-47 (1979).
16. See, e.g., Noun, Lotker, & Friesema, Utility Siting of WECS: A Preliminary Le-
gal/Regulatory Assessment, SERI Rep. TR-744-778 (May 1981).
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bifurcated organization is compelled by the fact that the legal questions fac-
ing utilities will vary according to whether the renewable energy applica-
tions are on the customer's premises (decentralized) or controlled by the
utility (centralized). Also, decentralized renewable applications produce dif-
ferent economic and institutional consequences for utilities than centralized
applications; the former reduce the utility's need to supply power but the
latter allow the utility to supply power. Although the focus of the discussion
is legal and regulatory, a significant amount of analysis is devoted to eco-
nomic and institutional issues. This non-legal analysis is necessary because
any legal and regulatory questions which emerge are largely the result of the
economic and institutional conditions confronting utilities interested in re-
newable energy applications.
II. UTILITIES AND DECENTRALIZED RENEWABLE ENERGY APPLICATIONS
There are two kinds of decentralized renewable applications which will
have the most immediate effect on utilities in the 1980's. The first, which
may be labeled "nonelectric solar technologies," reduces the user's need for
conventionally-supplied hot water, space heating, and space cooling. Exam-
ples are active solar hot water systems, active space heating and cooling sys-
tems, and passive systems.
The second of these renewable technologies produces electricity for the
user. Renewable technologies having this effect are small wind energy con-
version systems, photovoltaic applications, low head hydroelectric facilities,
and small scale plants which burn biomass to turn a generator. These elec-
tricity-producing technologies, like the nonelectric technologies, decrease the
demand on the utility's load. 17 Unlike nonelectric technologies, however,
17. Because the primary effect of both electric and nonelectric decentralized renewable
applications is to reduce demand, utilities will be interested in promoting them if two conditions
are present: 1) if demand reduction improves profits; and 2) if the innovations can successfully
compete with such traditional methods of reducing demand as conservation and load manage-
ment techniques.
Several factors influence whether electric utilities will demonstrate much interest in decen-
tralized renewable applications. Utilities with low reserve margins should be interested because
customer use of renewable energy will help such utilities should an electric generating unit fail.
Utilities with low load factors should be attracted because these technologies improve the utili-
ties' annual load factor by coupling the renewable application with a load management system.
Still others with high load growth rates should be interested because customer use of such en-
ergy might be more economical than the installation of new generating capacity. Because of the
high cost and uncertain availability of imported oil, utilities burning it would be interested in
the ability of renewable energy sources to reduce this consumption. Similarly, because environ-
mental and safety concerns have delayed bringing nuclear capacity on line, utilities that have
planned for nuclear capacity should be considered good prospects for decentralized renewable
energy development. Finally, utilities will be more interested in renewable energy applications
where high electricity costs create an incentive for the consumer to find alternative ways to meet
energy needs. See Utilties Put the Sun to Work, ELErRIC POWER RESEARcH INST. J., at 26 Mar.
1978; J. Laitos, W. Brown, & R. Taylor, Proceedings: SERI-ERA Workshop on Electric Utility
Involvement in Residential Solar Applications, SERI Rep. CP-733-781 Oct. 1981.
Even with these factors, a utility may be uninterested in decentralized renewable applica-
tions if its management believes that conservation and load management techniques can reduce
costs more cheaply and effectively. Of particular interest are load management technologies
that allow utilities to install more baseload capacity (which is most economically operated at
high capacity factors) and thereby reduce the consumption of oil and gas needed for peaking
units. Utility system storage could achieve this benefit by enabling generators to charge for
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these applications often have the potential of generating more electricity
than the user can absorb. In such circumstances, the user will want to sell
this excess power to the utility, which the utility may or may not want to
buy.
A. Utihties and Nonelectric, Decentralized, Renewable Technologies
Potential users of nonelectric renewable technologies are both varied
and numerous. Single family residences are currently the most common,
with a growing trend among multi-user residential systems, including apart-
ment buildings, condominiums, and mobile home parks, as well as commer-
cial establishments, such as shopping centers, industrial parks, schools, and
office buildings. Even the agricultural and industrial sectors have begun to
use solar assisted process heat to carry out certain manufacturing and agri-
cultural processes.
1 8
Expanded use of nonelectric renewable applications by these end-users
may produce different responses by utilities and their regulators. Utilities
unhappy with the technical and economic effects of solar on the utility sys-
tem might prefer to refuse to provide back-up power to solar users. PUCs
may allow utilities to charge discriminatory rates to users for back-up power;
or, instead of resisting renewable applications, utilities may seek to sell, lease,
or finance renewable energy systems.
1. The Effect of Nonelectric Renewable Technologies on Utilities
The effect of solar technologies on an electric utility's load profile,
which is the systemwide electric demand placed on the utility each hour, is
the primary utility concern. Some type of conventional auxiliary system is
needed to provide back-up energy when the solar system is not providing the
necessary energy, either because of a malfunction, cloudy weather, or the
demand outstripping the supply from the solar unit. If the backup energy
used is electricity, the utility must maintain reserve capacity. However,
when the solar unit is operative, this capacity will often remain idle. The
load factor (the ratio of the average electric use during a period of time to
the maximum amount demanded by a particular use during the same pe-
riod) is thus low when this occurs. The lower the load factor is, the fewer the
storage during off peak hours and dispatch stored energy during peak consumption hours. Load
management technologies and conservation techniques would operate on the demand side by
load leveling, or by decreasing consumption during peak hours and increasing consumption
during off-peak hours. See Taylor, Rates, Conservation, and Alternative Energy Sources, paper
delivered to Planning, Conservation, and Regulation: Issues for the 80's Workshop, Laramie,
Wyoming (Nov. 1979).
If the adoption of decentralized renewable energy sources appears disadvantageous to a
utility, the utility might not be adverse to renewable energy development providing it was absle
to recover costs through an appropriate rate structure. Renewable energy may also be of inter-
est to a utility if: 1) it perceives certain noncost institutional benefits that reduce demand,
including, for example, when such involvement helps to ensure the growth of the utility; 2) de-
centralized renewable applications affect its demand forecasting abilities; or 3) regulating agen-
cies or laws require some level of utility participation in renewable energy. See, e.g., Title II of
the National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8211-8226 (Supp. 111 1979).
18. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, SOLAR ENERGY FOR AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL
PROCESS HEAT, PROGRAM SUMMARY (1978).
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total units of energy over which the capital cost for the capacity can be
spread, and the higher the rates. A utility's peaking capacity, though rarely
used, must be kept in reserve and paid for through the rates charged over the
entire year. 19
Since the extra peaking equipment has fixed capital costs which must
be paid for during the extended periods of no solar customer demand, the
unit cost for serving the solar customer's occasional demand will be higher
than that for the nonsolar customer, who has a higher but steadier demand.
Therefore, some utilities argue that solar customers should pay higher rates
for infrequently used back-up electrical service to compensate for revenue
losses resulting from the necessity of maintaining peak capacity. Without
the higher rates, nonsolar users arguably subsidize solar users.
These potential problems can be exacerbated by two factors: the extent
of penetration of renewable energy technologies in a utility's service area and
the timing of back-up demand by users of these technologies. The scenario
envisioned by some commentators is that with widespread penetration in a
utility's service area and a period of inclement weather during a peak period,
users of renewable energy devices must rely on back-up energy, thereby
worsening the utility's peaking problems. The results are similar for winter
peaking natural gas utilities which must meet peak demands with expensive
liquefied natural gas, or other costly substitutes.
20
All these potential adverse consequences depend on a number of factors.
For example, one must determine whether customers using renewable energy
devices will require auxiliary energy during peak utility hours. Several vari-
ables influence the timing and duration of the need for auxiliary energy.
Some examples are the amount of solar system storage, weather conditions
during previous days, the size of the solar collector, and conservation mea-
sures undertaken by the user. Differences also exist between utility charac-
teristics which may also influence the impact of renewable energy systems on
a utility's load profile. These characteristics include customer mix, genera-
tion mix, the type of fuel used in the service area, and the timing and extent
19. Utility spokespersons most frequently cite as the primary difficulty, and as their domi-
nant concern, the potential disruption of the utility's load factors. Load factors, the percentage
of total capacity in operation at any given time, are crucial because they are directly related
both to the rates charged to customers and to profits. While the ideal demand curve would be
flat, the normal energy demand curve is a series of peaks and valleys in both diurnal and annual
cycles. The utility must maintain sufficient capacity to meet the peaks, even though the upper
15% of the annual demand occurs only about 10% of the time, and the yearly maximum may
last only a few hours.
Decentralized renewable energy usage could potentially disrupt load factors unless prop-
erly integrated into the utility system. An extended period of low insolation might increase the
peak load demand as the solar energy system's storage capacity is exhausted. However, during
periods of high insolation the solar energy system would require little auxiliary energy. As a
result, the utility would have lower valleys without a corresponding reduction in peak demand.
See Lawrence & Minan, The Competith.e Aspects of Utility Participation n Solar Development, 54 IND.
L.J. 229 (1979).
20. For a discussion of the impacts of solar systems on electric utilities, see OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, APPLICATION OF SOLAR TECHNOLOGY TO TODAY'S ENERGY
NEEDS 151-59 (1978); J. Laitos & R. Feuerstein, Regulated Utilities and Solar Energy, SERI
Report No. TR-62-255, at 62-65 (June 1979).
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of system peak demands.
2 1
The nature of a renewable energy application will also affect its impact
on a utility. Solar water heaters can be expected to impact favorably on
operations during the summer peak, which occurs during hot afternoons
when the air conditioning load is high. A utility's peak is determined by the
temperature, which is related to insolation, and it can be expected to occur
on one of the hottest days of the year or after a period of several consecutive
hot days.
Solar space heating should not cause difficulties for utilities when the
highest winter peak is considerably less than the summer peak. Adequate
capacity to meet the auxiliary energy needs of buildings equipped with solar
space heating should be available. The available reserve for a utility may
not, however, be dramatically larger in the winter than in the summer.
Although solar space cooling systems are not yet as developed as solar
heating and hot water systems, they should have a significant effect on sum-
mer-peaking utilities in the future because air conditioning loads are primar-
ily responsible for summer peaks. An efficient solar cooling system can
reduce consumption of electricity during peak periods and thereby reduce
the utility's maintained capacity, which will offset reductions in revenue re-
sulting from fewer sales of electricity. Improperly designed systems, how-
ever, could serve only to create greater utility problems.
The incorporation of passive design into a structure will reduce radiant
heat gain through windows in the summer and maximize that gain in the
winter. Consequently, a passive home can maintain a more consistent in-
door temperature with reduced reliance on mechanical heating and cooling
systems. Passive homes are thus likely to have peak shaving capabilities for
utilities.
22
The use of peak energy by owners of renewable energy technologies can
be minimized by encouraging daily diversity of consumption. Such diversity
can be accomplished by applying electric heating storage technology to cer-
tain solar applications. Proper utilization of thermal storage takes advan-
tage of the fact that the period of collection and the time of demand are not
necessarily coincident. Since the technology of thermal storage for active
solar systems is well developed and relatively inexpensive, and since storage
of electricity is prohibitively costly, storage of heated or chilled water is an
extremely attractive load management alternative. Passive design also
utilizes dense building materials to store heat for long periods. With proper
thermal storage, a solar system may operate through peak periods without
resorting to auxiliary power, though optimal sizing of storage capacity for
21. Feldman & Anderson, Fnancial Incentives for the Adoption of Solar Energy Design." Peak Load
riing of Back-up Systems, 17 SOLAR ENERGY 339 (1976).
22. Reliable data measuring the impact of nonelectric solar technologies on utilities is
sparse. Among the better published studies are: S. FELDMAN & B. ANDERSON, UTILITY PRic-
ING AND SOLAR ENERGY DESIGN (Sept. 1976) [hereinafter cited as UTILITY PRICING]; H.
LORSCH, IMPLICATIONS OF RESIDENTIAL SOLAR SPACE CONDITIONING ON ELECTRIC UTILI-
TIES (Franklin Inst. publishers 1977); AEROSPACE CORP. SHACOB: REQUIREMENTS, DEFINI-
TION AND IMPACT ANALYSIS, FINAL REPORT (Electric Power Research Inst. publisher 1978);
Dickson, Eichen, & Feldman, Solar Energy and US Pub/ic Utilities, ENERGY POL'Y (SEPT. 1977).
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active systems is essential.
23
A number of designs for solar buildings can improve a utility's eco-
nomic position. Areas of the country with reasonably high heating loads
commonly have adjoining electric utilities with differing peak seasons. One
utility may peak in the summer because of urban needs for air conditioning,
while its neighbor, with more rural customers, peaks in the winter. A build-
ing using an active solar hot water and space heating system might harm a
winter-peaking utility's load curve. A few miles away the same building de-
sign could help eliminate a water heating load from the utility's summer
peak. A relatively simple change in design to replenish storage with off-peak
or intermittently interrupted electric use could solve the problem for the first
utility.
24
If a utility's cost of encouraging installation of renewable energy systems
is less than or comparable to the cost of producing the same amount of en-
ergy at the margin, it might be advantageous for the utility to provide incen-
tives for installing such systems. The increased savings result from the
ability of a utility either to reduce the use of its most expensive generating
capacity or to avoid the capital expenditures necessary to increase current
capacity.
2. Responses of Utilities to Nonelectric Renewable Technologies
In light of these probable negative and positive effects of nonelectric
renewable technologies, utilities are likely to respond in one of two contra-
dictory ways. First, utilities may seek to discriminate against renewable en-
ergy users, either by refusing to provide back-up power or by urging PUCs to
adopt rates that charge solar customers higher rates for back-up electricity.
Conversely, utilities may choose to encourage the introduction of renewable
technologies by participating in their marketing and commercial develop-
ment. Regardless of what the utility wishes to do, however, an important
question is the legality of the utility's response.
a. Utility Discrimination Against Renewable Energy Users
(i) Service Discrimination
A regulated utility may not decline to provide backup gas or electricity
for structures equipped with nonelectric renewable energy technologies un-
less it can demonstrate a compelling case that backup service would cause
substantial harm to existing customers. Refusal to provide service would not
only transgress federal antitrust laws and state antidiscrimination statutes,
25
but it would also violate the utility's common law and statutory duty to
23. Lawrence & Minan, Solar Energp and Public Utility Rate Regulation, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
550, 574 (1979).
24. Sullivan, Getting Along Together, ELE CRIC POWER RESEARCH INST. J., Dec. 1978, at
18, 19.
25. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Re Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co., 9 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 97 (1955) (Cal.); Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976);.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48.3 1-1 (West 1969).
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provide utility service.
26
The basic concept of a public utility is an entity that has dedicated its
property to serve the public without discrimination. Almost every state has
a statutory provision requiring utilities to provide safe and adequate service
at just and reasonable rates. The United States Supreme Court enunciated
the underlying purpose of these statutes in the following terms:
Corporations which devote their property to a public use may not
pick and choose, serving only the portions of the territory covered
by their franchises which it is presently profitable for them to serve
and restricting the development of the remaining portions by leav-
ing their inhabitants in discomfort without the service which they
alone can render.
2 7
This duty to provide adequate service has certain limits. Utilities will
be excused from providing service when prevented from doing so by acts of
God, labor disputes, and shortages of fuel. Although there is substantial pre-
cedent to the contrary, in some cases utilities have been excused from provid-
ing service when to do so would be unusually expensive.
28
The "duty to serve" requirement is usually interpreted on a case-by-case
basis where "reasonableness" and the "public interest" are the typical court
standards of review. If a renewable energy device requires back-up service,
the public interest probably demands that the utility provide service. Utili-
ties may seek to avoid this duty by arguing that such devices require the
utility to build and maintain expensive peaking equipment that would only
be used infrequently (for example, when cloudy periods have drained solar
storage facilities, and the owners are consequently demanding power at the
time when demand from other customers is at its peak). This argument may
be rebutted since utilities can condition the receipt of back-up power on the
installation of equipment that will draw power from the utility only during
nonpeak periods. Even if such a condition did not eliminate the peak de-
mand induced by solar customers, the public interest in fuel conservation
might justify the enforcement of the duty to serve.
The duty to serve could be used to encourage renewable energy applica-
tions. For example, a gas company could refuse to provide gas connections
to new residences not equipped with solar heating and cooling equipment.
Such a discriminatory practice could be viewed as "reasonable" if there were
natural gas shortages. Some states have already taken measures to condition
the receipt of gas on the implementation of various conservation measures.
2 9
26. See Hodel & Wendel, The Duty and Responsibility of Oregon Pub/ic Agencies to Provide Ade-
quate and Sufitzini Electnial Utility Service, 54 OR. L. REv. 539 (1975); Note, The Duty of a Utility to
Render Adequate Service. Its Scope and Enforcement, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 312 (1962).
27. New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 245 U.S. 345, 351 (1917). For a general
discussion of a utility's duty to serve, see Hodel & Wendel, supra note 26.
One key federal statute, the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C.
§ 2601 (Supp. III 1979), specifically requires utilities to provide back-up power for electricity-
producing renewable technologies (z"e., "small power producers").
28. Compare Corporation Comm'n v. Southern Pac. Co., 55 Ariz. 173, 99 P.2d 702 (1940)
with Re Union Elec. Co., 90 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 194 (1950) (Mo.).
29. See, e.g., New York Pub. Serv. Comm'n Case 26206 (Apr. 16, 1974), where New York
banned the use of natural gas in buildings without adequate insulation; see also Colorado Pub.




(a) legality of rates harmful to users of renewable
energy devices
It has been demonstrated above how economic problems can be created
for a utility supplying back-up service to nonelectric renewable energy users.
These problems arise because most utility customers require service during
the entire year, but renewable energy users require back-up service only
when the storage capacity of their systems has been expended. Furthermore,
the demand for backup service is likely to coincide with peak demand
periods.
30
Renewable energy use may affect rates for solar customers. Public util-
ity rates have traditionally been based on cost-of-service principles. The pri-
mary principle is that a utility, by law, is entitled to recover all its costs.
Utilities generally incur three kinds of costs: 1) service costs (metering and
billing of customers); 2) energy costs (purchase of fuel); and 3) demand costs
(plant-related costs). Because renewable energy users may add to the util-
ity's demand costs, by requiring the utility to invest in excess capacity, appli-
cation of cost-of-service principles could result in high rates.
High rates for renewable energy users would necessarily be discrimina-
tory. Such rates are probably not illegal because of the principle that utili-
ties may discriminate between classes of customers if there is a reasonable
basis for distinguishing them.3 ' Users of decentralized renewable energy de-
vices may be distinguished because of the unpredictable nature of their de-
mand for power, their use of less gas and electricity than other customers,
and their ability to use storage facilities to control the time of day they de-
mand power.
Moreover, despite state laws prohibiting utility discrimination, 32 several
cases have interpreted these laws so that it will be difficult to challenge rate
structures that adversely affect renewable energy users.33 Other cases have
30. The annual peak load or peak demand represents the maximum power requirement
upon the utility, and therefore determines the necessary plant size. Gas distribution utilities
frequently experience their annual peak load during the coldest days of the year. Some electric
utilities also experience a winter annual peak load. If a solar hot water or solar space heating
unit does not operate during these winter-peaking periods, the user will want to draw conven-
tional power from the utility. Similarly, for electric utilities peaking during the summer due to
air conditioning loads, solar users will rely on utility-furnished electricity because solar space
cooling systems are not as efficient as conventional air conditioning. In order to satisfy the total
demand for energy during these peak periods, the utility must have adequate generating capac-
ity. However, since the back-up demand from solar users is only intermittent, the utility might
have to invest in excess capacity to meet this peaking demand. For a discussion of public utility
economics, see J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES (1961); P. GARFIELD &
W. LovEjoY, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS (1964); 1 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULA-
TION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS (1970); id. vol. 2 (1971); A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUB-
LIC UTILITY REGULATION (1969). For a discussion of factors that create either winter or
summer-peaking utilities see THE AEROSPACE CORP., SOLAR HEATING AND COOLING OF
BUILDINGS (SHACOB) REQUIREMENTS, DEFINITION AND IMPACT ANALYSIS, INTERIM RE-
PORT 2 (1977); Lawrence & Minan, supra note 19, at 236.
31. See Hicks v. City of Monroe Util. Comm'n, 29 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 275 (1959)
(La.); A. PRIEST, supra note 30.
32. Se supra note 25.
33. See A. PRIEST, supra note 30, at 288.
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also upheld the legality of rate structures that provide a direct subsidy for
the use of one source of energy (electricity),34 and in these jurisdictions a rate
structure incidentally burdening a competing source of energy would also be
valid.
A renewable energy user may also seek relief from discriminatory rates
under federal antitrust statutes. The Supreme Court has held that the Fed-
eral Power Act of 192035 provides no clear legislative intent to make the
antitrust laws inapplicable to electric utilities. It has further held that the
actions of the utility in refusing to sell at wholesale constitute anticompeti-
tive and monopolistic practices in violation of section two of the Sherman
Act. 36 Under these principles, a decision to punish users of renewable energy
with exorbitant rates, if based on a desire to protect its monopoly position,
might be deemed anticompetitive and in violation of the Sherman Act. In
another case, 37 the Court has held that the "state action" exemption to ap-
plication of the antitrust laws does not apply by the mere fact of state utility
commission approval of a utility practice. 38 Therefore, a commission-ap-
proved utility rate practice that discriminates either for or against renewable
energy users does not appear to have a state action exemption from the anti-
trust laws.
The Court has also held that a municipality adopting discriminatory
practices, in providing utility services in furtherance of its own policies, may
be subject to federal antitrust laws. Only when a municipality has acted
pursuant to the state's command would the state action exemption apply.
39
Thus, both investor-owned and municipally-owned electric utilities could be
subject to antitrust scrutiny if their pricing practices were monopolistic. A
renewable energy user could maintain that high back-up rates, designed to
slow the commercialization of renewable energy, are anticompetitive and so
monopolistic as to be in violation of the Sherman Act.
The United States Constitution is unlikely to provide restraints on dis-
criminatory rates for or against renewable energy users. Under the four-
teenth amendment, it is unconstitutional for "any state" to deprive any
person of property without due process of law. 40 Violations cannot occur,
however, through the actions of private persons or groups.4 The actions of
a municipally-owned utility are likely to be considered "state actions" and
subject to fourteenth amendment prohibitions. 42 On the other hand, the
34. For cases upholding rates that tend to benefit specific classes of customers see Rossi v.
Garton, 60 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 210 (1965); Re Promotional Activities by Gas & Elec.
Corps., 68 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 162 (1967); Gifford v. Central Me. Power Co., 63 PUB. U.
REP. 3d (PUR) 208 (1966); Oklahoma v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 9 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR)
369 (1975) (Okla).
35. 16 U.S.C. § 791 (1976).
36. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
37. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
38. Se. gentrally Gross, Impact of the Antitrust Laws on the Commercialization of Solar
Heating and Cooling, SERI Rept. No. TR-62-272 (June 1979).
39. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
40. U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
41. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
42. See Memphis Light, Gas, & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
19821
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
actions of an investor-owned utility, even PUC-approved discriminatory ac-
tions, might not constitute sufficient state action.4 3 In the absence of state
action, due process challenges based upon the fourteenth amendment will
fail.
Even if state action can be shown, the solar customer seeking to invali-
date the practice on constitutional grounds must show that the practice is a
denial of property without due process. While the United States Supreme
Court has not directly addressed this question, lower courts have suggested
that a solar user would find no relief in the fourteenth amendment. One
lower federal court has even concluded that residential users of electricity do
not have a property interest protected by the due process clause in the rates
they pay.44
If discriminatory rates for solar users are considered legal, two aspects of
nonelectric renewable technologies may mitigate the negative aspects of such
rates. First, depending upon the solar unit's storage capability, owners
might advantageously be able to alter the timing of the demands for back-up
service. If solar back-up demand coincides with the days of high demand for
conventional service, then the utility is justified in charging its solar custom-
ers higher rates. However, if solar storage allows the demand to be concen-
trated on off-peak hours, the on-peak demand will be diminished and the
utility will be more likely to satisfy the needs of all classes of energy consum-
ers without expanding plant capacity. Such a result would justify lower
rates to solar users.
45
The second mitigating factor is that PUCs may impose rates that dis-
criminate ti favor of renewable energy users. Because renewable energy sys-
tems have the potential to reduce some utility capacity expansion and fuel
expenditures, and thereby cut costs to all customers, it could be argued that
promotional rates benefiting renewable energy users are neither unreasona-
ble nor unlawful. This form of benign discrimination is consistent with na-
tional policy goals of energy conservation and environmental protection.
Utility commissions and courts have supported programs to finance the in-
stallation of insulation, and have prohibited the end-uses of energy not con-
tributing to conservation. 46 A program directly assisting solar customers,
while indirectly benefiting other customers, may similarly be found
reasonable.
4 7
43. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). If a PUC initiates state
involvement by ordmnhg that a discriminatory practice be undertaken by the utility, then a suffi-
ciently close nexus to state action is likely to exist. See Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S.
451 (1952).
44. See Georgia Power Project v. Georgia Power Co., 409 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Ga. 1975);
Wood v. Public Util. Comm'n, 83 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 494 (1971) (Cal.).
45. See generally deGrasse, Elecn'c Storage Heating After Two Years, 99 PuB. UTIL. FORT., Jan.
6, 1977, at 23.
46. See, e.g., Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 10 PUB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 478 (1975) (D.C.); Re
Pacific Power & Light Co., 69 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 367 (1967) (Idaho); In re Mich. Consol.
Gas Co. for Authorization of a Program for the Conservation of Natural Gas, 1 PUB. U. REP.
4th (PUR) 229 (1973) (Mich.); National Swimming Pool Inst. v. Kahn, 9 Pub. U. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 237 (1975) (N.Y.).
47. Some states have passed legislation that forbids increased rates for solar back-up. See,
e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 156 (West Supp. 1981-82).
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(b) alternative rate structures for the renewable energy
user
In light of these legal and economic considerations, there are a number
of alternative rate structures to impose on nonelectric renewable energy tech-
nologies. Before discussing alternative rate structures for the solar user, how-
ever, it is important to repeat that all rates must allow the utility to recover
its costs. Moreover, a utility's notion of cost can have an important impact
on rates charged to solar customers.
There are basically two definitions of cost that a utility may use in seek-
ing to charge rates: average cost and marginal cost. Using the average cost
approach, utilities calculate their revenue requirements and then allocate
the costs among various classes of customers (e.g., residential, industrial,
commercial) on the basis of the energy and demand patterns of each of these
classes. The allocated costs then provide the basis to set rates. Because own-
ers of renewable energy systems require backup systems, often at the utility's
peak, such customers have higher capacity costs per increment of power con-
sumed. Using the average cost approach, regular rates applied to such users
may result in an under recovery of costs, thereby justifying a higher rate for
their class.
This average cost methodology may be criticized for including less ex-
pensive costs incurred in the past, and for excluding the more expensive re-
placement costs of supplying additional units of service. As an alternative to
average costs, many economists and some utilities have proposed basing
rates on marginal costs, which provide a more correct price signal to the
customer. 48 In most cases, marginal costs can be expected to be higher than
average costs due to escalating fuel costs, the high costs of capital, and envi-
ronmental protection requirements. Marginally cost-based time-differenti-
ated rates would solve the problem of underrecovery of revenues from
renewable energy users that may occur with average cost-based rates. When
such a user requires peak use of electricity, then the price paid under a rate
based on marginal costs would reflect the higher costs of providing that ser-
vice. Likewise, the cost of using auxiliary energy during off-peak periods
would be lower than at peak periods. Such a rate structure would create an
incentive for the renewable energy user to install either a load control device
or a large thermal storage component to avoid paying the higher peak price
of auxiliary energy.
Given significant market penetration of renewable energy systems,
properly designed active solar units using utility energy mainly during off-
peak periods could reduce both the short and long term marginal costs of
utilities. Systems that perform well during summer peaks and that are
designed to utilize off-peak energy may reduce a utility's short-run marginal
costs by reducing the demand for high cost peaking fuels. In the long run,
such systems could delay or reduce the need for some peaking capacity. The
use of off-peak energy could also increase the efficiency of power generation




by spreading out the demand for energy, facilitating greater use of base and
intermediate load equipment.
Despite the seeming benefits of marginally based rates, utilities and
PUCs have traditionally based rates on average rather than marginal costs.
Therefore, it is from this average cost viewpoint that they have addressed the
issue of appropriate rates for users of renewable energy devices. One method
that might be used to recover costs from such customers is the standby
charge. In its most inflexible form, this would be a capacity charge for the
connected load for which standby service is being provided. The rationale
for this rate is that the utility is obligated to "stand by" and be prepared to
provide service when the renewable energy system is inoperative. This
charge, aimed solely at renewable energy customers, is obviously
discriminatory.
Another proposed method to allow recovery of capacity costs is a de-
mand-energy charge. Under such a rate schedule, a customer would receive
charges for both kilowatt-hour and kilowatt usage. This rate requires a
meter which records the maximum demand of electricity that the renewable
energy user requires. One problem with this type of tariff is that the maxi-
mum demand of the solar home does not necessarily coincide with a utility's
peak. In fact, demand-energy charges could actually encourage consumers
to shift some consumption to peak periods because demand charges en-
courage consumers to spread out their consumption evenly to produce better
load factors. This would result in an inefficient use of utility resources as
well as higher rates for consumers.
49
Another method of distinguishing on-peak service is to offer inter-
ruptible service to customers with back-up requirements. Under this system,
only service to certain uses, such as a storage heating systems, would be inter-
ruptible. This approach essentially divides the back-up service customer cat-
egory into two groups, those with and those without adequate storage
capacity. The only customers who could realistically take advantage of the
offer of lower rates would be those with adequate storage capacity because
the service would only be available during off-peak hours.
50
Finally, the most common rate schedule is the declining block-meter
rate schedule, in which the price per unit of energy decreases for successive
blocks of consumption. The application of this rate to both back-up and
conventional service classes can result in the latter further subsidizing the
back-up service group. Under this method, rates charged for each block de-
pend on projected maximum demand and customer load factors for the av-
erage customer in the class. Consumers requiring back-up service may have
reduced energy requirements that do not exceed the amount of service pro-
49. See, e.g., In re Proposed Increased Rates & Charges Contained in Tariff Revisions Filed
by the Public Service Co. of Colorado, No. 87460 (Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Oct. 21, 1975).
50. For an example of interruptible service, see Gilbert & deGrasse, Prospects for Electnc
Utili'y Load Management, 96 PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 28, 1975, at 15, which describes the special
contract offered by the Central Vermont Public Service Corporation.
Federal standards regarding ratemaking included in the Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (Supp. IV 1980), suggest the availability of interruptible rates for
industrial and commercial electricity consumers. Id. § I11 (d)(5).
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vided in the first block of the rate schedule. Monthly bills for these custom-
ers might cover customer and energy costs, but only part of the demand costs
associated with back-up service. Hence, rate adjustments enabling the util-
ity to recover its full costs would result in subsidization of the back-up class
by the conventional residential class.
Arguably, the national interest justifies this result because it may pro-
vide an economic impetus to the development of renewable energy. How-
ever, this method is probably inadequate to provide such an impetus. The
approach is analogous to proposed lifeline rates, which provide a low rate for
those least able to afford electricity. Both policies place strong emphasis
upon considerations other than costs as factors in support of a rate design
that results in interclass subsidization. Renewable energy users are likely to
be members of the upper economic stratum who can afford the initial invest-
ment in solar collecting equipment. Therefore, regulatory commissions, hav-
ing already demonstrated their resistance to lifeline rates for the poor, will be
reluctant to adopt a policy which results in rate subsidies for the wealthy. 5 1
Even if this proposal were accepted by a number of commissions, it
would remain an unreliable means of encouraging the utilization of renewa-
ble energy. Due to the disparate distribution of pecuniary benefits and bur-
dens, such a policy would surely be attacked in the courts as unduly
discriminatory. If the policy survived judicial review, which seems unlikely
in view of the reception given lifeline rate proposals, uncertainty over the
eventual outcome of the legal review process would undermine the incentive
to use decentralized renewable energy.
52
b. Utility Participation in the Development of Nonelectric,
Decentralized Renewable Energy Applications
Should utilities or their regulatory bodies decide to participate in the
development of nonelectric renewable technologies, four major issues arise.
First, given their regulated monopoly status, should utilities be allowed to
compete with private market participants? Second, if utilities are allowed to
compete in renewable energy development, does such involvement give rise
to antitrust and restraint of trade concerns? Third, since utility involvement
can range from simple data collection to aggressive marketing and financing
of renewable energy devices, what are the economic and institutional conse-
quences of these different actions? Fourth, what legal and regulatory issues
confront utilities engaged in active commercialization of renewable energy
devices? These questions are discussed below in more detail.
(i) Utility Involvement in the Renewable Energy Market
There are several reasons utilities should become involved in renewable
energy development. From a social perspective, utility interest may bring
51. Utility commission opposition to lifeline rates is reflected in East Ohio Gas Co., 16
PUB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 137, 156 (1976) (Ohio); Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Philadel-
phia Elec. Co., 91 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 321, 372-75 (1971).(Pa.); Madison Gas & Elec. Co.,
17 PUB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 109, 124 (1976) (Wis.).
52. Set J. BONBRIGHT, 5upra note 30, at 116-17.
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the energy to the public at attractive cost levels. Should they wish to lease or
sell solar systems, it is likely that utilities could overcome the cost-intensive
nature of renewable energy business ventures and achieve economies of scale
that translate into lower prices. Utility ownership and sale of renewable en-
ergy devices might help assure potential users of product quality. Further,
most utilities' existing service, sales, distribution, maintenance, and adminis-
trative operations (e.g., billing procedures) could easily be adapted to a re-
newable energy leasing scheme.
53
Since many nonelectric renewable energy technologies have the poten-
tial to affect electric utility system load factors adversely, utilities may find it
advantageous to participate in their operation and development. Utility
control of the devices might ensure that the devices are designed as effective
load management tools. For example, active solar heating systems beneficial
to the utility's load factor use auxiliary energy only during off-peak periods.
Under utility ownership, such devices could be controlled to help assure that
auxiliary demand did not occur coincidentally with the system's peak.
54
If utilities take an interest in renewable energy development, what pol-
icy should govern their participation? The four policies advanced most fre-
quently are: 1) utilities, being classified as regulated monopolies, are given
exclusive monopoly franchises to own, sell, lease, or market renewable energy
systems; 2) utilities are allowed to enter the market, but are regulated and
are not given exclusive franchises; 3) nonregulated utility subsidiary compa-
nies are allowed to enter the competitive renewable energy market; and
4) utilities are prohibited from owning, for lease or sale, systems located
upon a customer's premises.
55
These four policies have been implemented in other regulated indus-
tries. Prior to the Federal Communication Commission's Carterfone deci-
sion,5 6 telephone companies had exclusive control over the interconnection
devices used in the telephone system-a situation reflected in the first option.
Each customer was required to purchase the internal interconnection system
from the local telephone company. If this ownership policy is applied to
renewable energy devices, a customer desiring a device using back-up energy
would be required to purchase or lease the system from that utility.
After Carterfone, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company
(AT&T) leased, and sometimes sold, customer premise equipment (CPE)
under a scheme reflecting the second policy option. Telephone companies
53. See general R. BEZDEK, J. MARGOLIN, T. SPERROW, C. SPONSLER, A. EZRA, R.
SPONBERG, A. MILLER, E. MEEKER, E. ROSEMEN & M. MISCH, ANALYSIS OF POLICY OPTIONS
FOR ACCELERATING COMMERCIALIZATION OF SOLAR HEATING AND COOLING SYSTEMS 227-28
(Program Policy Studies in Science & Technology publisher 1978); BOOZ-ALLEN & HAMILTON,
INC., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOLAR ENERGY INCENTIVES AT THE STATE AND LOCAL LEVEL 6
(Federal Energy Admin. publisher 1976); Hirshberg & Schoen, Bamrns to the Widespread Utiiza-
"ion of Residential Solar Energy: The Prospects for Solar Energ in US Housinsg Industy, 5 POL'Y SCI.
453, 468 (1974).
54. See S. FELDMAN & B. ANDERSON, UTILITY PRICING, supra note 22, at 117; H. LORsCH,
supra note 22, at 3.
55. See Laitos & Feuerstein, supra note 15, at 40; Noll, Maintaining Competition in Solar Energ
Technology, in FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE SOLAR ENERGY MARKET: PROCEEDINGS
OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON COMPETITION IN THE SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRY 179, 181-2 (1978).
56. In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C. 2d 420 (1968).
[Vol. 59:4
UTILITY USE OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES
were allowed to market CPE devices, but they no longer had an exclusive
monopoly. Customers could either obtain their telephones and other CPE
devices from the telephone company at a regulated rental price (or in some
instances purchase at regulated prices), or purchase them from an unregu-
lated competitive supplier. Under a similar scheme, a renewable energy cus-
tomer could lease the renewable energy system from a utility at a regulated
rental rate or purchase the system from an unregulated supplier.
The third policy option exists where regulated gas and electric utilities
control unregulated subsidiary companies engaging in activities such as min-
ing, energy resource exploration, and the selling of appliances. In the renew-
able energy industry, this option would place an unregulated utility
subsidiary in competition with other suppliers of renewable energy devices.
The extent of direct utility involvement with renewable energy system mar-
keting through the subsidiary would be governed by the nature of the PUC
jurisdiction over the utility.
AT&T also exemplified the fourth policy, which is prohibition from en-
gaging in a certain business activity. For over a decade, AT&T was gener-
ally prohibited from engaging in unregulated sales of certain
communications equipment. Following a 1956 consent decree that settled
an antitrust complaint against the Bell System, AT&T could not enter in-
dustries such as data processing.57 Computer time-sharing services that uti-
lized telephone lines for connecting remote data terminals to central
computers could be offered only by telephone utilities not affiliated with the
Bell System. Under a similar option, the renewable energy industry would
not be faced with competition from utilities or their unregulated
subsidiaries.
Granting utilities monopoly franchises and prohibiting their involve-
ment in renewable energy development are undesirable options. The natu-
ral monopoly rationale that normally supports the restriction of free entry
into business does not apply to the renewable energy industry. On the other
hand, the fears underlying a prohibition of entry by utilities may be
exaggerated.
Three traditional reasons support monopoly status for utilities: natural
monopoly conditions, the need to allocate limited physical resources, and the
presence of potentially destructive economic competition. These criteria do
not justify extending utilities a monopoly solar franchise.
58
A single supplier of a product is most efficient when it can decrease unit
costs over the entire range of demand. This natural monopoly position can
be achieved only when an industry realizes significant economies of scale.
Although utilities realize economies of scale in the generation and transmis-
sion of electricity, and in distributing natural gas, those efficiencies are not
applicable to utility commercialization of renewable energy equipment.
Neither the manufacturing nor the marketing of such devices has technologi-
cal advantages related to the size of output giving rise to economies of scale.
57. United States v. Western Elec. Co., (1956] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 68,246.
58. See Lawrence & Minan, Competitie Aspects of Utilio Partiipation, supra note 30, at 253-
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The need to limit physical resources is a second justification for restrict-
ing market entry. Examples include the television and radio broadcasting
industries (due to limited number of frequencies) and hydroelectric facilities
(because of a limited number of appropriate dam locations on rivers). By
contrast, the resources for the development of renewable energy are
abundant.
The third rationale for limiting entry into the solar market is that eco-
nomic competition may lead to a deterioration of service quality. This was
at least part of the early justification for allowing electric and natural gas
monopolies. While unrestrained competition has the potential to affect ad-
versely the quality of the product sold, the problem does not necessarily re-
quire direct restraints on entry; well-conceived quality control standards and
financial responsibility legislation could achieve the same objectives.
The other extreme would be the absolute prohibition of utility partici-
pation. The National Energy Conservation Policy Act (NECPA)59 origi-
nally prohibited utilities from supplying, installing, or financing solar
devices.6° This prohibition stemmed largely from the fear that utilities could
strategically use renewable energy technologies to create internal subsidies
and, thereby, recapture monopoly profits and foreclose competition. For ex-
ample, if a joint solar/gas utility could affect an allocation between solar-
assisted and gas-only services that attributed too much to gas, it would suc-




Utilities might also find it economical to acquire a company in the busi-
ness of manufacturing renewable energy devices instead of purchasing the
devices. Utilities would thus become vertically integrated, similar to the na-
tion's large oil companies. Such practices are conducive to price maneuver-
ing within the different levels of the industry, which in turn supresses
competition.
62
While these concerns about unfair competition are legitimate, utility
involvement might improve rather than harm competition. It might reduce
the significance of the psychological and economic barriers that deter private
firms from installing renewable energy systems. Deterred by unfamiliarity
with such systems, as well as by their high initial cost, many private compa-
nies have not been willing to risk investing in renewable energy technologies.
The utility's size and market stature may help reduce industry and consumer
uncertainty about renewable energy systems and open up the market. Such
59. 42 U.S.C. § 8201 (Supp. III 1979).
60. Id. § 216.
61. See Bossong, The Case Against Plliate Utility Involvement in Solar/Insulation Programs, SOLAR
AGE, Jan. 1978, at 23, 24.
62. See Laitos & Feuerstein, Regulated Utilities and Solar Energy: A Legal-Economic
Analysis of the Major Issues Affecting Solar Commercialization Effort, SERI Rep. No. TR-62-
255, at 16 (June 1979).
Another argument advanced to justify restrictions on utility participation is based on the
assumption that since profits are proportional to the value of property included in the rate base,
utilities have a tendency to overcapitalize, ie., to invest in overly durable equipment to increase
the value of the rate base. See Averch & Johnson, &rhavior of the Firm under Reguatoty Constraint,
52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962).
[Vol. 59:4
UTILITY USE OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES
considerations contributed to the 1980 amendment of NECPA, which re-
moved most of the earlier restrictions on utility solar involvement.
63
If the dangers of participation do not warrant absolute prohibitions
against utilities, and if natural monopoly conditions are not necessarily pres-
ent, then the optimal degree of utility involvement in renewable energy de-
velopment appears to be some form of competition with other private
enterprises. Such competition could occur with either regulation or
nonregulation of the utilities' renewable energy activities.
(ii) Regulating Utility Involvement in Renewable Energy
Development: Antitrust Concerns
The question of utility regulation hinges in part on the ownership of the
utility to be regulated. Municipal and federally-owned utilities, for exam-
ple, are controlled by a different set of legal principles than investor-owned
utilities.64 For investor-owned utilities, the first question concerning controls
on their involvement in renewable energy development is whether this kind
of activity may be regulated by the state PUC. The principles that subject a
business enterprise to regulation were initially outlined in Nebbt'a v. New
York. 65 Based on those principles, both courts and administrative agencies
continue to distinguish between utility transactions that are "public" and
subject to regulation, and those that are "private" and beyond regulatory
supervision.
Unfortunately, these authorities provide little assistance in distinguish-
ing the two types of transactions. The same practice has been treated as
private in one jurisdiction and public in another. However, the courts and
commissions generally agree that the resolution of the issue turns on the rela-
tion of the questioned activity to the central function of the utility, which is
to furnish the most efficient and satisfactory gas and electric service at the
lowest reasonable price. As the questioned practice becomes more inti-
mately related to the utility's duty to serve, and as its potential impact on
service increases, the practice is more likely to be viewed as a proper utility
function and subject to regulation.
A program designed to encourage renewable energy use is arguably
consistent with utility functions. If total energy consumption is to continue
to increase, some utilities must increase their available capacity. By encour-
aging the use of decentralized renewable energy, a utility can effectively aug-
ment the amount of available energy. Expanding capacity has always been
a proper utility function, and hence, encouraging the use of renewable en-
ergy may also be considered a proper function.66 If renewable energy devel-
opment activities are considered a utility function, such activities would be
considered "public" and subject to PUC regulation.
6 7
63. Energy Security Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 701 (Supp. III 1979).
64. Set supra note 7.
65. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
66. See Competitive Aspects of Utility Participation, supra note 30, at 272-73.
67. A utility is likely to view PUC regulation as desirable because of the opportunities for
cost sharing and risk spreading. The obvious benefit would be the inclusion of its renewable
energy expenditures in its rate base. The rate of return allowed by the regulatory commission
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Regulation by state PUCs is only the most direct form of utility control.
Utilities interested in participation in renewable energy development must
also be sensitive to a range of federal and state laws that will control the
nature of the utility's participation. The most important of these is antitrust
law, which is applicable to utilities unless the questioned activity is ordered
and actively supervised by a PUC.68 Certain utility renewable energy pro-
grams may be in conflict with two major antitrust doctrines. First, a utility
which finances or installs renewable energy systems for its customers may be
found to have tied the sale of its traditionally furnished energy to the instal-
lation of the system. Second, the utility might be held to have foreclosed the
market (its customers) to potential renewable energy system competitors.
Both of these practices raise antitrust concerns.
Judicial hostility to tying arrangements is strong, and generally only
two conditions need be present to give rise to a presumption of illegality.
First, the seller must have sufficient economic power over the tying product
to restrain the market appreciably. Second, interstate commerce must be
affected. A renewable energy incentive program with these two conditions
could be held to be an illegal tying arrangement. Furthermore, the utility is
not insulated from the antitrust laws by the fact of regulatory approval.
69
The second antitrust difficulty facing utilities is the illegal vertical re-
striction, most commonly called the franchise. While there are many
franchise configurations, the most important one for a renewable energy in-
centive program is the exclusive dealership plan. Under this type of plan,
the franchisee is granted an exclusive right to market a product as the
franchisor's authorized representative. This plan would be illegal if unduly
restrained competition resulted through market foreclosure.
70
A utility could structure its renewable energy program to avoid the
traditional form of exclusive dealing plan by authorizing a single dealer
would apply equally to this investment as to the expenditures for conventional capital, and bad
debts resulting from customer accounts would be allowable as an operating expense. The regu-
latory process would therefore provide a guaranteed opportunity to earn an established rate of
return on invested capital.
Competitors entering the renewable energy business may seek to prevent utilities from ob-
taining the advantages of a regulated rate of return. The thrust of the competitors' argument
will be that the utility's renewable energy involvement is beyond the jurisdiction of the PUC
approving the rate of return.
68. Cantor v. Detroit Edison, 428 U.S. 579 (1976). Cantor modified Parker v. Brown, 317
U.S. 341 (1943), where the Supreme Court indicated that some forms of state authorization
exempted utilities from the federal antitrust laws. See also California Retail Liquor Dealers
Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345, 357 (1974).
69. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). After Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), a utility company's refusal to lease a renewable
energy device to certain customers, or to purchase such devices from manufacturers (grounded
on a desire to protect its monopoly position), may be deemed anticompetitive and in violation
of the Sherman Act.
In addition, the regulations implementing the residential conservation service (RCS) re-
quirements of NECPA prohibit utilities participating in the RCS program from discriminating
unfairly among contractors, customers, suppliers, and installers of solar measures. 10 C.F.R.
§ 456.308(d)(e) (1981).
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either to produce the systems or to install qualified systems not manufac-
tured by the utility. Such factual differences, however, are immaterial. The
utility would still be using its substantial economic power and leverage to
give its authorized representative dominance in the market, a result particu-
larly likely in the nonelectric renewable energy market due to its decentral-
ized nature. Most firms currently producing such systems or system
components are small, although a number of large national or multinational
firms are beginning to enter the market. The economic advantages to these
small companies of an exclusive dealership would be substantial in light of
the market power of utilities.
Another portion of the federal antitrust laws, the Robinson-Patman
Price Discrimination Act, 71 prohibits price discrimination in goods of like
grade and quantity where the effect of such conduct is to lessen competition
substantially or to tend to create a monopoly. Actual harm need not result
to competition; only a reasonable "possibility" of such harm would be suffi-
cient for a cause of action. 72 If a utility or its subsidiary received quantity
discounts for the purchase of renewable energy devices, competition might
be impaired and the transaction would possibly violate the Robinson-Pat-.
man Act.
A Clayton Act 73 violation may occur if a utility or a subsidiary enters
into an agreement with its renewable energy system supplier to deal exclu-
sively in the supplier's products rather than those of a competitor. Under
this federal statute, a company may not sell goods on the condition that the
recipient not buy from a competitor, if the effect of such a transaction may
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. 74 If utilities
prevent buyers from purchasing renewable energy devices from competitors,
this economic power would create a presumptive Clayton Act violation.
State trade laws have an effect on utility participation in the renewable
energy market that is similar to that of the antitrust statutes. These trade
laws are intended to safeguard the public against the creation of monopolies
and to encourage competition by prohibiting unfair and discriminatory
practices. These statutes often declare it unlawful for any corporation en-
gaged in the sale of any product or service to discriminate between different
locations. However, the statutes usually provide an exception for any service
or product sold or furnished by a public utility regulated by the PUC or by a
municipal regulatory body. Where utility ownership of renewable energy
devices is regulated by a PUC, rental prices for the equipment will not be
subject to scrutiny. However, the rental charged by an unregulated subsidi-
ary, as well as the prices charged by manufacturers who supply renewable
energy devices to either utilities or subsidiaries, would be subject to these
statutes.
75
Moreover, agreements or contracts intended to prevent competition are
71. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13b, 21a (1976).
72. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976).
74. See Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FrC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
75. See, e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. § 6-2-101 to -117 (1973).
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often illegal restraints of trade in most states. Corporations engaging in any
combination, conspiracy, or agreement restraining trade, or combining or
conspiring to monopolize any part of the trade, are guilty of an unlawful
conspiracy. 76 Unlike price discrimination, an exemption from application of
these statutes is not afforded to investor-owned or municipally-owned public
utilities. Therefore, contracts, combinations, or conspiracies between a re-
newable energy system supplier and a utility or subsidiary would be suspect
where the effect is to prevent competition.
77
Federal antitrust and state trade laws regulate only certain incidents of
utility involvement in renewable energy development. A far more restrictive
form of regulation is one which prohibits all utility involvement in renewa-
ble energy activities. Utilities could be regulated out of the renewable en-
ergy market in three ways. First, the state PUC could prohibit utility
commercialization activities through either its rules and regulations or
through its general policy positions.7 8 Second, a state legislature, operating
pursuant to the state's police power, could enact laws that either prohibit
utility renewable energy involvement or prescribe the extent to which a util-
ity subsidiary could become involved. 79 Third, federal law could foreclose
certain utility relationships with the renewable energy market. Before it was
amended by the Energy Security Act of 1980,80 NECPA prohibited most
commercial forms of utility involvement in renewable energy
development.1'
(iii) Alternative Types of Utility Involvement in
Renewable Energy Development
Utility involvement in decentralized renewable energy development
could occur in various ways. The utility role could be similar to the role
utilities played in promoting electric and gas appliances. Alternatively, utili-
76. See, e.g., COLO REV. STAT. § 6-4-101 (Supp. 1980).
77. Se Q-T Markets, Inc. v. Fleming Cos., 394 F. Supp. 1102, 1106-07 (D. Colo. 1975).
78. Before a state PUC could so prohibit a utility it usually must be shown that such
involvement "affects" or "could affect' the utility's regulated business. See D. TURNER,
TRENDS AND ToPics IN UTILITY REGULATION 20 (1969).
79. See Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911).
80. Solar Energy and Energy Conservation Act of 1980, 12 U.S.C. § 3601 (Supp. IV 1980).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 8217(a) (Supp. III 1979).
A unique situation arises if municipally-owned utilities seek to become involved in decen-
tralized renewable energy development. In most states an exemption from regulation by the
PUC is provided in the state constitution, or is recognized in the PUC jurisdiction section of the
state law. PUC jurisdiction attaches only if the municipal utility operates outside city bounda-
ries. If a municipality were to furnish renewable energy devices to its customers within the
municipal limits, the city's officers would possess the sole power of fixing general regulation.
The extent of this regulation is generally provided in the city charter. The city council usually
approves the utility's rates within municipal boundaries, as well as the utility's general func-
tions. See, e.g., City of Loveland v. Colorado Pub. Util. Comm'n, 195 Colo. 298, 301-03, 580
P.2d 381, 383-85 (1978); COLO. CONST. art. XXV; COLORADO SPRINGS, COLO., CHARTER art.
VI, § 34.1 (1977).
For an argument in favor of municipal utility participation in the renewable energy mar-
ket, see supra note 61, at 6. See aLro City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S.
389 (1978), holding that municipally-owned utilities are not necessarily always immune from
federal antitrust laws.
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ties could become more actively involved by financing, leasing, or selling
renewable energy systems with utility-backed warranties.
Regulatory bodies guarantee utilities a rate of return on their invest-
ments by imposing appropriate rates on customers. For many years, a util-
ity's best interest was advanced by selling as much power as possible.
Accordingly, PUCs adopted declining block rates, which tended to en-
courage power consumption, and utilities promoted energy-intensive appli-
ances. 82 By the late 1970's some utilities were no longer able to guarantee
customers sufficient power because of oil and gas shortages, nuclear shut-
downs, the environmental effects of coal, and the exhaustion of new hydroe-
lectric sites. These utilities were, therefore, no longer as interested in selling
maximum amounts of power, but rather, became concerned about ways of
reducing demand. Because decentralized, nonelectric renewable energy de-
vices reduce the need for utility-supplied power, utilities experiencing or an-
ticipating fuel or capacity problems may be interested in these devices.
83
Conversely, since unrestricted use of such devices can have adverse effects on
utility load profiles and revenues, an active campaign to promote systems
reducing the likelihood of on-peak usage can ease the problems arising from
widespread penetrations of renewable energy systems in utility service
areas.
8 4
If utilities take a role in the development of decentralized renewable
systems, and if the role parallels the way utilities promoted gas and electric
appliances, they can be expected to engage in consumer education, general
incentive programs, data collection, and the development of quality assur-
ance standards. If utilities use less traditional, more aggressive means to pro-
mote renewable energy devices, they may become involved in the actual
marketing of these devices. This role would allow a utility to install or serv-
ice, own, sell, lease, or finance solar systems.
(a) traditional utility roles and renewable energy
development
Consumer Education. Consumer education by utilities can take several
forms. Utilities can promote renewable energy use by advertising, by dem-
onstration projects, and by making available to customers records of their
energy use. 85 A more dramatic and direct form of consumer education is the
82. A review of the legality and propriety of merchandising gas and electric appliances by
utility companies is found in D. TURNER, supra note 78, at 707-10. The primary legal issue is
whether such marketing activity is a proper and traditional utility role which may be regulated
by the state PUC.
83. See EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, THE TRANSITIONAL STORM 3 (1970); THE ELEC-
TRIC POWER INDUSTRY 149-50 (Electrical World ed. 1949); M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, PUBLIC
UTILITIES: REGULATION, MANAGEMENT, AND OWNERSHIP 198-99 (1979); E. VENNARD, THE
ELECTRIC POWER BUSINESS 160 (2d ed. 1970); G. WILSON, J. HERRING & R. EUTSLER, PUBLIC
UTILITY INDUSTRIES 94-95 (1936); Netschert, Then and Now with Utility Advertising and Marketing,
102 PUB. UTIL. FORT., Nov. 9, 1978, at 17; PEPCO: A UTILITY LEARNS TO PROSPER BY
AVOIDING GROWTH, BUS. WEEK, June 8, 1981, at 137; Mid-US Utilities Shocked by Load Projec-
tions, Will Lean on Save-a-Watt, ELEC. WEEK 7 (Feb. 9, 1981).
84. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
85. In 1980 the United States Supreme Court invalidated a New York PUC ban on all
promotional advertising by the utility, in part because such an order would prevent utilities
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residential conservation service. program contained in NECPA, which re-
quires most utilities to offer an energy audit to all customers in certain resi-
dential buildings.8 6 Such audits inform homeowners of the estimated cost of
purchasing and installing conservation and renewable energy measures, and
the savings resulting from such a retrofit.
Incentive Arograms. The most obvious form of renewable energy incentive
is a rate structure which does not penalize the renewable energy user, and
does not harm the economic condition of the utility. From both the cus-
tomer and utility perspective, time-of-day rates based on marginal costs ap-
pear more likely to achieve this ideal than non-time-differentiated rates
based on average accounting CoStS. 8 7 If the utility wanted to impose an eco-
nomic disincentive to nonrenewable use it could petition the PUC to add a
surcharge to customer bills when some percentage of the energy consumed
was not from renewable sources. If the utility wanted to support an eco-
nomic incentive to renewable energy use it could seek to have the legislature
enact tax laws favorable to renewable technologies.88
Data Collection. Collecting load survey and climate data to predict the
effect that decentralized renewable energy systems will have on future loads
is a logical utility role. Utilities might engage in renewable energy assess-
ment studies, monitor individual test sites, or fund the large-scale testing of
demonstration systems. They might even wish to participate in technical
research and development work. The impact of decentralized renewable en-
ergy devices on a utility's load is difficult to assess. Most utilities, regardless
of whether they are interested in promoting such devices, at least have an
interest in anticipating the probable effects of customer use. 89
Quality Controls. A utility could help provide quality controls for renew-
able energy devices in two ways. It could develop energy efficiency stan-
dards, and it could offer a warranty for the devices used by customers.
Because utilities need to predict accurately the impacts of renewable tech-
nologies on the utility's load, and because both forms of quality control en-
hance renewable energy system reliability, utilities may find developing such
controls advantageous.
The NECPA residential conservation service program already ensures
some utility-backed quality control. If a utility auditor determines renewa-
"from promoting... services that reduce energy use .... " Central Hudson Gas v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 570 (1980). See alro Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 8216(a) (Supp. III 1979); 10 C.F.R. § 456.307-.506. Section 456.106 of the
RCS regulations provides that no utility that arranges for financing or for installation of solar
devices may be held liable for unsatisfactory solar system performance by virtue of its RCS role.
87. See su/ra note 48 and accompanying text.
88. See Minan & Lawrence, State Tax ncentives to Promote the Use of Solar Enery, 56 TEx. L.
REV. 835 (1978).
89. See Electric Power Research Institute, Electric Utility Solar Energy Activities, 1979
Survey (EPRI Rep. No. ER-1299-SR) (Dec. 1979); Laitos, Brown, & Taylor, Proceedings:
SERI-ERA Workshop on Electric Utility Involvement in Residential Solar Applications, Univ.
of Denver Law School, Denver, Colo., April 18, 1980, SERI Rep. No. CP-733-781 (Oct. 1981).
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ble energy to be a preferred application to reduce the homeowner's demand,
then the utility must offer aid in arranging for financing and installation of
the measure. Only solar measures "warranted by the manufacturer to meet
a specified level of performance over a period of not less than three years
[which also meet all applicable] Federal and State laws" may be recom-
mended by the utility performing the audit.9° The regulations provide fur-
ther that only suppliers carrying systems meeting the Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) Intermediate Minimum Property Standards Supple-
ment may be recommended, and suggested installation contractors must
comply with the HUD standards in installing the measures and use ap-
proved materials. 9' These statutory and regulatory requirements insure
some degree of product quality.
9 2
(b) utility marketing of renewable energy systems
Insallation and Mahitenance. Poor installation can ruin the efficiency of
any system and disillusion consumers. Thus, installation is repeatedly cited
as the weak link in renewable energy applications. Since utilities have the
resources to acquire the necessary engineering capabilities, they seem suited
to address this problem. They could, for example, conduct installer training
programs leading to certification. Performance bonds could also be required
as a certification condition. Utilities could be responsible for inspecting a
certified installer's work and for requiring repairs when necessary.
93
The Energy Security Act of 1980 retains the NECPA prohibition
against utility installation of decentralized renewable energy devices, but ex-
empts utility installations made "through contracts between [a utility] and
independent suppliers or contractors where the customer requests such sup-
ply or installation."194 It also provides that such contracts may not be subject
to utility control, renewable energy installations may not be carried out by
affiliates or subsidiaries of the utility, and such installations may not ad-
versely affect competition in the area.95 In addition, the NECPA residential
conservation service program requires utilities to perform installation inspec-
tions. Four of the first ten installations of active solar hot water heating and
space heating systems by each contractor must be inspected to ensure that
they meet the required standards.
96
90. National Energy Conservation Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 210(11) (Supp. III 1979).
91. Sr 10 C.F.R. § 456.701 (1981). In addition, section 222 of NECPA requires the De-
partment of Energy to consult with the National Bureau of Standards before judging the energy
efficiency of renewable energy devices, and the Federal Trade Commission to ensure that the
RCS regulations "do not operate to deceive consumers or unreasonably restrict consumer...
options."
92. For a discussion of solar warranties, see generally Jaroslovsky, Solar Equipment Warran-
ties. Consumer troblems in Caifornia, 55 CAL. ST. B. J. 236 (1980).
93. See Smackey, Should Elecnc Ul'ities Market Solar Energy?, 102 PuB. UTIL. FORT., Sep-
tember 28, 1978, at 37; see also 10 C.F.R. § 456.314(o (1981), which requires all state plans
pursuant to the RCS program to devise a system for ensuring the qualifications for installers of
solar devices.
94. Energy Security Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 8701 (Supp. IV 1980).
95. Id.
96. 10 C.F.R. § 456.313 (1981).
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Ownership, Sales, and Leasing. Several reasons exist for a utility to be in-
terested in selling or leasing renewable energy systems. Most obviously, mar-
keting of solar systems might be profitable. Another motivation is the
opportunity to influence system design in its service area. If electric utilities
are concerned about unrestricted use of auxiliary power, they will want to
play a role in ensuring that the design of systems minimizes potential nega-
tive impact on utilities.
Utility leasing and direct sales programs are controversial. Industry
representatives may be concerned that utilities not only have government-
backed marketing advantages, but also have the capacity to compete un-
fairly with private firms. These fears stem from the belief that utility sales or
leases would almost certainly lead to utility domination of the renewable
energy field.
97
An alternative to direct renewable energy system sales or leasing by a
utility is the formation of a subsidiary that could compete with other suppli-
ers for the renewable energy market. However, the subsidiary may have po-
tential advantages over other competitors due to its relationship with a
parent company in the business of energy supply and distribution. Because
of this relationship, a consumer may view dealings with the subsidiary as
involving less risk.98
Another method of allowing utilities to market renewable energy sys-
tems is to allow them to own-lease the system, to include the cost of the
renewable energy investments in their rate base, and to earn a return on this
investment. 99 This arrangement would allow a utility the greatest degree of
control over renewable energy systems in its territory since it would actually
own the systems. A utility would be in the best position to select systems
which could integrate most effectively with the utility's system. Utility own-
ership could also increase product quality since the utility would avoid using
systems which would damage its reputation. 100
If utilities invest in renewable energy systems, it will be necessary to
demonstrate that nonsolar customers will not be subject to discrimination.
Some proposals would require a degree of subsidization by these ratepayers.
These customers would not reap the short-run benefits (reduced energy bills)
that would accrue to renewable energy customers, and the long-run benefits
(lower cost energy and deferred capacity) may appear less tangible. To be
97. See Smackey, supra note 93.
98. The formation of subsidiaries by utilities is not a new concept. Many utilities have
formed subsidiaries to perform operations not specifically related to their monopoly franchise.
An example is a subsidiary formed to manage generation of fuel procurement operations for the
parent company. Though there are concerns regarding the financial impact of the subsidiary
on the parent company and the financial transactions between the two, these are not new or
insurmountable problems. Regulatory oversight, either by commissions or intervenors, reduces
the risk of financial manipulation between parent and subsidiary.
99. For an example of judicial willingness to affirm a PUC decision allowing a utility to
include expenditures for renewable energy research and development in the utility's rate base,
see Caldwell v. Public Util. Comm'n, 613 P.2d 328 (Colo. 1980).
100. NECPA and the Energy Security Act are silent on the question of utility ownership-
sale-lease of solar systems, and therefore one may assume that state law will govern utility own-
ership and marketing strategies.
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justifiable, these benefits must equal or exceed the cost of the program. 10 1
Financing. NECPA prohibited utility financing or installation of renew-
able energy measures unless a waiver was first obtained from the Depart-
ment of Energy. 10 2 However, the Energy Security Act of 1980 eliminated
this prohibition, thus leaving the decision to the utilities and their regula-
tors. 10 3 Utility financing of renewable energy measures might be en-
couraged for several reasons. First, it has the potential of reaching a larger
market than current federal and state income tax incentive programs since
tax credits are predominatly taken by upper income persons. Another im-
portant benefit is better examination of the costs and benefits of renewables
as compared with those of conventional energy resources. Finally, it would
help alleviate the impact of the high initial cost of renewable energy
systems. 104
An important question is whether utilities are a better financing source
than existing, more traditional sources. Real and potential costs are associ-
ated with using utilities as financial intermediaries for renewable energy
commercialization. Banks and other conventional financial institutions can
obtain money at a lower cost than regulated utilities. Banks are capitalized
at roughly ninety-five percent debt, from deposits, and only five percent eq-
uity. Utilities typically have about thirty-five percent equity capital, which
is more costly than debt or preferred stock. Utility financing thus involves
an intrinsically more expensive source than might be available through con-
ventional means. ' 05
There are other less readily quantifiable considerations of utility financ-
ing. For example, long-term loans by a utility present some problems.
While the life expectancy of solar collectors, hot water storage, and copper
plumbing may be expected to be about twenty years, other solar components
101. Gas utility marketing of solar systems involves a special set of considerations. The
direct marketing of household products utilizing gas is not a new activity to the gas utilities. In
the 1940's and 1950's many gas utilities not only sold ranges, furnaces, water heaters, and dry-
ers, but also maintained service capabilities. These activities accelerated the adoption of gas as
a major household fuel. Similar marketing activities by gas utilities could speed the adoption of
solar hot water, heating, and space cooling systems.
One study concluded that as between gas utility-owned, gas utility-leased, and consumer-
purchased renewable energy systems, utility-leased systems are the most preferable for both the
utility and the consumer. "In addition to financial benefits, which include lower monthly costs,
the utility-leased systems alternative is attractive to consumers because it imposes a high degree
of reliability and standardization for design, manufacturing, and installation." D. BOYD, J.
CASKEY, G. PRICE, P. SPEWAK, supra note 13, at 34.
One advantage to sales-leasing programs is that the capital allocation for renewable energy
and for "new," unregulated gas could be put on a more equal basis. See the Natural Gas Policy
Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. § 3301 (Supp. IV 1980), which calls for phased deregulation of natural
gas prices. Investment decisions about the demand reduction advantages of renewable energy
would then be more fairly compared to the real cost of supplying gas. The qualitative differ-
ences between purchasing new sources of gas and developing renewable energy technologies
that reduce the need for new gas could be resolved by utility management.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 216(a)(2) (1976).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 8701 (Supp. III 1979).
104. See generally Kahn, Using Utilities to Finance the Solar Transition, 2 SOLAR L. REP. 543
(1980).
105. E. KAHN, L. Ross, P. BENENSON &J. CHERRY, UTILrrY SOLAR FINANCE: ECONOMIC
AND INsTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 4 (1979) [hereinafter cited as UTIIry SOLAR FINANCE].
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do not last as long. Loans may have to be geared to the replacement of these
shorter-lived components. Additionally, since the average home ownership
is seven years, many borrowers will move before the loan is fully paid.
Whether the loan would be liquidated or accepted by the new homeowner
would have to be determined.
10 6
Another major feature of a utility financing program is the use of spe-
cial bonding authorities to raise relatively low cost capital. When munici-
palities and other specially constituted local agencies raise funds, they sell
tax-exempt bonds. One approach to this capital market is through existing
publicly-owned utilities. Special bonding authorities may also be used for
access to the tax-exempt market. 107
Utilities could also simply arrange customer financing with lending in-
stitutions. NECPA's Residential Conservation Service Program requires
utilities to arrange for financing of conservation measures, including renewa-
ble energy, that customers install as a result of an energy audit. 108 Although
the definition of "arrange" has been left to the states, the Department of
Energy has required that these arrangements must extend beyond distribut-
ing lists of lenders and information on shopping for loans.
Another utility lender option is for utilities to subsidize interest rates on
loans. A utility could make payments to a lender equal to the difference
between revenues from a loan at the lender's normal rate and the subsidized
rate. The payments could be made annually or at the time the loan was
taken out. Such a program would be enhanced if it were operated in con-
junction with lending institutions offering the longest loan periods. The sub-
sidy would be included in the utility's rates. The amount of subsidy a utility
is willing to undertake would depend upon the cost reductions it could ex-
pect from the use of renewable energy.109
106. Despite these concerns, in 1980 the California Public Utilities Commission ordered
California's largest gas and electric utilities to develop demonstration financing programs for
solar hot water retrofits. The PUC order required these programs to allow solar retrofit of 2% of
the gas and 10% of the electric water heaters within each utility's service area. The utilities were
also required to offer sufficient funds (in combination with tax credits) to finance the full cost of
all reasonably priced solar systems. The utilities could include the funds advanced in the rate
base or have them treated as expenses. California PUC Decision No. 91272 (Jan. 29, 1980).
The Energy Security Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 8701 (Supp. III 1979), provides that whenever
utilities seek to finance solar programs through lenders, the utility must seek the funds from
financial institutions located in the area covered by the program.
107. UTILrrY SOLAR FINANCE, supra note 105, at 19. See also White, Municipal Bond Fi-
nancing of Solar Energy Facilities, SERI Rep. TR-434-191 (Dec. 1979).
108. 10 C.F.R. § 456.309 (1980).
109. See Noll, %bc Uilitiis and Solar EnergP Development-Institutional Economic Considerations,
in ON THE ECONOMICS OF SOLAR ENERGY 211 (S. Feldman & R. Wirtshafter eds. 1980).
If a joint utility/lender financial program is not practical, it may be possible to establish a
subsidiary solely for the purpose of making renewable energy loans. Capital for such a venture
could come from a conventional lending source. An advantage of forming a subsidiary is that it
can be highly leveraged to obtain lower costs for capital than might be otherwise obtainable.
The revenue would be the source of interest payments on the debt issued to operate the subsidi-
ary. If the project is of sufficiently low risk, the parent company may not be placed in the
position of having to guarantee the debt, thereby not damaging its financial status. UTImrry
SOLAR FINANCE, supra note 105, at 18.
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(iv) Legal and Regulatory Issues Raised by Active
Involvement in Renewable Energy Development
Should a utility decide that it is economically attractive to market re-
newable energy devices aggressively, the marketing of such devices is likely
to be postponed until a number of legal and regulatory issues are resolved.
As discussed above, antitrust concerns are the most important of those is-
sues.1 t° Another potentially significant legal impediment was removed
when the 1980 Energy Security Act eliminated most of NECPA's restrictions
on such utility commercialization activities.III Nevertheless, utilities consid-
ering a renewable energy marketing strategy will also want to examine a
number of other relevant federal and state laws. Some of these laws, and
their probable effect on marketing plans, are addressed below.
Federal Tax Laws. Utilities are not granted any special tax credits on
decentralized renewable energy devices purchased for lease or resale to con-
sumers. Utilities investing in either conventional or alternative means of
supplying power are eligible only for the regular ten percent investment tax
credit. This credit applies to investments in tangible property used in cer-
tain specified businesses, i 2 one of which is furnishing electrical energy.
113
Tangible property includes facilities for the conventional generation, trans-
mission, and distribution of electricity. Capital outlays for decentralized re-
newable energy devices seem eligible for the tax credit if such devices are
purchased by utilities as a supplementary source of power for customers.
The devices would then be considered an additional means by which utilities
supply the power they are under a duty to provide. However, this tax credit
is available only for investments in property owned by the business claiming
the credit.i 14 Purchase of renewable energy devices for resale to customers
therefore does not qualify for the credit, since the devices then become the
property of the utilities' customers. Only investments in renewable energy
devices which utilities own and then lease to their customers seem to be eligi-
ble, since only in this situation are the devices part of the utilities' property
used in their business of supplying power."I 5
Utilities would not qualify for the special ten to fifteen percent energy
tax credit offered other businesses for similar investments. The energy tax
credit is generally available to businesses that purchase certain kinds of re-
newable energy property for use as supplementary sources of power in their
day-to-day operations.' 1 6 Public utility property, however, does not qual-
ify. 1 7 It is defined in the federal tax statutes as property used predomi-
110. See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
11. See supra notes 80-81.
112. I.R.C. § 48(a)(l)(B).
113. Id. at § 48(a)(1)(B)(i).
114. Kahn, supra note 104, at 549.
115. Id. Kahn questions whether utility investments in utility-owned devices would qualify
for this credit.
116. I.R.C. § 46(a)(2)(C) (1976 & Supp. III 1979), as amended by Crude Oil Windfall Profit
Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 222(C), 94 Stat. 262.
117. I.R.C. § 48(1)(3) (B), as amended by Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-223, § 222(i)(1)(B), 94 Stat. 265.
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nantly in the business of furnishing electrical energy. " 18 Utility property was
excluded from the energy tax credit because Congress believed that
shortages of conventional fuel would force utilities to invest in renewable
energy sources without this additional financial incentive.' 1 9
The Pub/ic Ulity Holding Company Act. If electric utilities market and
finance renewable energy devices they will do so through either regulated or
unregulated subsidiaries. The subsidiaries will be regulated if the local
PUCs regard such commercialization efforts as a proper part of the business
of supplying power, and they will be unregulated if the PUCs consider the
commercialization to be outside the scope of the utilities' monopoly
franchise. 120 Utilities that create either type of subsidiary will be forming
holding company systems. The utilities will be holding companies of the
subsidiaries, and each utility and its subsidiary will be a holding company
system. Consequently, these utilities and their subsidiaries will be subject to
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.121 The Act should not,
however, have any significant impact on those electric utilities that form sub-
sidiaries to market renewable energy devices.
The Act allows utilities within holding company systems to engage in
businesses other than that of supplying power if such other businesses are
reasonably incidental, or economically necessary or appropriate to the sup-
plying of power. 122 Commercialization of renewable energy systems is ar-
guably reasonably incidental to the supplying of power because these devices
are an alternative means of providing the energy which utilities have a duty
to supply.' 23 Moreover, section 550 of the Energy Security Act of 1980124
expressly provides that any financing, supply, or installation of residential
energy conservation measures by a public utility holding company system
shall be construed as a business reasonably incidental or economically neces-
sary or appropriate to the supplying of power by the utilities within the
holding company system. 125 Thus, utilities engaged in renewable energy
commercialization efforts are exempt from Holding Company Act
restrictions.
State Law Regardng Ut/ity Merchandising Activities. Because of the high
cost of renewable energy devices, and the uncertainty associated with the
introduction of any new technology, many electric utilities may regard re-
newable energy commercialization programs as a risky investment. These
utilities may require that they be allowed to treat the costs of these activities
118. I.R.C. § 46(0(5) (1976).
119. S. REP. No. 529, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1978).
120. Feldman & Wirtshafter, Policy The Impact of Utitp Rates, Solar Tax Credits to Consumers,
and Utility Financing of Solar Energy Systems, in ON THE ECONOMICS OF SOLAR ENERGY: THE
PUBLIC-UTILITY INTERFACE 194 (S. Feldman & R. Wirthshafter eds. 1980).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 79k(b)(1) (1976).
123. Telephone conversation with Andrew MacDonald, Special Counsel for the Public Util-
ities Branch, Corporate Regulation Division, Securities and Exchange Commission (Sept. 17,
1980).
124. Act of June 30, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 611 (1980).
125. Id. § 550, 94 Stat. 745.
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the same way they handle their costs of providing conventional power, that
is, by passing these costs along to their ratepayers. If utilities are allowed to
recover all of their commercialization costs from their ratepayers, the risk
would be minimized.
In some states utilities may not, however, be permitted to rate-base re-
newable energy commercialization costs. Several state statutes 26 and a
number of PUC decisions' 27 prohibit utilities from including merchandising
costs in their revenue requirements. In these jurisdictions utilities may not
be able to submit merchandising costs as operating expenses in a ratemaking
proceeding, nor count capital investments in merchandising inventory as
part of the fair value of the property devoted to public use which constitutes
the utilities' rate base. Therefore, utilities subject to these statutes and deci-
sions may not be able to pass their merchandising costs along to their rate-
payers, nor may they earn a guaranteed fair rate of return on their
investment in merchandising inventory.
Whether these statutes and decisions apply to renewable energy pro-
grams is not clear. These legislative and administrative proscriptions oc-
curred over the past fifty years, and do not specifically address the marketing
and financing of renewable energy devices or any other conservation meas-
ures. Instead they deal with the sale and the subsidizing of customer
purchases of domestic electric appliances. If renewable energy devices are
considered electric appliances because they use electricity (albeit only inter-
mittently, for backup power), then these statutes and decisions would seem
to exclude renewable energy commercialization costs from utilities' revenue
requirements. If, however, these devices are considered alternative sources of
energy (because their principal source of power is solar rather than electrical
energy), state legislatures and PUCs may instead regard commercialization
of renewable energy products as a proper part of the business of supplying
power. Utilities would then be able to include their commercialization costs
in their revenue requirements.
.Some state statutes and a few PUC decisions expressly allow utilities to
recover the costs of marketing and financing renewable energy devices from
their ratepayers. For example, one section of the Illinois state code provides
that financing and supplying of solar energy systems are valid services and
126. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 80.04.270 (1962); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 196.59 (West
1957).
127. Ste, e.g., Re Rocky Mountain Natural Gas Co., 55 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 334 (1964)
(Colo.); Re Washington Gas-Light Co., 11 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 119 (1935) (D.C.); Re Miller
Gas Co., No. 770496-GU(CR) (May 10, 1978) (Fla.); Re Gulf Power Co., No. 71341-EV (June
30, 1972) (Fla.); Re Tampa Electric Co., 92 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 398 (1971) (Fla.); Re
Intermountain Gas Co., 86 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 1970 (Idaho); Re Potomac Edison Co., 7
PUB. U. REP. 135 (1935) (Md.); Re Detroit Edison Co., 83 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 463 (1970)
(Mich.); Re Michigan Gas Utils. Co., 47 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 15 (1962) (Mich.); Public Serv.
Comm'n v. St. Joseph Ry., Light, Heat & Power Co., 14 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 113 (1936) (Mo.);
Re Laclede Gas Light Co., 7 PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 277 (1934) (Mo.); Re Pennsylvania Gas Co.,
74 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 209 (1968) (N.Y.); Re Brooklyn Borough Gas. Co., 56 PUB. U. REP.
(PUR) 1 (1944) (N.Y.); Re Green Mountain Power Corp., 94 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 417




purposes of a public energy supplier within its service area.128 The state
code of Iowa contains a similar provision,' 29 and the Arkansas state code
provides that energy conservation programs, such as those involving residen-
tial solar commercialization, are a proper and essential function of public
utilities.' 30 Several recent PUG decisions are in accord with the policy ex-
pressed in these statutes. For example, in 1978, the Colorado PUC included
the operating expenses of a solar energy research program in a utility's reve-
nue requirement, and in 1980, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the ac-
tion.' 3 ' Similarly, in 1973, the Michigan PUC ruled that the costs involved
in an energy conservation financing program were a proper utility
expense. 1
32
State hub/ic Utt'lit Securities Laws. Utilities are likely to finance renewa-
ble energy commercialization programs principally through the issuance and
sale of securities, and, therefore, will be subject to state public utility securi-
ties laws. These laws typically provide that utilities may issue securities only
with the approval of the local regulatory commissions, and then only under
such terms and for such purposes determined to be in the public interest.'
3 3
There are two ways in which PUCs administering state public utility securi-
ties laws could prevent utilities from issuing securities to finance renewable
energy commercialization programs. One way would be to find that renew-
able energy investments are not a proper subject for utility securities issues.
The second way would be to limit the numbers of securities and thereby
prevent the utility from raising the necessary capital. 1
34
Nevertheless, PUCs are unlikely to prevent utility financing of renewa-
ble energy commercialization programs. Utilities will probably commercial-
ize these devices through unregulated subsidiaries. 135 State public utility
securities laws apply, however, only to securities issued by utilities for the
financing of utility business; they do not apply to securities issued by unregu-
lated subsidiaries for nonutility business. Even renewable energy programs
whose financing would be subject to PUC authority would not be adversely
affected by state securities laws. Utilities that directly commercialize renew-
able energy devices as part of their utility business would have to obtain
PUC approval. Thus, PUCs are unlikely to deny utilities permission to issue
securities to support PUC-approved activities.
128. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 961/, § 7315 (Smith-Hurd 1979).
129. IOWA CODE ANN. § 93.30 (Supp. 1981).
130. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 73-2503 (1979).
131. Caldwell v. Public Util. Comm'n, 613 P.2d 328 (Colo. 1980).
132. Re Mich. Consol. Gas Co., I PUB. U. REP. (PUR) 4th 229 (1973) (Mich.). Although
the case involved a home insulation program, the language of the decision was broad enough to
encompass an, energy conservation program.
133. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 817 (West 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I1 2/3, § 21
(Smith-Hurd 1966); N.Y. PUB. SERv. LAw § 69 (McKinney 1955).
134. PUCs may limit the amount of debt securities which utilities may issue if, for example,
utilities are approaching or have reached the limits of their debt coverage ratios.
135. See FELDMAN & WIRTSHAFTrER, srupra note 120.
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B. Decentralized Electricity-Produczng Renewable Technologies
The impact of nonelectricity-producing renewable technologies on utili-
ties differs from that of the four electricity producing renewable technolo-
gies-small wind energy conversion systems (swecs), photovoltaic
applications (pvs), low head hydroelectricity facilities (low head hydro), and
small scale biomass plants. Both utilities and the law treat these technologies
differently from other applications because of their electricity-producing
function. Before analyzing these impacts and the regulatory response to
them, an explanation of the relationship of each technology to utilities is
provided.
SS WECS. Large wind turbines have a rated power output of one to
three megawatts which utilities can use to generate power for sale. Swecs
generally only have a rated power output of one to fifteen kilowatts and are
used by residences, commercial establishments, and some light industry.
136
Like active and passive nonelectricity-producing systems, swecs have been
included in the NECPA residential conservation service program as a renew-
able resource measure that must be included in a utility's energy audit.
137
Because they produce electricity, however, swecs create unique problems for
utilities.
The first problem is power quality. Power produced by the wind gener-
ator must be in perfect synchronization with the utility's supply. The second
problem is poor power factors: the relationship between kilovolt amperes
and kilowatts. Customers with low power factors concern utilities because
billing practices may not recover the total cost of service, and these custom-
ers also increase system energy losses. Swecs typically have poor power fac-
tors, especially at the low output levels where the machines will most
frequently operate. A third problem is that wind generators feeding power
into utility lines could be very dangerous to linemen. Finally, swecs are only
intermittent producers of electricity, so owners must rely on conventional
utility backup power.133
* PVs. Like swecs, photovoltaic systems produce electricity intermit-
tently, thus precluding complete independence. PV electric output is some-
what more predictable than swecs power, but it is generally limited to
daytime hours. PV flat-plate collectors have a capacity factor, which is the
ratio between actual energy output to output at rated capacity, of approxi-
mately twenty percent. Photovoltaic systems have a relatively low capacity
factor because of the lack of output at night and the fact that the plate
136. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH BIENNIAL CON-
FERENCE AND WORKSHOP ON WIND ENERGY, held in Washington, D.C. October 29-31, 1979
(June 1980); U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, WIND ENERGY SYSTEMS: PROGRAM SUMMARY (Dec.
1978); ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INST., Going with the Wid, March 1980, at 6.
137. DOE Residential Energy Conservation Program, 10 C.F.R. § 456.105 (v)(5) (1981).
138. See Requirements Assessment of Wind Power Plants in Electric Utility Systems, EPRI
Rep. ER-978-SY (Jan. 1979).
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directly faces the sun for a small portion of the day.' 3 9 PV systems are espe-
cially useful to a utility in regions where the load curve is highest near the
insolation peak, because the PVs supply the greatest power when needed
most. PVs have another advantage over swecs, in that they never produce
excess power during a valley in a utility's nighttime load curve since they do
not generate power at night.'
40
* Low HeadHydro. Small hydroelectric facilities are those that have not
more than fifteen megawatts of installed capacity.' 4 ' Important differences
distinguish hydro facilities from swecs and PVs. Barring a drought, a small
hydro plant can produce electricity steadily. Because the generating capac-
ity is considerably larger for low head hydro facilities, they also are more
likely to be developed by utilities or rural cooperatives. Small hydro plants
may also be owned and operated by private parties and private developers
seeking to sell the power for a profit. While no law forbids this entrepreneur-
ship, private developers must realize that any project with over one hundred
kilowatts of installed capacity risks being subject to licensing by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and the sale of power may be reg-
ulated by a state PUC or by FERC. Several individuals or industries may
join in the cooperative development of a watercourse. Such joint operation
of a system may again subject the developers to the jurisdiction of the state
PUG.' 42
* Small Scale Biomass. Unlike the other three technologies, this method
produces electricity by direct combustion of biomass or by the combustion of
biomass-produced gas to turn a turbine. An internal use system might be a
self-sufficient, relatively steady producer of power, but it could be subject to
shortages of biomass materials and, thus, need the services of a utility.
A biomass conversion facility that sells gas to an interstate pipeline sys-
tem or supplies power to an electric power grid would be subject to regula-
tion by FERC. If the sale of biomass-derived electricity results in interstate
distribution through a power grid, the facility would also be subject to
FERC jurisidiction. An intrastate operation may be subject to regulation by
the state PUC, depending upon the state definition of a public utility.'
43
Under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), t 44 a
biomass conversion facility may be exempted from state and federal regula-
139. Seegenera/ly Requirements Assessment of Photovoltaic Power Plants in Electric Utility
Systems, EPRI Rep. ER-685-SY (June 1978).
140. See general/( Lamm, Photovoltaic Commercialization: An Analysis of Legal Issues Af-
fecting a Government-Accelerated Solar Industry, SERI Rep. No. TR-434-423 (June 1980).
141. This definition has been adopted by DOE in its small hydroelectric program, and in
section 408 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. § 2708 (Supp. IV
1980).
142. See McGuigan, Legal Issues Affecting the Development of Low-Head Hydroelectric
Power, SERI Rep. No. TR-434-373 (June 1980).
143. See C. Schwab, Legal Considerations in the Development and Implementation of Bio-
mass Energy Technologies, SERI Rep. No. TR-62-624 (Sept. 1979).
144. 16 U.S.C. §§ 796, 824i (Supp. III 1979).
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tion if it qualifies as a cogeneration facility. 145
1. Impacts On and Interconnections With the Utility
These decentralized electricity-producing technologies might have three
different impacts on utilities. First, it may be possible for some low head
hydro and small biomass projects to make themselves independent of the
utility. Such independence could occur either with sufficient fuel (water and
biomass) or adequate storage. Even biomass facilities, however, must con-
template forced outages and planned shutdowns for periodic maintenance.
Energy storage for hydro plants is expensive and not very efficient. Thus,
both technologies need to be connected in some fashion to the utility.
Interconnection, in turn, produces two important impacts: the need of
the owners of these technologies to purchase backup power periodically from
utilities, and the desire of the owners to sell electricity to utilities whenever
the rate of production exceeds that of consumption. Issues arising from these
impacts include whether a utility can refuse either to sell backup power to,
or to purchase excess power from, electricity-producing renewable energy
technologies. If a utility cannot make such refusals, then what rates may
utilities charge for backup service to the customer, and what rates may utili-
ties charge for buying back excess power?'
46
2. Legal and Regulatory Issues Governing Interconnection
The relationship between utilities and independent, relatively small
producers of electricity was not, for the most part, subject to scrutiny by any
federal or state regulatory authority. The only regulation involved energy
sales by small power producers to electric utilities; the regulatory inquiry was
on the effect of the purchase on the revenue requirement of the purchasing
utility. Even then, the extent and effect of these transactions were
insignificant. 1
47
With rapidly escalating costs of fossil fuel and utility plant capacity,
and with the development of electric energy from decentralized electricity-
producing renewable energy technologies, this previously neglected relation-
145. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (Supp. IV 1980); see 16 U.S.C. § 824a(b) (1976) (regarding FERC
jurisdiction).
146. The arguments surrounding backup rates for electricity-producing renewable energy
technologies are similar to those raised when discussing rates for backup power for nonelectric
applications. The source of energy is intermittent, and the utility may be asked to provide firm
power to the electricity-producing customer during the times when the device is not providing
enough energy. The utility may argue that it has to maintain enough generation, transmission,
and distribution facilities to serve that customer whenever needed, so the customer should pay
those fixed costs regardless of how much electricity is used in a given month. Utilities may press
this argument more strongly for electricity-producing customers than for nonelectric customers
because utilities are generally standing by for a larger load when dealing with the former.
Therefore, it is common for utilities to propose a standby charge or a higher customer charge
and/or demand charge to provide the opportunity for a more complete recovery of the utility's
fixed costs. Seegeneraly Public Util. Comm'n of Tex., Economic Research Div., Electric Utilities
and Solar Energy 63-64 (April 1980); Rice, An Analysis of PURPA and Solar Energy 65-67,
SERI Rept. No. TR-434-484 (March, 1980).
147. P. BROWN, STATE LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES AND THE PROBLEM OF MARKETING
POWER GENERATED BY SMALL POWER PRODUCERS 2-3 (Energy Law Institute (1980)).
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ship came under increased public attention. It prompted the issuance of
federal and state legislation and regulations that define the relationship.
The key statute is the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
(PURPA). 148
a. PURPA -Interconnection and Rate Regulation
Title II of PURPA sets out rules governing the interconnection of utili-
ties with independently owned facilities for cogeneration or electric power
production from renewable energy sources. A qualifying small power pro-
ducer is defined as a person, not engaged in the electric business, who gener-
ates electricity by use of a renewable energy resource from a facility of eighty
megawatts or less. 149 The four types of facilities discussed above qualify.
Section 202 of PURPA allows FERC to require interconnection between
these small power producers and utilities. 1 50 This section is significant be-
cause, by requiring utilities to connect physically their facilities with qualify-
ing facilities, it effectively prevents utilities from refusing to buy power from
or sell power to electricity-producing renewable energy applications.
Interconnection creates two important impacts on utilities: the need of
the small power producers for utility backup power and the desire of these
producers to sell excess electricity back to the utilities. FERC regulation,
through its PURPA authority, can require the interconnection. The pricing
for backup energy will then be based on factors similar to those for nonelec-
tric renewable energy applications. The intermittent nature of the applica-
tion similarly will affect the utility's standby capacity cost.
The issue which sets electricity-producing customers apart from non-
electric customers is the buyback issue. If a utility buys excess electricity, the
rate must be determined. Several approaches have been proposed. One
method is to let the meter run both ways and charge or pay the customer the
net balance (purchases minus sales). The utility buys at its retail rate for
purchases from the customers. Another approach is to measure separately
the energy from the customer with a time-of-day meter and to pay the util-
ity's time-differentiated marginal cost, including demand and energy costs.
Yet another approach is to pay a rate which reflects only the utility's cost of
fuel, either the incremental cost or the average cost as reflected in the fuel
adjustment charge. Finally, the rate could equal the utility's full "avoided"
costs, the incremental costs of electricity energy, capacity, or both which the
utility would have had to generate or purchase but for the purchase from the
customer. 
15 1
Section 210 of PURPA requires electric utilities operating in the proxi-
mate area of a qualifying cogeneration or renewable energy electric facility
to purchase all or a part of the output offered by the qualifying facility own-
148. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.
(Supp. III 1979)). The constitutionality of this statute was upheld by the United States
Supreme Court in Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, 102 S. Ct. 2126
(1982).
149. 16 U.S.C. §§ 2611, 2621, 2622 (Supp. III 1979).
150. 16 U.S.C. § 824i (Supp. IV 1980).
151. Ste Rice, supra note 146.
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er, and to sell backup power to the owner at just, reasonable, and nondis-
criminatory rates.1 52 The purchasing utility is not required to pay more
than the incremental cost of producing the same power from some alterna-
tive source.15 3 In other words, "reasonableness" is defined by the concept of
the utility's "avoided cost."
FERC regulations establishing rate standards between utilities and
qualifying small power producers' 54 became effective on March 20, 1980.
PURPA provides that rate setting will be accomplished by state regulatory
authorities pursuant to these standards. 155 State authorities must set three
different types of rates.156 First, rates for purchases for recently constructed
qualifying facilities must be set to equal the avoided cost of energy or capac-
ity costs of the electric utility.157 Second, rates for sales of backup, mainte-
nance, supplementary, and interruptible power for qualifying facilities must
be set which are reasonable and nondiscriminatory.' 5 8 Third, state authori-
ties must assess the interconnection costs which a qualifying facility must
pay to the utility.'
59
The most novel and significant of these ratemaking requirements is the
establishment of purchase rates based on avoided costs. While the principles
of avoided cost determination are relatively well understood, the mecha-
nisms of actually determining these costs are difficult and may be new to
many state regulatory bodies. One particularly relevant issue is whether a
given cost is actually avoidable; if so, measurement for purposes of ratemak-
ing will be extremely difficult.16o
Electricity-producing renewable energy technologies require a determi-
152. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b), 824a-3(c) (Supp. IV 1980).
153. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b) (Supp. III 1979). "Incremental cost of alternative electric en-
ergy" is defined as "the cost to the electric utility of the electric energy which, but for the
purchase from such cogenerator or small power producer, such utility would generate or
purchase from another source." 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(d) (Supp. III 1979).
154. FERC has the authority to exempt certain small producers (those whose installed ca-
pacity is 30 megawatts or less) from public utility regulation at the federal and state level if it
determines such exemption is necessary to encourage cogeneration and small power production.
16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e) (Supp. III 1979).
155. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(o) (Supp. III 1979). The constitutionality of this provision of
PURPA was successfully challenged by the state of Mississippi, on the lower court level. In an
unpublished opinion, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi
declared that PURPA unconstitutionally infringed upon Mississippi's ratemaking authority
over intrastate sales by public utilities within Mississippi. The court found that PURPA was
beyond the scope of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause, and an invasion of state
sovereignty in violation of the tenth amendment. Mississippi v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, No. J79-0212(c) (S.D. Miss. Feb. 19, 1981), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 2126 (1982). However, the
United States Supreme Court held that the challenged provisions did not violate the commerce
clause nor the tenth amendment, finding the challenged provisions constitutional. Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, 102 S. Ct. 2126 (1982).
156. 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.304-306 (1981). Several of these FERC regulations were successfully
challenged in American Electric Power Service Corp. v. FERC, 675 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
157. Id..§ 292.304.
158. Id. § 292.305.
159. Id. § 292.306.
160. For example, a utility may have already incurred significant plant costs before con-
struction commences. Other plant costs may vary with the rate of construction. The range of
such costs which may be avoided based upon certain contingencies is neither discrete nor con-
tinuous. Each contingency must be evaluated in the context of its probability of occurrence and
its impact on the utility. Id. § 292.304(e).
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nation of avoided utility costs when they offer energy of sufficient reliability
and legally enforceable guarantees of delivery, to permit the purchasing util-
ity to avoid constructing a new generating unit or reducing firm power
purchases from another utility. But how can electricity-producing technolo-
gies, which are largely unpredictable energy sources, meet this criterion?
One possible solution is that several facilities on the same utility system
could aggregate their capacity values to achieve reliability. For a power
source that is coincident with the system peaks, a solution may be to give
some capacity value to swecs or PVs. Further, it may be that the fluctua-
tions of wind, insolation, hydro, and biomass patterns in a large area tend to
even out, and provide some constant level of energy.
16 1
b. State Initzatives after PURPA
The FERC ratesetting guidelines for state regulatory authorities are not
methodological; considerable discretion is given to the states. For example, a
state regulatory authority may require a regulated utility to purchase power
from a small power producer at more than the avoided cost of the utility.
Obviously, any such order would involve a subsidy to the small power pro-
ducer, usually at the expense of the other ratepayers. Nevertheless, since the
FERC regulations do not prohibit such rates,1 62 some states might wish to
design a purchase rate that subsidizes alternative energy development.
III. LEGAL ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH UTILITIES AND CENTRALIZED
RENEWABLE ENERGY APPLICATIONS
Unlike decentralized applications, which mainly affect the amount of
power that a utility must normally produce, centralized renewable energy
technologies produce a source of electrical power which utilities may then
sell to their customers. Some advantages to utilities in using centralized
technologies to produce electricity are of course that the fuel source is either
inexhaustible or renewable, and is relatively clean. For utilities accustomed
to relying on scarce oil and gas, environmentally damaging coal, or poten-
tially dangerous uranium, renewable fuels may be an attractive option.
Six kinds of centralized technologies may be used. Biomass resources
can be used to generate electricity either by direct combustion or by being
converted to densified solid or liquid fuels for standard turbine-generators.
Hydroelectric power is already a developed technology which can be further
utilized by increasing the number of low-head hydroelectric dams. Large
wind energy conversion systems (WECS) can be used in an array to generate
electricity. Solar thermal central receiver plants can produce electricity by
having sunlight reflected by mirrors (heliostats) to heat a fluid in a central
receiver, which is then used to drive a turbine-generator. Photovoltaic cells
(PVs) may be grouped together in a system of flat plates or concentrating
configurations to produce electricity. Ocean thermal energy conversion
(OTEC) systems use ocean temperature differences between warm surface
161. Se 45 Fed. Reg. 12,224 (1980).
162. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(a)(2) (1981).
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waters and cold water depths to operate a heat cycle to generate
electricity.'
63
Whether utilities will consider these technologies viable alternatives will
depend on a number of factors. The extent to which each technology is
ready to generate reliable power will obviously affect utility interest in that
technology. An OTEC facility, for example, is less likely to be the subject of
utility interest than a hydroelectric facility because of the utility's familiarity
with hydroelectric power. Biomass and hydroelectric power will require lo-
cal, guaranteed supplies of plant and water resources at competitive prices.
All six of the central electric technologies will depend upon a favorable com-
parative cost for generated power.
Apart from the price and level of technological development, legal and
institutional factors will also determine the extent to which utilities become
interested in centralized systems. Four such factors are likely to play a role
in the utilities' decisional calculus; 1) federal law mandating consideration of
centralized technologies; 2) competition between utilities using centralized
technologies and conventionally fueled utilties; 3) siting of utilities using re-
newable energy technologies; and 4) regulations relevant to the operation of
such a utility.
A. Federal Law Mandating Utility Consideration of Centrahzed Technologies
The most direct way of obtaining utility use of centralized technologies
is to order them either to retrofit or to construct generating facilities to use
renewable fuels. The Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978
(FUA) 164 was a step in this direction. This statute prohibits the use of natu-
ral gas or petroleum as a primary energy source in certain new electric
powerplants, and orders, subject to certain exemptions, new electric power-
plants to be constructed with the capability to use coal "or any other alter-
nate fuel" as a primary fuel source. 165 The statute also allows the
Department of Energy to prohibit the use of petroleum or natural gas as a
primary fuel source in any existing electric powerplant if it determines that
the power plant has the technical capability to use coal or "another alternate
fuel" as a primary energy source. 166 The term "alternate fuel" is defined to
include "biomass, and municipal, industrial, or agricultural wastes, wood,
and renewable and geothermal energy sources."
1
67
Although this statute places primary emphasis upon coal as a substitute
fuel for oil and gas, and although its many exemptions appear far more sig-
163. See generally Nanda, Ocean Thermal Energy Converszon (OTEC) Development Under US and
International Law and Institutions, 8 DEN. J. INT'L L. POL'Y 239 (1979); R. Taylor, Solar Thermal
Repowering Utility Value Analysis, SERI Rep. No. TR-8016-1 (Dec. 1979); U.S. Dep't of En-
ergy, Fourth Wind Energy Workshop 137-144, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 1979); Requirements
Assessment of Wind Power Plants in Electric Utility Systems, EPRI Rep. ER-978-SY (Jan.
1979); Field Program Management for Central Receiver Technology Development (June 1978);
Requirements Assessment of Photovoltaic Power Plants in Electric Utility Systems, EPRI Rep.
ER-685-SY (June 1978).
164. 42 U.S.C. § 8301 (Supp. III 1979).
165. Id. § 8311.
166. Id. § 8341.
167. Id. § 8302(a)(6); see also 10 C.F.R. §§ 503-07 (1980).
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nificant than its prohibitions, its provisions do recognize centralized renewa-
ble energy applications as alternatives that must at least be considered by
electric utilities. Of these applications, FUA assumes that biomass has the
most near-term potential. FUA could therefore accelerate utilities' use of
biomass as a fuel source.t68
B. Competition of Facilities Using Renewable Energy Technologies with
Conventionally-Fueled Utilities
Two types of facilities use renewable energy technologies to generate
electricity. First, a large (50-100 megawatts) facility may-generate electricity
using any of the six centralized renewable energy technologies. This type
would typically be privately-owned, and its customers could include the en-
tire spectrum of traditional electric utility customers. The second kind,
much smaller (2-10 megawatts), is usually owned by its customers, and uses
only certain centralized renewable energy technologies-biomass, low-head
hydro, WECS, and PVs. This second type is used to produce electricity for a
small class of customers, such as apartment buildings, condominiums, shop-
ping centers, industrial parks, or any similar activity where multiple users
could utilize a single system. If either type of facility is located within a
utility's service area, it would compete with the utility. The response of the
utilities and their regulators to the competitive interaction will affect the
future of these facilities.
1. Utility Responses
Established utilities might have a tolerant attitude if these facilities do
not adversely affect utility operations. A permissive attitude might exist if
the facilities alleviate capital requirements for utility expansion. This situa-
tion might exist with a summer peaking utility if a facility using renewable
technologies tends to reduce the utility's seasonal peak demand. A utility
might also favor such facilities if it is confronted by a steadily increasing
demand for power, but, because of difficulties in securing authorization from
regulatory authorities, it is unable to provide increased generation capacity.
A negative attitude might exist when the utility is left with excess capac-
ity which could not be economically deployed or, in the case of smaller
multi-user renewable energy systems, when capacity must be expanded to
meet backup demand. The utility might be required to increase capacity
because, for example, the multi-user's need for backup service coincides with
seasonal peak demand periods. Under these circumstances, the utility will
face decreased revenues without any corresponding cost benefit.169
168. R. STOBAUGH & D. YERGIN, supra note 1, at 197-202; Spurr, Silviculture, 240 Sci. AM.
76 (1979).
169. The economic burden occasioned could be borne by utility customers that did not use
the renewable energy facility, but this result would have to be achieved through a rate increase
necessitating a change in the rate structure. Allocating the burden to the customer not using
renewable energy would effectively subsidize users of renewable energy. The utility may be
hesitant in seeking to use the rate structure to accomplish this form of subsidization because of
customer hostility to rate increases; a PUC may be reluctant to permit this subsidization out of
a sense of equity. See Competitie Aspecls of Ultfiy Parttpaoin, supra note 19, at 242-43.
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2. PUC Responses
Public utilities generally are spared from competition. This regulatory
protection occurs from a franchise granting the utility the right to provide
service on a nearly exclusive basis within a designated area. 170 Three legal
issues are likely to surface should a new, privately-owned facility begin com-
peting with a franchised utility, especially if the facility uses central renewa-
ble energy technologies capable of generating over fifty megawatts to a large
service area. They are 1) whether the facility is subject to PUC jurisdiction,
2) the consequences of PUC jurisdiction, and 3) the possible alternatives to
PUC jurisdiction. 
17'
a. PUCJurisdiction Over Facilities Using Renewable Energy
Most state constitutions and statutes recognize the broad authority of
PUC's to regulate the facilities, services, and rates of ahy public utility.'
72
Suppliers of electrical energy, including cooperative electric associations or
nonprofit electric corporations, are usually classified as public utilities sub-
ject to PUC jurisdiction. Under these principles, a facility using renewable
energy that desired to supply electric energy to the public or to members of
an association formed by the company would be subject to PUC jurisdiction.
Most courts hold that public utility status is accorded to a company if it
has "dedicated its property to public use." In Munn v. Illinois,173 the United
States Supreme Court established the principle that when one devotes prop-
erty to a use which affects the community at large, regulation can follow.
The owner then faces the prospect of having the property and its operations
controlled for the common good. Any organization that holds itself out as
serving some of the public's power needs through solar technologies may
thus be considered a utility.
Activities not involving the dedication of property to public use may,
nonetheless, be "so affected with the public interest" as to give rise to PUC
jurisdiction. This is a minority position that was applied in Cottonwood Mall
Shopping Center, Inc. v. Utah Power & Light Co. ,174 where a shopping center
constructed an electric generating plant designed to supply power to its ten-
ants. The court held that since both the shopping center tenants and the
public at large would benefit from the supply of power, the activity con-
ferred public utility status upon the shopping center and subjected it to PUC
regulation. Under either the majority or minority rule, a private facility de-
siring to generate electricity for public distribution would certainly qualify
as a public utility.
170. M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, supra note 83, at 62.
171. An excellent discussion of these issues appears in Dean & Miller, Utilities at the Dawn ofa
Solar Age, 53 N.D. L. REv. 329, 345-350 (1977).
172. See, e.g., Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass'n v. District Court, 160 Colo. 128, 134, 414
P.2d 911, 914 (1966); CoLo. CONST., art. XXV; CoLO. REv. STAT. § 40-1-103(2) (1973).
173. 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877).
174. 440 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1971).
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b. Consequences of PUCJurisdiction
A facility using renewable energy should fear PUC jurisdiction for sev-
eral reasons. Under regulation it must file reports and accounts, serve all
customers who demand service within a given area, submit its rate schedules
to the PUC for approval, and provide safe, adequate, and reliable service
until given permission to discontinue. 175 Perhaps the most significant bur-
den of PUC jurisdiction is the requirement of obtaining a certificate of pub-
lic convenience and necessity before beginning operation or even
construction. Certification proceedings are often long and expensive. Fur-
thermore, PUCs use the process to protect existing utility monopolies, which
are granted unless the public convenience and necessity require otherwise. '
76
Generally, the only way a facility using renewable energy can convince
a PUC that the public convenience and necessity require its certification is to
show that existing utilities are unwilling or unable to provide adequate elec-
tric service. Lack of facilities, economic infeasibility, or fuel shortages might
constitute the basis of inadequate service. However, some courts have held
that the utility first certified should be given the opportunity to supply any
needed service before another utility is allowed to compete with it. 17 7 Other
courts have held that even if the existing utility is providing inadequate and
inefficient service, it will still be permitted to exercise monopoly control if it
promises to correct its shortcomings. 178 Another" method a renewable energy
facility can use to gain entry into the electric service market is to purchase an
existing utility's certificate of public convenience and necessity, subject to
PUC approval. '
79
c. Alternatives to PUcJurisdct'on
These barriers to electric service competition may be removed by sev-
eral means. PUCs might choose not to exercise jurisdiction over electric gen-
erating facilities using renewable fuels. Such a policy could be beneficial to
renewable energy development, but should be confined to certification pro-
cedures. Otherwise, consumers would not be accorded the protection that
rate and service regulations provide. Of course, if a PUC decided not to
exercise jurisdiction, utilities threatened by competition would surely argue
that the PUC is compelled to exercise jurisdiction over any entity declared as
a matter of law to be affected with a public interest.
If this argument prevails, the statutes could be amended either to re-
175. Dean & Miller, supra note 171, at 348.
176. P. GARFIELD & W. LOVEJOY, PUBLIC UTILTY EcONOMIcs 29 (1964).
177. See Town of Fountain v. Public Util. Comm'n, 167 Colo. 302, 447 P.2d 527 (1968);
Public Serv. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 142 Colo. 135, 350 P.2d 543 (1960).
178. See Kentucky Util. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 252 S.W.2d 885 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952).
179. The ability of a renewable energy facility to purchase a certificate from an existing
utility rests (as it does when allegations are made that the existing utility's service is inadequate)
in the discretion of the PUC. This discretion would obviously be substantially limited by the
bargaining position of the existing utility. The authority of the PUC to exercise discretion
relating to the sale of a certificate does not give the PUC the power to order the sale, for to do so
might constitute a taking of property without just compensation. Se Public Util. Comm'n v.
Home Light & Power Co., 163 Colo. 72, 85, 428 P.2d 928, 935 (1967); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 40-5-
105 (1973).
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move the certification requirement or to exempt renewable energy facilities
from PUC jurisdiction. 1 0 Recent federal legislation has also removed some
of the present discretion from state PUCs. PURPA permits the Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Commission to prescribe rules relating to the exemption of
"qualifying cogeneration facilities" from state laws and regulation respecting
wholesale sales of electricity.181 Cogeneration is defined as a "facility which
produces (i) electric energy, and (ii) steam or forms of useful energy (such as
heat) which are used for industrial, commercial, heating, or cooling pur-
poses."' 8 2 This definition is broad enough to exempt many multi-user re-
newable energy facilities from PUC jurisdiction.
3. Competition by Municipally-Owned Renewable Energy Facilities
Utilities owned by municipalities have broad potential to experiment
with, develop, and operate facilities using renewable fuels since they are not
subject to PUC jurisdiction. Recognizing this potential, some state legisla-
tures have granted municipalities the power to acquire or erect electricity-
producing renewable energy systems.1 83 In the absence of statutory author-
ity, common law and constitutional provisions govern whether a municipal-
ity seeking to compete with an existing utility could ignore a previously
issued franchise. A municipality wishing to compete with an existing utility
would be subject to scrutiny under the contract clause and the fourteenth
amendment of the Constitution. The contract clause guarantees that no
state shall impair the obligations of contract and the fourteenth amendment
protects against a state taking private property without due process of
law. 184
A municipal franchise to an existing utility is recognized as a binding
contract. Arguably, the municipality has contracted to give the utility the
exclusive right to provide service, and impairment of the agreement would
be actionable under the contract clause. 185 The grant of a franchise, how-
ever, has been held to carry with it no implied contract that would foreclose
competition by the municipality. 1 6 In addition, a franchise granted to a
utility by a municipality must be construed in accordance with the munici-
pality's authority to exercise its police power.' 8 7 Establishing a municipally-
owned renewable energy facility would presumably promote the health,
180. Once competition is allowed, electric consumers could not be compelled to take service
from one utility, but rather would be able to select service from the utility of their own choice.
See, e.g., Blue Ridge Elec. Membership Corp. v. Duke Power Co., 258 N.C. 278, 128 S.E.2d 405
(1962); Cass County Elec. Coop. v. Otter Tail Power Co., 93 N.W.2d 47 (N.D. 1958); CAL. PUB.
UTIL. CODE §§ 2801-2816 (West Supp. 1981).
181. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e) (Supp. III 1979).
182. Id. § 796(18)(A) (Supp. III 1979).
183. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 12825, 11561 (West 1951 & Supp. 1981); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 31-15-707 (1973 & Supp. 1980).
184. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
185. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978); United States Trust
Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
186. See Larson v. South Dakota, 278 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1929); Madera Water Works v. City
of Madera, 228 U.S. 454, 456 (1913); City of Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1
(1898).
187. See Skaneateles Water Works Co. v. Village of Skaneateles, 184 U.S. 354, 363 (1902).
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safety, and welfare of the public, and thus be considered a valid exercise of
police power.
A utility would have a stronger case against competition from a munici-
pally-owned renewable energy facility if the express terms of the franchise
preclude the municipality from operating a competitive facility. Even then,
if electric service from renewable sources is considered to be a "new" utility
service, an exclusive franchise would not protect the holder from competi-
tion. Moreover, if the power of a municipality to operate a utility is granted
by the state constitution, the municipality would still be allowed to compete,
because a franchise granted pursuant to state statute cannot abrogate a
power constitutionally vested in a municipality. 1 8 The contract clause
should thus pose only a minor limitation on a municipal facility seeking to
compete with a franchised, existing electrical utility.
A private utility may also argue that such municipal involvement in the
franchised area amounts to a "taking" of private property under the four-
teenth amendment. This argument is not likely to be successful. In New
Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co. ,189 the United States Supreme Court
held that when a private utility has been granted a franchise that precludes
competition, the authorization by the municipality of a similar venture does
not constitute a taking when it is an exercise of the police power.
4. Competition by Federally-Owned Renewable Energy Facilities
Electricity-producing facilities owned by the federal government poten-
tially may compete with private electric utilities. Existing federal power
agencies, such as the Bonneville Power Administration and the Tennessee
Valley Authority, are generating and marketing agencies permitted to enter
into contracts for the wholesale distribution of electric energy. With the ex-
ception of the Rural Electrification Administration, the federal power au-
thorities do not generally market electric energy directly to individual
customers on a retail basis. If Congress or federal agencies, however, were to
establish renewable energy electric facilities to compete with privately-
owned utilities at the retail level, these entities would likely be subject to
state PUC jurisdiction. Most state PUC statutes provide that every coopera-
tive electric association and "every other supplier of electricity" are subject
to the jurisdiction, control, and regulation of the PUC. Courts have held
188. Larson v. South Dakota, 278 U.S. 429, 432 (1929); New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana
Light Co., 115 U.S. 650 (1885).
189. 115 U.S. 650 (1885); see also Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619,
623-24 (1934); City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp., 251 U.S. 32, 39 (1919).
Another possible limitation on municipal competition with existing private utilities is the
array of federal antitrust laws. Municipalities are not likely to be subject to the antitrust laws
after the Supreme Court announced in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), that the Sherman
Act's coverage does not extend "to restrain state action or official action directed by a state." Id.
at 351. The Parker state action exemption as applied to a municipally-owned utility was more
recently considered in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978),
where the Supreme Court held that actions of municipalities are exempt by the Parker doctrine
when such actions are "engaged in as an act of government by the State as sovereign, or, by its
subdivisions, pursuant to state policy .. " Id. at 413. Any constitutional or statutory author-
ity that a municipality exerts to acquire or operate a facility using renewable energy should
qualify for the state action exemption from the antitrust laws.
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that these statutes make no exceptions.1 9° Thus, the certification procedures
applicable to privately-owned renewable energy facilities would be equally
applicable to federally-owned facilities.
The tenth amendment also potentially limits the ability of federally-
owned solar facilities to compete with existing utilities on a retail basis. It
provides that "[tjhe powers not delegated to the United States by the Consti-
tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people." 19 ' In Fg v. United States, 19 2 the Supreme Court
recognized that this amendment precludes Congress from exercising power
in a manner that impairs a state's integrity or its ability to function effec-
tively. 193 In National League of Cities v. Usey,' 9 4 the Supreme Court recog-
nized that the states have attributes of sovereignty which may not be
impaired by Congress. The Court held that Congress may not exercise the
commerce power so as to limit state decisions regarding the conduct of inte-
gral governmental functions. 19 5 States' regulation of public utilities is ar-
guably an integral governmental function traditionally of a local nature.
Thus, a congressionally authorized renewable energy facility may so inter-
fere with the states' regulation as to violate the tenth amendment.
196
C. Sithng of Utilities Using Renewable Energy Technologies
If utilities are to construct or to retrofit powerplants that use centralized
renewable energy technologies, one of the first issues that must be addressed
is where they should be located. 197 This issue of site selection has a number
of significant subsidiary questions. For example, any such utility would
want to construct its site where the renewable resource was available and
cost competitive. The utility would also need to assess the location of ade-
quate sites relative to existing transmission lines. If a site was remote from
the existing network, the additional transmission lines needed would raise
the cost of power. In addition, the utility would need to research the land
requirements of the renewable energy technology.
Apart from these economic and geographic considerations, the utility
must also consider the legal implications of selecting a particular site; these
include land use restrictions, environmental concerns, legal liability for tor-
tious interference with private property rights, safety issues, and aesthetics.
190. 'See Western Colo. Power Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 159 Colo. 262, 280, 411 P.2d
785, 794-95, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 22 (1966); see also E. BERLIN, C. CICCHETrI, W. GILLEN,
PERSPECTIVE ON POWER 157-63 (1974) (App. C).
191. U.S. CONST., amend. X.
192. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
193. Id. at 547 n.7.
194. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
195. Id. at 855.
196. See Mississippi v. Federal Energy Reg. Comm'n, No. J79-0212(C) (S.D. Miss. Feb. 19,
1981), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 2126 (1982). See also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
197. See R. KEENEY, SITING ENERGY FACILrIES (1980); Kapaloski, Power Plait Siting on




The legal concerns differ with each technology and thus, the six primary
technologies will be discussed separately.
1. Biomass
There are three aspects of a biomass-fueled utility that come into play
in a utility siting decision: collection of biomass, its storage, and resulting
emissions. Wood is the most readily available source of biomass. In fuel
collection, land use is the main problem for large-scale wood-burning power
plants. The harvesting of large quantities of wood (500,000 tons per year for
a fifty megawatt plant) obviously has environmental consequences, and the
size of the operation requires many square miles of forested land (either fed-
erally or privately owned). Because of its bulk, wood is not economical to
transport long distances, and therefore, the plant must be sited close to the
trees, and in an area where harvesting is permitted.
Wood also requires large storage areas for its wastes. The runoff waters
from such a storage area can become polluted, and may, therefore, require a
state or federal water discharge permit. The storage area itself may violate
local aesthetic zoning ordinances. 198
The major air pollutant from a wood burning plant is particulate mat-
ter. Wood is lower in sulfur than oil and vastly lower in sulfur than coal.
Thus, sulfur pollutants are only a problem in areas that already have fairly
severe sulfur pollution levels. 199 The particulate pollution level can be re-
duced ninety-nine percent with existing control equipment, and national
source performance standards for particulates can thereby be met. 20 0 A util-
ity using wood as its primary fuel has a distinct emission advantage over
utilities which rely on coal or oil.
2. Low-Head Hydroelectric Power
There are three legal obstacles facing those wishing to site a low-head
hydroelectric power facility: acquisition of the necessary property rights, ob-
taining a FERC license, and compliance with relevant state land use laws.
The first step is acquisition of certain property rights. These include 1) the
right to use the land upon which dams, powerhouses, and other facilities will
be located; 2) the right to divert water and use its flow for power; 3) the right
to construct powerlines for distribution or interconnection with an existing
power grid; and 4) the right of access to the dam site. One who constructs a
new dam should also have a legal interest in the land that will be flooded.
Every utility that wishes to rely in whole or in part on low-head hydroe-
198. Se, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30 § 248(b)(4) (Supp. 1981), which forbids issuance to a
utility of a "certificate of public good" if the state Public Service Board determines that the
project will have an undue adverse effect on aesthetics.
199. C. HEWETT & C. HIGH, ENVIRONMENTAL ASPEcTS OF WOOD ENERGY CONVERSION
(1979).
200. 40 C.F.R. § 60.42(a)(1) (1981). Coal fired utilities might also wish to burn municipal
solid waste with coal to reduce sulfur emissions from the coal plant. If a plant uses less than 25%
fossil fuel, the plant is exempt from the percentage reduction requirements of federal air pollu-
tion regulations. Refuse-derived fuels are exempt from the sulfur standards. &ee id. at § 60.1-
60.424.
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lectric power must also comply with federal laws, the most important of
which is a license from FERC. Federal statutes give FERC the power to
license all dams "necessary or convenient for the development and improve-
ment of navigation and for the development, transmission, and utilization of
power." 20 1 This authority has been construed to grant FERC jurisdiction
over relatively small hydroelectric facilities that are not on navigable water-
ways.20 2 Whenever FERC receives a license application, it is required to
consider whether it would be in the public interest to have the project devel-
oped. While FERC is required to determine whether the project complies
with state law, such compliance is not a prerequisite for licensing. However,
since the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)20 3 requires an
environmental impact statement (EIS) for "major Federal actions signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of human environment, ' 20 4 small hydroelectric
projects may require an EIS if FERC determines that a project has a sub-
stantial environmental impact.
Another significant federal statute affecting small hydro development is
PURPA, which provides that FERC establish simple and expeditious licens-
ing procedures for small hydro projects at existing dams.205 Under PURPA,
dams over 1.5 megawatts will require an EIS, and presentation of evidence
to FERC regarding the project lands and works, methods of financing, and
market for the power. This procedure may delay and deter potential utilities
interested in using low-head hydro.
Such utilities must also comply with applicable state laws. Many states
require permits for all dam construction on waterways within the state. Like
the FERC licensing process, the state permitting process may require consid-
eration of or compliance with certain environmental protection statutes (for
example, laws protecting critical wildlife areas, soil conservation and flood
control regulations, and water quality acts). Many states are also enacting
detailed power plant siting laws which override local regulations affecting
the siting decision. These may be applicable to hydroelectric facilities if the
generating capacity of the hydro project meets the statute's threshold
requirements.
20 6
3. Large Wind Energy Conversion Systems (WECS)
WECS will generate maximum electricity if they are arrayed as a group
of large wind machines. 20 7 These WECS farms will require land that has
sufficient average wind velocities and space to allow for the construction and
unobstructed operation of the WECS. The western rangelands are thus
among the most desirable WECS siting locations in the United States.
The federal government holds title to over forty-five percent of that
201. 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1976).
202. Federal Power Comm'n v. Union Elec. Co., 381 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1965).
203. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1976).
204. Id. § 4332.
205. &e 16 U.S.C. § 2705 (Supp. III 1979).
206. See grnrally McGuigan, supra note 142, at 30-33.
207. See Worl's Largest Wind Cluster Planned by W:idfrmu, JVE, Caiforna, 7 SO.AR EN-
ERGY INTELLIGENCE REPORT No. 15 at 132 (April 13, 1981).
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land area. Congress has spelled out guidelines for federal land utilization in
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA).20 8 This
Act specifies that a grant of a right-of-way for generation, transmission, and
distribution of electric energy is an appropriate use of federal lands. WECS
arrays, after receiving a required environmental assessment by the Depart-
ment of Interior, therefore should not have trouble obtaining federal rights-
of-way for the WECS themselves or for the required transmission lines.
Forest Service land is also governed by FLPMA, as well as by the Multi-
ple Use and Sustained Yield Act of 1960,209 the National Forest Manage-
ment Act of 1976,2 10 and the Cooperative Forestry Assistance Act of 1978.211
These statutes expand upon the multiple use and sustained yield philosophy,
and require the development of implementation plans for renewable re-
sources on Forest Service land. In developing land use plans to implement
these statutory policies, potential wind power sites may be considered a "re-
source." Wind, a renewable resource, could therefore be subject to the stat-
utes' sustained yield provisions, and WECS could be considered one of the
multiple uses possible on Forest Service lands.
Other major siting questions for WECS arrays involve the possibility of
noise, interference with television transmission, and the need for Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) acceptance of the WECS towers.21 2 Noise
problems from wind turbines tend to be site-specific, and can be eliminated
by locating the equipment at a distance from population centers. Large-
scale WECS should cause little television interference if they, too, are located
in areas of very low population density. The interference produced by the
blades can affect reception only within a few miles of the WECS installation.
If an array is to be located near an FAA navigational aid, it must be below a
line passing through the navigational aid at two degrees from horizontal. A
350 foot tall 2.5 megawatt WECS could be as close as two miles to a naviga-
tional aid.
213
4. Photovoltaic Systems and Solar Thermal Central Power Stations
Photovoltaic arrays and solar thermal central power facilities both re-
quire an abundant supply of unobstructed sunlight. Therefore, the major
siting concern for these two central technologies is guaranteed solar access.
Courts have not been willing to imply a common law right to light. 21 4 Ab-
sent a private agreement or solar zoning statute, a utility's right to direct
sunlight will depend on securing enough open land to insure a lack of ob-
structions.21 5 While enactment of state solar access legislation will help to
208. 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976).
209. 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1976).
210. 16 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976).
211. 16 U.S.C. § 2101 (Supp. III 1979).
212. See generallv Noun, Lotker, Friesema, Utility Siting of WECS: A Preliminary Le-
gal/Regulatory Assessment, SERI Rep. No. TR-744-78 (May, 1981).
213. Hoffman, Site Selection Considerations for Land-Based Biomass and Wind Energy
Conversion Systems (WECS) from a Legal Viewpoint, SERI Rep. No. TR-434-372 (July, 1980).
214. G. HAYES, A. MILLER, & G. THOMSON, SOLAR AccESS AND LAND USE: STATE OF
THE LAW 12 (1977); G. HAYES, SOLAR ACCESS LAw 53-71 (1979).
215. See Ziliman & Deeney, Legal Aspects of Solar Energ Development, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J.25.
[Vol. 59:4
UTILITY USE OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES
protect utilities that rely on sunlight as a fuel source, it is important that
such legislation include photovoltaic systems and solar thermal central
power stations in their definitions of solar uses.
2 16
5. Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion (OTEC)
The most important OTEC siting question is which government con-
trols the siting decision. Since OTEC facilities are offshore, they may be
under the jurisdiction of international law (for example, the Law of the Sea,
the Law of the Continental Shelf, etc.), United States law, or state law. This
issue is partially resolved if the OTEC plant is within twelve miles of the
shoreline; the jurisdiction is then determined by the demarcation of author-
ity between the federal government and adjacent coastal states.21 7 Because
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
21 8 and the Deepwater Ports Act 219
apply the law of the adjacent coastal state, it seems likely that the law of the
state where the OTEC transmission cables go ashore will apply, to the extent
that it is not inconsistent with other federal law.
D. Legal Liabilities Resultig From The Operation Of Usng Renewable Fuels
Once the utility is functioning, the two most significant legal concerns
are liability for damage or injury caused by the renewable energy technol-
ogy, and liability for failure to supply power.
1. Liability For Damage or Injury
Utilities using WECS or low-head hydroelectric facilities are particu-
larly susceptible to tort liability. Property damage and personal injury could
result from a blade being thrown, the collapse of a supporting tower or a
WECS continuing to feed electricity into the grid during a time when power
from a connecting utility was shut down to allow for repairs. A low-head
hydro plant carries the risk of dam failure, and of injuries caused by the
subsequent flooding.
For utilities using WECS, this potential liability may be resolved by
technological improvements in the wind turbine system. For example, if the
synchronous inverter used to connect WECS to the utility grid automatically
disconnects during power outages, a line worker would be protected from
electrocution. Nor is there anything particularly novel about the tower that
supports a wind turbine, although the stresses put on a tower by a several-
hundred-foot rotor may call for extra strengthening. Research is being un-
dertaken to determine whether a "fail-safe" belt or cable system could be
used in the blades to prevent a thrown blade from traveling any significant
distance. And the machines being built today all feather their blades in high
winds and shut down completely when the wind reaches a certain level, so
that even uncharacteristically high winds should not pose a serious
216. See Lamm, supra note 140.
217. Nanda, Selected Legal and Institutional Issues Related to Ocean Thermal Energy
Conversion Development 7-17, SERI Rep. No. TR-62-204 (June, 1979).
218. 43 U.S.C. § 1331-43 (1976).





To insure safety, city ordinances may regulate WECS by setback re-
quirements, tower length limitations, and blade specifications. For injuries
caused by a utility-owned WECS, the liability may attach either upon a
theory of strict liability or a theory of negligence.
The general principle of the theory of strict liability is that "[o]ne who
carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to
the person, land, or chattels or another resulting from the activity, although
he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm." 22 1 Strict liability will
be imposed upon an activity when there is the "existence of a high degree of
risk" and an "inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable
care." 222 Therefore, it will be important for the utility using wind machines
to show that a high degree of risk or harm can be avoided by the exercise of
reasonable care. Also important in deciding whether a person is to be held
strictly liable for injuries that result from carrying on a particular activity is
the "extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage," and the
"inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on."
223
Large-scale electrical generation from an array of wind machines could be
found inappropriate in a densely populated area. A final factor in deciding
whether an activity is ultrahazardous is "the extent to which its value to the
community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes." 224 Because the social
value of wind power utilization will increase as fossil fuels become more ex-
pensive, its resultant value to the community should minimize the applica-
tion of strict liability to WECS.
A utility using a WECS might also be found liable based on negligence.
The elements necessary to maintain a negligence cause of action include:
(1) a duty requiring the actor to protect others from unreasonable risks, (2) a
breach of that duty, (3) an injury which is proximately caused by the breach,
(4) actual loss or damage.22 5 A utility must operate the WECS in such a
manner as not to expose others to an unreasonable risk of harm. The utility
owes this duty to any person who might foreseeably be injured by a breach
of the duty. If such a person is injured, the utility most likely will be liable.
It is important to realize that the law of negligence puts no burden on the
utility other than to act as a reasonably prudent person would in similar
circumstances. 
226
A major concern of a utility owning a low-head hydro dam is potential
liability for injuries to persons and property resulting from a failure of the
dam. Courts are not uniform in the legal theories that they use to determine
liability for breach. This legal uncertainty can be a disincentive to develop-
220. F. ELDRIDGE, WIND MACHINES 30 (National Science Found., 1975); ENERGY
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, SOLAR PROGRAM ASSESSMENT: ENVIRON-
MENTAL FACTORS, WIND ENERGY CONVERSION 28 (1977).
221. See 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(1) (1977).
222. Id. §§ 520(a), 520(c).
223. Id. §§ 520(d), 520(e).
224. Id. § 520(0.
225. Ste W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971).
226. Coit, Wind Energy: Legal Issues and Institutional Barriers 14-15, SERI Rep. No. TR-
62-241 (June, 1979).
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ment of small hydroelectric projects, especially at older dams where safety
questions will be paramount. A majority of state courts require a showing of
negligent conduct on the part of the dam owner before finding liability for
injuries resulting from breach.227 The dam owner is held to a standard of
reasonable care in constructing and operating the dam, including knowledge
of weather and water conditions that are likely to affect the dam. If a utility
does not exercise reasonable care and a dam breach results, the utility will be
liable for the injuries resulting from its negligence.
A minority of states employ a theory of strict liability for dam breach.
In the celebrated case ofR;/ands v. Fletcher,228 the English Court articulated
the doctrine that those who carry on unreasonably dangerous activities
should be responsible for all harm caused by those activities, even though the
harm does not result from negligent conduct. Recent cases have adopted the
strict liability theory from Rylands v. Fletcher when water stored behind a dam
on the defendant's property was released and flooded the plaintiff's land.
229
The second basis for a holding of strict liability for dam breach is state
statutory law. In some jurisdictions, statutes have been enacted which pro-
vide that dam owners shall be liable for all damages arising from overflow or
floods caused by dam breach. Courts have interpreted these statutes as re-
quiring strict liability for all damages, irrespective of whether the dam owner
was negligent. 230 Utilities in these jurisdictions might not wish to develop
low-head hydro sites for fear of strict liability.
2. Liability For Failure to Provide Electricity
A utility has a legal responsibility to supply electricity to all customers
in its area, regardless of the peak demands. If an electric supplier fails to
provide power to wholesale or retail customers, it will be liable for the result-
ing injuries to persons or property.2 3 1 Utilities using low-head hydro,
WECS, solar thermal, or photovoltaic systems are thus subject to potential
liability because their capacity can vary according to stream flow, wind
speeds, and insolation levels. If an interruption in service is foreseeable (for
example, a prolonged drought, lack of wind, or extended cloudiness), a util-
ity must give reasonable notice of the anticipated shutoff to protect custom-
ers from loss. The utility supplier is not liable, however, if an unforeseeable
act of God causes an interruption in service.
2 32
Utility users of renewable fuels should recognize the inherently inter-
mittent nature of some renewable energy sources and provide for a limitaion
of liability. A utility may contractually limit its liability for power failure
227. See e.g., Eikland v. Casey, 290 F. 880 (9th Cir. 1923); Barr v. Game, Fish, and Parks
Comm'n, 30 Colo. App. 482, 497 P.2d 340 (1972).
228. L.R. 3, H.L. 330, 1 Erc. 256 (1868).
229. Clark-Aiken Co. v. Cromwell-Wright Co., Inc., 323 N.E.2d 876 (Mass. 1975); Smith v.
Board of County Road Comm'r, 5 Mich. App. 370, 146 N.W.2d 702 (1966).
230. Ryan Gulch Reservoir Co. v. Swartz, 77 Colo. 60, 234 P. 1059 (1925); Beaver Water
and Irrigation Co. v. Emerson, 75 Colo. 513, 227 P. 547 (1924).
231. Se, e.g., National Food Stores, Inc. v. Union Elec. Co., 494 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. App.
1973).
232. Florida Power Corp. v. City of Tallahassee, 154 Fla. 638, 18 So.2d 671 (1944).
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that is not the result of its own negligence. 23 3
CONCLUSION
As United States utilities face increasing demand for electricity, they
will have to expand conventional plant capacity and acquire the resources to
fuel this capacity. Gas utilities will, likewise, have to confront an increasing
demand for natural gas, as supplies become more expensive and difficult to
locate. Renewable resources and technologies can assist utilities in meeting
their consumer obligations. Decentralized technologies allow utilities to re-
duce customer demand for gas and electricity. Centralized renewable tech-
nologies allow utilities to supply gas and electricity from renewable fuels.
Although both kinds of applications are useful to utilities, their development
largely depends on laws, regulations, and cost factors. Therefore, the legal
and economic implications of utility use of renewable resources must not be
ignored.
233. See McGuigan, supra note 142, at 42.
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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE SWINGING
COURTHOUSE DOORS OF GANNE7T AND
RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS
RICHARD M. SCHMIDT, JR.*
GREGORY M. SCHMIDT**
INTRODUCTION
For nearly two hundred years, the closing of a courtroom in the United
States to the press or public was an extremely rare event. In the last five
years it has become commonplace. The closure motion is threatening to
become a routinely employed weapon in every criminal defense attorney's
arsenal and its use in civil proceedings is growing at an alarming rate.
The Supreme Court has both promoted and responded to this develop-
ment. It has now granted certiorari in three courtroom closure cases in the
last four years. The first two decisions addressed the validity of closures
designed to protect criminal defendants from the dissemination of prejudi-
cial publicity. In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,l the Court approved closure of a
pretrial suppression hearing, holding that the sixth amendment right to a
public trial is personal to the accused and does not provide the public or the
press an independent right to attend such a proceeding. In Richmond Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. V'rginia,2 however, the Court overturned closure of a trial, finding
that the first amendment provided the requisite right of attendance to the
public and press.
How the Court could have spoken with less clarity and given less direc-
tion to lower courts than it did in the twelve opinions issued in these two
cases is difficult to imagine. While the Court now has fashioned a constitu-
tional pigeonhole of uncertain dimensions for the public's right to attend
criminal trials, it did so only by first lurching in one direction, then essen-
tially reversing its ground without explanation and without specifying any
standards to govern closure decisions. Left undecided and very unclear are a
number of important issues including the extent to which this right attaches
to various pre-trial and post-trial criminal proceedings; whether it attaches
to any or all civil proceedings; what, if any, procedural predicates must pre-
cede a closure order; and what types and degrees of countervailing interests
will justify closure.
The result of the Court's actions has been rampant confusion and a
spate of lower court decisions addressing motions to close nearly every con-
* B.A., J.D. University of Denver. Member, Bar Associations of Colorado and the Dis-
trict of Columbia. Partner, Cohn & Marks, Washington, D.C.
** B.A. Swarthmore College, J.D. Stanford University. Member, Bar Associations of Cal-
ifornia and the District of Columbia. Associate, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C.
1. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
2. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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ceivable type of judicial proceeding and arriving at nearly every conceivable
permutation of outcome.3 Perhaps in response to these obvious signs of con-
tinued systemic distress, the Court has taken yet another closure case this
session, Globe Newspapers, Co. v. Superior Court,4 where the Court determined
that a state statute requiring exclusion of the general public and press from
criminal trials during the testimony of minor victims of sexual offenses vio-
lated the first amendment. The Globe Newspapers case, however, appears an
unlikely vehicle for the Court to resolve the many uncertainties engendered
by Gannett and Richmond Newspapers. Indeed, given the current divisions on
the Court, it is quite possible that the Globe Newspapers decision will further
muddy the waters, serving only to publicize the closure mechanism and pro-
voke yet another rush of closure motions, all too many of which will be
granted by a doctrinally ill-equipped judiciary.
At least in part to compensate for lack of guidance from the Supreme
Court, efforts are under way on a number of fronts to codify and implement
the holdings of Gannett and Richmond Newspapers, both of which were con-
cerned solely with the use of closures to ensure jury impartiality. Both the
Judicial Conference5 and the Justice Department 6 have recently proposed or
adopted guidelines to govern their respective clientele in deciding whether to
approve, join, or initiate fair-trial closure motions. A new Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure to govern fair-trial closure decisions in criminal cases
has been proposed by the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules. 7 In
addition, the American Bar Association (ABA) Standards on Criminal Jus-
tice, which have governed this area since 1968, but which were substantially
revised in 1978, are being reexamined in light of Gannett and Richmond
Newspapers.
This article will concentrate on the status of courtroom closures which
are sought as a means of protecting criminal defendants from prejudicial
publicity. It will briefly review the history of fair-trial courtroom closures
3. See zn/a notes 136-37 and 163-72.
4. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1493, 423 N.E.2d 773, revId, 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982). On June 23,
1982, after this article went to press, the Supreme Court held the Massachusetts statute to be
unconstitutional. Glope Newspapers Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982). The five-
justice majority opinion, authored by Justice Brennan, found that the only legitimate state in-
terest supporting such closures, the trauma and embarrassment of the minor victims, did not
justify a mandatory closure statute, though it might be sufficient in particular cases. Once
again the Court spoke through several Justices; there were three other opinions. See ina notes
213 and 215. The case appears to represent a triumph for the access analysis developed by
Justice Brennan in Richmond Newspapers, see infta text at notes 160-168, 212-215, but its narrow
holding severely limits its precedential value and it seems unlikely to slow the rush of closure
motions and orders.
5. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, COMMITTEE ON THE OPERATION OF
THE JURY SYSTEM, REVISED REPORT ON THE 'FREE PRESS-FAIR TRIAL' ISSUE, 87 F.R.D. 519
(approved September 25, 1980) [hereinafter cited JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE RE-
VISED REPORT].
6. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, GUIDELINES ON THE CONDUCT OF
CLOSED CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, 28 C.F.R. § 50.9 (1981).
7. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE TO PROPOSED FED. R. CRIM.
P. 43.1 (Oct. 1981), repnntedin 30 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 3001, 3019 (October 21, 1981) [herein-
after cited as JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT].
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before scrutinizing and commenting upon the decisions in Gannett and Rich-
mond Newspapers. After gleaning and analyzing whatever principles can be
gleaned from these decisions, the authors will venture some observations as
to the appropriate scope of the developing right of access in the criminal
justice context.
I. FAIR-TRIAL CLOSURES: A THUMBNAIL HISTORY
It has become something of a ritual in discussing courtroom closings to
begin with Justice Black's 1948 survey in In re Oliver:8 "[The Court was]
unable to find a single instance of a criminal trial conducted in camera in
any federal, state, or municipal court during the history of this country." 9
The impressive sweep of Justice Black's statement is circumscribed
somewhat by the acknowledgement that it applies only to entire trials. A
few appellate courts had even then sanctioned limited closures, excluding
some or all of the public from some portions of a variety of proceedings.' 0 It
appears, however, that exclusion of the press had never been approved."
Even those few closures that had been approved were for purposes other
than ensuring an impartial jury;12 closure was simply not used as a fair-trial
safeguard. There exists no comparable canvass of pre-trial proceeding clo-
sures, but this practice must have been even more rare since the exclusionary
rule had not been promulgated at the time and suppression hearings were
unknown.13 In startling contrast, the Reporter's Committee on Freedom of
the Press, in a noncomprehensive survey, has recorded over 230 successful
motions for closure of trial or pre-trial proceedings in the less than three
years following the decision in Gannett, over half of which were premised on
fair-trial grounds. '
4
The long Anglo-American tradition of open courtrooms has now been
exhaustively surveyed in Gannett and Richmond Newspapers.' 5 It is worth a
brief review of the very short history of closed courtrooms to underscore both
8. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
9. Id at 266 (footnote omitted).
10. Seegenera/{y Gannett, 443 U.S. at 388 n. 19, 431-32 n. 11 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
11. 333 U.S. at 272 n.29. See also Gannett, 443 U.S. at 431-32 n.l 1 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Black also excepted juvenile proceedings, which, for
better or for worse, are classified as civil proceedings, and also courts martial. 333 U.S. at 266
n.12.
12. See, e.g., Beauchamp v. Cahill, 297 Ky. 505, 180 S.W.2d 423 (1944) (testimony of minor
victims of sexual offenses); State v. Croak, 167 La. 92, 118 So. 703 (1928) (obscene evidence).
13. In Gannett, neither the majority opinion nor Justice Burger's historical review in his
concurring opinion cites any instances of closed pre-trial proceedings. A number of state codes
appear to sanction such action under various circumstances. See Gannett, 443 U.S. at 390-91,
394-96 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 868 (West 1981) (requiring
closure of preliminary hearings at request of defendant).
14. Reporter's Committee on Freedom of the Press, Court Watch Summary (January 29,
1982); id (November 1, 1980). The Reporter's Committee statistics are somewhat difficult to
interpret, but it appears that at least 123 of these closures were justified on the grounds of
protecting the accused's fair-trial rights. Of these, only 20 were trials and 103 were pre-trial
proceedings. The statistics do not reveal whether these proceedings were closed in whole or in
part.
15. This history is most thoroughly recapitulated in the dissent in Gannett, 443 U.S. at 418-
33 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Chief Justice's plurality and
19821
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the eagerness and rapidity with which this country's courts have embraced
this novel technique for protecting the judicial processes against the per-
ceived dangers of prejudicial publicity and the role that the Supreme Court
has played in fostering its use.
A. The Storm Builds
The Supreme Court did not reverse a criminal conviction because of
prejudicial publicity until eleven years after In re Oliver.16 The first reversal
linked to the new mass medium of television followed in 1963."7 In short
order came the Warren Commission's criticism of the manner in which both
the media and the government handled the Oswald and Ruby cases. '8 Vir-
tually contemporaneously, the convictions of Billy Sol Estes and Sam Shep-
pard, which had been secured in spectacularly infamous fashion, were
reversed by the Supreme Court in opinions which strongly exhorted the
bench to be more aggressive in protecting the judicial processes from the
apparently unprecedented intensity and pervasiveness of the new mass
media. 19
With the Sheppard decision came Justice Clark's still-authoritative laun-
dry list of measures available to trial judges to preserve the accused's right to
a fair trial. 20 Largely ignored in the ensuing years has been the fact that the
bulk of the Shppard opinion dealt with mistakes that the trial judge had
made in conducting the trial. 2 1 Many of the prophylactic and remedial
measures proposed by Justice Clark go essentially to preserving the decorum
of the court during trials. But the leitmotif of Justice Clark's opinion was
that "the cure lies in those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice
at its inception." 22 It is the manifestations of this message, particularly prior
restraints on the press, gag orders on participants, and courtroom closures,
which have come to dominate the free press-fair trial controversy.
Interestingly, excluding the press and public from criminal proceedings
was not one of Justice Clark's recommended tools for preserving the integrity
of the judicial process. In short order, however, the ABA's own Advisory
Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press, the Reardon Committee, specifi-
cally advocated closure not only of pre-trial proceedings but of trials as well.
Purporting to do no more than ratify the practice followed in a number of
Justice Brennan's concurrence in Richmond Newspapers also contain extensive dissertations on the
topic. 448 U.S. at 564-69, 589-93.
16. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (first state conviction overturned); Marshall v.
United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959) (first federal conviction overturned). See generall Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 547-56 (1976); J. BARRON & C. DIENES, HANDBOOK OF
FREE SPEECH AND FREE PRESS ch. 9 (1979); Schmidt, Nebraska Press Association: An Expansion
of Freedom and Contraction of Theoy, 29 STAN. L. REV. 431, 436-43 (1977).
17. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (film of murder suspect confessing to local
sheriff televised in community where trial took place).
18. Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, 219-
24, 231-42 (1964).
19. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
20. 384 U.S. at 357-62. See also Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 562-65.
21. Landau, Fair Tial and Free Press.- A Due Process Proposal, 62 A. B.A. J. 55, 56 (1976); see
Younger, The Sheppard Mandate Today: A TrialJudge's Perspective, 56 NEB. L. REV. 1, 5 (1977)..
22. 384 U.S. at 363.
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states, the procedural standards promulgated by the Reardon Committee
and adopted by the ABA sanctioned defense motions to close any prelimi-
nary hearing in whole or in part on the ground that
dissemination of evidence or argument adduced at the hearing may
disclose matters that will be inadmissible in evidence at trial and is
therefore likely to interfere with [the defendant's] right to a fair
trial by an impartial jury. The motion shall be granted unless...
there is no substantial likelihood of such interference.
23
Similarly, section 3.5(d) required closure of trials upon the defendant's mo-
tion unless 1) it was determined that there was no substantial likelihood of
interference with the accused's right to a fair trial or 2) the jury was
sequestered.
24
The Supreme Court first indicated its apparent approval of the closure
tool in dicta in Branzburg v. Hayes:25 "Newsmen have no constitutional right
of access to the scenes of crime and disaster when the general public is ex-
cluded, and they may be prohibited from attending. . . trials if such restric-
tions are necessary to assure a defendant a fair trial before an impartial
jury."'26 For whatever reason, few trial courts chose to pick up on these sug-
gestions. While gag orders on all manner of participants and members of the
public and even direct prior restraints on the press became frequent, court-
room closure remained a seldom-considered and little-used option.
2 7
The turning point, ironically enough, was the press's most significant
post-Sheppard victory in the free press-fair trial struggle, Nebraska Press Associa-
tion v. Stuart.2 8 In that case, the Court struck down a direct prior restraint
forbidding the media to publish information it had acquired concerning
events which had transpired in open court. In so doing, the Supreme Court
set down predicates for judicial prior restraints on the press that may well
make it impossible for a court to issue a constitutional prior restraint to pre-
23. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS § 3.1 (Approved Draft 1968)
[hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS]. See also REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COM-
MITTEE ON THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYSTEM ON THE "FREE PRESS-FAIR TRIAL" ISSUE,
45 F.R.D. 391 (1968); SPECIAL COMMITrEE ON RADIO, TELEVISION, AND THE ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, FREEDOM OF
THE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL (1967).
24. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 23, § 3.5(d).
25. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
26. Id at 684-85. See also Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 n.26 (1975)
(suggestion that government can keep information contained in official court records sealed
from public and press).
27. See, e.g., Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Jennings, 107 Ariz. 557, 490 P.2d 563 (1971) (trial
closure reversed for lack of clear and present danger of prejudice); Oliver v. Postel, 30 N.Y.2d
171, 331 N.Y.S.2d 407, 282 N.E.2d 306 (1972) (trial closure order reversed for lack of clear and
present danger prejudice). Closures for reasons other than protecting fair trial rights were, how-
ever, considerably more frequent. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir. 1975)
(closure permissible to preserve order, protect participants, maintain confidentiality of informa-
tion); Stamicarbon, N.V. v. American Cyanamid Co., 506 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1974) (confidential-
ity of trade secrets); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972) (confidentiality of
skyjacker profile); Bruno v. Herold, 408 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1969) (harrassment of witnesses);
Geise v. United States, 262 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1958) (privacy of minor witnesses in rape case). A
number of similar instances are collected in MacKenzie, On Cleanst'ng The Courtroom---The Pubc's
Right To A Public Tnal, 38 AM. U.L. REV. 769 (1969).
28. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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serve a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial.
29
At the same time, however, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the major-
ity, specifically noted that the closing of pre-trial proceedings had been rec-
ommended by various studies.30 Moreover, he expressed some sympathy for
the Nebraska trial court which, because the pertinent state statute was only
later interpreted in this fashion by the Nebraska Supreme Court, "could not
know that closure of the preliminary hearing was an alternative open to it
• . . ; but once a public hearing had been held, what transpired there could
not be subject to prior restraint."' 3' By placing closures in an apparently
benign contrast to prior restraints, the Chief Justice's opinion was widely,
and, as it turns out, correctly viewed as heralding the next wave of free press-
fair trial litigation.
32
B. Locating a Constitutional Niche
Whether it was because of the suggestions made in the Nebraska Press
Association opinion or because the decision made closure orders more attrac-
tive to defendants by limiting the more direct means of curtailing prejudicial
publicity,33 the number of closure motions and orders began to mount.
34
Those opposing the orders, generally media interests, pointed forcefully
and effectively to the long tradition of open court proceedings. The precur-
sor of the jury trial was, after all, an event which every freeholder was re-
29. Compare Cox, Foreword- Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1, 18-
19 (1980); Goodale, The Press Ungagged" The Practical Efect on Gag Order Litigation of'Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart,' 29 STAN. L. REV. 497, 504 (1977) with Schmidt, supra note 16, at
469-70.
30. 427 U.S. at 564 n.8.
31. Id at 568.
32. See, e.g., STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CONST. RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., FREE PRESS-FAIR TRIAL iii, 21 (1976). See also Schmidt and
Volner, Nebraska Press Association: An Open or Shut Decsion?, 29 STAN. L. REV. 529, 530 (1977).
33. Note, The Right to Attend Criminal Hearings, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1308 n.2 (1978).
34. Pre-trial closure motions: see, e.g., United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835 (3d Cir.
1978) (closure of suppression hearing reversed under strict and inescapable necessity standard);
Commercial Printing Co. v. Lee, 262 Ark. 87, 553 S.W.2d 270 (1977) (pre-trial voir dire clos-
ing); Star Journal Publishing Corp. v. County Ct., 197 Colo. 234, 591 P.2d 1028 (1979) (pre-
trial closures require clear and present danger to fairness and no reasonable alternative means
available); Gannett Pac. Corp. v. Richardson, 59 Hawaii 244, 580 P.2d 49 (1978) (closure of
preliminary proceeding upheld under substantial likelihood of prejudice standard); Keene Pub-
lishing Corp. v. Keene Dist. Ct., 117 N.H. 959, 380 A.2d 261 (1977) (closure of probable cause
hearing reversed under clear and present danger standard); New York v. Berkowitz, 93 Misc. 2d
873, 403 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1978) (fitness hearing closed because revealing testimony would pose a
serious and imminent threat to fair trial); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 478 Pa. 484,
387 A.2d 425 (1978) (closure of suppression hearing upheld under necessity to assure fair trial
standard). Trial closures: see, e.g., Detroit Free Press v. Macomb Circuit Judge, 405 Mich. 544,
275 N.W.2d 482 (1979) (trial closure reversed for failure to conduct evidentiary hearing and
investigate less intrusive means); Williams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322 (Wyo. 1979) (closure of bar
review proceeding upheld under clear and present danger standard). Post-trial closure motions:
see, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. State, 363 So.2d 603 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (closure
of sentencing hearing overturned under serious and imminent threat and no less restrictive al-
ternative standard); Gannett Co. v. Mark, 54 A.D.2d 612, 387 N.Y.S.2d 336 (1976) (post-trial
motion hearing closure overturned as premature and overbroad under compelling and unusual
circumstances standard). See also Note, The Right To Attend retrd Cnminal Proceedings." Free Press,
Public Trial, and Prionties in Curbing Pretrial PAblicity, 28 SYRACUSE L. REV. 875, 876 (1977).
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quired to attend.35 English criminal and civil trials have been open ever
since. Coke, Blackstone, Bentham, Hale, and nearly every other luminary in
British jurisprudence have noted this feature and extolled its virtues.
36
And the virtues, all have agreed, are manifold.3 7 Open trials have been
upheld as curbing perjury,38 informing witnesses who may have knowledge
of the events to come forward and testify, 39 and alerting non-parties of possi-
ble threats to their interests.
40
Some of these benefits may have appeared more compelling in times
when trials were quite localized community events and have been dismissed
as a little quaint and out of place in our urbanized and atomistic modern
society. 4 ' But the justifications for open proceedings have always rested on
broader grounds, on systemic concerns that have gained even greater
currency with the expanded role and increased activism of both the govern-
ment as a whole and the judiciary in particular.42 Open trials are seen as a
significant protection against judicial despotism, both for defendants as
individuals43 and as a class.4 4  "Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants .... 45
The interests underlying the policy of open proceedings clearly extend
beyond those of criminal defendants either individually or collectively. At a
minimum, public proceedings protect the public against unjust favoritism
towards particular defendants, as well as unjust severity.46 Moreover, re-
porting and criticism of courtroom events "can contribute to public under-
standing of the rule of law and to comprehension of the functioning of the
entire criminal justice system."' 47 Thus, open proceedings inspire confidence
35. See Gannett, 443 U.S. at 419 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
36. 1 J. BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 522-24, 583-84 (1827); 3 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 372-73; 2 E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 103
(6th ed. 1681); M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW IN ENGLAND 344-45 (6th ed.
1820). See generally authorities cited supra note 15.
37. See generally Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569-73 (opinion of Burger, C.J.), 593-97
(Brennan, J., concurring); Gannett, 443 U.S. at 383 (opinion of Stewart, J.), 427-32 (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
38. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 372-73. Accord, Lewis v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 791
(4th Cir. 1965); United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 921 (3d Cir. 1949) (en banc).
39. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270 n.24; United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835,
849, 852 (3d Cir. 1978); Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 606 (3d Cir. 1969); 6 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1834 at 436 (J. Chadbourne ed. 1970).
40. 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 39, § 1834 at 438.
41. See Note, supra note 33, at 1323 n.l 18. The continuing vitality of at least one of these
justifications is vividly demonstrated, however, by an incident occurring during the trial of
Sirhan Sirhan for the murder of Robert Kennedy. The testimony of a psychiatrist testifying for
Sirhan was reported in the New York Times. A reader pointed out the substantial similarities
between the psychiatrist's testimony and passages from a book on crime and psychiatry. The
passages and testimony were published in the Times and the witness effectively impeached. See
MacKenzie, supra note 27, at 778-79.
42. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 29, at 24.
43. See, e.g., Fenner & Koley, The Rights of the Press and the Closed Court Criminal Proceeding, 57
NEB. L. REV. 442, 478 (1978).
44. See Note, supra note 33, at 1325; Fenner & Koley, supra note 43 at 478-79.
45. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting L. BRANDEIS,
OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (1933)).
46. See, e.g., Lewis v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 791, 792 (4th Cir. 1965); Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v.
Phillips, 46 Ohio St. 2d 457, 467, 351 N.E.2d 127, 133-34 (1976).
47. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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in the proceedings of the judiciary48 and dispel the ignorance and distrust
and suspicion bred by secrecy.
49
Along somewhat different lines is the public's interest in deterrence and
retribution, two of the major goals of the criminal justice system. 50 The ca-
thartic aspect of the public trial as societal ritual sustains and promotes the
willingness of the citizenry to act through the collective law enforcement and
adjudication mechanisms. It also has been noted that trials "illustrate con-
flicts within society with clarity and emotional impact," 5 1 thus serving a vi-
tal role in the development of social values.
The tradition and importance of the public's right to attend criminal
proceedings has been universally acknowledged, 52 but prior to Richmond
Newspapers courts differed significantly on whether this right of the public
was of constitutional dimension and, if so, under what provision of the Con-
stitution. The Constitution expressly refers to public trials in only one place,
the sixth amendment. 53 Accordingly, many courts, most notably the Third
Circuit, 54 pronounced the sixth amendment to be the fountainhead of a
right of public access to criminal proceedings.
55
In 1978, upon the urging of a committee headed by Judge Alfred T.
Goodwin of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the
ABA revised its Criminal Justice Standards.5 6  The Revised Standards
adopted the Third Circuit's position and declared that the public's right to
attend criminal trials arises from the sixth amendment, and is a "right [that]
does not belong solely to the accused to assert or forgo as he or she desires."
'5 7
Expressing the belief that the no substantial likelihood of interference test of
the original ABA Standards was inadequate to vindicate this policy, 58 the
Revised Standards would permit closing a pre-trial proceeding or trial only
48. In re Oliiver, 333 U.S. at 270 n.24.
49. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring).
50. See Note, supra note 33, at 1323 n. 116.
51. Note, Trnal Secrecy and the First Amendment Right of Pub/ic Access to Judicial Proceedings, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1899, 1906-09 (1978).
52. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 614-15 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The sugges-
tion that there are limits on the public's right to know what goes on in the courtroom causes me
deep concern." Id.) Nearly every state has a separate constitutional provision paralleling the
sixth amendment and guaranteeing the accused the right to a public trial. Several state consti-
tutions go further and have a separate provision with no specific link to the accused. See also
Gannett, 443 U.S. at 429-30 n. 10 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In
any event, many state courts, under state provisions of both varieties, have expressly held that
the public has a separate enforceable right to attend trials. Id at 414 n.3, 429 n.10.
53. The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. ... U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
54. United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835 (3d Cir. 1978). It appears that the Third
Circuit is the only court ever to have actually held that the sixth amendment right to a public
trial was not personal to the accused. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 381 n.9. See also Note, supra note 33,
at 1321.
55. See also United States v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240, 246-47 (2d Cir. 1973); Bennett v. Rundle,
419 F.2d 599, 606-07 (3d Cir. 1969); Lewis v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 791, 792 (4th Cir. 1965); United
States v. General Motors Corp., 352 F. Supp. 1071 (E.D. Mich. 1973); accord, Fenner & Koley,
supra note 43, at 475-81.
56. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as "REVISED
STANDARDS"].
57. Id Commentary to § 8-3.2 at 8.33.
58. Id. Commentary to § 8-3.5 at 8.55.
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if the dissemination of information from the proceedings would create a
clear and present danger to the fairness of the trial, and the prejudicial effect
of such information on trial fairness "cannot be avoided by any reasonable
alternative means."
59
Both courts and commentators continued to stumble over the fact that
the sixth amendment speaks only of the accused.6" The attempt to read a
public right of access into this provision was rejected by some as being incon-
sistent with the literal language of the sixth amendment and as straining
even flexible constitutional language beyond its proper bounds.
6'
It was also apparent from the nature of many of the interests served by
open proceedings that the first amendment wws a likely locus for any such
right to attend. There is, after all, a long-standing and respected body of
first amendment law recognizing the full and free flow of information as a
core objective of the first amendment. 62 It was not a difficult step to recog-
nize a correlative right not only to disseminate but to receive information
and ideas.63 In a somewhat independent vein, the Court has recognized that
the right to gather news is not without some measure of constitutional
protection.
64
Though many would perceive in these principles a first amendment
right of access to public information and institutions, the Supreme Court
repeatedly pulled up short of this step. 65 The Court's hesitancy appeared in
significant part to be grounded in the fear that it would be unable rationally
to delimit or circumscribe this potentially all-encompassing principle.66 At
first the Court's decisions could be characterized as merely refusing to grant
the press a right of access superior to that of the public. 6 7 In Houch'ns v.
59. Id. §§ 8-3.2 (pre-trials); 8-3.5 (trials).
60. See, e.g., Note, supra note 33, at 1321-26. See also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538-39
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270 n.25; United States v. Cianfrani,
573 F.2d 835, 861-62 (3d Cir. 1978) (Gibbons, J., concurring); United Press Ass'n v. Valente,
308 N.Y. 71, 81, 123 N.E.2d 777, 781 (1954); Cox, supra note 29, at 19.
61. Ste Note, supra note 33, at 1321.
62. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980);
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764-65 (1976); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964).
63. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974); Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301,
308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring); see generally Note, The Rights of the Public and the Press to
Gather Infornation, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1505 (1974).
64. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681, 707 (1972).
65. See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 608-10 (1978); Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 829-35 (1974).
See a/so Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684-85 (1972); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17
(1965).
66. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965). For a more recent expression of this
apprehension, see Richmond Mewspapers, 448 U.S. at 603 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
Set a/so Address by Justice Brennan, 32 RtGrERs L. REv. 173, 196 (1979); Note, supra note 33, at
1317.




KQED, Inc. ,68 barely two months before the adoption of the ABA's Revised
Standards, a plurality of the Court appeared to go significantly further:
"[N]either the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates
a right of access to government information or sources of information within
the government's control." '69 Chief Justice Burger, writing for himself and
Justices White and Rehnquist, added that the right to gather news "affords
no basis for the claim that the First Amendment compels others-private
persons or governments-to supply information. '70 Concurring in the re-
sult, Justice Stewart was equally emphatic: "Forces and factors other than
the Constitution must determine what government-held data are to be made
available to the public."
'7 1
In Houchins the institution to which access was sought was a prison, a
traditionally closed institution. Access proponents suggested that the
Houchins decision, along with its predecessors, Pell v. Procunter 7 2 and Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co. ,73 did not extend beyond prisons and jails, a view that in
retrospect has been confirmed. 74 At the time, however, the rule of Houchins
seemed broader: while the press was assured the same effective right of ac-
cess to government institutions as the public, 75 neither press nor public had a
first amendment right of access to government proceedings. 76
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Powell, dissented in
Houchins. He would have found that the Constitution requires, under cer-
tain circumstances, that the government affirmatively provide public access
to information within its control. In reasoning that becomes more interest-
ing in light of the decisions in Gannett and Richmond Newspapers, Justice Ste-
vens placed the right of access under the first amendment. However, he
found the right of access to be particularly compelling in the prison context.
The public's interest in the criminal justice process, he argued, carries over
from conviction to incarceration. 77 And, Justice Stevens noted: "By express
command of the Sixth Amendment the proceeding must be a 'public trial.'
It is important not only that the trial itself be fair, but also that the commu-
68. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
69. Id at 15 (opinion of Burger, C.J.). Justice Stewart's concurrence was even clearer on
this point:
The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not guarantee a right of access to informa-
tion generated or controlled by government, nor do they guarantee the press any basic
right of access superior to that of the public generally. The Constitution does no more
than assure the public and the press equal access once government has opened its
doors.
Id at 16.
70. Id at 11. Cf Note, supra note 33, at 1315 (distinguishing between unwilling govern-
mental and private sources).
71. 438 U.S. at 16.
72. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
73. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
74. See Note, supra note 51, at 1904. See also Note, The First Amendment Right to Gather State-
Hedlnfomation, 89 YALE L.J. 923, 924-25 (1980) (suggesting that Houchins and related decisions
concerned only the rights of the press vis-i-vis the public).
75. 438 U.S. at 17 (Stewart, J., concurring). This puzzling concept and the Houchins opin-
ion are discussed in J. BARRON & C. DIENES, supra note 16 at § 8.13.
76. See Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422, 466
(1980). See also J. BARRON & C. DIENES, supra note 16, § 8.13 at 498, 501, 504.
77. 438 U.S. at 36-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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nity at large have confidence in the integrity of the proceeding."7 8 He then
repeated dicta from a Fourth Circuit opinion on the scope of the sixth
amendment: " 'The right to a public trial is not only to protect the accused
but to protect as much the public's right to know what goes on when men's
lives and liberty are at stake . . . .' 79
In any event Justice Stevens appeared to represent a clear minority on
the Court. After Houchrns and its predecessors, it is not at all surprising that
those who believed the right to attend criminal proceedings was of constitu-
tional dimension sought to lodge that right in the sixth, not the first,
amendment.
II. GANNETT: REJECTION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
RATIONALE, AND A LOT MORE
In Gannett Co. o. DePasquale,80 the Supreme Court upheld the closing by
a state court judge of a pre-trial hearing on a suppression motion. In doing
so, five members of the Court expressly declared that the sixth amendment
"right to a . . . public trial, by an impartial jury, [is] personal to the ac-
cused." ' But the five Justices wrote four opinions in the case that said a
great deal more and expressed strong disagreement about virtually every
other facet of the case, including what the Court held and what it likely
would hold in the future.
A. Facts
82
A Rochester, New York suburbanite disappeared with two male ac-
quaintances during a boating trip to a lake in a neighboring county, about
forty miles from Rochester. The two acquaintances returned in the boat the
same day and drove away in the victim's truck with the sixteen-year-old wife
of one of the men. The suburbanite's family reported his absence, bullet
holes were discovered in the boat, and an intensive search for the victim and
the suspects was begun.
Over the next two weeks, both Gannett-owned newspapers in Roches-
ter, each claiming only a small circulation in the county where the defend-
ants were to be tried,8 3 carried seven stories concerning the man's
78. Id at 36-37 (footnote omitted).
79. 438 U.S. at 37 n.32 (quoting Lewis v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 791, 792 (4th Cir. 1965)).
Justices Marshall and Blackmun did not participate in Houchins. They were on opposite sides in
Pelt and Saxbe, however, and there was every reason to believe that the result in Houchins would
not have changed had they participated. See Emerson, supra note 76, at 466.
80. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
81. Id at 379-80.
82. These facts are taken from Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court, 443 U.S. at 371-77,
supplemented where indicated by Justice Blackmun's dissent, 443 U.S. at 407-10, 447-48.
83. The morning paper had a daily circulation of 1,022 or 9.6% of the market of the county
where these events transpired. Its Sunday circulation was 1,532 or 14.3% of the market. The
evening paper had but one daily subscriber in Seneca County. The county had a population of
34,000. 443 U.S. at 371-72 n.. There were other newspapers in the county and at least one
television station Gannett owned. Although the New York court relied upon the fact that the
Gannett television station had also reported these events, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756, 758, 43 N.Y.2d 370,
372, 372 N.E.2d 544, 546 (1977), the Supreme Court opinions made no mention of this fact.
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disappearance, the search for the body, the search for three suspects, the
capture of the suspects in Michigan, and their subsequent arraignment, in-
dictment, and not-guilty pleas. Although none of these stories was sensa-
tional, numerous incriminating details were revealed, including the criminal
record of one of the suspects and the fact the other had led police to the spot
where he had buried the decedent's gun. Also revealed was the fact two of
the suspects were sixteen years old.
The defense filed motions to suppress allegedly involuntary statements
made by the defendants to police and to suppress physical evidence that had
been seized as fruits of the allegedly involuntary confessions. Although the
motions to suppress were heard some three months after the Rochester news-
papers last reported the not-guilty pleas of the defendants, the defense ar-
gued that the unabated buildup of adverse publicity jeopardized the
defendants' right to a fair trial. They therefore requested that the public
and press be excluded from the pretrial hearing.8 4 Neither the District At-
torney nor the Gannett reporter, present in the courtroom, opposed the
closure.
Gannett later moved the court to set aside the exclusionary order and
grant immediate access to the transcript. After a hearing, the trial judge
denied the motion. The judge conceded that there was a constitutional right
of access to pre-trial criminal proceedings, though it was unfortunate that no
one had objected to the motion at the time it was made. He found, however,
that because opening the hearing would pose a reasonable probability of
prejudice to the defendants, the right of the defendant to a fair trial out-
weighed Gannett's right of access." 5 The trial judge did not expressly con-
sider alternatives to closure.
B. The Majority Opinion
Writing for a bare majority, 86 Justice Stewart started with the plain
language of the sixth amendment. He found that it mentioned only the ac-
cused and nowhere referred to a public right to a public trial.8 7 He then
constructed a sort of legislative history for the sixth amendment, tracing the
public's right to attend criminal proceedings back to early England and
through the colonial period. Noting that "[n]ot many common-law rules
have been elevated to the status of constitutional rights,"s he concluded
that this history "ultimately demonstrates no more than the existence of a
84. 443 U.S. at 409 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The quoted
words are those of Justice Stewart and the New York Court of Appeals, not the defense attor-
ney. As the dissent noted, the defense apparently made no showing at all as to the publicity
that had already occurred, basing its motion solely on the prospect that evidence inadmissible at
trial might be admitted at the hearing. Id at 408.
85. The trial judge's initial ruling, made before any objection had been registered by Gan-
nett, was that "the hearing 'was not the trial of the matter' and that 'matters may come up...
that may be prejudicial to the defendant.'" Id at 408 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
86. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined the opinion.
87. 443 U.S. at 379-81.
88. Id at 384.
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common law rule of open civil and criminal proceedings." 89 He found no
evidence that the public trial concept was intended to signal a departure
from the common-law practice but also no evidence that the sixth amend-
ment was intended to incorporate this particular common-law practice. 90
At issue was only the right to attend a pre-trial hearing. Nevertheless,
the textual analysis could not be confined to any particular stage of criminal
proceedings; indeed, if anything it applied afortiori to trials as opposed to
pre-trial proceedings. It was not surprising, then, that Justice Stewart re-
ferred to the putative right throughout these portions of the opinion as the
"right of access to a criminal trial on the part of the public." 9 1 But, it was
not clear why Justice Stewart, frequently drifted from the sixth amendment
to the Constitution and continually couched his holding as a finding that
there is no constitutional right to attend criminal proceedings.
92
The precise scope of the opinion became even less clear as Justice Stew-
art abandoned the narrow textual analysis and espoused an institutional jus-
tification for infringement of the admittedly strong societal interest in
witnessing both pre-trial and trial proceedings. He first recited an apprecia-
ble portion of the litany of benefits of openness in judicial proceedings: im-
provement in the quality of testimony, inducement of unknown witnesses to
come forward with relevant testimony, causing all the trial participants to
perform their duties more conscientiously, and "generally giving the public
an opportunity to observe the judicial system." 9 3 But he analogized to the
strong societal interests represented by the other sixth amendment guaran-
tees extended to the accused, such as a speedy trial and trial by jury. Full
responsibility for protecting the public's interests in these guarantees is
placed in the hands of the judge and the prosecutor, who both must consent
to any waiver of these rights. 94 Since a member of the public, unlike the
judge or prosecutor, cannot prevent the accused's waiver of these important
rights, Justice Stewart reasoned, surely the public has no standing to prevent
an accused's waiver of the right to a public trial. 95 "In short," he opined,
"our adversary system of criminal justice is premised upon the proposition
that the public interest is fully protected by the participants in the
litigation."
96
Whatever the validity of this reasoning, it clearly extends beyond the
89. Id
90. Id at 383-87. Justice Stewart also argued that the historical analysis, because it did not
differentiate between criminal and civil trials, proved too much in the context of the sixth
amendment. Id at 386 n. 15.
91. See, e.g., id at 379 (emphasis added).
92. See, e.g., id at 383, 385, 394.
93. Id at 383.
94. Id at 382-84. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1965). Singer upheld the
constitutionality of FED. R. CRtM. P. 23(a) which states, in its entirety: "Cases required to be
tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant waives a jury trial in writing with the ap-
proval of the court and the consent of the government." See also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514
(1972) (acknowledging possible interest of defendant in delaying trial despite sixth amendment
right to speedy trial). Bul see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (absolute right of self
representation notwithstanding right to the assistance of counsel).




narrow question of whether the sixth amendment provides a public right of
access to criminal proceedings. The Court appeared to be declaring that the
public interest in open criminal proceedings, from wherever it may arise, is
fully protected by the institutional interests of the judge, the prosecutor, and
the defendant. It appeared then that Justice Stewart's frequent use of Con-
stitution in place of sixth amendment was advertent.
The foregoing textual and public policy analyses were applied equally
to trials and pre-trial proceedings, although Justice Stewart perceived an
even weaker claim of constitutional stature for the right to attend pre-trial
proceedings. In reviewing the history of the right to attend criminal pro-
ceedings, he found substantial evidence that even under the common law
there was no tradition of public attendance at pre-trial proceedings. 9 7 He
postulated that public access to pre-trial suppression hearings poses special
risks of unfairness because the purpose of the hearings is to review and possi-
bly to shield from the jury potentially unreliable or illegally obtained evi-
dence. 98  Justice Stewart found the danger of publicity concerning
suppression hearing to be "particularly acute because it may be difficult to
measure with any degree of certainty the effects of such publicity on the
fairness of the trial." 99 It was apparent to Justice Stewart that closure of
pre-trial proceedings was often "one of the most effective methods that a
trial judge can employ" °00to ensure trial fairness. And he immediately foot-
noted this declaration with the admonition that the criminal justice system
"permits, and even encourages, trial judges to be overcautious in ensuring
that a defendant will receive a fair trial."
10 1
The insensitivity of this analysis to the interests motivating the policy of
open courtrooms, especially with respect to pre-trial proceedings, is discussed
below,10 2 as is the validity of Justice Stewart's view of the dynamics of the
judicial system.' 0 3 But it is worth noting here that these last two points
implicitly assume that the public's interest is not of a constitutional nature.
Thus, Justice Stewart's argument that the need for these severe protective
measures is demonstrated by the uncertainty of the degree of prejudice flow-
ing from failure to do so, turns traditional constitutional and particularly
first amendment analysis on its head. One need look no further than Ne-
braska Press Association v. Stuart, where the Court rejected a pre-trial prior
restraint in part because the trial judge's "conclusion as to the impact of
such publicity on prospective jurors was of necessity speculative, dealing as
he was with factors unknown and unknowable."' 1 4 Justice Stewart's rever-
sal of this traditional presumption can only be accepted on the premise that
he assumed no constitutional right, and certainly no first amendment right,
was implicated by closure. Similarly, his exhortation to trial judges to be
97. Id at 387-91. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 560 (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
98. 443 U.S. at 378-79.
99. Id at 378.
100. Id at 379.
101. Id at n.6.
102. See in/a text accompanying notes 211-27.
103. See infra text accompanying notes 228-42.
104. 427 U.S. at 563.
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overcautious in protecting defendants' sixth amendment rights makes no
sense if the protective measures infringe upon the first amendment rights of
others; otherwise his call to arms would amount to encouraging judges to be
overbroad in issuing closure orders.
Notwithstanding all these indications that the Court was effectively rul-
ing that the right of access to any stage of criminal proceedings was not
located anywhere in the Constitution, Justice Stewart then expressly con-
fronted the question of whether this right could be located in the first
amendment. Remarkably, citing his own concurring opinion in Houchins, he
came very near to asserting that the question of a first amendment right of
minimum access to at least some government institutions was still an open
question. 105 He promptly declared the Court need not decide whether there
is any such constitutional right because "this putative right was given all
appropriate deference by the state nisiprius court in the present case."'
0 6
Justice Stewart's opinion ends, then, with a non-holding purporting to
leave open an issue the rest of the Court's analysis would seem to decide. At
the very least, however, this non-holding appeared to be a determination
that the balancing standard (permitting closure upon a showing of a reason-
able probability of prejudice) and procedures adopted by the lower court
would adequately protect first amendment rights.
B. The Concurring Opinons: Compoundihg the Confus ion
Of the four justices who joined in Justice Stewart's opinion, only Justice
Stevens did not succumb to the temptation to write separately. The three
who did, succeeded not only in highlighting the conflicting cross-currents in
the Court's opinion, but also in making it virtually impossible to discern the
decision's precedential effect.
Chief Justice Burger's concurrence basically tracked the majority opin-
ion. He, too, rested in the first instance on the plain language of the sixth
amendment. He, too, conducted a mini-tour through the common-law his-
tory of open criminal trials. While acknowledging that the public has an
interest in observing the performance not only of the litigants and the wit-
nesses but also of the advocates and the presiding judge, he also found that
"interest alone does not create a constitutional right."'
0 7
Despite the apparent breadth of this statement, and the fact that he
joined the opinion of the Court, the Chief Justice insisted that he was writing
to emphasize that "a hearing on a motion before trial to suppress evidence is
not a trial, it is a pretrial hearing."' 08 He elaborated upon the historical
analysis in the majority opinion and noted that, although suppression hear-
ings were unknown in civil pre-trial proceedings at the time the Constitution
105. 443 U.S. at 391-92: "Some members of the Court, however, took the position in [P.et,
Saxbe and Houchins] that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do guarantee to the public in
general, or the press in particular, a right of access that precludes their complete exclusion in the
absence of a significant governmental interest."
106. Id. at 392.
107. Id at 394 (emphasis added).
108. Id at 394 (emphasis in the original).
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was adopted, civil proceeding hearings were not wholly unknown at the
time. At common law, he concluded, "there was a very different presump-
tion for proceedings which preceded trial."10 9 The Chief Justice concluded
with an essentially opaque functional analysis:
In the entire pretrial period, there is no certainty that a trial
will take place. Something in the neighborhood of 85 percent of all
criminal charges are resolved by guilty pleas, frequently after pre-
trial depositions have been ruled upon.
For me, the essence of all of this is that by definition 'pretrial
proceedings' are exactly that. 110
Justice Powell, too, joined in the Court's opinion. Nevertheless, he
wrote separately to state his view that the Gannett reporter, as agent of the
public at large, had an interest protected by the first and fourteenth amend-
ments in being present at the pre-trial suppression hearing. 11  In direct con-
trast to the Chief Justice, Justice Powell rejected the notion that closure of
pre-trial suppression hearings must be judged by a different standard from
trials. He declared that because of the paucity of criminal trials and the
often-dispositive nature of suppression hearings, "the public's interest in this
proceeding often is comparable to its interest in the trial itself."' 1 2 He noted
that in this respect he was in agreement with the four dissenting justices, who
would have found a sixth amendment right of access. Reasoning from this
agreement, he announced, contrary to Justice Rehnquist's suggestion,'
1 3
that lower courts "cannot assume . . . they are . . . free from all constitu-
tional constraint" in closing criminal proceedings. 1
14
Justice Powell emphasized the importance of providing trial judges with
a clear constitutional standard to govern closure decisions. 115 The urgency
connotated by this perception, however, did not prevent him from con-
cocting a flexible set of standards which did not comport with that of the
four dissenters and which, in fact, had never been adopted by the Court or
any of its members. Justice Powell would permit closure whenever "a fair
trial for the defendant is likely to be jeopardized by publicity, if members of
the press and public are present and free to report judicial evidence that will
not be presented to the jury."
' "1 6
To this general principle, Justice Powell added three specific require-
ments: 1) the trial court must consider whether there are alternative means
"reasonably available by which the fairness of the trial might be preserved
without interfering substantially with the public's interest in prompt access
to information concerning the administration of justice;"11 7 2) the exclusion
order must extend no further than is necessary to achieve these goals; and
109. d at 394, 396.
110. d at 397.
111. Id
112. Id at n.1.
113. Set infra text accompanying note 123.
114. 443 U.S. at 398 n.2.
115. Id at 398.
116. Id at 400.
117. Id at 400-01.
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3) representative groups who are present at the time the motion for closure is
made must be given an opportunity to be heard. 11
In this instance, Justice Powell believed "the procedure followed by the
trial court fully comported with that required by the Constitution."' 1 9 He
made much of the fact that no objection had been made before the closure
order. He agreed with the trial judge's conclusion that substantial prejudice
was likely given "the nature of the evidence to be considered at the hearing,
the young age of two of the defendants, and the extent of the publicity al-
ready given the case. .... ',"20 The fact that the trial judge did not give any
explicit consideration to alternatives to closure and sealing of the transcript
was forgivable in light of the uncertain nature of Gannett's claims and the
unsettled nature of the law. 121
The final concurrence was that of Justice Rehnquist, who took the op-
portunity to emphasize that despite the Court's seeming reservation of the
first amendment question, "it is clear that this Court repeatedly has held
that there is no First Amendment right of access in the public or the press to
judicial or other governmental proceedings."' 22 After quoting Justice Stew-
art's concurrence in Houchins, he declared that the Court had emphatically
rejected Justice Powell's position and announced that "in my view, and, I
think, in the view of a majority of this Court, the lower courts are under no
constitutional constraint [and are] free to determine for themselves" whether
or not to close court proceedings.'
23
He then derided Justice Powell for suggesting that there was a majority
of the Court who would repudiate the doctrine of stare dec'ss and find consti-
tutional limitations to courts' authority to close their proceedings, even
though those limitations would necessarily stem from two different sources in
the Constitution. This would indeed be, said Justice Rehnquist, the odd
quintuplet. Moreover, he declared, as a practical matter, such an amalgam
of views would "place outside of any limits imposed by the United States
Constitution all but the most bizarre orders closing judicial proceedings
")124
C. The Dissent
In an elaborate and painstaking dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by
Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall, disparaged the sixth amendment
118. Id. Justice Powell placed the burden of proof on the party seeking to close the trial to
demonstrate that the fairness of the trial likely would be prejudiced by public access. The
burden would then shift to the members of the press and public who object, to demonstrate that
satisfactory alternative procedures are available. Id at 401.
119. Id. at 403.
120. Id at 402. The reference to the "young age" of the defendants is mystifying. The
rationale for closing juvenile proceedings lies in their civil, in oco Iparentis natures. The Gannett
defendants were being tried as adults. Surely Justice Powell was not suggesting a general rule
that pre-trial publicity is more likely to cause unfair trials for younger defendants?
121. Id at 403 n.4.
122. Id at 404. Among the authorities cited for this proposition was the Gannett dissent.
123. Id at 405.
124. Id at 405 n.2.
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textual analysis of the majority as a mere mechanical inference. 125 Justice
Blackmun rested primarily upon an exhaustive examination of the common-
law practice of open trials and found in the strength of that tradition and
recognition of its public benefits an inference that the language of the sixth
amendment had not been intended to preclude assertion of the right by the
public. 126 He expounded at length upon the societal benefits of openness in
criminal proceedings,' 2 7 finding, as did Justice Powell, that these values ac-
crue not only from open trials but fr6m open pre-trial proceedings such as
suppression hearings, which are close equivalents of trials on the merits. 128
In any event, Justice Blackmun concluded that trials and their close
equivalents could not be closed to the public without a showing that closure
is "strictly and inescapably necessary in order to protect the fair trial
guarantee."'
29
Justice Blackmun elaborated in some detail a multipart inquiry by
which this determination should be made. He first placed on the party seek-
ing closure the burden of providing an "adequate basis to support a finding
that there is a substantial probability that irreparable damage to his fair
trial right will result from conducting the proceeding in public."' 130 This
showing would require in the first instance evidence as to the impact on the
jury pool of the information revealed at the hearing. In particular, this
would involve an assessment of the nature and extent of the publicity prior
to the motion to close, information relating to the size of the jury pool, the
extent of media coverage in the pertinent locality and the ease with which a
change of venue can be accomplished. Also pertinent would be whether and
to what extent the information sought to be suppressed has already been
divulged to the public.
Second, the accused must show a "substantial probability that alterna-
tives to closure will not protect his right to a fair trial."'' 1 Third, the ac-
125. Id at 407. Throughout his dissent, Justice Blackmun insisted upon characterizing the
issue not as whether the sixth amendment grants the public an independent right of access but
rather whether that amendment grants the accused the right to compel private criminal pro-
ceedings. See, e.g., id at 415. Justice Stewart easily disposed of this more severe formulation by
noting that either the prosecutor or the trial judge could sua spante prevent closure, whether or
not the public has an independent right of access. As a practical matter, however, Justice
Blackmun was surely correct that without recognition of an independent public interest in open
proceedings, the institutional objectives of the judge and the prosecutor will not fully protect the
interests of the public. See thj5a text accompanying notes 233-39.
126. 443 U.S. at 418-27.
127. Id at 427-33. Briefly, he found that public trials not only ensure the impartiality of
proceedings, but enable the public to scrutinize the performance of police and prosecutors, edu-
cate the public as to the performance and functions of important government officials, and
promote public confidence in the administration of justice.
128. Id at 433-39. His reasoning rested solely on a functional analysis, ie., that suppression
hearings are conducted in the manner of trials, are often dispositive, involve important ques-
tions as to the conduct of law enforcement officials and involve the potential exclusion of highly
relevant evidence. Id at 434-36. See infra text accompanying notes 216-232. Justice Blackmun
essentially acknowledged that there was no common-law right to attend pre-trial proceedings.
Id at 436.
129. Id at 440. The Third Circuit first enunciated this standard. See United States v. Cian-
frani, 573 F.2d 835, 854 (3d Cir. 1978); Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599, 607 (3d Cir. 1969).




cused should demonstrate that there is a "substantial probability that
closure will be effective in protecting against the perceived harm.
1 ,3 2
Fourth, should the trial court determine that the accused has established the
necessity of closure, the sixth amendment still requires that "restrictions im-
posed should extend no further than the circumstances reasonably re-
quire."' 3 3 Finally, Justice Blackmun would require the court to permit
contemporaneous objections from those present in the courtroom (though he
would not require notice to the public), to state its reasons for the record and
to make a complete record of the proceedings.1
34
In this case, Justice Blackmun found no factual basis for the closure
order. The reporting had been circumspect and accurate, no story had ap-
peared for ninety days, the papers had a tiny circulation in the venue, virtu-
ally all of the information to be brought out at the hearing was already
known and alternatives to closure seemed readily apparent and apparently
effective. 135
There remains the dissent's curious treatment of the first amendment
issue. Early in his dissent Justice Blackmun noted that notwithstanding Jus-
tice Powell's "concern. . .this Court heretofore has not found, and does not
today find, any First Amendment right of access to judicial or other govern-
mental proceedings."' 3 6 Gannett's assertion of a first amendment right of
access and its claim that the appropriate closure standards were those
adopted in Nebraska Press Association to govern prior restraints were dis-
patched in short order:
I do not agree. As I have noted, this case involves no restraint upon
publication or upon comment about information already in the
possession of the public or the press. It involves an issue of access to
a judicial proceeding. To the extent the Constitution protects a
right of public access to the proceeding, the standards enunciated
under the Sixth Amendment suffice to protect that right. I there-
fore need not reach the issue of First Amendment access.'
3 7
Of course, the standards he had enunciated under the sixth amendment
would have sufficed to protect the right of access only if the sixth amend-
ment approach had been adopted by the Court, which it was not. Was Jus-
tice Blackmun implying that the dissenters would accept Justice Powell's
suggestion and continue to decide cases on a principle rejected by a majority
of the Court? Or was he indicating that Justice Rehnquist was correct in
citing the dissent as authority for the final entombment of the first amend-
ment right of access? Or was he simply acknowledging that whatever he
held, it would not change the outcome of this case?
D. What Did Gannett Hold
The one clear holding adopted by a majority of the Court in Gannett is
132. Id at 442.
133. Id at 444.
134. Id at 445-46.
135. Id at 407-10, 447-48.
136. Id. at 411.
137. Id at 447.
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that the sixth amendment does not in and of itself provide the public with a
right to attend a pre-trial suppression hearing. As a technical exercise in
statutory interpretation, this conclusion is plaisible, if by no means compel-
ling. 138 Unfortunately, the dispositive analysis employed by Justice Stewart
cannot be confined to this narrow holding. His conclusion that sixth amend-
ment rights must be viewed as personal to the accused is premised in the first
instance on the plain language of the sixth amendment and the lack of any
contrary intent of the drafters. As such it applies with equal force to trials as
well as pre-trial proceedings. Even this extension would not have created
significant controversy, if the opinion were clearly restricted to the sixth
amendment. But Justice Stewart went on to enumerate the public benefits
of open proceedings and to declare them adequately protected by the par-
ticipants in the litigation. He repeatedly referred to constitutional rather
than sixth amendment rights. The history of open criminal proceedings, he
stated, did no more than demonstrate the existence of a common law right
and "not many common law rights have been elevated to the status of con-
stitutional rights." 139 Justice Rehnquist took this cue to announce that the
Court had indeed freed lower courts from all constitutional restraints on clo-
sures, save possibly for the most bizarre orders.
Thus the Court's reservation of the first amendment question seemedpro
forma. The dissent was surely correct that to find a reasonable probability of
prejudice in the skimpy facts in the record before the Court was largely to
emasculate to a large extent any first amendment right that might subse-
quently be recognized.
Justice Powell's opinion, however, indicated that the constitutional
standard would be more stringent in the future. By pointing to the four
dissenters, he in effect declared his proposed standards to be the minimum
showing required by the Constitution, under a combination of the first and
sixth amendments. Nevertheless, as Justice Rehnqust properly complained,
there was in fact no majority finding the public's right of attendance to be
protected, only an odd quintuplet. If stare decis had any vitality (and these
cases cast serious doubt on that proposition), there were only four justices
who had signalled their allegiance to the principle of a first amendment right
of access. 14° Whatever one can make of Justice Blackmun's statement in
Gannett that he need not decide the first amendment issue, there could be
little doubt, both from the tone of the opinion and the extraordinary efforts
he undertook to shoehorn the right of access into the sixth amendment, that
he was strongly disinclined to find such a right. The final touch was provided
by the Chief Justice, who implied that he would treat trials differently than
pre-trial proceedings. Although this, too, was a theme of the Court's opin-
ion, it was repudiated by the odd quintuplet, who would find an equally
strong right to access to trials and to their close equivalents such as suppres-
sion hearings.
138. See supra note 60.
139. 443 U.S. at 384.
140. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 19 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by
Brennan and Powell, JJ.); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 41"7 U.S. 843, 850 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing, joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.).
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The result of this almost impenetrable melange of conflicting signals
was predictable. Both the commentators and the press expressed uncer-
tainty, confusion, and disbelief. 14 1 The confusion intensified as nearly all
the Justices took to the stump and made wildly varying clarifications.1
42
More important, the confusion was accompanied by a remarkable rush of
closure motions and orders.
143
III. RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS: ADOPTION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
RATIONALE AND A LOT LESS
Whether it was to staunch this flow or "to escape further pummeling by
the press," 144 the Court granted certiorari in the case of Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virgini'a,'145 a mere five months after the decision in Gannett. And one
year to the day after the Gannett decision, the Court held that the first
amendment did provide the public with an enforceable right of access to
criminal trials.
Notwithstanding the confusion that had followed the five opinions in
Gannett, the eight Justices participating in Richmond Newspapers146 found it
necessary to express their views in seven different opinions, none of which
collected more than three votes.
A. Facts 1
47
The defendant, John Paul Stevenson, was charged with the murder of a
hotel manager in a small town in Virginia. His initial conviction had been
overturned by the Virginia Supreme Court because it was based on a blood-
stained shirt which had been admitted improperly into evidence.
After the second trial, a newspaper account had reported not only the
mistrial but also the details surrounding the accused's original conviction
and its reversal. The third trial had ended in a mistrial because a prospec-
tive juror had read about the previous trials in the newspaper and had told
other prospective jurors about the case before the trial started.
Two months later, at the outset of the fourth trial, the defense moved to
141. An excellent array of the confused reactions is contained in Rapid City Journal v.
Circuit Ct., 283 N.W.2d 563 (S.D. 1979), where the majority accepted Justice Rehnquist's inter-
pretation of the holding of Gannett. One dissent accepted Justice Powell's position on the first
amendment and another dissent, relying in part on the Chief Justice's concurrence, would have
found a sixth amendment right of access to trials but not to pre-trial proceedings. Much of the
legal and journalistic commentary decrying the obscurity of the Gannett decision was collected
by Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion in Richmond Newspapers. 448 U.S. at 602 nn.l, 2.
142. See Reznek, Gannett v. De Pasquale and Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia: Re-opening
Courtroom Doors and Constitutional Windows, 10 CAP. U.L. REV. 101, 114 n.66 (1980). See also Cox,
supra note 29; Schmidt, The Gannett Decision. A Contradiction Wrapped In An Obfuscation Inside an
Enigma, 18 JUDGES' J. 12, 13 (1979); Stephenson, Fair Tral-Free Press." Rights In Continuing Con-
flict, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 39, 63-64 (1979).
143. See generally Reporter's Committee on Freedom of the Press, Court Watch Summary,
supra note 14. See also United States v. Powers, 622 F.2d 317, 321 n.2 (8th Cir. 1980); Cox,supra
note 29, at 20; Reznek, supra note 142, at 116-18.
144. Cox, supra note 29, at 24.
145. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
146. Justice Powell did not participate.
147. 448 U.S. at 559-63.
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close the trial to the public. In support of this motion, defense counsel of-
fered nothing more than the assertion that a family member of the decedent
had been present in court earlier and counsel did not want information be-
ing shuffled back and forth at the recess. Neither the prosecutor nor the two
reporters present objected. The trial judge granted the motion apparently
without further comment. The newspaper moved to vacate the closure order
later that day and a hearing was held at the conclusion of the day's proceed-
ings. In support of the motion, defense counsel recounted that this was the
fourth trial, that there had been a problem with information passing be-
tween jurors and that he did not want information prejudicial to the accused
to leak out to the jurors of this small community. The trial judge, declaring
obscurely that his ruling might be different if the courtroom were set up in
such a fashion that the jury would not see and be distracted by spectators,
ratified the closure order. He reasoned that if the rights of the defendant are
infringed in any way, a defense motion to close should be granted so long as
it "doesn't completely override all rights of everyone else. .... ,,148
B. The Plurality Opinion
Chief Justice Burger, writing for himself and Justices White and Ste-
vens, made no attempt to clarify or explain the conflicting strands in Gannett.
Indeed, he immediately indulged in precisely tle same ambiguity that had
riddled the Court's opinion in Gannett: "In Gannett . . . the Court was not
required to decide whether a right of access to trials, as distinguished from
hearings on pretrial motions, was consttutionally guaranteed."
149
The Chief Justice properly stated that Gannett was limited to a sixth
amendment holding pertaining to pre-trial proceedings and did not decide
whether the first amendment guarantees a right of access to trials. 150 But he
did not explain why the sixth amendment analysis in Gannett did not apply
equally to trials or why the public policy conclusions in Gannett did not apply
equally to any putative first amendment right to attend pre-trial proceedings
or trials.
In any event, the Chief Justice proclaimed that
[h]ere for the first time the Court is asked to decide whether a crim-
inal trial itself may be closed to the public upon the unopposed
request of a defendant, without any demonstration that closure is
required to protect the defendant's superior right to a fair trial, or
that some other overriding consideration requires closure. 151
The Chief Justice retraced the familiar history of open trials, a history
supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, concluding that a
presumption of openness inheres in every criminal trial.152 He recounted the
usual array of reasons supporting this history, including the educative effect
on the citizenry which increases the respect for the law and inspires confi-
148. Id at 561.
149. Id at 564 (emphasis added to "constitutionally").
150. Id
151. Id
152. Id at 573.
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dence in judicial remedies by providing intelligent acquaintance with the
methods of government.1 53 The Chief Justice signaled out for special atten-
tion the significant community therapeutic value in open trials, the satiation
of the urge to punish, and the need for retaliation and vengeance within the
framework of organized society and the rule of law.
54
The question remained as to how to elevate this common-law tradition
to constitutional stature. The Chief Justice first observed that the right to
attend trials served the same core purpose as the express first amendment
rights, "assuring freedom & communication on matters relating to the func-
tioning of government."' 155 Then, venturing where the Court had repeat-
edly balked, he expressly cited the decisions establishing the freedom to
listen and to receive information and ideas and concluded: "What this
means in the context of trials is that the First Amendment guarantees of
speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily clos-
ing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time that
amendment was adopted. "1
56
The Chief Justice found further support in the public forum doctrine,
equating courtrooms with streets, sidewalks, and parks as traditionally open
places: "People assemble in public places not only to speak or to take action,
but also to listen, observe and learn . . . ,,157 The Chief Justice then ad-
dressed the State's argument that the right to attend trials must fail because
it was nowhere spelled out in the Constitution. He equated the right to
attend criminal trials with, in Justice Blackmun's words, a pot pourri of
other constitutionally unarticulated fundamental rights such as the rights of
association, privacy, and interstate travel.'
5 8
Having recognized the right, the Chief Justice left to another day the
task of establishing the appropriate standard to govern its accommodation
with the rights of the accused to a fair trial. He found dispositive the failure
of the lower court to make any findings in support of his order or to examine
any of the various tested alternatives to closure. Beyond that the Chief Jus-
tice would say only that "[a]bsent an overriding interest, articulated in find-
ings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public."' 59 Even if this
standard could be regarded as anything but purely tautological, the superior
right of an accused to a fair trial had already been identified at the outset of
his opinion as an overriding interest. The Chief Justice, then, was refusing to
specify any fair-trial closure test.
C. Justice Brennan's Concurrence
Justice Brennan's concurrence provided an extension of the views he
espoused in Nebraska Press Association. Less grudgingly than the Chief Justice,
he, too, attempted to place the right of access to trial proceedings in the
153. Id at 572.
154. Id at 570-72.
155. Id at 575.
156. Id at 576 (emphasis added).
157. Id at 577-78.
158. Id at 579-80.
159. Id at 581.
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context of a larger right of public access to governmental information. This
right of access to information rested on the structural importance of public
debate in a democracy and on the implicit antecedent assumption that to be
valuable, public debate must be not only "uninhibited, robust and wide-
open," but also "informed." 160 The prior right-of-access decisions, all of
which had resulted in rejections of the putative right, simply reflected the
special nature of the right. 16 1 When read with care, Justice Brennan stated,
these decisions are consistent with the general rubric that "any privilege of
access to government information is subject to a degree of restraint dictated
by the nature of the information and countervailing interests in security or
confidentiality."
16 2
Justice Brennan located two helpful principles in determining how to
cull out the information to which this theoretically endless access principle
applies. First, because a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judg-
ment of experience, the right of access has special force when drawn from an
enduring and vital tradition of public entree to particular proceedings or
information. Second, the value of access must be measured in specifics and
the importance of access to a particular governmental process must be mea-
sured in terms of that very process.
163
Needless to say, in assessing the importance of public access to the trial
process, Justice Brennan found the judgment of experience to have been
favorable. As to the effect of access on the functioning of the process, he
relied in part on the belief that public access promoted accurate factfinding
and in part on the belief that secrecy was profoundly inimical to the demon-
strative functions of the trial process, including the demonstration that the
laws are fairly administered. 164 Importantly, Justice Brennan also rested
heavily on the notion that the judiciary is a coordinate branch of govern-
ment whose role, particularly with respect to the vitally important task of
construing and protecting constitutional rights, has extended far beyond the
adjudication of private disputes. 16 5 To Justice Brennan, public access to tri-
als assumed the status of "an important check, akin in purpose to the other
checks and balances that infuse our system of government.
' 166
These factors, said Justice Brennan, "tip[ped] the balance strongly to-
ward the rule that trials be open."'1 6 7 He never said, however, what was on
the other side of this balance, nor did he assess any claims by the Govern-
ment that there were countervailing interests promoted by judicial secrecy
and confidentiality that were systematically impaired by openness. He also
expressly declined to declare which state interests might be sufficient in par-
ticular cases to overcome the presumption of closure, noting that in this case
160. Id at 586.
161. Id at 587.
162. Id at 586.
163. Id at 588-89.
164. Id at 593-97.
165. Id at 595.
166. Id at 596. For a discussion of the checking value with respect to newsgathering and
trial reporting, see Blasi, The Checki'ng Value In First Amendment Theoe, 77 Am. B. FOUND. RE-
SEARCH J. 521, 591-611, 636-37 (1977).
167. 448 U.S. at 598.
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the judge's decision had rested on a state closure statute which gave trial
judges unfettered discretion.' 68
D. The Remaing Opinions
The remaining opinions were singularly unenlightening. Justice Stew-
art, the author of both the concurring opinion in Houchins and the majority
opinion in Gannett, concurred in the judgment, calmly pronouncing that the
first amendment clearly gives the public and press a right of access to trials.
He made virtually no attempt to reconcile this position with either of his
prior opinions. He did join in the Chief Justice's public forum analogy,
which, as discussed below,' 69 provides a basis for distinguishing Justice
Stewart's conclusion, if not his reasoning, in Houchins. Then, incredibly, he
bolstered his decision by alluding to the many good reasons for open trials
set out not only in the two main opinions in Richmond Newspapers, but in
Justice Blackmun's dissent in Gannett as well. The only hint of a reconcilia-
tion of his current stance with his position in Gannett came in his declaration
that the Court had not yet delivered the ultimate answer as to the first
amendment status of access to pre-trial hearings.
1 70
Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment as a secondary position to
his preferred sixth amendment position. He said little, however, other than
to chastise the Court for Gannett and to bemoan the task of wrestling with the
problems of delimiting a first amendment right of access.1 7' Justice Rehn-
quist dissented, decrying the Court's usurpation of constitutional power from
the states and the elective branches of government.
1 72
Justice Stevens concurred in the Chief Justice's opinion, pronouncing
this to be a watershed case because the Court unequivocally held that an
arbitrary interference with access to important information is an abridge-
ment of the first amendment. He pointed out that he had dissented at
length in Houchns. He then expressly incorporated by reference in his con-
currence that portion of his dissent in Houchins where he had relied in part
on the sixth amendment in deriving a right of access to prisons. Apparently
speaking to those who might be puzzled as to how his position had escaped
unscathed his silent concurrence in the Court's opinion in Gannett, Justice
Stevens simply cited the language of the sixth amendment and declared
Richmond Newspapers to be in no way inconsistent with the perfectly unam-
biguous holding of Gannett that the sixth amendment is personal to the ac-
cused. The drafters of the sixth amendment, he stated, had merely been
identifying the accused as the party with the greatest interest in a public
trial. 173
168. Id
169. See infra text accompanying notes 202-07.
170. 448 U.S. at 598-99.
171. Id at 601-04.
172. Id at 604-06.
173. Id at 582-84.
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E. What Is Left of Gannett?
Before assessing the status of fair-trial closures in light of Richmond News-
papers, it might well be asked just what remains of Gannett. That the answer
is not obvious is amply demonstrated by the range of views expressed by
courts and commentators in the wake of Richmond Newspapers. The Judicial
Conference Committee on the Operation of the Jury System sees in Richmond
Newspapers implicit approval of Gannett.t 74 Indeed, notwithstanding the
views of the odd quintuplet in Gannett, declaring access to pre-trial suppres-
sion hearings to be as important as access to trials, at least one court has
found in the welter of views expressed in Gannett and Richmond Newspapers,
that a state may require exclusion of the public from any preliminary hear-
ing, even if the hearing has all the characteristics of a suppression hearing. 
175
Others have taken the position that while there is some first amendment
right of access to pre-trial proceedings, that right is sheltered by a less protec-
tive standard than the one applying to trials. 176 Still others have placed
access to trials and all pre-trial proceedings on equal constitutional
footing. '
77
Significant divergences in approach are also evident among those artic-
ulating a balancing standard with which to weigh first amendment rights
against the countervailing concern of trial fairness. Some have adopted the
overall standard proffered by Justice Powell in Gannett: whether an open
hearing will likely prejudice the sixth amendment rights of the defendant. 178
Others, such as the Judicial Conference Committee, have adopted a reason-
able likelihood of prejudice standard; 1 79 the Justice Department guidelines
require a "substantial likelihood" of prejudice. 18 0 The Ninth Circuit, faced
with a trial closure, found no standard in R'chmond Newspapers and searched
the confusing Gannett case for guidance. It concluded the trial judge must
find that the defendant's right to a fair trial will be prejudiced before closure
is permitted. The court then permitted partial closure.' 8 ' Other courts have
reaffirmed the clear and present danger test of the Revised Standards, al-
though at least one court expressly adopted the Revised Standards gov-
erning pre-trial closures after declaring that Gannett controlled the
decision. 18 2 The courts and codifiers have shown an encouragingly greater
174. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITrEE REVISED REPORT, supra note 5, at 523. But cf
Advisory Committee Note, supra note 7, at 67 (Richmond Newspapers has some application to pre-
trial proceedings).
175. San Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498, 179 Cal. Rptr. 772, 638
P.2d 655 (1982) (upholding constitutionality of state statute making exclusion mandatory upon
defendant's request).
176. See, e.g., State v. Burak, 37 Conn. Supp. 627, 431 A.2d 1246, 1248 (1981).
177. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1344 (D.C. App. 1981) (en banc);
Patuxent Publishing Co. v. Maryland, 48 Md. App. 689, 693, 429 A.2d 554, 556 (Ct. Spec. App.
1981); Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 281 S.E.2d 915, 922-23 (Va. 1981).
178. See, e.g., State v. Burak, 37 Conn. Sup. 627, 431 A.2d 1246, 1248 (1981); United States
v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1345 (D.C. 1981); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 281
S.E.2d 915, 922-23 (Va. 1981).
179. See supra authorities cited note 174.
180. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, GUIDELINES ON OPEN JUDICIAL PRO-
CEEDINGS, 28 C.F.R. § 50.9(c)(6)(i).
181. Sacramento Bee v. United States Dist. Ct., 656 F.2d 477, 481-83 (9th Cir. 1981).
182. Kansas City Star v. Fossey, 630 P.2d 1176 (Kan. 1981). See also In re P.R., 637 P.2d 346
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degree of acceptance of the procedural predicates for fair-trial closures out-
lined in the Gannett opinions of Justices Powell and Blackmun. tI"
In fact, Gannett should be viewed as a nullity with respect to first amend-
ment issues, both as to the question of whether the first amendment issues
right of access will be extended to pre-trial proceedings and as to what the
balancing standard governing any fair-trial closures of protected proceedings
should be. Although Gannett's first amendment non-decision technically ap-
proved the reasonable probability standard utilized by the trial court, the
opinion also found the public's right to attend all criminal proceedings to be
fully protected by the participants. It concluded that the common law right
of access simply did not attain constitutional stature. Yet this reasoning was
repudiated by seven of the eight justices who participated in Richmond News-
papers, including the author of the opinion in Gannett. Moreover, with the
possible exception of the plurality opinion, a majority of those voting in Rich-
mond Newspapers, again including the author of the opinion in Gannett clearly
viewed the first amendment status of pre-trial proceedings to be an open
question. While Gannett offers an empirical justification for distinguishing
between trials and pre-trial proceedings, t1 4 the only aspect of the decision
which can logically survive Richmond Newspapers is the very limited proposi-
tion that the language of the sixth amendment precludes the use of that
amendment as a source for a public right of access to criminal proceedings.
IV. WHAT DOES RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS IMPLY FOR THE FUTURE OF
FAIR-TRIAL CLOSURES?
Richmond Newspapers unquestionably constitutionalizes the public's right
to observe criminal trials. The seven-to-one vote, an all-too-rare margin in
the Burger Court on constitutional issues, 18 5 at first blush seems a resound-
ing affirmation of this important and long-held civil liberty. But the decisive
margin was present only with respect to criminal trials themselves. The
Court obviously remains deeply divided as to the broader issues underlying a
first amendment right of access. The decision is, nevertheless, certain to be
offered in support of a wide variety of claims of access to other kinds of
judicial and governmental proceedings. 18 6 Whether Richmond Newspapers is
in fact Justice Stevens' watershed or landmark decision establishing the pub-
(Colo. 1981) (contempt proceeding for grand jury witness; clear and present danger standard
reaffirmed).
183. See, e.g., Sacramento Bee v. United States Dist. Ct., 656 F.2d 477, 482 (9th Cir. 1981)
(opportunity to object, use of less intrusive alternatives and narrowly drawn exclusions); In re
United States ex ret. Pulitizer Publishing Co., 635 F.2d 676, 678-79 (8th Cir. 1980) (voir dire
closure: opportunity to object, articulated findings as to less intrusive alternatives). See also
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REVISED REPORT, supra note 5; JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 94-100.
185. See generally Note, Plurality Decisrions andJudicial Decirzonmaking, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1127,
app. (1981).
186. See, e.g., In re Application of NBC, 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981) (suggesting applicability
to videotape evidence admitted at trial). See also Fenner & Koley, Access toJudicial Proceedings."
To Rt~dnond Newspapers and Beond, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 430-32 (1981) (civil judi-
cial proceedings); Note, supra note 51, at 1921-23 (civil proceedings); The Sureme Court, 1979
Tem, 94 HARv. L. REV. 75, 157 (1980).
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lic's right of access to these and other important governmental operations
and information generally and whether it will lead to a "significant and salu-
tary recasting of much first amendment doctrine,"' 8 7 are beyond the scope
of this article. The welter of views expressed in R'chmond Newspapers (and, of
course, Gannett) instead will be analyzed to answer the more limited ques-
tions of whether the right of access will and should be extended beyond trials
to other criminal proceedings and, if so, what balancing standard should
govern closures of protected criminal proceedings when the asserted state
interest is to protect an accused's right to a fair trial.
A. The Divergent Pnnctples of the Major Opintons
Both the Chief Justice and Justice Brennan found a first amendment
right of public access to criminal trials. Both relied heavily on the tradi-
tional openness of criminal trials (as did the dissent in Gannett). But, because
of their differing objectives, the two Justices employed the element of history
in quite different ways, with significantly different implications.
1. Underpinnings of the Right to Know
Before assessing these implications, it may be useful to digress briefly
and reexamine the underpinnings of the right of access to state-held informa-
tion. Such an examination reveals an immediate irony in the fact that a
constitutional right of access has first surfaced in such a venerable context.
For the recent clamor, if it can be called that, over recognition of a first
amendment right to know has been prompted by changes in the historic
relationship between the government and the citizenry and in the relation-
ships among the coordinate branches and levels of government.
The right to know is infused primarily, as Justice Brennan noted, with
the Meiklejohnian insight that self-expression is a necessary predicate of self-
government.1 88 Citizens must be both qualified to act as political deci-
sionmakers and equipped with sufficient information to make intelligent
political decisions; public debate is an important, if not the only, means by
which they acquire these tools.18 9 Advocates of a constitutional right of ac-
cess generally are among those who fear that because of certain changes in
the structure of our society, public debate is in danger of becoming critically
contentless and uninformed.
The change most often alluded to is the sheer growth of government
and its usurpation of numerous functions that before were entrusted to indi-
viduals and private institutions. Professor Cox has encapsulated the argu-
ment as follows:
187. See The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, supra note 186, at 149.
188. 448 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing, inter alia, A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948)).
189. See, e.g., Note, supra note 74, at 928-31. For simplicity of exposition, this discussion is
devoted to the instrumental or functional purposes of a first amendment right to know. It is
clear, however, that other important purposes of free discussion and expression, such as the
promotion of individual dignity, autonomy, and self-definition, see, e.g., Note, supra note 51, at
1906-09, are also furthered by such a principle. See also T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE-
DOM OF ExPREssioN 6-7 (1970).
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Recognition of the right [to know] may well be essential if the first
amendment is to continue to serve the basic function of keeping the
people informed about their government . . . . Because of [the]
scale and complexity [of the activities of the federal government],
coupled with the interdependence of all aspects of society, govern-
ment itself is often the chief, if not the only, source of information
for the people about the conduct of those who are supposed to be
the people's agents. The central problem today is how to deal with
governmental secrecy and-all too often-with government
deception. to
Critics of the right to know doctrine observe that the concept is more
comfortably lodged in a model of participatory or direct democracy, whereas
the Constitution establishes only a representative form of self-government.
Citizens in this country "do not directly either make or implement public
decisions, though through their power to elect their representatives, they re-
tain their authority to choose the direction of governmental policy."'' 9 Pro-
fessor BeVier, for example, sees in a first amendment right of access an
unavoidable insistence that every citizen has the right to a hands-on experi-
ence at every level of government, a result which would threaten govern-
ment's basic viability.
92
Yet, even within the confines of represenative democracy, citizens must
have the means of assessing the adequacy of the performance of the actual
decisionmakers. The quest for recognition of an affirmative right of access to
government processes arises from the awareness that often the mere results of
a particular governmental policy or decision are not in themselves sufficient
to enable meaningful evaluation of that decision or policy. The citizens also
must know something of the premises of a decision, the information the
policymakers possessed, and the choices that confronted them. Those argu-
ing for a right of access believe that the changing nature of government has
made even this indirect manipulation of government more difficult. This is
not to say that the right to know necessarily contemplates direct participa-
tion, influence, or even observation of every governmental decision at the
time it is made or even ever. 193 If, as Justice Brennan hypothesizes, the right
of access is only designed to fulfill a checking function, "akin in purpose to
the other checks and balances,"' 194 surely this objective can be substantially
accomplished short of converting our government to a participatory
democracy.
Another important change in the structure of the federal government
has been the diminished authority of elected officials in relation to the ad-
ministrative and judicial branches. This decline has resulted not only from
190. Cox, supra note 29, at 24. See also Emerson, supra note 76, at 464.
191. BeVier, An Informed Pubic, An Informing Press: The Searchfor a Constitutional Principle, 68
CALIF. L. REV. 482, 505-06 (1980).
192. Id at 509-10.
193. Meiklejohn, for example, saw in the first amendment a mechanism for ensuring that
everything worth saying shall be said but this did not contain an implicit requirement that "on
every occasion, every citizen shall take part in the public debate." A. MEIKLEJOHN, SUPra note
188, at 25.
194. 448 U.S. at 596. See also The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, supra note 186, at 154 n.33.
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the rapid growth of the executive bureaucracy, but also from the now well-
established practice of delegating legislative authority to the executive and
judicial branches through broad, vaguely worded statutes.1 9 5 We have
grown comfortable with the fact that administrative agencies are entrusted
with the regulation of whole fields of activity, constrained by little more than
the admonition that they do so "in the public interest."' 196 And since the
turn of the century, courts have been entrusted with such fundamentally
political responsibilities as determining the degree of concentration in Amer-
ican business, imposing upon themselves a rule of reasonableness. 197
The federal judiciary, moreover, has been more than just a passive re-
cipient of legislative duties and responsibilities. The past thirty years have
witnessed a vigorous and aggressive expansion of the sphere of federal judi-
cial decisionmaking and an ever more pervasive reliance upon courts to
make fundamental social and political determinations through constitu-
tional adjudication. ' 98
This unquestionable shift in the balance of authority has important and
potentially disturbing ramifications in a democracy, where the government's
legitimacy derives from its electoral mandate. The point, as Professor Ely
has observed, is not that these faceless bureaucrats do a bad job, "it is rather
that they are neither elected nor reelected, and are controlled only spasmodi-
cally by officials who are."' 199 Judicial assumption of legislative functions in
the name of constitutional norms is particularly troublesome, for when
courts invalidate acts of the political branches on constitutional rather than
statutory grounds, they not only override coordinate branch judgments, they
do "so in a way that is not subject to 'correction' by the ordinary lawmaking
process." 2° ° The right of access appears to be premised in part on the belief
that a greater degree of direct citizen observation of the processes of govern-
ment can provide, in some instances, an admittedly not wholly adequate
surrogate for some of the accountabililty and legitimacy that has been
eroded by the growing hegemony of the administrative and judicial
branches.
20 '
195. See generall y J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 131-34 (1980).
196. See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1976) (FCC to regulate in
public interest, convenience, and necessity); United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S.
157 (1968) (upheld FCC assertion of jurisdiction under § 303(r) over cable television, an indus-
try which did not exist at the time the statute was enacted).
197. See, e.g., the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2; United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221
U.S. 106 (1911) (rule of reason).
198. See generally Nagel, A Comment on the Burger Court and 'Judicial Activism," 52 U. CoLo. L.
REV. 223 (1981).
199. J. ELY, supra note 195, at 4 (1980).
200. Id at 131.
201. Cf G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 27
(1980) (legitimacy of agencies derives from indirect accountability to other branches and direct
pressure from interested public). In this narrow context, the argument is admittedly vulnerable
to the criticism that it invokes the increased scope of judicial authority to justify the creation of
yet another judicially enforced constitutional right. Although it is not an entirely satisfactory
answer, the short response is that with respect to access to judicial proceedings the courts are
merely extending the reach of the Constitution into their own sphere of decision-making. This,
of course, does not fully ameliorate the federalism concern, which is the infringement upon the
prerogatives of state courts and legislatures to develop state closure standards. See, e.g., Rich-
mond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 607 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); BeVier,
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Neither of these developments seems compelling in the narrow context
of whether there exists a constitutional right to observe criminal trials, a
right which appears to have changed relatively little over the years. But
they do suggest another way of looking at the history of open judicial pro-
ceedings. It is possible to see in the strong and unbroken tradition of open
trials, an early, if implicit, recognition that the attenuated legitimacy of an
appointed judiciary in our otherwise representative democracy, particularly
a judiciary with ultimate and uncheckable authority in certain areas, creates
a concomitant need for a greater degree of direct citizen observation and
understanding of its processes. This concern cannot be confined to criminal
trials alone, but applies alike to all judicial proceedings.
2. Where The Major Opinions Lead
Returning, then, to the opinions in Richmond Newspapers, the shortcom-
ings of the Chief Justice's historical analysis are plain. To the Chief Justice,
the uncontradicted common-law history of open'trials was essentially dispos-
itive. At its narrowest, his opinion twice relied on the fact that the tradition
of trial openness was fully recognized at "the time the [First] Amendment
was adopted. ' ' 20 2 Even the educative and therapeutic effects of public trials
were only reasons supporting the tradition. In this most distilled formula-
tion, first promulgated in Gannett, the Chief Justice's rubric essentially takes
the form of the classic, now largely abandoned, historical test for determin-
ing whether the seventh amendment right to a jury trial attaches to a partic-
ular cause of action.
20 3
The seventh amendment historical test has been both harshly criticized
and lavishly praised and often for the same reason: its unparalleled rigidity.
Those who favor expansion of the right have generally applauded the
supra note 191, at 512. But the insurmountable difficulty, at least in the context of fair-trial
closures, is that there is no alternative. The asserted conflicting interest is the sixth amendment,
another right over which the judiciary has asserted ultimate authority. Any coordinate branch
action, e.g., a Courtrooms in the Sunshine Act, would be limited by the judicially-enforced sixth
amendment.
This analysis should not and is not intended to imply any substantive assessment as to
whether these expansions in executive and judicial authority are in general or in their particu-
lars wise or desirable. It derives solely out of the tension between democratic theory and, in this
case, constitutional adjudication and is irrelevant to one's politics-liberal or conservative. See,
e.g., Estreicher, Platonic Guardans of Democarcry: John Hart Ely's Role for the Supreme Court in the
Constitution's Open Texture, 56 N.Y.U.L. REV. 547, 550 (1981). The point is simply that whatever
one's views are as to the appropriate and necessary scope of federal judicial authority, the fact
that the federal judiciary is a less electorally accountable branch in and of itself provides a
justification for greater openness of its processes. This is a far preferrable alternative to, for
instance, the ill-advised Congressional efforts to selectively prune federal court jurisdiction. See,
e.g., 97th United States Congress, S. 158 (abortion), S. 528 (school busing), S. 583 (abortion),
H.R. 72 (school prayer), H.R. 73 (abortion), H.R. 114 (federal court review of state cases);
ConsttutionalRestraints Upon thejud tczry, Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Constitution
of the Committee of the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (1981); Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the Committee on
the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. (1982).
202. 448 U.S. at 575-76.
203. See, e.g., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935). "In order to ascertain the scope
and meaning of the Seventh Amendment, resort must be had to the appropriate rules of the




Supreme Court's move to a more rational test because it enlarges the scope
of the right.20 4  Conversely, those who oppose the extension of jury trial
rights, motivated in most instances by the belief that jury trials are ineffi-
cient anachronisms, urge the resuscitation of the rule and the restriction of
the right to causes of action to which it attached in 1791.205 However one
views the underlying right to which the test is applied, the certain effect of
the strict historical test is to freeze arbitrarily the right of access to judicial
proceedings in the amber of post-Revolutionary America.
The Chief Justice did later analogize to public forum law, referring to
the long-standing, if not transcendent, minimum access doctrine, which de-
clares that access to traditionally open places such as streets, parks, and side-
walks cannot be broadly and absolutely denied.20 6 This somewhat reluctant
analytical broadening provides the basis for a more useful and fruitful in-
quiry. Not surprisingly, the concerns arising from public claims of access to
government-owned property are identical in many instances to those gener-
ated by claims of access to goverment-controlled information.
20 7
The minimum access notion has developed in fits and starts over the
last forty years; its acceptance by the Court has been neither secure nor of
certain dimension. 20 8 Accordingly, the Chief Justice's use of it to establish a
right of access to courts has been hailed as a revival of the principle.20 9 But
the Chief Justice revives the minimum access principle only to imprison it.
His formulation recalls the branch of the minimum access principle that
would encompass only traditional forums. Access to nontraditional forums,
on the other hand, need not be guaranteed, it need only be
nondiscriminatory.
2 10
204. See, e.g., McCoid, Procedural Reform and the Right toJugy Tral A Study of Beacon Thea-
tres, Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2, 13-14, 23-24 (1967).
205. See, e.g., Redish, Seventh Amendment Right To Jugy Trial, A Study In The Irrationality of Ra-
tinal Decision Making, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 486 (1975).
206. 448 U.S. at 578. See also id at 599-601 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
207. For an attempt to apply the public forum doctrine to the right of access, see Note, supra
note 74, at 933-39.
208. The concept received its initial articulation in Justice Robert's familiar dictum on be-
half of the plurality in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in
trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public ques-
tions. . . . [This right of access] must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or
denied.
Id. at 516-516. See also Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308, 315 (1968), rev'd on other grounds, Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). See
generally Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, in FREE SPEECH AND Associ-
ATION 115 (Kurland ed. 1975); Stone, Fora Americana: "Speech in Public Places," in FREE
SPEECH AND ASSOCIATION 342 (Kurland ed. 1975); Note, The Public Forum: Mnimum Access,
EqualAccess, and the First Amendment, 28 STAN. L. REV. 117, 118-32 (1975). The minimum access
notion is to be contrasted with the equal access concept, where the restrictions on access are
scrutinized merely to ensure that restrictions on members of the public are nondiscriminatory.
See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 143 (1968); ud at 150-51 (White, J., concurring).
209. See The Supreme Court 1979 Term, supra note 186, at 155.
210. Compare Hague .v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (streets, parks, and sidewalks) with
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (military base); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976)
(shopping center); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303 (1974) (street car);
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966) (jail grounds).
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Extending the guarantee of minimum access even to traditional forums
or to traditionally available governmental information is not an insignificant
step. Nor is it fully satisfactory. The minimum access principle seeks to
ensure the availability of sufficient channels of communication by prevent-
ing the state from completely forbidding public use of certain public places
for expressive purposes, subject to nondiscriminatory time, place, and man-
ner restrictions. The Court's myopic solicitude for only traditional public
forums has been rightly criticized as failing to respond to technological and
sociological changes that have dramatically reduced the actual importance
of many traditional forums. 2 1' In time, this will result in a net decline in the
effective reach of expressive outlets and a decreased ability of speakers to
reach their desired audiences. Similarly, the push for public access to gov-
ernment-held information derives from changes in the nature of government
and changes in the type and amount of information possessed by the govern-
ment. Protection of merely traditionally available information fails utterly
to accommodate these concerns.
Justice Brennan's not yet fully articulated alternative holds the promise
of recognizing and encompassing these developments. Justice Brennan
started at the opposite pole from that of the Chief Justice, finding a broad
presumption of a citizen right of access to all governmental functions and
operations. He did turn first to the helpful delimiting principle of a tradi-
tion of access. But the role of history was seriously circumscribed; a history
of openness amounted to little more than empirical evidence that permitting
public access to a particular governmental process has not in fact proved
unduly disruptive of that process and, perhaps, an implicit recognition that
the structural purposes of the first amendment have been particularly well-
served by access to this function or process.
But a tradition of access has no independent significance. It is simply a
sign that there has been a successful resolution of the underlying balancing
process that must be undertaken in every instance, based on the information
sought and opposing interests invaded. Access is to be "subject to a degree of
restraint dictated by the nature of the information and countervailing inter-
ests in security and confidentiality. '2 12 And this balance is to be based on
specifics, the importance of access to observe a particular governmental pro-
cess in terms of that particular process.
Obviously this framework is still somewhat inchoate, not to mention
tautological, and will need considerable refinement. It must be said that
neither of the delimiting principles uncovered thus far provides a great deal
of guidance. But there seems little reason to believe, as some have argued,
that the process of circumscribing this first amendment right will be inher-
ently more difficult than in any number of other first amendment
contexts.
2 13
211. & e Stone, supra note 208, at 342, 354-6 1; Note, supra note 208, at "136.
212. 448 U.S. at 586.
213. It has been observed, for instance, that the basic thrust of Justice Brennan's formula-
tion is similar to the public forum incompatibility analysis announced in Grayned v. Rockford,
408 U.S. 104 (1972). "The nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the
kinds of regulations of time, place and manner that are reasonable. . . .' The crucial question
is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a
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In any event, the analysis sketched out by Justice Brennan in Richmond
Newspapers appears to require a dual-level analysis. The first question is
whether the right extends to the type of information or type of government
process to which access is sought. A strong tradition of access may be suffi-
cient to resolve this level of inquiry. Where such a history is not present, the
court must then analyze the nature of the information or process, assessing
its importance in terms of citizen understanding and control of the processes
of government. This entails an assessment of the importance of the process
or function itself and the degree to which the information sought reveals
important aspects of that process. Included here would be an analysis of the
importance of the checking function of access to this type of information and
the value of that function in this context. Also pertinent are any direct bene-
fits that public observation provides to the actual functioning of the process.
On the other side of the balance, the court must determine at this stage
whether there are any systematic reasons for denying public access, any im-
portant state interests that will be unavoidably and consistently abridged by
permitting the public to observe directly the functioning of this governmen-
tal process. If so, those interests must be weighed against the value of pre-
sumptively opening the proceeding. Whatever the particular balancing
standards developed for this level of the analysis, public forum doctrine
teaches that the "thumb of the Court [must] be on the speech side of the
scales. "
2 14
Finally, even if it is decided that public access is not inherently incom-
patible with the functioning of a governmental process, the breadth of the
particular claim of access must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in light
of any legitimate state interests furthered by confidentiality and security. At
this level, it seems appropriate to utilize the familiar balancing standards
applicable to restrictions on expression.2 15 Courtroom closures to protect
particular place at a particular time." Id. at 115-16. Indeed, at least one commentator has
urged the incorporation of the Grayned test in the access context. See Note, supra note 74, at 935-
36.
214. Kalven, supra note 208, at 142.
215. See, e.g. ,In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 191 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (protective order in discovery
proceedings constitutionally permissible only if 1) the harm posed by dissemination is substan-
tial and serious; 2) the order is narrowly drawn and precise; and 3) there is no alternative means
of protecting the public interest that intrudes less directly on expression). Seegenerall Procunier
v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974). See also The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, supra, note 186, at
158.
Justice Brennan's first amendment access analysis appears to have been adopted by a ma-
jority of the Court in Globe Newspapers v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982). In that case,
the Court struck down a Massachusetts criminal trial closure law which required the exclusion
of the press and public during the testimony of all minor victims of sexual offenses. Justice
Brennan's opinion, joined by Justices White, Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, reiterated the
two-pronged "structural" access test announced in Richmond Newspapers, assessing first whether
there was tradition of access and, second, the functional importance of public access in terms of
the particular governmental process.
Justice Brennan then noted that both of these inquiries had been resolved with respect to
criminal trials in Richmond Newspapers. As a result, Justice Brennan announced, trials can be
closed for reasons based on the content of the communication sought to be suppressed only in
the face of a compelling state interest and a narrowly drawn closure order. Id. at 2620.
In this case, the statute mandated only a partial closure. The state asserted two interests in
support of these closures: to protect minor victims from trauma and embarrassment and to
encourage these victims to come forward and testify. The second interest was rejected as specu-
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fair-trial rights of defendants are content-based restrictions and thus, consti-
tutional only if supported by a compelling or important state interest, the
restriction is narrowly drawn, and there is no less drastic means of accom-
plishing that objective.
B. Access to Pretrial Hearings in Criminal Cases
The diverging implications of the analyses developed by the Chief Jus-
tice and Justice Brennan in Richmond Newspapers are graphically illustrated
by applying them to the question of whether there is a public right of access
to pre-trial hearings, and, in particular, to suppression hearings. The Chief
Justice's rigid historical analysis clearly excludes suppression hearings from
the ambit of any public right of access to judicial proceedings. Certainly no
such practice existed in 1791. Public attendance at suppression hearings
subsequently has not acquired a historical patina comparable to that which
has settled upon the right to attend trials.
216
Any structural or functional first amendment analysis must lead to a
contrary result. For, as Justice Blackmun articulated in his Gannett dissent,
the nature of "the suppression hearing implicates all the policies that require
that the trial be public. 21 7 Suppression hearings have the same mechanics
as a trial and thus derive the same benefits from publicity in terms of induc-
ing witnesses to come forth, promoting the conscientiousness of the partici-
pants, deterring perjury of witnesses, and checking the abuse of judicial
power. Moreover, quite often suppression hearings are the only important
public proceeding that takes place during a criminal prosecution. Thus,
whatever educative and therapeutic effects accrue to the public from observ-
ing trials must also flow from public access to suppression hearings.
Indeed, these last two purposes are often more directly implicated by
suppression hearings than by trials. By definition, suppression hearings arise
out of allegations of serious misconduct by law enforcement officials, miscon-
duct which has allegedly resulted in the infringement of important civil
rights. In those instances in which evidence is not suppressed, despite even
serious misconduct by law enforcement officials, a closed suppression hearing
lative. Justice Brennan found that the first asserted interest could be compelling but was not
inherently present in every case. The result was that closure could be justified only after a case-
by-case assessment of the nature of the offenses, the age and vulnerability of the youthful victim,
etc.
Chief Justice Burger's dissent, joined by Justice Rehnquist, could also be read as endorsing
an analysis incorporating an assessment of the specific structural value of public access in the
circumstances. While this is essentially the same overreaching rubric espoused by Justice Bren-
nan, the Chief Justice insisted that it is hard to find a limiting principle in Justice Brennan's
analysis. He then reverted to his historical approach, rejecting the right to access claim in this
context in part because the public had long been excluded from trials involving sexual assaults.
In addition, he disagreed with Justice Brennan's assessment of the importance of the state's
asserted interests.
Justice O'Connor's brief concurrence also indicated an unwillingness to extend the right of
access beyond criminal trials, though she did not elaborate on the means by which she would so
confine the right of access. Justice Stevens dissented solely on the mootness issue.
216. See The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, supra note 186.




will result in the suppression of this information for a substantial period of
time. By delaying its dissemination and divorcing it from a meaningful news
event, a court is generally ensuring that these facts will never appreciably
penetrate the public consciousness. 218 To return to the public forum anal-
ogy, just as nontraditional forums or mediums of communications have in
many instances supplanted or superseded traditional public forums or medi-
ums in importance, so the suppression hearing has in many instances as-
sumed the traditional role of the trial. If the public is to remain informed
concerning the functioning of the criminal justice system and if that system
is to benefit from participation by the public, the right of access must make
the appropriate adjustment.
Equally significant is the damage to the public's perception of the ad-
ministration ofjustice. As the Chief Justice stressed in his paean to the value
of open trials in Richmond Newspapers, "withdrawing from both the victim
and the vigilante the enforcement of the criminal laws . .. . cannot erase
from the people's consciousness the fundamental, natural yearning to see jus-
tice done."'2 19 To quote the Chief Justice, a "result considered untoward
may undermine public confidence, and where the [proceeding] has been con-
cealed from public view, an unexpected outcome can cause a reaction that
the system has failed and at worst has been corrupted. '220 The exclusionary
rule often results in the suppression of highly relevant and even dispositive
evidence. In many instances, it operates to acquit or terminate the prosecu-
tion of a clearly guilty individual. It is a rule promulgated under the belief
that it serves the "imperative of judicial integrity . .. 221 But if the public
is deprived of a full understanding as to the values which are being bal-
anced, implementation of the rule is virtually certain to create precisely the
opposite impression.2 22 Indeed, it is hard to imagine an event more likely to
inspire criticism and cynicism toward the administration of justice than the
unexplained failure to convict those against whom there is strong or over-
whelming evidence of guilt.
The Chief Justice has frequently and bitterly complained about the ex-
clusionary rule.2 2 3 The rule does represent an extraordinary judicial incur-
sion into the administration of law enforcement, an incursion which is
essentially uncheckable by the coordinate branches. It is for this very reason,
however, that the administration of the rule must be exposed to the public as
fully and completely as possible, whatever one's view of its wisdom or the
appropriateness of its promulgation by the judiciary. To suggest, as the
Chief Justice did in Gannett,224 that pre-trial hearings may be opened only
after we modify the exclusionary rule, is precisely to reverse the constitu-
tional priorities.
218. See Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 560-61; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 268
(1941). See also Gannett, 448 U.S. at 442 n.17 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
219. 448 U.S. at 571.
220. Id
221. See 448 U.S. at 594 n.19 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
222. 443 U.S. at 435-36 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
223. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411-27 (1971)
(Burger, CJ., dissenting).
224. 443 U.S. at 396.
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It is clear, then, that an assessment of both the importance of the infor-
mation sought and the benefits of public access to the functioning of suppres-
sion hearings yields very much the same results as it would for trials. There
remains the question of whether there are any countervailing state interests
that are systematically threatened by creating a constitutional presumption
of pre-trial proceeding openness against which these values must be weighed.
The only such interest which has been hypothesized is Justice Stewart's
special risk of unfairness arising from the possible dissemination into the ve-
nire of inadmissible (and highly prejudicial) evidence. The actual dimension
of this risk even in highly publicized cases is open to serious doubt, as dis-
cussed below. But this interest must be rejected here for a more fundamental
reason. To defeat the extension of a right of access to a particular process, as
opposed to a particular case, it must be demonstrated that that access is
inherently incompatible with the functioning of the process and that it will
consistently and unavoidably result in the abridgment of an important or
overriding state interest. Virtually no one has suggested that any substantial
risk of unfairness is presented by opening suppression hearings in most, or
even many, criminal cases. 225 The proper approach is to recognize the exist-
ence of the right and account for the risks on a case-by-case basis, determin-
ing in each instance whether opening a particular hearing will impermissibly
endanger the fair-trial right of that particular defendant.
226
Much of what has been said with respect to suppression hearings is, of
course, applicable to virtually any pre-trial proceeding and, indeed, any
post-trial proceeding. The analysis will vary slightly depending upon the
format and purpose of each proceeding. Thus the interests in deterring per-
jury or aiding accurate factfinding would not seem significant in the absence
of an evidentiary hearing. Similarly, the cathartic or therapeutic effect
would point strongly towards opening a non-evidentiary sentencing proceed-
ing. But the primary reasons supporting the right of citizen access to the
judicial processes, the educative and therapeutic effects and the checking
function, are common to all judicial proceedings.
In any event, a right of public access has been properly acknowledged
not only with respect to suppression hearings, 22 7 but to jury voir dire, 228 pre-
225. But see San Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Ct., 30 Cal. 3d 498, 179 Cal. Rptr. 772,
638 P.2d 655 (1982) (upholding preliminary hearing closure statute in part on grounds that
non-lawyers may be misled by the superficial resemblance between preliminary hearing and
trial and ascribe to a one-sided hearing the legitimacy and credibility of a trial, thereby perhaps
compelling a defendant to abandon his right of silence at such a hearing and try his case in the
media). Se also In re Application of NBC, 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1980) (Weis, J., dissenting)
(would have deprived public of access to Abscam videotape evidence admitted at trial because
the videotape does not employ euphemisms but produces the truth of stark reality, sometimes so
brutally as to be unsuitable for general audiences.).
226. United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1344 (D.C. 1981).
227. See, e.g., Keene Publishing Co. v. Cheshire County Sup. Ct., 406 A.2d 137 (N.H. 1979);
Pennsylvania v. Hayes, 6 MEDIA L. REP. (CCH) 1273 (1980).
228. See, e.g., United States v. Layton, 519 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Cal. 1981); In re United
States ex rel. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 635 F.2d 676, 678-79 (8th Cir. 1980). But ef Hovey v.
Superior Ct., 28 Cal. 3d 1, 80, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 181, 616 P.2d 1301, 1354 (1980) (court
promulgated rule requiring voir dire of each prospective juror in capital cases to be done indi-
vidually and in sequestration).
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trial competency hearings, 2 29 pre-trial detention hearings, 23 0 and post-trial
sentencing proceedings.2 31 In general, it would appear that the public right
of access should attach to any important or significant stage of the criminal
process that can be conducted in open court.
232
C. The Apprprt'ate Fair- Trial Closure Standard
Whenever the Richmond Newspapers right of access is extended to a par-
ticular judicial proceeding, the right of access must still be balanced against
any important or significant countervailing interests which will be endan-
gered by its exercise. 233 In the abstract, protecting a defendant's right to a
fair trial is clearly such a potentially overriding interest. The question, as
always, is how great a danger to this interest must be demonstrated before it
attains the status of a compelling state interest and an abridgment of the
right of access will be tolerated. Believing this result was not foreclosed by
Gannett,234 nor daunted by the evident trend toward a less rigorous stan-
dard,2 35 the authors would argue for retention of the standard expressed in
the ABA's Revised Criminal Justice Standards, that the moving party
demonstrate a clear and present danger of prejudice to the defendant from
failure to close a judicial proceeding. And, of course, even if a clear and
present danger is established, the closure must be no broader than necessary
and the moving party must establish the unavailability of less intrusive
alternatives.
236
229. Compare People v. Berkowitz, 93 Misc. 2d 873, 403 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1978) ("Son of Sam"
murder case; pre-trial competency hearing closed to public because of massive pre-trial public-
ity and prospect of much inadmissible evidence being admitted with condition that transcript
be released within a week of determination of competency and trial by sequestered jury) with
People v. Berkowitz, 65 A.D.2d 581, 409 N.Y.S.2d 706 (App. Div. 1977) (change of venue mo-
tion denied because of large venire from which to select jury).
230. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981).
231. See, e.g., United States v. Feeney, 501 F. Supp. 1324 (D. Colo. 1980); Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. State, 363 So. 2d 603 (Dist. Ct. App. 1978). See also Gannett Co. v. Mark, 54
A.D.2d 818, 387 N.Y.S.2d 336 (App. Div. 1976).
232. See United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (access right arises
with respect to all critical pre-trial proceedings). Cf Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). This would encompass not simply any stage where
what transpires could affect an accused's substantive position, his likelihood of conviction or of
punishment, but also proceedings such as bail hearings where the issue is whether an accused
will remain incarcerated prior to trial or pending appeal. See Fenner & Koley, supra note 186, at
435. It should be noted that on this point we part company with the dissenting opinion in
Gainett, which distinguished preliminary probable cause hearings, where a determination is
made whether to bind a defendant over for trial, from suppression hearings as "not critical to
the criminal justice system .. " 448 U.S. at 437. Justice Blackmun, of course, was also taking
an essentially historical approach. As a result, he felt compelled to separate suppression hear-
ings, unknown at common law, from those preliminary hearings which clearly had been histori-
cally closed or closable. It should also be noted that Justice Blackmun assumed preliminary
hearings not to be trial equivalents in form. It seems clear that in many jurisdictions, however,
substantive issues, such as the suppression of evidence can and do arise at preliminary hearings
and that the preliminary hearings can be of great import to the remainder of the proceedings.
See, e.g., San Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Ct., 30 Cal. 3d 498, 179 Cal. Rptr. 772, 638 P.2d
655 (1982).
233. See generally The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, supra note 186, at 158-59.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 174-84.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 178-80.
236. REVISED STANDARDS, supra note 56, at §§ 3.2, 3.6(d).
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At the outset it is worth emphasizing the theoretical inaccuracy of defin-
ing the state's interest as that of seeing that the defendant is not deprived of
his right to a fair trial. As Professor Tribe has argued, the sixth amendment
right to a fair trial is in fact an absolute; it does not permit a conviction
without a fair trial. Thus, the interest in conflict with the right of access is
not the defendant's right to a fair trial but the state's interest in securing
convictions and punishment of the guilty and in preserving public confi-
dence in the administration of justice by seeing that its actions are just.
2 37
Whatever the theoretical soundness of this observation, as a practical
matter, it is generally wrong. Juxtaposed in the wide gulf that in reality
separates these two rights, is administrative convenience and efficiency of the
court. As a result, in highly publicized proceedings, it is almost always one
of the two rights that yields. What is clothed in the garb of protecting an
accused's right to a fair trial is often mere administrative convenience or
expense. For the choice facing trial judges is almost invariably between the
use of an easy-to-implement, highly visible, and less directly expensive judi-
cial tool (for example, closure or gag order) and a more disruptive, time-
consuming or expensive mechanism (for example, prolonged voir dire,
change of venue, continuance, sequestration, or even reversal). 238 Nor, as
experience has now rather conclusively proven, can the executive branch be
relied upon to protect the public's right of access. 239 Thus, even when the
press is given notice and an opportunity to participate, the trial judge will
bear a uniquely difficult burden in protecting the expressive interests. 240
This is not to say that the state's interests are inevitably trivial or in-
flated. The unsatisfactoriness of relying solely on extreme remedies such as
reversals is evident. As a practical matter, relying solely on that remedy will
effectively guarantee that the fair-trial rights of defendants will consistently
be given short shrift.2 4' The point is simply, to paraphrase Justice Brennan,
that the apparent congruence of the defendant's sixth amendment rights
with the judiciary's administrative and institutional "incentives and [the]
dynamics of the system .. .will inevitably lead to overemployment of the
technique." 242 The pattern of overreaching by the judiciary since Sheppard is
237. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-11, at 625 n. 15 (1978). See also Note,
supra note 51, at 1914-15.
238. REVISED STANDARDS, supra note 56, Commentary to §§ 3.6 at 8.55-.56.
239. The Reporter's Committee, Court Watch Summary, supra note 14, reported that prose-
cutors opposed closure motions about one-third of the time. See generally Fenner & Koley, supra
note 43, at 456-57.
240. Younger, supra note 21, at 7. Judge Younger pointedly observed that Nebraska Press
Association presented "the rare situation in which a trial judge's decision on any issue enjoy[ed]
the support of both parties all the way to the United States Supreme Court and [was] unani-
mously reversed." Id He also noted: "Emotionally and intellectually, the burden on a trial
judge who is asked to go against the wishes of a defendant in a capital case on a major constitu-
tional point where the State joins in the defense position is almost unbelievable." Id (emphasis in
original).
241. See J. BARRON & C. DIENES, supra note 16, 9.1.
242. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring) (referring to prior re-
straints). In opting for a lesser standard, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules rea-
soned in part that because the clear and present danger standard was applied to prior restraints
in Nebraska Press Ass'n, that a less stringent test could be employed against closures. The Advi-
sory Committee pointed to the crucial differences between prior restraints and closures, most
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consistent with respect to all manner of fair-trial measures. 243 And the ulti-
mate difficulty is that these administrative or political concerns become
shielded in the armor of the accused's sixth amendment rights, and thus are
beyond even a theoretical check from the legislature.
For 'all these reasons retention of a stringent formulation such as the
clear and present danger standard is essential to the safeguarding of the im-
portant first amendment issues at stake. Whenever the first amendment has
come under attack in the interest of improved judicial administration, the
clear and present danger standard has consistently represented the highest
degree of solicitude for expressive interests.2 44 It is true, as the Commentary
to the Revised Standards points out, that the clear and present danger stan-
dard has had a checkered history in other contexts. 24 5  Regardless of
whatever deviations in application have occurred in turbulent times and
over the wide range of areas in which the test has been applied, this standard
remains the single most demonstrative symbol to trial judges and lawyers
alike that they are entering an area where important interests are in danger
of infringement.
246
notably the tendency of prior restraints to enmesh the judiciary in the daily workings of the
press. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 72. See also Gannett,
443 U.S. at 393 n.25. Note, however, that the REVISED STANDARDS adopted Justice Brennan's
view inNebraskaPressAss'n that virtually no fair-trial prior restraints are permissible. Moreover,
while the differences between prior restraints and closures are significant, there are strong rea-
sons for adopting a tough stance on closures as well. Thus, in closures as opposed to prior
restraints, there will be no uninvolved eyewitnesses to the events. And it seems inevitable that
closure orders will be accompanied by gag orders on those in attendance not to discuss the
events that transpired during the proceedings.
243. See, e.g., United States v. CBS, 497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974) (sketch artist ban); Hamil-
ton v. Municipal Ct., 270 Cal. App. 2d 797, 76 Cal. Rptr. 168 (1979) (gag order); Comment,
Gagging the Press in Crtmninal Tn'a/s, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 608 (1975).
244. See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 531 (1976); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Craig v.
Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 322 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252 (1941).
245. REVISED STANDARDS, supra note 56, Commentary to § 8.1-1 at 8.10. And, unfortu-
nately, in Nebraska Press Ass'n, Chief Justice Burger resurrected perhaps the most discredited
formulation of the clear and present danger standard, Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 562,
Learned Hand's inquiry as to whether "the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability
justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." Dennis v. United
States, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aj'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). There are those who see this
as part of a continuing effort by the Burger Court to emasculate any categorical taint in first
amendment jurisprudence and to introduce into every first amendment area a "pure" ad hoc
balancing approach. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 76, at 446-47; Schmidt, supra note 16, at 458-
64. In any event, there is no reason to believe that the clear and present danger standard will be
any more or less vulnerable to this process than any other formulation.
246. The clear of the clear and present danger standard also highlights the importance of a
serious empirical inquiry. See thia text accompanying notes 247-69. The rubric of the dissent in
Gannett, that "an accused who seeks closure [must] establish that it is strictly and inescapably
necessary," 443 U.S. at 440 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), encapsu-
lates this concern nearly as forcefully, and, of course, incorporates the less drastic alternatives
requirement. There seems little difference in the balance of interests represented by this stan-
dard and that represented by the clear and present danger standard in its various metamorpho-
ses. The argument for retention of the clear and present danger standard is based on a concern
for the somewhat greater difficulties of persuading courts to implement a standard rejected in
Gannett, even if that case no longer has any valid application to the first amendment inquiry,




D. The Importance of a Serious Empirical Assessment of the Danger of Prejudce
There is one other aspect of the Gannett opinion which seems likely to
create enduring problems. That is Justice Stewart's sweeping and unrefined
characterization of the special risks presented by open pre-trial proceedings
and his unqualified assessment that closure will often be one of the most
effective ways of obviating these risks. The Court, apparently believing these
observations to be intuitively obvious, did not attempt to bolster these asser-
tions with support from the growing body of empirical research by social
scientists as to the nature and risks of jury prejudice from pre-trial public-
ity, 24 7 nor did it refer to the less voluminous but growing body of empirical
data being generated by conscientious trial courts.248 In accordance with its
intuition, the Court upheld a trial court finding of a reasonable probability
of prejudice to the defendants, based on a record which contained precious
little evidence of any serious risk to the accuseds' right to fair trials.
249
This legacy of Gannett is a particularly unfortunate one, for nearly every
recent indicator points in the opposite direction, towards the conclusion that
the occasions on which a criminal defendant faces a serious threat to his
right to a fair trial from prejudicial publicity of even the most damaging sort
are extremely rare. When such a danger does exist, it is almost always in a
context where the closure of a particular judicial proceeding will have virtu-
ally no ameliorative effect. Indeed, it is safe to say that, short of a categorical
rule against closures, the best hope for a proper accommodation of first
amendment rights with society's interest in obtaining just convictions is to
ensure that every trial judge undertakes a serious and thorough look at the
actual danger that opening a particular hearing will make it impossible, or
even significantly more difficult, to give the accused a fair trial.
The heightened sensitivity of the judiciary to the danger of prejudicial
publicity is no doubt part of a trend toward giving increased weight and
recognition to individual rights of all stripes. But it is also in part attributa-
ble to a fear of what is perceived to be the growing pervasiveness and imme-
diacy of the new mass media, particularly television.250 There can be no
question but that the early empirical efforts such as the Reardon Report
were strongly influenced by the perception that these changes in the nature
of communication were both radical and potent. 25' One can almost feel the
future shock as the Court confronted the potential dangers presented by po-
lice broadcasting the filmed interrogation and confession of a murder suspect
immediately after his arrest, 25 2 or the entire country witnessing the broad-
cast of the actual killing of a Presidential assassin in the midst of a crowd of
247. See general~v Schmidt, supra note 16, at 447-5 1; Simon, Does The Court's Decision in Ne-
braska Press Association Fit the Research Evidence on the Impact ofJurors of News Coverage?, 29 STAN.
L. REV. 515 (1977); J. BUDDENBAUM, R. WEAVER, R. HOLSINGER & C. BROWN, PRETRIAL
PUBLICITY AND JURIES: A REVIEW OF RESARCH (Modern Media Institute manuscript 1980)
[hereinafter cited as J. BUDDENBAUM & R. WEAVER].
248. See infra text accompanying notes 257-64.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 82-85.
250. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
251. See, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 16, at 432, 443.
252. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963). See also id at 732 (Clark, J., dissenting)
(noting only three of twelve jurors had seen the film).
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reporters. One can sense the Justices recoil as television sought to expose the
courtroom sanctum to mass audiences.
2 53
Now Estes v. Texas 2 5 4 has given way to Chandler v. Florida2 55 and televi-
sion seems firmly ensconced in the courtroom. And as we have lived with
and studied the effects of the mass media (and the nature of human psychol-
ogy), it has become more and more evident that the media's influence, at
least in this narrow area, has been far less revolutionary than was earlier
imagined. The social science literature has been thoroughly canvassed else-
where and it is beyond the scope of this essay to explore its full implica-
tions.256 We will be content to note some recent findings by trial courts in
sensational cases. From these observations comes the clear lesson that the
most common judicial mistake, one made by the trial judges in both Gannett
and Richmond Newspapers, is to focus exclusively on whether the information
that might be revealed at a hearing is facially prejudicial. At least two other
important questions must be answered: 1) is there a significant likelihood
that the information will actually reach a substantial number of veniremen;
2) if the information is likely to reach a substantial portion of the venire, is
there a significant likelihood that a substantial number of those who receive
it will be so affected as to remember it and be actually prejudiced against the
defendant at the time of trial?
The answers to these questions, certainly in major metropolitan areas, is
almost certain to be no. A judge in suburban New York City found that
only twenty percent of the jury panel in a rape case had read about or were
even aware of the case despite intense publicity and notices sent out to the
parents of all grammar school children in the venue warning them of the
presence of a rapist preying on local children.2 5 7 As a result of this experi-
ence, the judge refused to close a suppression hearing in the trial of Jean
Harris, the highly publicized killer of the "Scarsdale Diet Doctor. ' '2 58
In one of the early ABSCAM cases-that of Congressman Michael My-
ers-Judge Pratt found, despite extremely intense publicity, that roughly
half of the jury panel had no recollection whatsoever of ABSCAM. Of those
who did, only eight or ten had anything more than a generalized recollec-
253. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). See also id at 568 (Warren, CJ., concurring).
Warren's opinion has been characterized as near hysterical in its "worry over the evil potential
of television." Nesson & Koblenz, The Image afjustze: Chandler v. Florida, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 405, 406 (1981).
254. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
255. 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
256. See supra authorities cited note 247.
257. New York v. Harris, 6 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2107, 2108-09 (October 8, 1980)
("[W]hile litigants themselves are actually aware of everything that appears in the press about
their case, they tend to distort the public's perception and recollection of these events in which
they have themselves a deep, vital and abiding interest, whereas to the public at large, it is just a
passing event in an otherwise hectic society." Id).
258. Id See, also, United States v. Capo, 595 F.2d 1086, 1089 n.1, 1091 (5th Cir. 1979) (90%
of jury panel had heard about or seen two newspaper stories and 121 television news reports
within three months of trial concerning murders related to drug charges facing defendants;
nevertheless, only a handful had more than a vague awareness of case; judge did not commit




tion.259 Then after releasing to the press the smoking gun videotapes placed
in evidence at that trial, Judge Pratt found he still had no trouble finding an
impartial jury in the immediately subsequent trial of Congressman Frank
Thompson. 260 Judge Pratt concluded that "the public interest not only
wanes quickly but probably does not exist in the way members of the press
think it does, or perhaps other people think it does."'26 ' Five years ago,
Professor Simon pointed to the acquittals of Angela Davis, John Connally,
Maurice Stans, and John Mitchell, all figures of national prominence, tried
under conditions of the most intense publicity. 26 2 This is probably evidence
of yet another characteristic of jurors, one that has been expressly relied
upon by the Supreme Court in refusing to overturn convictions merely on
the ground that some of the jurors initially had preconceived notions of guilt
based on pre-trial publicity, 26 3 namely their willingness to accept their re-
sponsibilities as jurors and to be persuaded by subsequent, more authorita-
tive information.
264
Finally, in his dissent in Gannett, Justice Blackmun properly raised a
question of great significance that trial judges facing closure motions almost
never ask: will the closure order actually have any impact on the amount or
nature of publicity that is generated?265 Justice Blackmun singled out the
situation where the information the defense seeks to conceal has already
been revealed, similar to the situation in Gannett itself. But there are at least
two other situations where closure orders are likely to be either completely
ineffective or possibly even damaging to the accused's sixth amendment
rights. The first of these is the pervasive publicity case, such as Watergate.
In these cases the court prosecutions may be a small and relatively incidental
part of a much larger picture; totally suppressing information about the pro-
259. United States v. Myers, 6 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1801 (August 15, 1980).
260. Reported in United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 830 (3d Cir. 1980) (Weis, J., con-
curring and dissenting). See also Michigan v. Harris, 6 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1399 (May 30,
1980) (pervasive publicity in county did not prevent empanelling of impartial jury).
261. United States v. Myers, 6 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1801, 1803 (August 15, 1980).
262. Simon, supra note 247, at 528. Professor Simon reports that Mitchell's attorneys paid
for a poll which showed 75% of a national sample had heard of the Watergate cover-up and 84%
in the District of Columbia, thought Mitchell and Stans guilty. Only 2% thought them inno-
cent. Id at n.60.
263. See, e.g., Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975). See also Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717
(1961):
It is not required, however, that jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues in-
volved. In these days of swift, widespread and diverse methods of communication, an
important case can be expected to arouse the interest of the public in the vicinity, and
scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors will not have formed some im-
pression or opinion as to the merits of the case. This is particularly true in criminal
cases. To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or
innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a
prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It is
sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict
based on the evidence presented in court.
Id. at 722-23.
264. See Schmidt, supra note 16, at 450. It has also been determined that prior courtroom
experience decreases a juror's willingness to prejudge a defendant. In a correlative vein, it has
been found that nonsensational media coverage may actually decrease willingness to prejudge if
the coverage reduces the reliance upon interpersonal sources of information. Id See J. BUD-
DENBAUM & D. WEAVER, supra note 247, at 2.
265. 443 U.S. at 442.
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ceedings will have a de minimus impact on the amount and kind of publicity
that reaches a jury panel or jury.2 6 6 A similar dilemma is presented by the
small town murder, such as the Simants case which led to the prior restraint
vacated by the Supreme Court in Nebraska Press Association. As the Chief
Justice observed:
Finally, we note that the events disclosed by the record took place
in a community of 850 people. It is reasonable to assume that,
without any news accounts being printed or broadcast, rumors
would travel swiftly by word of mouth. One can only speculate on
the accuracy of such reports, given the generative propensities of
rumors; they could well be more damaging than reasonably accu-
rate news accounts. But plainly a whole community cannot be re-
strained from discussing a subject intimately affecting life within
it.
26 7
Would the closure of the preliminary hearing have had any appreciable
effect on the likelihood that Simants could have been tried by an impartial
jury in the town where the crime took place? The answer is clearly no. (And
indeed the entire town was excluded from the jury). Was the publicity aris-
ing from the preliminary hearing likely to be as pervasive in other possible
venues? Possibly, but obviously this is a quite different inquiry.2 68 By clos-
ing the hearing, would the trial judge have nevertheless enhanced the possi-
bility of preserving such a conviction from reversal despite his refusal to
grant a change-of-venue motion? The answer to this question is less clear,
though one would hope it is no. However, given the demonstrated reluc-
tance of appellate courts to overturn convictions on fair-trial grounds, it is
not at all unreasonable to assume that in many situations the real danger to
a defendant's right to a fair trial is the use of an apparently solicitous but
actually ineffective panacea such as a gag or closure order when a more sub-
stantial form of relief such as a change of venue, exhaustive voir dire, or
sequestration is mandated.
Whatever overarching rubric is adopted, a detailed multi-step factual
inquiry such as that set forth by Justice Blackmun should unquestionably be
required. 269 This record is essential not only to promote careful judicial con-
sideration of such motions and to preserve a satisfactory appellate record but
to contribute to the development of an adequate body of empirical data to
guide trial judges who suddenly face their first sensational criminal case.
The improved knowledge flowing from these more conscientious inquiries
will reveal the extent to which the free press-fair trial dilemma is truly more
apparent than real.
266. Sesupra note 262. Seea&o United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 70-71 (D.C. Cir.)
(en banc), cer. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977) (refusal to overturn Watergate convictions despite
intense pre-trial publicity).
267. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 567. See also id at 599-600 n.22 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
268. See, e.g., United States v. Civella, 493 F. Supp. 786, 789-90 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (refusal to
close hearing; grant of change of venue motion after determining that publicity had been less
intense elsewhere).




In a sense, the free press-fair trial controversy represents a conflict of
paradigms. On the free press side, represented here by the right of access, is
the ideal of a vigorous and vital marketplace of ideas, the uninhibited, ro-
bust and wide-open public discussion of political and social events and is-
sues. This model is grounded on the notion that the competence of citizens
as voters, as self-governors, derives from their participation in this debate
and that the more information they have concerning the workings of their
government, the more competent they are as self-governors. It also embodies
the further assumption that an important mechanism by which this debate
acquires meaning is direct citizen observation of the processes of govern-
ment, and acquisition of sufficient information underlying the specific ac-
tions of governmental bodies and officials to allow those actions to be
meaningfully judged.
On the other side are the due process principles governing the fairness
of criminal trials, embodied in the desire that the "conclusions . . .reached
in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court.
'27 0
At its core, this model assumes that citizens as jurors, unlike judges when
sitting as factfinders, are not capable of adhering to this principle and ex-
cluding from their consideration evidence not relevant to their determina-
tion. In short, the due process model assumes that citizens as jurors are
made less competent by receiving at least certain kinds of additional
information.
These two views of the public are probably both largely true; yet they
suggest very different emphases in approaching the free press-fair trial di-
lemma. The fact that both visions of the citizenry have some elements of
truth makes it inevitable that this conflict will never be entirely resolved.
But judges are not sufficiently sensitive to the destructive interplay between
these two paradigms, because whenever a judicial proceeding is closed to
protect a particular defendant by concealing information from potential or
actual jurors, information is unavoidably concealed from the public. It is
concealed, moreover, in just the cases most likely to be of general interest to
the public and thus to be of the most use in educating the public as to the
workings of the judicial system.
Undoubtedly, educating the average citizen as to the nature and work-
ings of the judicial system helps to make that citizen more competent as a
juror. The converse also is likely to be true: the more ignorant a juror is as
to the role and responsibilities of the courts and their designated fact-finders,
the more difficult it will be to ensure that that juror carries out those respon-
sibilities in a given case. Thus, to the extent that courts consistently refuse to
give proper weight to first amendment concerns in this context, they are, in
the long run, exacerbating the very problems at which their prophylactic
measures are aimed.
27'
270. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
271. Cf Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1926) (Brandeis, J., concurring). "If there be
time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech not enforced silence." Id. at 377.
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MARITAL STATUS DISCRIMINATION: A PROBLEM
NOT SOLVED BY THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY
TAX ACT OF 1981
NANCY E. SHURTZ*
Many who have wandered through the maze of the federal income tax
laws are aware of the inequities known as the "marriage penalty" and the
"singles penalty."1  The "singles penalty" arose in 1948 when married
couples were allowed to consolidate their incomes and use a different rate
schedule which was more favorable than that used by a single taxpayer.
Under the joint-rate schedule, which is still in effect, income belonging to or
earned by one spouse can be attributed to the other spouse. Therefore, when
only one spouse has income, the couple will pay less tax than a single tax-
payer with the same amount of income. When both spouses have income,
the progressive nature of the tax code creates a substantial tax burden or
"marriage penalty," since the lower-paid spouse's income is taxed at the
marginal rate of the higher-paid spouse. Even the "married filing separate"
schedule, established in 1969, results in less favorable rates than the single
schedule. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 19812 partially eliminates the
"marriage penalty" but leaves the "singles penalty" intact.
This article will examine the recent changes made by the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 regarding the marriage and singles penalties. Sec-
tion I of the article discusses the history of marital status taxation leading up
to the Economic Recovery Tax Act. Section II describes the current law and
its effect upon marital status discrimination. Section III analyzes possible
alternatives to the recent legislation that may reduce what can still be
viewed as a discriminatory tax policy.
* Visiting Associate Professor, University of Oregon Law School; on leave from The
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania; J.D., Ohio State University College of Law;
LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center.
1. See generally Alvarez, Dicrimination on the Basis of Sex and Marital Status in Tax and Related
Laws, 46 CONN. BAR J. 496 (1972); Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 1389 (1975); Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of Working
Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 49 (1971); Bruton, The Taxation of Family Income, 41
YALE L.J. 1172 (1932); Cooper, Working Wives andthe Tax Law, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 67 (1970);
Gerzog, The Marriage Penalty: The Working Couple's Dilemma, 47 FORDHAM L. REv. 27 (1978);
Harmelink & Krause, Reduction of Tax Dicriminaton Based on Filing Status: A Proposal, 55 TAXES
760 (1977); Mess, For Richer, For Poorer Federal Taxation and Marriage, 28 CATH. U.L. REv. 87
(1978); Oldman & Temple, Comparative Analysis of the Taxation ofaMarried Persons, 12 STAN. L.
REV. 585 (1960); Sjostrand, Income Tax System Needs a New Motor, Not Just an Overhaul, 54 TAXES
419 (1976); Watson, The Problem of Income Tax in Community Property States, 27 NEB. L. REV. 541
(1948); Note, Community Property and the Federal Income Tax, 14 CALIF. L. REV. 351 (1926) [herein-
after cited as Community Property]; Note, Epilogue to the Community Property Scramble: Problems of
Repeal, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 332 (1950); Note, Disparity in Federal Income Tax Rates: Dicnmnination
Against the Single Taxpayer, 4 IND. LEGAL F. 380 (1970).
2. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 173 (1981) (codified in scattered sections of I.R.C.).
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I. OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
The tax legislation in the United States, as it has affected marital status,
has been erratic and often contradictory. From the beginning, the govern-
ment has had no consistent policy. In the first individual income tax law in
the United States, the Revenue Act of 1913,3 Congress did not consider mar-
ital status as a basis of taxation. 4 The tax unit was the individual and each
individual was taxed according to one rate schedule. Husbands and wives
had to file separate returns if each had income. The married taxpayer was
taxed at the same rate as the single taxpayer, but was allowed an additional
exemption for his or her spouse. Even though the tax appeared to be neu-
tral, married persons had an advantage over single persons. In common law
states, married persons could, by agreement, lower their marginal tax rate by
shifting income to their spouses. This could be accomplished either through
trusts, partnerships, employment, or corporate arrangements. 5 In the eight
community property states,6 in which half of the earnings of each spouse
belonged to the other and property acquired during the marriage was owned
in equal shares, income was automatically shifted to a taxpayer's spouse even
though the management and control was usually in the husband.7 Thus,
because of this automatic shifting in income, couples in community property
states usually paid less income tax than identical couples in common law
states. This shift, whether automatic or by agreement, resulted in married
couples paying less tax than single individuals, except in the rare instance
where both husband and wife each earned equal amounts of income.
The Revenue Act of 19188 established a joint return for married
couples; however, there was no advantage in using the joint return because
the same progressive tax rates applied to both single and joint returns. In
fact, the joint return increased a married couple's tax liability if both earned
income during the tax year.9 Under the 1918 Act, as under the 1913 Act,
married couples had an advantage over single persons, in that they could
minimize their total tax burden by shifting income to their spouse and filing
separately. Again, couples in community property states did not have to
3. Ch. 16, § II(A)(1)(2), 38 Stat. 166.
4. Mess, supra note 1, at 100, suggests numerous plausible reasons the individual taxpayer
was chosen as the proper tax unit: 1) the large number of single individuals, 2) the trend
toward recognition of separate property rights for women, and 3) a tacit assumption that the
term "individual taxpayer" referred only to the male gender.
5. Such shifting arrangements were probably not used frequently, however, because
1) people lacked knowledge of such schemes, 2) such schemes required the aid of a lawyer, and
3) the tax rates were low enough that such schemes were unnecessary.
6. Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington.
7. Each state's laws-are different, however. Personal service income is generally consid-
ered community income. Income from separate property is considered community in some
states and not in other states. This aggregation of community income also occurs in other coun-
tries, see, e.g., Spain, Argentina, Brazil, and the Dominican Republic. Oldman & Temple, supra
note 1, at 585; see also HARVARD LAW SCHOOL INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM IN TAXATION,
WORLD TAX SERIES [hereinafter cited as WORLD TAX SERIES].
8. Ch. 18, § 223, 40 Stat. 1074.
9. In unusual circumstances, joint filing could be advantageous. For example, a joint
return could increase a generous couple's deductions for charitable contributions by increasing
their adjusted gross income and hence raise the deduction ceiling which is determined by a
percentage of adjusted gross income. See Bittker, supra note 1, at 1400 n.20.
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engage in income-shifting devices, since state law automatically split their
income.
Until 1920, the Department of the Treasury had no published policy on
the splitting of income by married residents of community property states. '0
It was generally known, however, that the Treasury required all community
income to be reported by the husband.II In September 1920, Attorney Gen-
eral Palmer issued to the Secretary of the Treasury an opinion which con-
cluded that the community property laws of one state-Texas-were fully
effective for federal income tax purposes. 12 Palmer, who advocated that
state laws should be recognized in these matters, reasoned that because the
husband and wife were legally joint owners of the property under Texas law,
they could divide the income from community property and each report half
of it to the federal government. In 1921, the Attorney General issued an-
other opinion that reached the same conclusion with respect to all commu-
nity property states except California.1 3 In California, the husband had the
complete control of the community interest and could dispose of it as he saw
fit during his lifetime without the consent of his wife. The rights and powers
of the wife in California were in other respects the same as in the other com-
munity property states. The California courts, however, had described the
wife's interest as an "expectancy" rather than a "vested" interest. ' 4 Because
of this characterization by the state court, the Attorney General concluded
the husband in California should be taxed on all the community property.
Attorney General Palmer's opinions were adopted in 1920 and 1921
Treasury Decisions.' 5 The 1921 decision addressed for the first time the is-
sue of federal estate taxes on married couples. ' 6 The decision adopted a rule
similar to the income tax rule that only half of the community property in
community property states (other than California) was to be included in the
estate of the decedent husband.'
7
It was not long before these rulings were challenged by taxpayers from
California. The estate tax ruling was initially challenged in Blum v. War-
drli.'8 The federal district court held that in California half of the commu-
nity property taken by the wife upon the death of the husband is not part of
the husband's estate and, therefore, not subject to federal estate tax. On
March 26, 1924, the Treasury acquiesced in this opinion. 19 Interestingly,
this acquiescence applied to income taxes as well as estate taxes, and stated
10. See Community Propery, rupra note 1, at 354 n.10.
11. Id. at 354.
12. 32 Op. Att'y Gen..298 (1920).
13. 32 Op. Att'y Gen. 435 (1921).
14. In re Moffitt's Estate, 153 Cal. 359, 95 P. 655 (1908).
15. T.D. 3138, 23 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 238 (1921); T.D. 3071, 22 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 456
(1920).
16. J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX PoLIcY 296 (3d ed. 1977). The estate tax was established
in 1916.
17. T.D. 3138, 23 .Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 238 (1921).
18. 270 F. 309 (N.D. Cal. 1920), aJ'd, 276 F. 226 (9th Cir. 1921), crt. denied, 258 U.S. 617
(1922).
19. T.D. 3569, 26 Treas. Dec. int. Rev. 60 (1924).
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that residents of California should be allowed to split their community prop-
erty income like residents of other community property states.
While the Blum case was being litigated, Congress attempted in the
Revenue Act of 192120 to deal with the issues raised by the case. This Act
was to have included a uniform rule that would not discriminate between
couples in community property and common law states. The rule would
have provided: 1) that income received by any married couple in a commu-
nity property state was includable in the gross income of the spouse who
managed and controlled the community property, and 2) that half of the
community property taken by the wife on the death of her husband was
taxable as part of the estate of the decedent. Even though this provision
passed the House and was reported by the Senate Finance Committee, it was
dropped in conference and deleted on the Senate floor.2 ' Thus, the problem
of marital discrimination was left unresolved.
In 1924 the Secretary of the Treasury recommended a similar provision
to the House Ways and Means Committee; however, the provision was never
adopted. In fact, under the Revenue Act of 1924,22 Treasury Regulations
were implemented, which followed the earlier opinions of Attorney General
Palmer and the Treasury Decisions, permitting spouses in all community
property states, except California, to split income that was community prop-
erty.23 The earlier Treasury Opinion, which acquiesced in the Blum case
and applied to California law, was withdrawn. 24 However, in 1924, the At-
torney General limited his opinion to taxation of community property on the
death of the husband, leaving unresolved the issue of whether California
allowed income-splitting of community property.
25
Subsequently, a California taxpayer attempted to resolve the issue in
Robbins v. United States.26 In Robbins, the taxpayer was forced to include and
pay taxes on all income from community property. The taxpayer claimed
that the tax was excessive because he should have been permitted to include
only half of the income. The Attorney General and the Treasury Depart-
ment, both in the district court and the California Supreme Court, asserted
that the husband is the absolute owner of the property under California state
law. The district court ruled against the Government, and held that the
husband and wife could report half of the income from the community prop-
erty and half of the husband's earnings, since the California statutes defining
the husband's power of control over the community property were substan-
tially the same as those in other community property states. The United
States Supreme Court reversed this decision on the grounds that California
law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of California, gave the wife a mere
"expectancy" in the community property during the husband's life and that
the husband's power of management and control was so extensive as to
20. Ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227.
21. See Community Aroperty, supra note 1, at 260.
22. Ch. 234, 43 Stat. 253.
23. Treas. Reg. 65 § 213, art. 31 (1924).
24. I.R.B. 111-23-1591, III-I C.B. 101 (1924).
25. 34 Op. Att'y Gen. 395, 405 (1924).
26. 5 F.2d 690 (N.D. Cal. 1925), rev'd, 269 U.S. 315 (1926).
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render him liable for the tax.
2 7
Until this case, the Treasury had proceeded upon the belief that divi-
sion of community property income depended upon whether the wife had a
vested interest in the property, and not on whether she actually had any
control over it. After the Robbins decision, the Treasury decided that because
the husband usually had significant powers of control and management over
community property the government could tax the husband for the total
community property income in all community property states. Conse-
quently, the earlier Palmer opinion, which allowed income splitting in com-
munity property states was withdrawn, 28 giving the Secretary of the
Treasury an opportunity to litigate the tax issue in states other than
California.
Subsequent to the Robbins decision, the California Civil Code was
amended to conform to statutes in other community property states. The
new code divided community property between the spouses by providing
that the wife's interest was "present, existing and equal" with the husband's
interest. 29 Thus, the amended laws of California, as well as the community
property laws of Washington, Arizona, Louisiana, and Texas were subjected
to general test cases before the United States Supreme Court.
The first test case, Poe v. Seaborn,3° involved a taxpayer from Washing-
ton who had income from community property in addition to his salary.
The Government argued that the broad powers of the husband over the
property made him liable for the tax on the total community income. The
Government also argued that taxing the husband and thereby preventing
preferred treatment to married couples in community property states would
result in uniform income taxation throughout the United States. The court
rejected this argument, and stated that the wife is co-owner of the property
and entitled to half the husband's income and wages. According to the Sea-
born Court, the wife has a vested right in the property since the husband's
power of disposition is substantially restricted. Specifically, the wife has the
power to borrow for community purposes and to encumber the community
property. She also has the power to enjoin the collection of the husband's
separate debts out of the community property. Furthermore, the commu-
nity property is not liable for judgments resulting from the husband's torts
committed while not carrying on the business of the community. The
Supreme Court reached similar conclusions in United States v. Macolm ,
3 1
Godell v. Koch ,32 Bender v. Pfaf,3 3 and Hopkins v. Bacon .
3 4
27. Robbins v. United States, 269 U.S. 315, 327 (1926). Justice Holmes' opinion indicated
Congress has the power to tax community property to the husband. However, Congress, in
Section 1212 of the Revenue Act of 1926, stipulated that if the wife has a "vested interest"
rather than a mere "expectancy" in the income under state law, she is entitled to include that
income on her federal return. Ch. 27, 44 Stat. 9, 130 (1926).
28. 35 Op. Att'y Gen. 265 (1927). The Attorney General's Opinion relating to the estate
tax also was withdrawn. 35 Op. Att'y Gen. 89 (1926).
29. CAL. CIV. CODE § 161(a), added by 1927 Cal. Stat. ch. 265.
30. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
31. 282 U.S. 792 (1930) (involving the laws of California).
32. 282 U.S. 118 (1930) (involving the laws of Arizona).
33. 282 U.S. 127 (1930) (involving the laws of Louisiana).
34. 282 U.S. 122 (1930) (involving the laws of Texas).
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The Seaborn Court distinguished Lucas v. Earl,35 a case also decided in
1930, in which a husband and wife in California agreed to split the hus-
band's earned income equally between themselves. The distinction made by
the Seabom Court was based on a technical theory of title, that is, the hus-
band's earnings were never exclusively the property of the husband because
under Washington law the wife's interest attaches automatically. In Lucas,
the income belonged to the husband, and the wife's interest was created by a
voluntary assignment of future income. The Supreme Court held earned
income could not be shifted among family members by private agreement
since the "fruits" could not be "attributed to a different tree from that on
which they grew."
'36
The Lucas decision significantly affected how taxpayers in non-commu-
nity property states assigned their income, and when contrasted with Seaborn
and the other cases allowing income splitting in community property states,
it sanctioned discrimination between the tax treatment of married couples in
community property states and those in common law states. The Lucas and
following decisions made it impossible for common law taxpayers to shift
earned income to their spouses. The Lucas line of cases did not, however,
affect the transfer of unearned income such as dividends, interest, rent, and
royalties to a spouse. Investment income could be shifted to a taxpayer with
a lower tax liability if the ownership of the underlying property-bank ac-
count, stock, patent, etc.-were also transferred.
Following these cases, Congress and the Department of Treasury again
attempted to eliminate the. differential tax treatment of couples in commu-
nity property states and those in common law states. One proposal, similar
to the one made in the Revenue Act of 1920, required the spouse exercising
management and control of community income to pay the income tax.3
7
Another proposal required all married couples to file joint returns. 38 A third
proposal provided for mandatory joint returns with a special allowance for
the earned income of the husband and wife.39 All of these proposals were
rejected. Thus, from 1913 through 1947, community property couples
benefitted from splitting of income on their returns.
Initially, there was little resentment perceived toward the community
property couples among taxpayers in common law states. This was due
mainly to the low taxes levied during those years. The tax rate in 1913 to
1915 was 1% on the first $20,000 of taxable income.4° From 1919 until 1939,
the rates increased somewhat but ranged from 1.5% to 4% on the first $4,000
of income and from 3.2% to 9.17% on income over $4,000 but less than
$20,000. 4 1 During the period of 1939 to 1949, however, rates increased sub-
35. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
36. Id. at 115.
37. S. REP. No. 673, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-12, 36 (1941).
38. H.R. REP. No. 1040, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-22 (1941).
39. Id.
40. J. PECHMAN, .upra note 16, at 298.
41. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF U.S.: COLONIAL TIMES TO
1970 1094-95, 1111-12 (1975).
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stantially, particularly during World War II. For instance, the tax in 1939
on $20,000 was 9.17%;42 in 1949 it was 30.4%.4 3 As taxes began to be felt
more, common law states began to adopt community property laws to take
advantage of income splitting. By 1948, Michigan,
44 Nebraska, 45
Oklahoma,4 6 Oregon, 47 and Pennsylvania 48 had joined the original eight
states of Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas,
and Washington in adopting community property laws. Hawaii, 49 Massa-
chusetts, 50 and New York5 1 were considering similar steps.
The Revenue Act of 194852 was enacted to prevent more states from
adopting community property laws, as well as to diminish the use in com-
mon law states of such income splitting devices as trusts, joint tenancies,
employment agreements, and family partnerships. The 1948 Act, which
adopted a nationwide community property system for federal income tax
purposes, was designed to eliminate discrimination against couples in com-
mon law states. For the first time in United States tax history, a separate tax
rate schedule was instituted for married taxpayers. Married couples were
required to aggregate their income and deductions, and in effect, were taxed
as two single persons, each reporting half of the couple's aggregate income.
53
As a result, if only the husband were earning income, the couple paid signifi-
cantly less tax than a single individual with the same amount of taxable
income.
The Act caused a tremendous loss of revenue to the federal government.
One study indicates that the government has lost in excess of $5.6 billion
annually as a result of this change. 54 It did, however, accomplish its pur-
pose, in that common law states stopped adopting community property laws
and several states-Michigan, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Oregon-actually
repealed their laws. 55 Hawaii, then a territory, also repealed its laws.56 The
Act also put an end to many of the income-shifting devices being used in
common law states. The Act provided a form of geographic equity, since
married couples in common law property states were now taxed the same as
married couples in community property states. Most important, however,
the Act had the effect of changing the basic tax unit for federal taxation
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 1947 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 317.
45. 1947 Neb. Laws ch. 156.
46. 1945 Okla. Sess. Laws H.B. 218.
47. 1947 Or. Laws ch. 525.
48. 1947 Pa. Laws, No. 550. In Wilcox v. Penn. Mutual Life Ins. Inc., 357 Pa. 581, 55 A.2d
521 (1947), the Pennsylvania law was declared unconstitutional.
49. 1945 Hawaii Sess. Laws, 273 § 1. At this time Hawaii was a territory, not a state.
50. See, Bittker, supra note 1, at 1412.
51. Id.
52. Ch. 168, § 301, 62 Stat. 114.
53. For example, a couple having taxable income of $10,000 would pay the same tax as
two single taxpayers each having taxable income of $5,000.
54. A. GROVES, FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF THE FAMILY 74 (1963); see also B. OKNER,
INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 69, 70 (1966).
55. 1948 Mich. Pub. Acts 1st Ex. Sess. No. 39; 1949 Neb. Laws, Ch. 129; 1949 Okla. Sess.
Laws, H.B. 13; 1949 Or. Laws, 349.
56. 1949 Hawaii Seas. Laws, 242.
19821
DENVER LAWJOURNL
from the individual to the married couple. Amazingly, there was no discus-
sion of the higher tax burden placed on single persons or the reasons for
reduced rates for married couples. The reduced rate was later justified with
reasons such as family responsibilities or the additional expenses of maintain-
ing a household.
5 7
The Revenue Act of 195158 established a third set of rate schedules for
"heads of households," who were defined under the Act as single taxpayers
who maintained a household in which a dependent relative lived. Under the
new rate schedules, heads of households were given approximately half the
benefits of income splitting accorded to married couples. The head of house-
hold provisions were extended by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to in-
clude taxpayers who met certain support requirements with respect to their
parents, even though the father or mother did not live in the taxpayer's
home.5 9 The 1954 Code also adopted the surviving spouse provision, which
extended the full income-splitting benefits enjoyed by married couples to
surviving spouses with dependent children.6° The benefits are permitted for
two years after the death of the spouse. The rationale given in the legislative
history foi the special rates for heads of households and surviving spouses
was that of family responsibilities; certain support requirements have to be
met to qualify for head of household rates and a surviving spouse has to
maintain a household where a dependent child resides.
6 '
Single taxpayers received a tax break under the Tax Reform Act of
1969.62 Before the 1969 Act, a single person's tax liability at certain income
levels was forty-two percent higher than the income tax of a married couple
with the same income. 63 The 1969 Act lowered the rates applied to single
persons so that the single taxpayer was subjected to no more than a twenty
percent differential between his or her tax liability and that of a married
couple with the same taxable income. The existing single person's tax rate
schedule became the new "married filing separately" rate schedule, a fourth
rate schedule. This schedule allowed married couples, both of whom earned
substantial income, to avoid the progressive impact of consolidating their
incomes. Nevertheless, when the income of the two spouses approached
equal amounts, the rate of tax on their income, whether they filed jointly or
separately, was heavier than if the couple had chosen not to marry. Thus,
two income-producing persons sharing the same household increased their
tax burden by marrying.
The burden on single persons and married couples resulted in a number
ofjudicial challenges to the tax code. In 1965 a single taxpayer brought suit
57. See Bittker, supra note 1, at 1416-17.
58. Ch. 521 § 301, 65 Stat. 480.
59. I.R.C. § 2(b)(1)(B).
60. I.R.C. § 2.
61. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1954).
62. Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 803, 83 Stat. 487.
63. JOINT COMMrEE ON TAXATION, 96TH CONG., 2D SESs., REPORT ON THE INCOME
TAX TREATMENT OF MARRIED COUPLES AND SINGLE PERSONS 23 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
JOINT COMMITTEE].
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in Ke//ems v. Commissioner,6 4 challenging the tax law under the fifth, ninth,
fourteenth, and sixteenth amendments as well as under article I section 2
clause 3 and article I section 9 clause 4 of the United States Constitution.
The taxpayer's claim with respect to the ninth and sixteenth amendments
and first article of the Constitution was that 1) the amount of tax paid by
her was in excess of that which would be payable if joint return rates were
applied to her income, 2) the tax paid was not an income tax, and 3) the
tax paid was not a tax which was apportioned among the states. The fifth
and fourteenth amendment "equal protection" claims were based on the fact
that Congress had no rational basis for the distinction drawn between mar-
ried and single persons for purposes of the applicable rates of tax. All of the
taxpayer's claims were denied by the Tax Court, which devoted most of its
opinion to the taxpayer's fourteenth amendment argument. The court held
that the joint tax schedule was necessary to insure geographic uniformity
and to forestall the trend by state governments to adopt community prop-
erty laws.65 In addition, the court noted that conceivably Congress could
have believed that married persons generally have greater financial burdens
than single persons.
66
Several married couples brought suit in Johnson v. United States,6 7 chal-
lenging the tax law under the first, fourth, fifth, ninth and tenth amend-
ments to the United States Constitution. The taxpayers' main argument
was that the due process clause of the fifth amendment had been violated in
the following four respects:
(1) the due process clause of the fifth amendment forbids tax rate
differentiation by which the tax on the income of one spouse
is measured in part by the income of the other spouse;
(2) the due process clause of the fifth amendment forbids
gendered-based tax rate differentiation that results in a
greater burden on married female workers than is imposed
upon married male workers;
(3) the due process clause of the fifth amendment forbids marital
classification by which higher tax rates are imposed on the
taxable income of a married person (whose spouse has signifi-
cant income) than are imposed on the same taxable income of
an unmarried person; and
(4) the due process clause of the fifth amendment forbids classifi-
cation by which higher tax rates are imposed on the taxable
income of a married person who lives with her spouse than are
imposed on the taxable income of one who does not. 68
The taxpayers asserted that the classifications under the tax code penal-
ized them for asserting their fundamental right to marry and interfered with
their fundamental right of privacy and association, as protected by the first,
64. 58 T.C. 556 (1972), ajf'dper cunam, 474 F.2d 1399 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 831
(1973).
65. 58 T.C. at 559.
66. Id.
67. 422 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Ind. 1976), afdsub noma, Baxter v. United States, 550 F.2d 1239
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1012 (1978).
68. 422 F. Supp. at 962-63.
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fourth, fifth, ninth and tenth amendments. In addition, the taxpayers
claimed the "free exercise" clause of the first amendment was violated be-
cause that clause prohibits the imposition of higher tax rates on those who
practice their religious beliefs in regard to marriage.
The Johnson court held there was no due process violation under the
taxpayers' first claim since federal law contained no compulsory income ag-
gregation provision. 69 Each taxpayer may make the individual choice to file
a separate return and avoid "attribution of income." As to the second due
process argument, the court held the federal tax schedules at issue, married
filing separately, cannot be said to burden all women, if indeed any are so
burdened. 70 According to the court, these schedules avoid any type of as-
sumption about the economic status of men and women and therefore there
is no basis for holding that women and men are treated differently. 7 1 As to
the third and fourth claims, the court recognized the fundamental nature of
marriage and freedom to marry under the Constitution, but held that the
marriage penalty strictly construed does not create such a severe marriage
discrimination that it amounts to a prohibition. 72 The court emphasized
that the tax rate schedules are not always a disadvantage to those who are
married. Congress' longstanding policy that married couples with equal ag-
gregate incomes should pay equal taxes regardless of differences in the con-
tributions of each spouse to the total also influenced the court. Equal tax
treatment of the marriage unit, the taxable entity since 1948, was recognized
as a legitimate legislative objective. The Johnson court concluded that the
government has a compelling interest which justifies the burden upon mar-
riage. 73 As to the taxpayers' last argument-infringement upon the right to
freely exercise their religious beliefs as to marriage-the court held there is
no impermissible restriction on that right.74 According to the court, the fact
that some married persons may pay more taxes due to their peculiar eco-
nomic circumstances does not render a general taxing statute a regulation of
religious beliefs. In conclusion, the court asserted that even if it agreed that
the Code provisions under attack burden the taxpayer's free exercise of his
religion, the government has a sufficiently substantial interest in raising reve-
nue and in equalizing the tax burden between single and married taxpayers
to justify any incidental burden on the taxpayer. 75
The Johnson case was followed in Mafpes v. United States, 76 which recog-
nized that marriage is a fundamental right; but, unlikeJohnson, Mapes held
that strict scrutiny of the marriage penalty was unnecessary. The appropri-
ate test was one of "minimum rationality."' 77 The tax system met this test
because it merely discourages rather than proscribes marriage. 78 As in John-
69. Id. at 967-68.
70. Id. at 968.
71. Id. at 969.
72. Id. at 970-73.
73. Id. at 973.
74. Id. at 975.
75. Id.
76. 576 F.2d 896 (Ct. C1.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978).
77. 576 F.2d at 901.
78. Id.
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son, the court found no gender-based discrimination. As these cases illus-
trate, taxpayers' judicial attempts to alleviate the marriage penalty and
singles penalty have failed.
79
II. ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981
Under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, there are five rate
schedules: the joint schedule,80 the heads of households schedule, 81 the sin-
gles schedule,82 the married filing separately schedule, 83 and the estates and
trusts schedule. 84 The 1981 Act did not change the following advantages
enjoyed under previous law: 1) married couples that file jointly receive a
tax advantage from income splitting when their incomes are unevenly dis-
tributed; 2) the tax liability of the head of household is more than the tax
liability of a married couple, even if their income and family expenses are
identical;85 3) at all income levels, the single person bears a heavier tax bur-
den than the head of household or married couple filing jointly with the
same amount of income;8 6 and 4) the married couple electing to file sepa-
rately is taxed more severely than if that couple were allowed to elect to file
under the singles' rates.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act establishes a new rate schedule for
trusts and estates that is even less favorable than the rates of married persons
filing separately. The big change brought about by the Economic Recovery
Tax Act, however, is the provision that allows a married couple with two
incomes to deduct from gross income an amount equal to a percentage of the
lower-paid spouse's earned income.8 7 During 1982 the percentage is five
percent. The percentage increases in future tax years to ten percent. In no
year, however, may the percentage be applied to more than $30,000 of the
79. Married couples have also attempted to avoid the marriage tax penalty by divorcing at
the end of the tax year, filing as single persons and remarrying at the beginning of the next year.
In order to deny tax effect to these "sham divorces," the IRS issued Rev. Rul. 76-255, 1976-2,
C.B. 40. The validity of this ruling was addressed in Boter v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 989 (1980),
in which the Tax Court refused to recognize a Haitian divorce obtained by a married couple
living in Maryland at the end of the tax year. The Tax Court supported its holding with a 1945
Supreme Court case, Wilamr v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945), which declared that the
domicile of at least one spouse is a prerequisite to recognition by all other states of a divorce
decree under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution.
The Boyter decision left unresolved the issue of whether a divorce decree that is valid under
state law should be disregarded for federal income tax purposes pursuant to Rev. Rul. 76-255.
Because there are substantial non-tax consequences associated with a valid divorce, it is argua-
ble that the Revenue Ruling may not be given effect. For example, if one spouse should die
during the time interval of nonmarriage, life insurance and other insurance coverage may lapse,
joint ownership of property may terminate, and a spouse's intestate interest could end. Because
of these adverse state law consequences, courts may decide not to give Rev. Rul. 76-255 effect.
80. I.R.C. § 1(a) (as amended by Section 101 of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981),
Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 173 [hereinafter cited as the Economic Recovery Tax Act].
81. I.R.C. § 1(b).
82. Id. at § 1(c).
83. Id. at § 1(d).
84. Id. at § I(e).
85. The head of household still pays taxes at rates between those of single persons and
those filing jointly.
86. In no case, however, will a single person pay more than 20% of the amount paid by a
married couple with the same income.
87. I.R.C. § 221 (as amended by Section 103 of the Economic Recovery Tax Act).
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lower-paid spouse's income. Thus, the maximum deduction would be
$1,500 for tax years beginning in 1982 and $3,000 for 1983 and thereafter.
This new provision will cost the federal government an estimated $419 mil-
lion in 1982, $4.4 billion in 1983, $9.1 billion in 1984, $11 billion in 1985,
and $12.6 billion in 1986.88
Congress considered a number of alternative proposals for eliminating
the marriage penalty,8 9 but chose to follow the recommendations made in
an earlier Senate Finance Committee bill and adopted the deduction propo-
sal.9° That Committee decided the deduction was the simplest way to allevi-
ate the marriage penalty.9 1 The Committee Report referred to recent
studies showing that high marginal tax rates on the income of a second
earner adversely affected that earner's decision to seek employment. 92 In
addition, the Committee noted that two-earner couples may be less able to
pay their income tax than one-earner couples with the same amount of in-
come. The Committee cited the employment-related expenses, such as
clothing and transportation, of two-earner couples9 3 and the fact that such
couples have less free time for family chores and child care.
94
The two-earner deduction is calculated like employment-related deduc-
tions in arriving at adjusted gross income. 95 First, the taxpayer determines
the "qualified earned income" amount, 96 which consists of "earned in-
come" 97 less specified allowable deductions.98 Then, the appropriate per-
centage (five percent in 1982 and ten percent thereafter) of that amount is
deducted from gross income to arrive at adjusted gross income. 99
The definition of earned income under the Economic Recovery Tax
Act'0° coincides with the definition found in section 401(c)(2) of the Code
(dealing with the earned income credit) and section 911 (d) (2) of the Code
(dealing with income from sources outside the United States). Thus, earned
income includes wages, salaries, tips, and anything else of value (money,
goods, or services) received for personal services-regardless of whether the
amount is taxable.' 0' In addition, it includes net earnings from self-employ-
ment. 10 2 Under the new Act, as under the earned income credit, earned
income must be computed without regard to any community property
laws.' 0 3 Therefore, earned income must be attributed to the spouse who ren-
88. CONFERENCE REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 290, 97th Cong., 1st Sess, (1981) [hereinafter
cited as CONFERENCE REPORT).
89. See JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 63.
90. S. REP. No. 96-940, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (report on H.R. 5829).




95. I.R.C. § 62(16) (added by § 103(b) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act).
96. I.R.C. § 221(b)(1) (added by § 103(a) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act).
97. I.R.C. § 221(b) (1) (A) (added by § 103(a) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act).
98. I.R.C. § 221(b)(1)(B) (added by § 103(a) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act).
99. I.R.C. § 221(a)(1), (2) (added by § 103(a) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act).
100. I.R.C. § 221(b)(2) (added by § 103(a) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act).
101. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY 1040 FEDERAL INCOME TAX FORM AND INSTRUC-
TIONS 15 (1981).
102. Id.
103. I.R.C. § 221(b)(1) (added by § 103(a) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act).
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dered the services for which the income is received. In the case of a person
employed by a corporation, earned income does not include any distribu-
tions from earnings and profits unless the distributions constitute reasonable
compensation for services actually rendered.' 0 4 In the case of a person en-
gaged in a trade or business (other than in corporate form) in which both
personal services and capital are material income-producing factors, earned
income is a reasonable amount for services actually rendered. 0 5 In such a
case, however, a person may not have earned income in excess of thirty per-
cent of his share of net profits from the trade or business. '0 6 Earned income
does not include interest, dividends, estate and trust distributions, or capital
gains and losses, and most rents will not qualify as earned income, except
where the owner of the property renders services to occupants or aids materi-
ally in the production of farm products grown on rented land.
10 7
The Act specifically provides that earned income will not cover
amounts not includable in gross income,'0 8 since those amounts will not re-
sult in a work disincentive. Thus, social security benefits, veterans benefits,
tax exempt interest, and other exempt income do not enter into the calcula-
tion. Similarly, pensions, 10 9 annuities," 0 individual retirement plan distri-
bution,"' and deferred compensation" 2 are excluded. Pensions and
annuities are excluded from earned income because these amounts are com-
posed largely of investment income that has been accumulated tax-free.
This exclusion is necessary because the proposal is intended to benefit indi-
viduals currently earning income, and not to create a windfall for those
whose work took place in past years. 1 3 Distributions from individual retire-
ment plans are excluded so that parity with qualified plans can be main-
tained."14 Other forms of deferred compensation are excluded from the
definition of earned income for similar reasons."'5 Additionally excluded are
wages currently exempt from certain social security taxes because an individ-
ual is employed by his or her spouse. The wages are excluded because
1) they are exempt from social security tax-thus substantial relief is al-
ready provided-and 2) the spouses could shift earned income between
themselves and attribute an inaccurate or unreasonable amount of earned
income to the second earner." 16 In general, the exclusions are consistent
with the definitions that apply to the earned income credit.
Following the determination of earned income, the allowable deduc-
104. Treas. Reg. § 1.911-2(b)(1) (1981).
105. Treas. Reg. § 1.911-2(b)(2) (1981).
106. Id.
107. [1982] 1 STAND. FED. TAx REP. (CCH) 519J.05.
108. I.R.C. § 221(b)(2)(A)(i) (added by § 103(a) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act).
109. I.R.C. § 221(b)(2)(A)(ii) (added by § 103(a) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act).
110. Id.
111. I.R.C. § 221(b)(2)(A)(iii) (added by § 103(a) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act).
112. I.R.C. § 221(b)(2)(A)(iv) (added by § 103(a) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act). In
general, deferred compensation is any amount received after the close of the taxable year follow-
ing the taxable year in which the services are performed.






tions must be ascertained. In general, the Act allows the deductions in Code
section 62(1), (2), (7), (9), (10), and (15).117 The deductions must be alloca-
ble to or chargeable against the earned income of the lower-paid spouse, and
include expenses attributable to a trade or business from which the earned
income is derived. (This corresponds to the deduction under section 62(1)).
If, for example, the gross income from a trade or business includes other than
earned income, only the proportional share of the deductions attributable to
the earned income from the trade or business -can be deducted. Typical
trade or business expenses include losses, bad debts, depreciation, and rent.
Expenses paid or incurred while performing services as an employee (section
62(2)) are also allowed as deductions under the Act, including travel and
transportation expenses, expenses incurred by an outside salesperson, and
reimbursed expenses.' 18 All other deductible employee business expenses
are itemized deductions, and would not reduce the employee's earned in-
come. Consequently, employees may have a possible tax advantage over
professionals and others not considered employees if the employee itemizes
his or her deductions.' 1 9 Deductions for contributions by a self-employed
person to a qualified retirement plan, deductions relating to pension plans of
Subchapter S corporations, and deductions for contributions to an individ-
ual retirement plan are also permitted (section 62(7), (9), and (10) respec-
tively). Certain deductions are not allowed under the new Act since they do
not relate to earned income. These deductions include those relating to long
term capital gains (section 62(3)); to losses from the sale or exchange of prop-
erty (section 62(4)); and to deductions attributable to rents and royalties
(section 62(5)). In addition, the moving expense deduction (section 62(8)),
while relating directly to earned income, is not allowed. Moving expenses,
which are infrequent and usually large, could not be included in the quali-
fied earned income without drastically reducing qualified earned income
amount, and, in some instances, eliminating it altogether. It is also possible
that certain section 62 deductions specifically allowed under the earned in-
come provision could be large and infrequent, causing distortion of the
amount. An example of this is an educational expense to maintain and im-
prove the taxpayer's job, this is a section 62(1) deduction for professionals
and the self-employed. Such a deduction, along with the deduction for
meals and lodging "while away from home,"' 120 could substantially reduce
the earned income amount. In such a case the marital deduction provision
would not be fully effective in reducing the marriage penalty.
The Act specifies that no deduction is allowed if either spouse claims on
the joint return the benefits of Code section 911 (relating to income earned
by individuals outside the United States), or Code section 931 (relating to
income from sources within possessions of the United States). Couples bene-
117. I.R.C. § 221(b)(1)(B) (added by § 103(a) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act).
118. I.R.C. § 62(2).
119. In certain cases, as, for example, where there are educational expenses, this treatment
could significantly benefit the employee.
120. This combination of educational expense deductions and deductions for meals and
lodging could occur when an employee takes a leave of absence from his or her job to maintain
and improve job skills.
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fiting from these provisions are excluded from the new deductions because
substantial relief is provided elsewhere in the Economic Recovery Tax Act
for income earned abroad and because coordinating the new deduction with
these provisions would be too complicated. 2 ' This provision is consistent
with the eligibility rules for the earned income credit, which does not apply
to situations in which Code sections 911 and 931 are involved.
Although the new provision may be conceptually simple, calculating
the deduction is a complicated matter, as the above discussion illustrates,
and will undoubtedly present the IRS with administrative problems. One of
the most difficult problems will arise when a taxpayer has disability income
or unemployment compensation. The relationship between the earned in-
come deduction and Code section 105 (dealing with amounts received under
accident and health plans), and Code section 85, (dealing with unemploy-
ment compensation), is extremely complex. Under section 105 of the Code,
a disability income exclusion of up to $5,200 annually is available to certain
disabled, retired taxpayers under the age of sixty-five. The exclusion phases
out on a dollar-for-dollar basis as adjusted gross income exceeds $15,000.
This adjusted gross income limit is calculated without regard to the earned
income deduction (which is usually a deduction to arrive at adjusted gross
income).1 22 The deduction is then computed, excluding from earned in-
come the amount of the disability income. Similarly, under section 85, un-
employment compensation is included in income once the adjusted gross
income figure of $20,000 is reached. Thus, a taxpayer includes unemploy-
ment compensation in income without regard to the earned income deduc-
tion. 123 It is possible that the calculations may pose an administrative
problem. The problem may not be too significant, however, because only a
small percentage of taxpayers have either unemployment compensation or
disability income.
A greater administrative problem may arise when taxpayers enter into
employment, partnership, and corporate agreements to shift income to the
lower-paid spouse. These agreements will give rise to all of the problems
with assignment of income that the IRS had before the 1948 Act.' 24 The
abuse from such agreements may be minimized, however, because earned
income does not include wages exempt from social security paid to one
spouse who is employed by the other spouse. If this social security exemp-
tion does not apply, as, for example, when there is a corporate entity, there is
a tax advantage to income-splitting. The following table illustrates how the
taxes of a husband and wife with a combined income of $60,000 vary as the
121. An individual present in a foreign country for 330 full days in any period of 12 consec-
utive months may elect to exclude foreign earned income attributable to the period of foreign
residence or presence at an annual rate of $75,000 for taxable years beginning on or after Janu-
ary 1, 1982. This amount is increased $5,000 a year over the next four years to $95,000. Thus,
at the end of the phase-in period a taxpayer will be able to exclude up to $95,000. In the case of
a married couple, the exemption is computed separately for each qualifying individual. Ste,
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 88, at 203.
122. Section 103(c) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act.
123. Id.
124. See Community Property, supra note 1.
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income of each spouse varies. (The table assumes that the deduction is fully
effective).
A B C D E F G
Income Income
higher- lower- Taxable (1984)
paid paid 10% El Income Tax Tax
spouse spouse deduction Exemptions (A+B)-(C+D) Liability Differential
$60,000 $ 0 $ 0 $3,000* $57,000 $14,028 $ -
55,000 5,000 500 2,000 57,500 14,218 190
50,000 10,000 1,000 2,000 57,000 14,028 190
45,000 15,000 1,500 2,000 56,500 13,838 190
40,000 20,000 2,000 2,000 56,000 13,648 190
35,000 25,000 2,500 2,000 55,500 13,458 190
30,000 30,000 3,000 2,000 55,000 13,268 190
1,140
* An extra exemption is allowed here because one spouse is a dependent.
As evidenced in the table, a couple earning $60,000 can save $1,140 in taxes
by entering into a valid income-splitting arrangement.
Couples in community property states are likely to argue that their
earned income is automatically split with the other spouse, and will cite Poe
v. Seaborn to defend their position. Undoubtedly, the taxpayers will lose in
any court challenge because it is clear that Congress has the power to disre-
gard state law for federal tax purposes. 1
25
Although administrative problems may arise under the new deduction
provision, the more significant problem is one of equity. As the above table
illustrates, the new tax structure is not horizontally equitable, whereby tax-
payers who are equally situated are taxed equally. Under our tax system
this has been interpreted to mean that the tax of a married couple does not
differ when the proportion of income contributed by each spouse differs-as
long as the couple has the same combined amount of income. Because mar-
ried couples pool their income and spend as a unit, they, according to this
theory, should be taxed on aggregate income. Under the new tax structure
the married couple's tax changes depending on the earned income of the
lower-paid spouse.
The purpose of this change in policy seems to be that of economic effi-
ciency. According to this principle, the tax system should encourage the full
utilization of human resources in the work force. Thus, the tax rates should
be lowest on persons whose work effort is most responsive to lower taxes.
Because taxing the lower-paid spouse at the marginal rate of the higher-paid
spouse can adversely affect the lower-paid spouse's decision to work-at least
in the low and medium income tax brackets-reducing the rate by providing
a deduction alleviates the disincentive. The new provision, however, only
removes the disincentive where Congress felt the disincentive had the great-
est impact-when the lower paid spouse's income is less than $30,000. The
earned income deduction does not actually encourage work by the non-
working spouse. As the table above illustrates, if a spouse decides to work,
125. Congress has disregarded community property law in the Code before. Se, e.g., I.R.C.
§ 402(e).
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the $ 1,000 extra dependency exemption will be lost, increasing the tax liabil-
ity of the couple. In addition, social security taxes and employment-related
expenses (transportation, clothing, household chores, and possible child
care) 126 are incurred-all of which would most likely exceed the earned in-
come deduction.
Congress apparently felt that the earned income deduction should vary
depending on the lower-paid spouse's salary. While it is clear that child care
and household expenses remain relatively constant for all those who work
and have children, it is possible that the food, clothing, and transportation
expenses would vary in relation to the salary level. Thus, there is some ra-
tionale for the way the deduction is established. Yet, the tax savings from
the deduction depends on the combined income of the couple, not on the
earnings of the lower-paid spouse. Thus, a spouse earning $5,000 in 1984
obtains a $60 tax benefit when the other spouse earns $5,000, but a tax bene-
fit of $210 when the other spouse earns $65,000.127 The difference is due to
the fact that the value of a deduction increases as the income level of the
taxpayer increases. The discriminatory effect of the deduction is reduced
somewhat because the Economic Recovery Tax Act reduces the top tax rates
from seventy percent to fifty percent. However, the deduction is inequitable
to those in the lower income brackets where the tax benefit should arguably
be higher because the needs of the family are likely to be greater.
The earned income deduction was not enacted to discourage couples
from "living in sin" because if that had been its purpose, there would be no
$30,000 limit. As it stands now, the marriage penalty continues and be-
comes more severe at the higher maximum marginal tax rates and when the
separate incomes of the spouses are more nearly equal. The following table,
which assumes the separate incomes of the spouses are equal and that the
earned income deduction is fully effective, illustrates this.
126. Under the new law, the maximum child care credit is $2,400 for one dependent and
$4,800 for two or more dependents. The credit is 30% of employment-related expenses of tax-
payers with incomes of $10,000 or less. The credit is reduced by 1% for each $2,000, or fraction
thereof, of income above $10,000. Therefore, taxpayers with adjusted gross income above
$28,000 will have a credit rate of 20%. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 88, at 201.
127. The following are examples of the differing tax benefits under the new El deduction.
Lower- Higher-
paid paid E.I. Personal Taxable Tax Tax
spouse spouse deduction Exemption Income Bracket Benefit
5,000 . 5,000 500 2,000 7,500 12% x 500 $60
5,000 15,000 500 2,000 17,500 18% X 500 $90
5,000 25,000 500 2,000 27,500 25% X 500 $125
5,000 35,000 500 2,000 37,500 33% x 500 $165
5,000 45,000 500 2,000 47,500 38% X 500 $190
5,000 55,000 500 2,000 57,500 38% X 500 $190
5,000 65,000 500 2,000 67,500 42% X 500 $210
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2ombined Income Under Income
Gross PE* & as joint Single/Married
(Earned) 10% EI Joint Return Filing
Income Deduction (A-B) (1984) Separately
S 10,000 $2,500 $ 7,500$ 471 $ 4,000
20,000 3,000 17,000 1,921 9,000
30,000 3,500 26,500 3,940 14,000
40,000 4,000 36,000 6,538 19,000
50,000 4,500 45,500 9,673 24,000
60,000 5,000 55,000 13,268 29,000
70,000 5,000 65,000 17,268 34,000
80,000 5,000 75,000 21,468 39,000
90,000 5,000 85,000 25,668 44,000
100,000 5,000 95,000 30,150 49,000
120,000 5,000 115,000 39,374 59,000
140,000 5,000 135,000 49,174 69,000
160,000 5,000 155,000 58,974 79,000
















































* PE = personal exemptions of $2,000
Column H above indicates that if the taxpayers were divorced they
could save considerable taxes. Column I indicates that married taxpayers
filing separately end up paying significantly more tax than if they had filed
jointly. Therefore, the couple pays significantly more tax than if they had
filed as two singles. There still may be circumstances, however, when it will
be more favorable for a married couple to file separately, as for example,
when one spouse has a large deductible item.'
28
It is also interesting to note that for the tax year 1982, the marriage
penalty is not eliminated when the lower-paid spouse earns less than $30,000
due to the fact that the deduction is only five percent. The following table
indicates the severity of this penalty.
A B C D E
Taxable
Combined 5% Income Tax
Gross El Under Under
(Earned) Personal Deduction Joint Joint
Income* Exemption (1982) Return Return
$10,000 $2,000 $ 250 $ 7,750 $ 570
$20,000 2,000 500 17,500 2,343
$30,000 2,000 750 27,250 4,806
$40,000 2,000 1,000 37,000 8,025
$50,000 2,000 1,250 46,750 11,875
$60,000 2,000 1,500 56,500 16,165




























The marriage penalty also continues to exist when both spouses have
investment income and when investment income represents a significant por-
tion of the couple's total income. Thus, couples that have investment in-
come will also obtain a tax advantage from "living in sin" or obtaining a
128. The most typical example is when one spouse has a large medical deduction. Because
a percentage of adjusted gross income is a floor under the medical expense deduction, a two-
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divorce. 129
Another inequitable problem remaining after the Economic Recovery
Act is the continuing discrimination against single taxpayers. At all levels of
income the single person pays more tax than a one-earner couple with the
same amount of income. The following table indicates the singles penalty at
various income levels.
Taxable
Income of Taxable Tax on Tax
one-earner Income one-earner on
Gross married of couple single Singles
Income couple* single" (1984) (1984) penalty
$10,000 $7,000 $9,000 $411 $915 $504
20,000 17,000 19,000 1,921 2,945 1,024
30,000 27,000 29,000 4,065 5,773 1,708
40,000 37,000 39,000 6,868 9,369 2,501
50,000 47,000 49,000 10,228 13,469 3,241
60,000 57,000 59,000 13,952 17,891 3,939
70,000 67,000 69,000 18,108 22,211 4,103
* Personal exemptions = $2,000/dependency exemption = $1,000.
** Personal exemption = $1,000.
Similarly, two single persons pay more tax than a two-earner married couple
with the same amount of income.'
30
To summarize the tax system as it relates to marital status: 1) the tax
system is still not marriage neutral because it treats single persons differently
from married couples in similar circumstances; 2) the system is not horizon-
tally equitable-married couples with the same combined income but with
different separate incomes have different taxes;i 3 1 3) the marriage penalty
still exists; and 4) administrative difficulties may arise in determining the
earned income deduction.
Although there are problems with the new deduction provision, a simi-
lar provision is being used in a number of foreign countries. In the United
Kingdom, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Switzerland an earned income
allowance is given when both spouses receive earned income independently
129. The following table illustrates a few examples of the effect of the penalty:
A B C D E F G H I
Tax
Taxable Under Taxable Tax
Combined Combined Combined PE & 10% Income Joint Income as Marriage
Earned Investment Gross EI as Joint Return as Single Penalty
Income Income* Income Deduction (C-D) (1984) Single (1984) (F-(HX2))
$20,000 $10,000 $30,000 $3,000 $27,000 $4,065 $14,000 $1,801 $463
20,000 20,000 40,000 3,000 37,000 6,868 19,000 2,945 978
40,000 10,000 50,000 4,000 46,000 9,848 24,000 4,625 1,318
40,000 20,000 ' 60,000 4,000 56,000 13,648 29,000 5,773 2,102
40,000 30,000 70,000 4,000 66,000 17,688 34,000 7,473 2,742
60,000 20,000 80,000 5,000 75,000 21,468 39,000 9,445 2,578
60,000 30,000 90,000 5,000 85,000 25,668 44,000 11,369 2,930
60,000 40,000 100,000 5,000 95,000 30,150 49,000 13,469 3,212
* Assume income is split equally between the spouses.
130. Se, Chart, top of page 782 supra.
131. It is impossible to have marriage neutrality and horizontal equity unless a proportional
tax system is adopted.
19821
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of one another. 132 Similarly, in Sweden, there is an earned income allow-
ance, but the maximum benefit applies only when the couple has a child
under the age of sixteen living in the taxpayer's home.
133
III. ALTERNATIVES
A number of different approaches to the marital status discrimination
problem have been proposed and several of them are in effect in other coun-
tries. The proposals range from eliminating both types of discrimination to
only partially eliminating the marriage penalty. Proposals that partially
eliminate the penalty include: 1) the credit proposal, 2) the optional use of
the singles' schedule by married persons, 3) the optional use of the joint
schedule by single persons and heads of households, 4) the split return, and
5) flattening the tax rates. The proposals that completely eliminate marital
status discrimination include: 1) the proportional tax system, 2) the one-
rate schedule, and 3) the dual-rate schedule.
A. Partial Elimination of Marital Status Discrimination
1. Credit- Proposal
One method to reduce the marriage penalty is to grant a tax credit
equal to a percentage of the earnings of the lower-paid spouse. Like the
earned income deduction, this proposal will not completely eliminate the
marriage penalty nor will it change the singles penalty. The credit proposal
is as simple as the deduction proposal, and the calculations for determining
the earned income amount would be the same. Like the deduction, it aban-
dons the horizontal equity concept that all married couples with equal in-
come should pay the same tax regardless of each spouse's contribution to the
couple's total income. The advantage to this proposal is that it is more pro-
gressive than a deduction. It avoids the discriminatory effect that a deduc-
tion has on lower-income couples. It would not, however, be as effective as a
deduction, per dollar of revenue loss, in reducing marginal tax rates in the
higher income brackets where high marginal rates present the most serious
problems. Under such a proposal the revenue loss would be comparable to
the losses under the deduction proposal.' 34 Such a proposal has been intro-
duced in Congress; 135 however, it is not a common provision in the tax stat-
utes of other western countries.
2. Optional Use of Singles' Schedules By Married Persons
A method to eliminate the marriage penalty completely is to allow mar-
ried persons use of the singles' rate for their separate incomes. 136 Unlike the
132. Information on tax laws of other countries was found in current editions of ARTHUR
ANDERSEN & Co., TAx AND TRADE GUIDE; INTERNATIONAL BUREAU OF FISCAL DOCUMEN-
TATION, SUPPLEMENTARY SERVICE TO EUROPEAN TAxATION; and WORLD TAX SERIES, supra
note 7.
133. TAX AND TRADE GUIDE, supra note 132, at 79 (Sweden 1978).
134. Set JOINT COMMrIrEE, supra note 63, at 59.
135. H.R. 6798, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
136. See Gerzog, supra note 1, at 44; S. 336, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980); H.R. 3609, 96th
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deduction or credit provision, this proposal would eliminate entirely the
marriage disincentive associated with the marriage penalty and totally
equalize the secondary earner's work incentive to that of his or her spouse.
The proposal, however, would not solve the discrimination problem against
single persons. In addition, like the deduction or credit provision, it aban-
dons the horizontal equity concept. Perhaps the most troublesome problem
with this proposal is that of administrative feasibility. As with the credit and
deduction provisions, community property laws would be disregarded to
avoid the problem that existed prior to 1948 (the discrimination against
couples in common law states). Unlike the credit and deduction provisions,
however, investment income would have to be divided, either by an exact
method or an allocation method. In addition, all deductions and credits
would have to be allocated between the spouses. An arbitrary formula
would create new marriage inequities and unfairness vzs-a-vIs single persons
because they would be taxed under an exact method. The exact method, on
the other hand, could cause an administrative burden on a couple that nor-
mally shares expenses and does not keep exact records as to who earns the
income or incurs the expense. Also, .there is the problem that community
property states automatically divide investment income between the spouses.
Advocates of this change claim that allocation problems can be solved by
adopting the allocation rules presently existing when married persons file
separately. ' 37
3. Optional Use of Joint Schedules By Single Persons and Heads of
Households
This proposal would combine the present tax rate schedules into two
schedules-the single schedule and the joint schedule. The rate under the
two schedules would be the same as under present law. All taxpayers, except
dual-income married taxpayers, would use the joint schedule. Dual-income
married taxpayers, on the other hand, could opt to use the single tax rate
schedule when advantageous to do so (that is, when their incomes are sub-
stantially equal). Otherwise, the couple would file under the joint schedule.
Frequently, this proposal is accompanied by suggestions for larger depen-
dency exemptions and a deduction or credit for second-earners. Without
such a credit or deduction, this proposal would eliminate the discrimination
against single persons but not against married persons. In fact, it would ex-
acerbate the marriage penalty because two-earner couples would either have
to file jointly and be taxed at unfavorably progressive rates or file as single
persons at more discriminatory rates. In addition, this proposal would also
pose administrative problems. As in the prior proposal, married persons
filing as single persons would need to allocate income, deductions, and cred-
its between themselves. Finally, this proposal would result in large revenue
Cong., 1st Sess. (1980); H.R. 5012, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1980). The United Kingdom is one of
the few countries that allows a married couple to opt to file as single persons when it would be
advantageous for them to do so. See TAX AND TRADE GUIDE, supra note 132.
137. Few controversies have developed over the proper allocation of income, deductions,
exemptions, and credits between husband and wife under present law because. so few couples
file separately. See JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 63, at 38-45.
1982]
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losses since single person and heads of households would pay less tax when
filing under the joint rate schedules. Small one-earner families would be
most adversely affected by this proposal.
138
4. Split Tax Return
The split tax return proposal1 3 9 would completely eliminate the singles
penalty but only partially eliminate the marriage penalty. A marriage pen-
alty would still exist when the second income source for the married couple is
primarily investment income. Under this proposal single persons, heads of
households, and married couples file under a single tax rate schedule. All
married couples file jointly but if both spouses earn income, they file a "split
return." tFirst, each spouse calculates his or her tax liability on separately
earned, income. As under the current earned income deduction, business ex-
penses allocable to earnings are deducted. Other deductions, such as inter-
est, medical expenses, moving expenses, and charitable gifts, do not enter the
calculation. Second, the tax liability of each spouse is added together.
Third, this amount is added to the "net investment tax," which is the tax on
the aggregate investment and earned income of the couple less the tax on the
aggregate earned income. The final result is that the singles penalty is en-
tirely eliminated and the marriage penalty is eliminated to the extent the
couple has only earned income. The marriage 15enalty still exists, however,
when the couple has investment income. The impact of this proposal on
investment income is quite severe because such income is combined with
earned income and taxed at higher income rates. At a time when the Eco-
nomic Recovery Tax Act is being used to emphasize savings and invest-
ment, 14° it is not likely that this proposal will be attractive to politicians.
As with the other proposals, this proposal abandons the horizontal eq-
uity concept and disregards community property laws. It also poses admin-
istrative problems, and is more complex than the current earned income
deduction. The proposal is less complicated, however, than when married
couples file as single persons because all the personal deductions need not be
allocated. 141
5. Flattening the Tax Rates
The marriage penalty could be substantially reduced by widening the
tax brackets and making our tax structure more proportional. However, the
138. H.R. 872, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). This elective filing status proposal has been
introduced in Congress, however, no western country studied has adopted it.
139. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, TAx REVISION COMPENDIUM, 86th Cong., Ist
Sess. 488-489 (1959).
140. Se CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 88, at 239-247.
141. Israel, Japan, and Venezuela have tax systems that use a form of the split return. See
Oldman & Temple, supra note 1, at 585. In these countries, the earned incomes of the spouses
are taxed separately under a single rate schedule applicable to all individual taxpayers. At all
income levels, therefore, married couples in these countries bear the same tax burdens on their
earned incomes as do single persons except for some variations caused by different personal and
dependency exemptions. Unearned income is aggregated, however, and married couples with
two such incomes are taxed more heavily than are two single persons with corresponding
incomes.
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singles penalty could still exist, depending on what schedules and rates are
established under the proposal. One such proposal made prior to the Eco-
nomic Recovery Tax Act called for the following two rate schedules:
1) married filing jointly-24% of the first $35,200 of taxable income, 45% of
taxable income between $35,200 and $45,800, with existing tax rates thereaf-
ter; and 2) single taxpayers-24% of the first $23,500 of taxable income, 44%
of the taxable income between $23,500 and $34,100, with existing tax rates
thereafter.1 42 Nonrefundable credits of $800 were proposed for each single
person and head of household and $1,600 for each married couple. Under
this proposal, the marriage penalty would be virtually eliminated for couples
with less than $35,200 of taxable income, 143 and the penalty would be sub-
stantially reduced for those with higher incomes. However, the discrimina-
tion against single persons would continue. In fact, some single taxpayers
would pay greater amounts of tax under this proposal than under the law
prior to the change.
The biggest problem with this proposal is one of vertical equity, which
is the principle that taxes should be higher on those better able to afford to
pay the tax. Flattening the tax rates would distort this principle because
higher-income taxpayers frequently have more deductions and tax prefer-
ence items than lower-income taxpayers. Therefore, higher-income taxpay-
ers could end up paying less than their fair share of the taxes under this
proposal.
B. Complete Elimination of Marital Status Discrimination
1. Proportional Tax System
The adoption of a proportional tax structure would eliminate the dis-
crimination based on marital status. It also would be horizontally equitable
because all married couples would be taxed at a flat percentage of gross
income, adjusted gross income, or taxable income. Such a proposal would
not, however, be vertically equitable. The proportionate tax system would
necessitate a fundamental change in our traditional tax structure, which is
based on the ability to pay. Although it is possible to make this system more
progressive by adopting elaborate credit mechanisms based on income, this
would complicate the tax system. In addition, it creates the problem of
whether the income of a married couple should be combined or separated to
determine the credits. t44 If the credits are based on the combined income of
the couple, the marriage penalty might be exacerbated. If the credit is based




Perhaps the most frequently suggested proposal to completely eliminate
142. See JoINT COMMITTEE, supra note 63, at 61.
143. Id.




the marital status discrimination is the adoption of a single-rate schedule.
Under this proposal, the individual would be the taxable unit, and each
taxpayer would file a return based on one rate schedule that includes that
taxpayer's income, deductions, and credits. This proposal would, in effect,
reinstate the pre-1948 tax structure without the joint return provisions. As
under prior proposals, this proposal would disregard community property
laws for tax purposes and each taxpayer would report the income that be-
longed to him or her. The proposal would create the same administrative
problems that arise when taxpayers are allowed to file separately. Invest-
ment income, deductions, and credits would have to be allocated. Under
this proposal, however, all married taxpayers, not just those with two in-
comes, would be required to divide and allocate their income. In addition,
this proposal would result in a substantial revenue loss, as would several of
the prior proposals.
1 4 6
3. Dual or Two-Rate Schedules
This proposal would combine the present tax rate schedules into two
new rate schedules. 147 Married taxpayers would file jointly under one tax
schedule in which the rate brackets are half as wide as those in the tax sched-
ule for single taxpayers, heads of households, and married persons electing to
file separately.1 48  Under this proposal, both -types of discrimination are
eliminated. Horizontal equity, however, is not maintained. Married couples
who have different combinations of income will pay different taxes. In fact,
married couples with equal amounts of income receive the best tax advan-
tage, whereas couples with the greatest difference between their incomes will
be in a worse position. Because this proposal more severely affects married
couples in which only one spouse works it is often accompanied by sugges-
tions to increase exemptions for the spouse who does not work and for
children.
The major problem with the two-rate schedule, as with several of the
prior proposals, is that an allocation scheme must be established in order for
married couples who opt to file under the singles schedule to be able to di-
vide their income, deductions, and credits. As with most of the proposals,
there is no economic incentive to encourage a nonworking spouse to work.
146. The one-rate schedule has been adopted in Canada, Australia, Pakistan, and Yugosla-
via. See WORLD TAX SERIES, srupra note 7. In Canada, couples in which spouses earn more
than a nominal amount are required to file separate returns. See Oldman & Temple, supra note
1, at 591.
147. See Harmelink & Krause, supra note 1, at 764.
148. An example under our system would be the following:
Taxable Taxable
Income Income
Singles/H of H/ One-earner
Two-earner married Tax Rates
married couple 1982 1984
$4,400-6,500 $2,200-3,250 16% 14%
10,800-12,900 5,400-6,450 22% 18%
15,000-18,200 7,500-9,100 27% 23%
18,200-23,500 9,100-11,750 31% 26%
28,800-34,100 14,400-17,050 40% 34%
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The two-rate schedule would not be as administratively burdensome as the
one-rate schedule because not all married couples would file separately.
However, unlike the one-rate schedule, under the two-rate schedule proposal
taxpayers have the option of calculating tax under both schedules to deter-
mine which schedule provides the better tax advantage. 149
IV. CONCLUSION
The newly enacted earned income deduction does not totally solve the
marriage penalty and leaves the singles penalty virtually unchanged. It ap-
pears to be a mere stopgap measure aimed at providing tax relief for married
couples in which the lower-paid spouse earns less than $30,000. However,
the alternatives to the earned income deduction, as shown above, have their
own problems. One advantage of the earned income deduction is its admin-
istrative manageability. Most of the other proposals (with the exception of
the credit proposal) create new complexities in the tax calculation. The
credit proposal, like the deduction proposal, will not solve the marriage pen-
alty completely nor will it change the singles penalty. In addition, most of
the other proposals have limited results and will solve only one of the penal-
ties, but not both. By flattening the tax rates, the marriage penalty can be
partially solved but the singles penalty would become worse. Allowing sin-
gle persons to file under the joint return will increase the marriage penalty.
Additionally, allowing married individuals to file as single persons fails to
solve the singles penalty problem. The split return is perhaps the best of the
partial elimination approaches; however, it would perpetuate the marriage
penalty for couples with investment income. In addition, it is not simple to
calculate.
Analysis of the complete elimination proposals indicates that the pro-
portional system alternative is not acceptable because of its fundamental
change in the progressivity of the tax rates. Additionally, the single-schedule
and dual-schedule proposals pose administrative feasibility problems be-
cause income, deductions, credits, and exemptions must be allocated be-
tween the spouses.
Despite these problems, many of these proposals have been adopted and
successfully used in other countries. The split return and single-schedule al-
ternatives appear to be viable alternatives to remedy the existing penalties
on married couples and single persons. Ultimately, however, the decision to
eliminate marital status discrimination in the tax code will rest on political
considerations.




PRIVACY RIGHTS V. LAW ENFORCEMENT DIFFICULTIES:
THE CLASH OF COMPETING INTERESTS IN
NEW YORK v BEL TON
INTRODUCTION
The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees a
personal right of privacy, free from unreasonable searches and government
invasions.' The interests protected by the fourth amendment, which re-
quires a search warrant in order to lawfully conduct a search of "persons,
houses, papers, and effects," 2 have been the subject of considerable litiga-
tion. 3 One important aspect of the development of fourth amendment re-
quirements and protections has been the creation of exceptions to the search
warrant requirement.
The United States Supreme Court has held that certain exigent circum-
stances obviate the search warrant requirement.4 For instance, the inherent
mobility and diminished privacy interests with respect to one's automobile
have been held to justify a warrantless search of an automobile on probable
cause. 5 Another exception arises for a search conducted contemporaneous to
a lawful arrest. 6 The boundaries of a warrantless search have been the sub-
ject of constant fluctuation.
7
The major decision defining the scope of a search incident to arrest,
Chimel v. Caiforni'a,8 represents the United States Supreme Court's attempt
at settling the vacillation and confusion in this area. However, major diffi-
culties have plagued the lower federal and state courts in their application
and interpretation of Chimel, under differing factual circumstances. 9 With
respect to automobiles, the lawful extent of a warrantless search has been
1. Under the fourth amendment a search into an area in which a party has a legitimate
expectation of privacy may be held unconstitutional. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967). A search generally involves exploratory investigation, or an invasion by a law officer. 1
W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.1(a) (1978 & Supp. 1980).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The importance of a search warrant was discussed in Mc-
Donald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948), which stated in part that, "the Fourth Amend-
ment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police. This was done ... so that
an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law." Id.
at 455.
3. See generally 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 1. This three-volume work, which deals exclu-
sively with the fourth amendment, reflects the enormous amount of litigation involved in the
evolution of rights under that amendment.
4. See infa note 15.
5. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925). See also United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982), where the United States Supreme
Court defined the permissible scope of a search under the automobile exception. See infa notes
117-121 and accompanying text.
6. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973). See infta text accompanying note 38.
7. "Few areas of the law have been as subject to shifting constitutional standards over the
last 50 years as that of the search 'incident to an arrest.' " Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
770 (1969) (White, J., dissenting). Set Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?
50 TEx. L. REV. 736, 740 (1972).
8. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
9. See infra note 10.
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intolerably confusing. 10 New York o. Beton ' I exemplifies the difficulties en-
countered by courts in considering what constitutes the scope of a search
incident to an arrest, when the locus of the arrest is an automobile.
This comment will explore the development of, and justifications for, a
permissible search incident to a lawful arrest, as well as the competing pri-
vacy interests and law enforcement responsibilities present in a fourth
amendment case. Furthermore, it will examine the possible effect of New
York v. Belton upon the law of search and seizure.
I. SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
A. Early Hzstoq'
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.'
2
This amendment guarantees to all citizens a personal right of privacy, free
from unreasonable governmental searches and invasions. The fourth
amendment does not prohibit all searches, only those that are unreasona-
ble.' 3 When a search is unreasonable as a matter of law, the exclusionary
rule, which precludes the use of illegally obtained evidence, is activated. 14
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that "searches
conducted without the authority of a search warrant are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few specifically established
and delineated exceptions."1' 5 These specific exceptions are "jealously and
carefully drawn."1 6 Proof of exigent circumstances or the existence of an-
other exception obviates the warrant requirement.'
7
Supreme Court decisions interpreting the application of the search-inci-
dent-to-arrest exception have resulted in constantly shifting methods of anal-
ysis.' 8 The Court has been unable to establish a strong precedent for
10. Compare United States v. Sanders, 631 F.2d 1309 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Dixon, 558 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1977); andIn re Kiser, 419 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir. 1969); with United
States v. Benson, 631 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Rigales, 630 F.2d 364 (5th Cir.
1980); and Thompson v. State, 488 P.2d 944 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
11. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
13. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886).
14. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See infra notes 53-67 and accompanying text.
15. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnotes omitted). The exceptions to
the warrant requirement include: I) exigent circumstances, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967); 2) automobile searches, United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982); Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); 3) automobile
inventory searches, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); 4) "stop and frisk"
searches, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); 5) consent searches, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973); 6) "plain view," Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); and
7) search incident to a lawful custodial arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
16. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) (quoting Jones v. United States,
357 U.S. 493, 499 (1956)).
17. McDonald v. United States, 355 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
18. Set general4y Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., con-
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application in cases arising under this exception. This inability has gener-
ated criticism focusing on the confusion and unpredictability of the
decisions. 19
The groundwork for the search-incident-to-arrest exception may be
found in dicta of several Supreme Court decisions. 20 This dicta became the
foundation for the decision in Marron v. United States ,2 1 which held there is a
"right without a warrant contemporaneously to search the place," 22 in order
to find and seize evidence of crime. This new reasoning was subsequently
held inapplicable when the circumstances of the arrest allowed the arresting
officers to obtain a search warrant.
23
The pendulum swung towards further extension of the scope of the
search incident to arrest in what were to become the two most influential
decisions in this area for almost twenty years. In Harris v. United States,24 the
Court sustained a warrantless search of an entire four-room apartment. The
Court noted that "[t]he opinions . . . recognized that the search incident to
arrest may, under appropriate circumstances extend beyond the person of
the one arrested to include the premises under his immediate control."
25
Finding that Harris commanded exclusive control over the entire four-room
apartment, the Court emphasized the reasonableness approach.2 6 The Har-
rzs Court also considered the nature of the objects of the search in conclud-
ing that both the intensity and length of the search were reasonable. 2 7
United States v. Rabtnowitz 28 strengthened the Harris principle of reasona-
bleness. This decision upheld the search of a desk, safe, and file cabinets
contained in a one-room office where the arrest occurred. Applying the
"reasonableness of all the circumstances test," 29 in upholding the search, the
curring); Aaronson & Wallace, A Reconsideration of the Fourth Amendment's Doctrine of Search Incident
to Arrest, 64 GEo. L.J. 53 (1975); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349 (1974); Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudzhaton and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyer-
ing, 48 IND. L.J. 329 (1973).
19. See generally Dworkin, supra note 18.
20. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (upheld the government's right to
search the person, incident to arrest, to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925) (upheld the right to seize whatever evidence is
found upon the arrestee's person or within his control); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30
(1925) (upheld the right to search the place of arrest to find weapons or evidence of crime). For
the early development of fourth amendment rights, see generally N. LASSON, THE HISTORY
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION,
51-78 (1937).
21. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
22. Id. at 199.
23. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 (1931). See also Trupiano v.
United States, 334 U.S. 699, 710 (1948) (there is a prohibition against general exploratory
searches).
24. 331 U.S. 145 (1947), overruled, Chimel v. United States, 395 U.S. 768 (1968).
25. 331 U.S. at 151.
26. "[O]nly unreasonable searches and seizures . . . come within the constitutional inter-
dict. The test of reasonableness cannot be stated in rigid and absolute terms." Id. at 150.
27. "The same meticulous investigation which would be appropriate in a search for two
small cancelled checks could not be considered reasonable where agents are seeking a stolen
automobile or illegal still." Id. at 152.
28. 339 U.S. 56 (1950), overruled, Chimel v. United States, 395 U.S. 768 (1968).
29. The Court stated that "[the relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a
search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable." 339 U.S. at 66. "The recurring ques-
tinnq nf thte rnrnAhl.n, n c - ,i A :_ C ... -....-.. _f
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Court found no unreasonable extension beyond the area of the arrestee's
immediate control.
30
The Harris-Rabinowitz principle, as applied by the lower courts, did not
limit the scope of a permissible search to places where an arrestee could ob-
tain a weapon or destroy evidence. The major limitation that evolved in
subsequent cases interpreting Harris and Rabinowitz was the restriction of the
search to the premises where the defendant was arrested.
3
Theories based upon control and possession allowed the lower federal
and state courts to uphold substantially intrusive searches. 3 2 As applied by
these courts, the Harrs-Rabtnowitz principle did not entail inquiry into the
arrestee's ability to control the area subject to search.
33
B. Chimel v. California: The Warren Court's Attempt to Enunciate a Rule
The scope of a search incident to arrest, as developed in the Harris-Rabi-
nowitz decisions and in lower court interpretations, was drastically curtailed
by the Warren Court. Ch'mel v. Californta 34 was, the pinnacle of the Court's
decisions broadening fourth amendment protections. This decision re-
stricted the scope of a search incident to arrest to that area within the arres-
tee's immediate control. 35 The law enforcement officers in Chimel obtained
an arrest warrant, but no search warrant. Concurrent with Chimel's lawful
arrest at his home, the officers conducted a full search of his residence.
36
The Court, in stressing the importance of procuring a search warrant,
recognized that certain exigent circumstances created exemptions from the
fourth amendment's search warrant requirement. 37 The test the Court es-
poused allowed the arresting officer the authority:
[T]o search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons
that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his
escape. . . . In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting
officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person
in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area
each case." Id. at 63 (construing Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357
(1931)).
30. 339 U.S. at 64.
31. See, e.g., James v. Louisiana, 382 U.S. 36 (1965) (search of a home invalidated when
defendant arrested several blocks away); United States v. Preston, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) (search
must be contemporaneous to arrest); Smith v. United States, 254 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
(search upstairs, arrest downstairs). See 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 6.3 (1978 &
Supp. 1980).
32. 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 31, § 7.1 at 498.
33. Id See, e.g., Arwine v. Bannan, 346 F.2d 458 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 882 (1965)
(search of automobile while arrestee was handcuffed); Crawford v. Bannan, 336 F.2d 505 (6th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 955 (1965) (search of passenger area while arrestee was in squad
car); United States ex rel Foose v. Rundle, 269 F. Supp. 1017 (E.D. Penn. 1967), aj'd per curnm,
389 F.2d 54 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 914 (1968) (search of automobile upheld as a search
incident to arrest when arrestee was in police custody at station house).
34. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). For detailed discussions of Chinet, see Aaronson & Wallace, supra
note 18; Amsterdam, supra note 18; Comment, Scope of Searches Incident to Arrest, 43 U. CoLO. L.
REV. 63 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Seope of Searches]; Comment, Search and Seirure-Permisible
Seope of a Search Incident to a Valid Custodiat Arrest, 8 U. RICH. L. REV. 610 (1974).
35. 395 U.S. at 763.
36. The officers, accompanied by Chimel's wife, searched the three-bedroom home, includ-
ing the garage and the attic. Id. at 754.
37. Id. at 762.
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into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or
evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule....
There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's
person and the area 'within his immediate control'-construing
that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
3 8
Chimd represents the Warren Court's endeavor to balance the law en-
forcement interests of the state with the privacy interests of the individual,
3 9
and to clarify the "quagmire" 4° that had developed around the search-inci-
dent-to-arrest exception. The Chimde holding, in overruling the Hams-Rabb'o-
witz principle, set down a sweeping guideline governing searches incident to
arrests and formulated a standard for application by law enforcement offi-
cials. The manner in which this principle was enunciated established few
positive guidelines for law enforcement officials to follow. 4 1 This lack of pos-
itive direction from Chimel resulted in the Supreme Court granting certiorari
in numerous subsequent cases to clarify Chimel.
42
The difficulty the lower courts were having with the lack of positive
guidelines from the Court partially arose from differing interpretations of the
issue in Chimel. The issue in Chinel was whether the area subject to search,
at the moment of the search, was accessible to the arrestee. 43  However,
lower federal and state courts interpreted the issue to be whether the arrestee
could have reached the area subject to the search at any time. This interpre-
tation resulted in an expansion of the area considered subject to the immedi-
38. Id. at 763. For cases applying the Chimd principle to automobile searches, see supra
note 10, and United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S.
800 (1974); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973).
39. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
40. See LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court. Further Ventures into the "Quagmire,"
8 CRIM. L. BULL. 9 (1972). Professor LaFave remarked that after Chimel, "it would seem that a
full search of the vehicle. . . could no longer be upheld as a search incident to arrest," placing
the automobile exception in effect. Id. at 18.
41. For criticism of the Chimel holding, see generally Aaronson & Wallace, supra note 18.
The authors maintain Chimel lacks a defensible basis, resulting in inconsistent application by
both the lower courts and law enforcement officials. Chimel left this area of the law ambiguous
-and uncertain. Id See also Carrington, Chimel v. California-A Po/e Response, 45 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 559 (1970). When the police searched Chimel's house they were actually within the
scope of Harris-Rabinowitz. Id. at 564. Carrington also suggested that Chimel's overbreadth re-
sulted in two problems: 1) police do not know what conduct is appropriate; and 2) judges
applying Chimel have great latitude for interpretation. Id. at 568.
42. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973), and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973) applied the Chimel standard in holding that an arresting officer has authority to search
the person of an arrestee incident to an arrest for a traffic violation. The Court found that the
person of the arrestee falls within the area of the arrestee's immediate control. The searches at
issue in both Robinson and Gustafson did not extend beyond the arrestee's person.
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), addressed whether a footlocker placed in an
automobile trunk may be searched two hours after arrest, as incident to arrest. Finding Chimel
inapplicable to the facts, the Supreme Court held:
Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not
immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and
there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to
seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident
of the arrest.
Id. at 15.
43. 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 31, § 7.1 at 501.
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ate control of the arrestee. 4 4 In light of lower court interpretations of Chbmel,
New York v. Belton presented an opportunity for the Court to clarify the defi-
nition of the area within the immediate control of the arrestee, when the
locus of the arrest is an automobile.
4 5
C. Clash of Competing Interests
Fourth amendment cases place constitutionally protected privacy inter-
ests against the responsibilities of law enforcement officers to combat
crime.46 The two interests are positioned in such a manner that the protec-
tion of one interest often curtails the other.4 7 It is the court's responsibility
to balance the public's interest in safety against the individual's right to pri-
vacy free from arbitrary interference by police officers.
Law enforcement officials' decisions to search subsequent to a lawful
arrest are necessarily swift ad hoc judgments, leaving little room for them to
contemplate the legality of their actions.4 3 Therefore, in order for policemen
to work within constitutional limitations, the Court must provide guide-
lines. 49 Since the fourth amendment regulates law enforcement officials in
their daily conduct, its requirements need "to be expressed in terms that are
readily applicable by the police." 50
Juxtaposed against the duties of law enforcement officials are the per-
sonal interests protected by the fourth amendment. Individuals are guaran-
teed freedom from unreasonable invasions of legitimate privacy interests. 5 1
These privacy interests are "indispensable to the full enjoyment of personal
security, personal liberty and private property . . . [and] they are to be re-
garded as the very essence of constitutional liberty."1
5 2
D. The Exclusionagy Rule
Seizure of evidence in violation of an individual's fourth amendment
rights invokes the exclusionary rule. The rule bars the prosecution from in-
troducing illegally seized evidence at trial. 53 Currently the major rationale
44. United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666, 673 (5th Cir. 1973) (Goldberg, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), cert. denied,.419 U.S. 831 (1974).
45. 453 U.S. at 459.
46. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 431 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
47. This balancing process constitutis a tremendous challenge to those in the criminal jus-
tice system. See genera/y LaFave, supra note 40.
48. See Carrington, supra note 41, at 560.
49. It has been urged that reviewing courts need to consider the realities of the situation.
Id. at 567.
50. See LaFave, supra note 40, at 141-42.
[I]f the rules are impossible of application . . . the result may be the sustaining of
motions to suppress . . . . [B]ut this can hardly be taken as proof. . . people are
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures. . . . Rather, that security can only be realized if the police are acting under
a set of rules which. . . makes it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand
as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement.
Id. at 142.
51. See supra note I and accompanying text. Although any search is an invasion of privacy,
it is only unreasonable searches that are constitutionally prohibited.
52. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921).
53. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Seegenerally, W. LAFAVE, supra note 1, at §§ 1.1-
1.2, 3-3.9; Amsterdam, supra note 18; Kaplan, The Ltmis of the Exctusonagy Rute, 26 STAN. L.
REv. 1027 (1974); Wright, supra note 7.
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of the rule lies in its potential deterrent effect, 54 however, the preservation of
judicial integrity is another suggested justification.
55
The trend towards the deterrence rationale as the sole justification for
the exclusionary rule has lead to the erosion of the rule's application. There
is a growing tendency to find that the harmful consequences of the rule out-
weigh any deterrent effect, 56 as well as a tendency to hesitate in applying the
rule to anything less than flagrant or willfull violations of fourth amendment
rights.57 The exclusionary rule has been held inapplicable in grand jury
proceedings,5 impeachment of witnesses, 59 actions under statutes subse-
quently held invalid,6 ° and administrative proceedings.
6 1
The criticisms directed at the exclusionary rule,6 2 coupled with the cur-
rent trend by the Court, suggest that modification of the exclusionary rule
may be imminent. 63 Justice White's dissent in Stone o. Powe164 proposed bar-
54. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). See generally United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338 (1974); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
55. The exclusionary rule's preservation ofjudicial integrity is based upon the idea that the
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence will bar the courts from becoming accomplices with
police actions violating constitutional rights the courts are required to protect. See Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). Many studies have attempted
to evaluate the impact of the exclusionary rule. The result of these studies is that no one "has
yet been able to establish with any assurance whether the rule has any deterrent effect .... "
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 450 n.22 (1976). See generally Canon, Is the Exclusiona Rule
in Failing Health? Some New Data and A Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681
(1974); Spiotto, Search and Seizure. An Empirical Study of the Exclusionar Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J.
LEG. STUD. 243 (1973).
It has been asserted that "the costs of the exclusionary rule are immediately apparent,
while its benefits are only conjectural. When courts apply the rule, law enforcement officials are
deprived of incriminating evidence. In contrast, any police misconduct that would have oc-
curred but for the deterrent effect of the suppression order is purely speculative." Mertens and
Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule. Deregulating the Police and Derailing
the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 394 (1981).
See generally Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Setzure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665
(1970); Comment, The Erosion of the Exclusionary Rule Under the Burger Court, 33 BAYLOR L. REV.
352 (1981); Comment, Broadening the Scope of a Search Incident to Arrest.- The Burger Court's Retreat
from Chimel, 24 EMORY L.J. 151 (1975).
57. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 415, 419 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
58. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
59. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
60. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
61. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
62. See Bernardi, The Exclusionary Rule. Is a Good Faith Standard Needed to Preserve a Liberal
Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 30 DE PAUL L. REV. 51 (1980); Burger, Who Will Watch the
Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1964); Note, The Erosion of the Exclusionary Rule Under the Burger
Court, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 363 (1980).
It has been argued that the exclusionary rule fails to deter because: 1) The deterrent effect
operates only when police officers know what specific rules apply; 2) The officer suffers no pen-
alty from his actions, often having no knowledge of the consequences; 3) It fails to reach non-
evidence-gathering activities. See Bernardi, supra; Burger, supra.
On the other hand, one commentator has asserted that the exclusionary rule is "indispensa-
ble to the development of law by lower courts. Suppression litigation provides the principal
occasion for appellate courts to clarify and refashion the broad principles of the fourth amend-
ment; it also permits development of coherent standards through case-by-case adjudication of
more fact-specific questions." Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 56, at 402.
63. An important consideration for examining the future of the exclusionary rule is the
effect Justice O'Connor will have on the Court. Although she has not voiced any intention to
overrule the exclusionary rule, during her confirmation hearings she remarked that "evidence
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ring the rule's application in those circumstances where the evidence at issue
was seized by an officer acting in the good faith belief that his conduct com-
ported with existing law and having reasonable grounds for this belief.
65
This "good faith" rule is based upon the assumption that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule is the deterrence of willful police misconduct. It is argued
that when the officer does not know his actions are illegal or he acts under
the mistaken assumption that they are legal, the exclusionary rule has no
deterrent effect. 66 Whether it is perceived as an exception to or modification
of the exclusionary rule, the "good faith" standard can be seen as protecting
individual rights only when deterrence of illegal police conduct can be effec-
tively achieved.
6 7
Although the United States Supreme Court has not yet adopted the
good faith standard suggested by Justice White,68 the Fifth Circuit, in United
States v. Williams,69 recently proclaimed its acceptance of this change in the
exclusionary rule. The Fifth Circuit modified the exclusionary rule to the
may not need to be excluded if standards were applied that take into account the good faith of
the police." Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 56, at 370 (quoting Confimnation Hearng of Sandra
Day O'Connor Before the Senate judiciary Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 143 (Sept. 9, 1981)).
Because at least four other justices have voiced their dissatisfaction with .the exclusionary
rule, the addition of Justice O'Connor to the Court may create a majority in favor of overruling
the exclusionary rule. See California v. Minjares, 443 U.S. 916 (1979) (Burger, CJ., Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (suggesting a
good faith exception); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-12 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in
part) (suggesting a sliding scale test based upon the flagrancy of the fourth amendment viola-
tion).
In defense of the good faith exception, several advantages have been mentioned. The good
faith standard would provide for judicial review of fourth amendment questions, would main-
tain judicial integrity and public respect, and would encourage the states' formation of alterna-
tive procedures of deterrence. Bernardi, supra note 62, at 10 1-03.
Critics of the good faith exception maintain that it would 1) curtail the fourth amendment
protections, Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 56; 2) would encourage law enforcement offi-
cials' ignorance of the law, Kaplan, supra note 53; and 3) would diminish whatever deterrent
impact the exclusionary rule may have; Ball, &ood Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The "Reason-
able" Exception to the Exclusionaty Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635 (1978).
64. 428 U.S. 456, 538 (1976) (White, J., dissenting); see Ball, supra note 63; Bernardi, supra
note 62; Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 56.
65. 428 U.S. at 538.
66. Id. at 539.
67. Another proposed modification of the exclusionary rule is based upon the concept of
substantial violations of an individual's fourth amendment rights. A motion to suppress would
be granted only if the trial court found the alleged violations to be gross, willful, and prejudicial
to the accused. In its determination of the substantiality of the violation, the trial court would
be required to take into account all circumstances concerning the proposed violations,
including:
(a) the extent of deviation from lawful conduct;
(b) the extent to which the violation was willful;
(c) the extent to which privacy was invaded;
(d) the extent to which exclusion will tend to prevent violations of this Code;
(e) whether, but for the violation, the things seized would have been discovered;
and
(f) the extent to which the violation prejudiced the moving party's ability to
support his motion, or to defend himself in the proceeding in which the things seized
are sought to be offered in evidence against him.
A.L.I., A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 150.3 (Proposed Official Draft,
1975).
68. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 456, 538 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
69. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
The arresting officer was found to have a reasonable belief, motivated by good faith, that he
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extent -that evidence is admissible "where it is discovered by officers in the
course of actions that are taken in good faith and in the reasonable though
mistaken belief that they are authorized."7 0 This holding, grounded on the
belief that that the exclusionary rule's purpose is to deter only willful or
flagrant violations of fourth amendment rights, may have a considerable im-
pact on the status of the exclusionary rule in other jurisdictions.
7 1
II. FACTS OF NEW YORK V BELTON
Patrolman Douglas Nicot, observed an automobile traveling at an ex-
cessive rate of speed as it passed his patrol car on a New York thruway.
72
After stopping the automobile, he asked the driver for his driver's license and
the automobile's registration. As the driver rolled down the window, Nicot
smelled burnt marijuana and noticed an envelope marked "Supergold" on
the floor of the car. Nicot directed the four occupants to get out of the auto-
mobile and then proceeded to "frisk" them. 73 Nicot had only one pair of
handcuffs which led him to believe it was necessary to split the four men into
separate areas of the thruway. They were positioned in such a manner as to
preclude physical touching, while still being in close proximity to the two-
door vehicle.
74
The officer retrieved the envelope marked "Supergold" from the car's
interior. This envelope contained traces of marijuana, leading to the arrest
of the four men for possession of marijuana. After the arrestees were read
their Miranda75 rights, they were individually searched for further contra-
had the authority to arrest. Although this officer did not have the authority to arrest, his good
faith belief was held to be sufficient to preclude the exercise of the exclusionary rule. Id. at 844.
For an in depth analysis of United States v. Williams, see Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra
note 56; Comment, Exclusionay Rule.- Good Faith Exception-The Fi/th Circutt's Approach in United
States v. Williams, 15 GEo. L. REV. 487 (1981); Note, United States v. Williams, 13 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 179 (1981).
70. 622 F.2d at 840.
71. Id. This "good faith" exception was codified by the Colorado Legislature:
(1) Evidence which is otherwise admissible in a criminal proceeding shall not be
suppressed by the trial court if the court determines that the evidence was seized by a
peace officer, as a result of a good faith mistake or of a technical violation ....
(2)(a) "Good faith mistake" means a reasonable judgmental error concerning
the existence of facts which if true would be sufficient to constitute probable cause
(b) "Technical violation" means a reasonable good faith reliance upon a statute
which is later ruled unconstitutional, a warrant which is later invalidated due to a
good faith mistake, or a court precedent which is later overruled.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-308 (1973), as amended by 1981 Colo. Sess. Laws, Ch. 188. The United
States Congress has also considered a codification of some form of the good faith exception. See
S. 101, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 751, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
72. Nicot approximated the rate of speed to be 75 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour
zone. Brief for Respondent, App. at 13, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
73. Probable cause to arrest exists when the officer feels it is more likely than not that a
crime has been committed and was committed by the person to be arrested. Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). In the Belton case, the odor of the marijuana supplied sufficient
probable cause for a valid arrest. Therefore, the validity of the arrest was not at issue.
74. Brief for Respondent, App. at 21.
75. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), which held that an individual who is taken
into custody or otherwise significantly deprived of his freedom should be afforded the following
procedural safeguards to protect the privilege against self-incrimination:
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent,
that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right
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band. A search of the interior of the two-door vehicle revealed approxi-
mately eight marijuana cigarettes as well as five outer garments in the back
seat. One of these garments was ajacket with zippered pockets belonging to
Roger Belton, one of the four arrestees. A search of the zippered pockets
revealed a rolled-up twenty-dollar bill containing suspected cocaine.
76
Roger Belton was subsequently indicted by the Ontario County Grand
Jury for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree.
The trial court denied his motion to suppress the cocaine as the fruit of an
illegal search. 77 The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court
unanimously affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress. 78 This lower
court found the search of Belton's jacket justified as a search incident to an
arrest. The New York court relied on the Chimel holding that incident to an
arrest, a search may be made of the area within the arrestee's immediate
control. 79 The court described this area as including effects of the arrestee
that are "ready to hand."' 0
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, hold-
ing that under the circumstances of the arrest the search was unreasonable.
8 '
The court asserted that once Belton had been removed from the vehicle and
placed under arrest, "a search of the interiors of a private receptacle safely
within the exclusive custody and control of the police may not be upheld as
incident to his [Belton's] arrest."'8 2 In spite of his arrest, Belton retained a
strong privacy interest in his jacket. Furthermore the court found that be-
cause Belton was effectively neutralized and his jacket was in the exclusive
custody and control of the officer, there was no possibility for the destruction
of evidence or access to weapons. Hence, the court concluded that a search
warrant was required prior to commencing a search of a jacket, under these
circumstances.
8 3
III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING
In a five-to-one-to-three decision,8 4 the United States Supreme Court
reversed the holding of the New York Court of Appeals. The Court stressed
the importance of the fourth amendment requirement that a search warrant
to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Id. at 478-79.
76. Brief for Respondent, App. at 21. The officer took the jacket from the back seat of the
arrestees' car into the patrol car. Id. at 50, 55.
77. People v. Belton, 68 A.D.2d 198, 416 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1979). Belton preserved his claim
that the warrantless search of his jacket violated his fourth amendment rights.
78. 68 A.D.2d at 200, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 925.
79. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
80. 68 A.D.2d at 200, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 924 (citing People v. Weintraub, 35 N.Y.2d 351,
354, 361 N.Y.S.2d 897, 900, 320 N.E.2d 636, 638 (1974)).
81. People v. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447, 429 N.Y.S.2d 574, 407 N.E.2d 420 (1980).
82. Id. at 453, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 577, 407 N.E.2d at 423.
83. Id.
84. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). Justice Stewart wrote the opinion of the
Court in which Chief Justice Burger, Justices Blackmun and Powell joined. Justice Rehnquist
filed a separate opinion joining in the opinion of the Court. Justice Stevens filed a separate
opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion in which Jus-
tice Marshall joined. Justice White filed a separate dissent in which Justice Marshall joined.
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be obtained prior to the initiation of a search. 85 The Court noted that exi-
gent circumstances could render the search warrant requirement unneces-
sary.86 However, the Court stated that the scope of a search must be strictly
limited by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.
8 7
The majority, after considering the difficulty of applying Cht'mel,88 rec-
ognized the need for a "bright line" rule89 to guide police officers in their
daily activities.90 The Court held that the interior of the automobile is ar-
guably part of the area within the immediate control of the arrestee, when
the arrestee has been a recent occupant, and that the "articles inside the
relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of the automobile
are in fact generally, if not inevitably, within 'the area into which an arrestee
might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary item.' "91 As a result,
the majority concluded that when a policeman has effectuated a valid "cus-
todial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporane-
ous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that
automobile." 92 Consequently, the Court held that any containers within the
interior of a vehicle may also be searched when a recent occupant is the
subject of a lawful arrest.
93
While extending the scope of the search to containers, the majority spe-
cifically limited the authority to search only the interior of the automobile.
94
Justice Stewart noted that a lawful custodial arrest supersedes any privacy
interest the arrestee may have in any container within the interior of the
automobile. 95 However, a search extending beyond the interior of the auto-
85. Id. at 457.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 458. Justice Stewart suggested that the Chimel principle is difficult to apply. The
police, with limited expertise and time to reflect on social and law enforcement considerations,
require a single, familiar standard. Id See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
89. The majority called for the adoption of a single familiar standard; however, it was the
dissent that coined the expression "bright line" rule. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority,
noted that the protections of the fourth and fourteenth amendments "can only be realized if the
police are acting under a set of rules, which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a
correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest
of law enforcement." 453 U.S. at 458 (quoting LaFave, "Case by Case Adjudication"versus "Stan-
dardzediProcedures'" The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 127, 142).
90. 453 U.S. at 458. Justice Stewart appeared to be persuaded by several commentators.
Id. See generally LaFave, supra note 89. LaFave stressed that the fourth amendment's purpose is
to regulate the police. Theses standards of regulation should be "expressed in terms that are
readily applicable by police in the context of the law enforcement activities .... " Id. at 141.
See also Amsterdam, supra note 18; Carrington, supra note 41; Dworkin, supra note 18; LaFave,
Improving Pohe Performance Through the Exclusiona y Rule-Part II" Defining the Norms and Training
the Polie, 30 Mo. L. REV. 566 (1965).
91. 453 U.S. at 460.
92. Id.
93. "If the passenger compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so also will containers in
it be within his reach." Id. However broad this may seem, the Court attempted to limit its
holding to the circumstances involved in Belton. The Court stated in a footnote that "[olur
holding today does no more than determine the meaning of Chime/'s principles in this particular
and problematic context. It in no way alters the fundamental principles established in the
Chimel case regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests." Id. at n.3.
94. Id. at 460-61 n.4. Luggage, boxes, clothing, and other receptacles, as well as the open
or closed glove compartment, are now legitimate objects of a warrantless search of an automo-
bile's interior, incident to the arrest of a recent occupant. Id.
95. 453 U.S. at 461. The character of the container is irrelevant. No requirement of prob-
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mobile would seemingly violate an individual's right against unreasonable
searches under the fourth amendment warrant requirement.
96
Justice Brennan's dissent 97 agreed with the majority's use of the search-
incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement, 98 however, he had
difficulty accepting the majority's expansion of the Chinel proposition. In
Justice Brennan's opinion, the majority's desire to formulate a police guide-
line ignored the underlying policy rationales originally justifying the search-
incident-to-arrest exception. He assessed the Ch'mel standard as narrowly
tailored to address the concerns of "the safety of the arresting officer and the
preservation of easily concealed or destructible evidence." 99 His analysis of
Chimel placed a "temporal and a spatial limitation on searches incident to
arrest."'0 Justice Brennan concluded his dissent by asserting that the ma-
jority "failed to offer any principles to guide the police and the courts in
their application of the new rule to nonroutine situations."10 1
IV. ANALYSIS OF NEW YORK V BEL TON
A. Analytt'cal Weaknesses of the Behon Decision
New York v. Be/ton represents a significant expansion of the scope of a
search incident to an arrest, when the locus of the arrest is an automobile.
The Court utilized the Ch'mel standard 10 2 in evaluating the search of Bel-
ton's jacket.'0 3 Where Chime served as a limitation on the arresting officer's
able cause is required by the Court. "A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is
a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search inci-
dent to the arrest requires no additional justification." Id. (quoting United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)).
96. 453 U.S. at 460-61 n.4. The Court dismissed the New York Court of Appeals' conclu-
sion that the jacket was in the exclusive control of the police. But see Chadwick v. United States,
433 U.S. 1 (1977). This case presented issues distinguishable from Belton. See supra note 44.
97. 453 U.S. at 463.
98. Id. at 466.
99. Id. at 465 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's major criticism rested with the
Court's extension of authority to search when the justifications that create this authority are
absent. His analysis assumed that the arrestees, while in custody, had no opportunity to reach
for evidence or a weapon. This may be a dubious assumption when the facts associated with the
instant case are considered. In Belton, there were four suspects and one arresting officer who
possessed only one set of handcuffs.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 470-71 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan suggested that the majority
failed to address some of the following issues: How long after the arrest must the search be
conducted? What is included in "interior?" Does the holding in Be/ton apply only to
automobiles? Does it matter whether the police established probable cause to arrest before or
after the suspect left his car? Does the Belton rule apply to any container even if it could not
hold a weapon or evidence of a crime? Id. at 470.
102. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See supra text accompanying note 38.
103. 453 U.S. 453passim (1981). The automobile exception could have been the basis for
evaluating the Be/ton search. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. As Justice Stevens noted
in his dissenting opinion in a case decided the same day as Be/ton, "[I]nstead of relying on the
automobile exception to uphold the search of respondent's [Belton's] jacket pocket, the Court
takes an extraordinary dangerous detour to reach the same result by adopting an admittedly
new rationale applicable to every 'lawful custodial arrest' of the occupant of an automobile."
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 449-50 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In a plurality opin-
ion, the Robbbru Court held unconstitutional the opening of opaque packages found by the po-
lice in the recessed luggage compartment of the suspect's car. Robbins, unlike Be/ton, involved a
warrantless search pursuant to the automobile exception. In light of the holding in Robbins, it is
doubtful whether the Be/ton search would have been upheld if the Court had decided the case
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authority to search incident to a lawful arrest, the Be/ton holding expands the
scope of these searches to pre-Chi'nel levels.' 0 4 While Belton purports to be an
application of Ch'mel to its specific facts t0 5 the effect of its holding serves as
justification for a potentially unlimited search subsequent to a lawful
arrest. 106
The majority in Be/ton substantially departed from the Chimhel holding
by declaring that an open or closed container within the interior of an auto-
mobile may be lawfully searched, "since the justification for the search is not
that the arrestee has no privacy interest in the container, but that the lawful
custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee
may have."' 1 7 Such a justification ignores prior foundations upon which a
search incident to an arrest was based-the need to protect police officers
and to prevent the destruction of evidence.' 08 By ignoring the foundations
which limited the scope of a search incident to arrest, it is conceivable that
the Be/ton principle of subordinating privacy interests once a lawful arrest
has been effected will be applied to factual situations beyond the context of
the automobile. 10 9
While there may exist a need for a "bright line" rule in the often un-
clear area of searches incident to arrest," t0 the Court failed to limit its deci-
sion in a manner which would serve to protect an individuals' privacy
interests in containers placed in an automobile."' The Court allows a
search incident to arrest to become a complete justification for a search of
the entire interior of an automobile. The Court could have required the
police officers to have probable cause to search a container found during the
lawful search of the automobile. "1 2 This probable cause requirement would
serve the interests of the law enforcement officials, for if articulable facts
substantiating that the necessity of a search existed, thereby establishing
probable cause, officers could search the container. t 13 This probable cause
requirement could therefore serve as a necessary compromise between law
enforcement duties and privacy interests of the individual.
under the automobile exception. But see United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982) and in/a,
notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
104. 453 U.S. at 460. See supra note 33.
105. Id. n.3.
106. Id. at 468 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See zhf/a text accompanying note 114.
107. Id. at 461. This proposition was specifically rejected by the Court in Chirmel. 395 U.S.
at 766 n. 12. The majority in Belton dispensed with precedents by not classifying Roger Belton's
zippered pocket as a closed container in which there was a reasonable expectation of privacy.
108. 395 U.S. at 763.
109. State v. Gomez, 632 P.2d 586 (Colo. 1981). The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the
search of a motel room as incident to arrest, through its application of the Chimel principles to
the facts, while citing Belton.
110. See supra note 90.
111. See 453 U.S. at 460-61 n.4. The Court seemed to ignore that "[tihe scope of [a] search
must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permis-
sible." Id. at 2862 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969), where definite limitations were placed upon the warrantless searches).
112. One commentator has suggested this method to protect fourth amendment interests.
See Scope of Searches, supra note 34.
113. See generally Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 (1980) (upheld search and seizure of
evidence in automobile where police officer had probable cause to arrest the occupants and to
seize the incriminating items without a warrant).
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The Court's decision in Belton seems to erase the search warrant require-
ment while spatially expanding the scope of the authority to search.' 14 A
likely result of Belton is that once a lawful arrest is effected, a warrantless
search of an automobile will only rarely be held unconstitutional. The
search incident to the arrest could uncover evidence which would. give rise to
probable cause to search the remainder of the automobile under the automo-
bile exception to the search warrant requirement." 5  As previously dis-
cussed, Belton could be more appropriately limited and the competing
interests balanced by requiring that police officers establish probable cause
before searching containers within the interior of an automobile. However,
in its present form, Belton could lead to the establishment of probable cause
to search containers beyond the interior of an automobile. This leaves ques-
tions as to what would stop law enforcement officials from conducting a gen-
eral exploratory search.
Belton's expansion of the scope of a search incident to arrest as previ-
ously formulated under Chime could result in significant intrusions upon in-
dividual privacy interests. Where the Warren Court liberalized the
individual's fourth amendment protections, Belton is further evidence of the
Burger Court's refusal to expand and in some instances, willingness to limit,
the constitutional protections of the individual.
B. Impact of the Court's Use of Bright Line Rules
An in depth study of the last fifty years of fourth amendment case law is
not necessary to conclude that the entire area is permeated with confusion
and inconsistent decisions. Conflicting and differing applications of fourth
amendment principles to the same or similar factual patterns is a key expla-
nation for this confusion, as evidenced by the disparate holdings in Belton,
Robbins v. California, 1 16 and United States v. Ross. 1 7 The Court's failure to
114. 453 U.S. at 460.
115. Under the automobile exception, the enlarged search would be considered constitu-
tionally permitted. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Under Ross, as it has expanded the
automobile exception, the officers only need probable cause to believe the object of the search
will be found in the container. Thus, an individual lawfully stopped on the highway, may have
significantly limited privacy interests. See infra note 117.
116. 453 U.S. 420 (1981). Robbins was stopped for erratic driving. After discovering that
the vehicle's registration was not in his wallet, he opened the door, whereupon the officers
smelled marijuana. Id. at 422. After Robbins was patted down, there was a search of the
passenger compartment which revealed a vial containing liquid as well as a package of mari-
juana. Robbins was placed in the patrol car while the officers searched the recessed luggage
compartment of the station wagon. The fruits of this search included a tote bag and two green
opaque packages. The packages were opened, revealing 15 pounds of marijuana. Robbins'
motions to suppress were denied by the trial court and he was convicted. Id.
Robbins v. Caiforna presented the issue of whether closed containers found during a lawful,
warrantless search, authorized under the automobile exception, may themselves be searched in
the absence of a warrant. Under Robbins, a closed container found during the lawful search of
an automobile, pursuant to the automobile exception, could not be opened without the author-
ity of a search warrant. The plurality opinion, written by Justice Stewart, held that a "closed
piece of luggage found in a lawfully searched car is constitutionally protected to the same extent
as are closed pieces of luggage found anywhere else." .453 U.S. at 425. The exact nature of the
container was considered unimportant as long as the container was closed, opaque, and mani-
festing an expectation of privacy. The court saw no need to distinguish between the relative
privacy interests in "personal" as opposed to "impersonal" effects. 453 U.S. at 426. However,
any container that clearly announced its contents was considered to be in plain view and there-
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apply a similar analysis to these cases, adds to the existing confusion in this
area of the law. I"
In Ross, the United States Supreme Court held that the scope of a war-
rantless search conducted under the authority of the automobile exception,
is to be "no narrower-and no broader-than the scope of a search author-
ized by a warrant supported by probable cause.' 19 The Court went on to
say that the scope of the search of an automobile under this exception is not
dependent upon the nature of the container that is suspected to be the locus
of the contraband. The only limit to this broad authority to search is found
in the requirement of probable cause to believe the container is the locus of
the object of the search'1
20
Belton expands the scope of a search incident to arrest at the expense of
certain privacy interests. Similarly, Ross expands the scope of the automo-
bile exception to include the search of the entire automobile and any con-
tents that may conceal the object of the search. Where Robbins recognized
the need to protect privacy interests during a search conducted pursuant to
the automobile exception, Belton and Ross subordinate these individual pri-
vacy interests when a search is conducted under the search incident to arrest
exception and the automobile exception, respectively.
12
The Court's use of "bright line" rules represents a significant departure
from the previous approach of case-by-case determinations.' 2 2 The case-by-
case approach has contributed to the confusion permeating fourth amend-
ment law, as well as to the confusion of law enforcement officials who have
fore manifesting no reasonable expectation of privacy, allowing for a search without a warrant.
Id
Where Belton expanded the scope of a search incident to arrest at the expense of certain
privacy interests, the Court in Robbtns refused to expand the automobile exception to include
the warrantless search of closed containers found in an automobile. Robbins recognized the need
to protect privacy interests during a search conducted pursuant to the automobile exception,
whereas Belton subordinated these privacy interests in a search conducted after a lawful arrest.
117. 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982). Ross was stopped based upon an informant's tip that he was
selling narcotics. The police officer discovered a bullet on the front seat of the car, and a pistol
in the glove compartment. After arresting Ross, one of the officers opened the trunk of the
automobile and discovered a closed paper bag, later found to contain heroin. A thorough
search of the car at the police station revealed a zippered leather pouch containing $3,200. The
District Court denied Ross' motion to suppress this evidence and he was convicted of possession
of heroin with intent to distribute. Id. at 2160.
118. Rather than formulate a single "bright line" rule applicable to the factual situations in
both cases, the Court handed down "bright line" rules that may be applied in either situation.
In Robbins it was not asserted that the search was the product of a search incident to arrest, as in
Briton. The Court will only decide the issues put forward by the parties. 453 at 452 n. 15 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). Therefore, what appears as opposite holdings is the product of two differ-
ent theories of fourth amendment law applied to similar factual situation. These two decisions
evidence the confusion that is widespread in the fourth amendment decisions. "Viewing similar
facts from entirely different perspectives need not lead to identical results." Id. at 430 (Powell,
J., concurring).
119. 102 S. Ct. at 2172.
120. Id.
121. The precedential weight of Robbins is questionable in light of Ross. The majority opin-
ion in Ross recognizing that the holding was inconsistent with Robbins, failed to specifically
overrule Robbins. Ross only rejected Robbins. Id. at 2172. In light of Ross' "bright line" rule, it
appears that while not specifically overruling Robbins, Ross has emasculated Robbins almost to-
tally. "[Tihe Court unambiguously overrules 'the disposition of Robbins' ... though it gingerly
avoids stating that it is overruling the case itself." Id. at 2181 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
122. St generally LaFave, supra note 89 at 142.
1982]
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been forced to second-guess how a court will subsequently analyze a particu-
lar fact situation.1 23 However, the use of "bright line" rules presents certain
difficulties.
The "bright line" rules set forth broad principles of law that can be
applied to all factual circumstances resulting in straightforward guidance for
both law enforcement officials and courts. 1 24 "Bright line" rules encourage
consistency among decisions, and do not require subjective decisions by the
officer in the field. However, it is conceivable that this type of mechanical
application may result in infringement upon individual privacy interests.
The courts are only required to assess whether the narrow facts of the case at
hand fit under the broad "bright line" rule without investigating facts that
could lead to an opposite result. These types of rules may contribute further
to the current confusion in the fourth amendment law. When a court may
apply one of several constitutional tests to similar factual circumstances
when assessing the validity of a search, and each is generally associated with
a predetermined result, confusion is inevitable. In this context, the law en-
forcement officer is also forced to guess which test the Court will apply.'
2 5
Although the case-by-case approach leads to a degree of confusion, an
important aspect of this type of judicial determination lies in its flexibility.
The fact that fourth amendment cases present an infinite variety of factual
circumstances suggests the necessity of limiting holdings to the specific facts
of the case at hand. The case-by-case approach best serves this desired re-
sult. For example, if narrowed only to apply to the facts of the case, the
holding could become more palatable to fourth amendment interests than a
broad "bright line" rule. Numerous situations are easily imagined where
Belton's holding could become overly oppressive toward fourth amendment
privacy rights. 126
The case-by-case approach, coupled with the good faith modification of
the exclusionary rule,' 27 could result in greater protection of fourth amend-
ment rights. A case-by-case analysis under this proposed test would take into
account the various factual circumstances that may arise. The use of the
good faith standard would give law enforcement officials a better idea of
whether their conduct will subsequently be declared illegal. While the pri-
vacy interests of the individual would receive greater protection, the di-
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2172; New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460;
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. at 429.
125. This situation is partially rectified by the "bright line" rule of Ross. Under Belton and
Ross, it is conceivable that the permissible scope of a search under either exception would ex-
tend to the interior and any containers found therein. However whether a search of containers
found within the trunk, is subsequently upheld as legal, will depend totally upon the asserted
justification for the warrantless search. For example, if the search of Ross' trunk and the con-
tainers found there had been argued as a search incident to arrest, under Belton, the search
would have been declared illegal. See State v. Cooper, 636 P.2d 126 (Ariz. App. 1981). The
search of a closed box found on the back seat of an automobile was held invalid under the
automobile exception, in light of the holding in Robbins v. California. The search-incident-to-
arrest exception was not raised. Under this exception, as applied in New York v. Belton, it is
probable that the Cooper court would have upheld the search.
126. The same comment applies with equal force to the Ross decision. What if in Belton,
there were an equal number of arrestees to police officers or handcuffs?
127. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
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lemma of balancing these competing interests might be solved.1 28
C. Impact of Belton on Searches Incident to Arrests in Automobiles
The Belton decision has been applied in several lower court decisions.
Fdr example, in Government of the Virgin Islands v. Rasool,1 29 the Third Circuit
denied a motion to suppress a revolver found in a paper grocery bag located
on the back seat of an automobile. The Court of Appeals upheld the search
as incident to arrest. Finding parallels between Belton and the questioned
search, the Rasool court held that:
[A]ny container, regardless of its opacity, or whether it is sealed,
may be searched if it is found in the interior of the passenger com-
partment of a vehicle after a lawful arrest has been effected. If,
however, the container is not found in the interior or passenger
compartment of the vehicle, but . . . in the trunk. . . then it may
not be opened without a search warrant, unless by its very appear-
ance or distinctive configuration or otherwise, its contents are obvi-
ous to the observer.
130
A recent Utah Supreme Court case, In re KKC.,13 1 demonstrates that
Belton's "bright line" rule does not necessarily clarify the ambiguities of
fourth amendment law, especially with respect to automobiles. In this case,
an officer approached a parked truck with the intention of warning the occu-
pants not to litter. Several bottles of beer and drug paraphernalia were in
plain view. The officer ordered the two occupants out of the vehicle. He
then searched the cab and the bed of the truck. As a result of this search, the
officer found more beer and two bags of marijuana, one of which was in a
cassette tape case.' 32 In upholding the denial of the motion to suppress, the
court found the search to be lawful as an incident to arrest. The court as-
sessed the validity of the search before addressing the issue of the legality of
the arrest.1 33 The record was unclear as to when the arrest occurred; never-
theless, the court found probable cause for the search under the automobile
exception. The Utah court upheld the general search by relying on Belton.
However, the court decided the search of the tape case was not invalid, by
using a Robbins analysis.
134
In People v. Hen y, 135 the Colorado Supreme Court applied Belton, in
denying a motion to suppress a revolver seized incident to an arrest of the
occupants of an automobile. The search commenced after the suspects were
128. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
129. 657 F.2d 582 (3d Cir. 1981).
130. Id. at 590. The case exemplifies an attempt at reconciling the decisions in Belton and
Robbins.
131. 636 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1981).
132. Id. at 1045.
133. Id. at 1046.
134. Id. The misapplication of two conflicting lines of analysis points to the possibility that
other courts will also misinterpret Be/ton and Robbbnu.
But see State v. Croft, 635 P.2d 972 (Kan. App. 1981), which exemplifies the ease with
which Belton can be applied. The defendant was arrested for not having a driver's license in his
possession. Subsequent to this arrest, the officer found a radio scanner under the front floor
mat. The Kansas court found that under Belton, the search was proper. Id. at 974.
135. 631 P.2d 1122 (Colo. 1981). This search, conducted at night with a flashlight, was
pursuant to a lawful arrest of the occupants of the automobile.
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handcuffed and placed in a police vehicle. The Colorado Supreme Court
found that the observation of the revolver, in plain view on the floor, oc-
curred moments after the defendant was in custody and still at the scene of
arrest. The court held that Belton mandated denial of the motion to
suppress. 136
The Henry decision exemplifies difficulties that will arise in the applica-
tion of Belton to varying factual circumstances. Heny differed significantly
from Be/ton. The handcuffed arrestees were in the police car, which may
indicate that the principal justifications for a search incident to arrest were
absent. However, the court found no difficulty applying Belton, upholding
this questionable search incident to arrest.
1 37
CONCLUSION
The net effect of the Supreme Court's decision in New York v. Belton is its
emasculation of Ch'mel to the extent that the constitutional definition of the
area within the arrestee's immediate control is expanded. Belton approves
warrantless searches of the interior of an automobile, including any locked or
unlocked containers found within this area, when an arrestee is a recent oc-
cupant. This holding gives arresting officers unlimited authority to search
the interior of an automobile incident to a lawful arrest.
Belton's "bright line" rule will serve as a necessary guideline for law en-
forcement officials while legitimizing intrusions into once protected privacy
interests. The development of this "bright line" rule of constitutional analy-
sis may prove to perpetuate the confusion permeating the fourth amend-
ment, while simultaneously tipping the scales to the advantage of law
enforcement.' 38 The good faith modification to the exclusionary rule ap-
plied concurrently with case-by-case judicial determinations could serve as a
viable alternative to the further use of "bright line" rules. The flexibility of
this method of analysis will serve not only the interests of law enforcement
officials, but also the privacy interests of the individual. This would result in
the balancing of the scales between the two competing interests.
Deborah L. Fres
136. Id. at 1125. In his dissenting opinion in Belton, Justice Brennan hinted at the possibil-
ity of future cases construing Beiton in this manner. "[T]he result would presumably be the
same even if Officer Nicot had handcuffed Belton and his companions in the patrol car before
placing them under arrest and even if his search had extended to locked luggage or other inac-
cessible containers located in the back seat of the car." 453 U.S. at 468 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
137. Id. at 1125. Other recent cases applying Belton include United States v. Cleary, 656
F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Rivera, 654 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1981); People v.
Gomez, 632 P.2d 586 (Colo. 1981).
138. The decision in Ross is further evidence of the curtailment of individual privacy rights
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